Affiliated Centers

Reshaping City Politics? Asian Voters’ Demands for Change in San Francisco and Vancouver

Presented by the Citrin Center for Public Opinion Research

In 2022, Asian voters shocked the political establishment in San Francisco and Vancouver. In Vancouver, frustrated voters voted out the City’s Mayor and City Council to elect the first Canadian-Chinese mayor Ken Sim and deliver his party a majority on the City Council. In San Francisco, voters supported two historic recalls of the City’s District Attorney Chesa Boudin and three members of its Board of Education. In both cities, Asian voters were a key constituency in support of these political earthquakes. What led to these historic events, and are they the start of a trend?

Presented by UC Berkeley’s Citrin Center for Public Opinion Research, this panel featured insiders from both cities, including Ken Sim’s campaign manager, a leader from Vancouver’s Canadian-Chinese community, a leader in the San Francisco school board recall campaign who was appointed to the school board herself, and scholar Neil Malhotra. The panel was moderated by Citrin Center-affiliated faculty David Broockman.

Speakers

Kareem Allam, Former Campaign Director, Ken Sim for Mayor and Partner, Fairview Strategy
Ann Hsu, Former San Francisco School Board Commissioner and Founder & Head of School, Bert Hsu Academy
Lorraine Lowe 劉黛明, Executive Director, Dr. Sun Yat-Sen Classical Chinese Garden
Neil Malhotra, Edith M. Cornell Professor of Political Economy, Stanford GSB
David Broockman, Moderator Associate Professor, UC Berkeley Travers Department of Political Science

Learn more about the Citrin Center: https://citrincenter.berkeley.edu.

Affiliated Centers

John McWhorter: Pitfalls in the Policing of Language

Presented by the Citrin Center for Public Opinion Research

Recorded on April 7, 2023, this video features a lecture by Professor John McWhorter, associate professor in the Slavic Department at Columbia University. This lecture was presented by the UC Berkeley Citrin Center for Public Opinion Research.

Professor McWhorter earned his B.A. from Rutgers, his M.A. from New York University, and his Ph.D. in linguistics from Stanford. Professor McWhorter has taught the seminar “Language in America,” a study of American linguistic history that considers Native American languages, immigrant languages, creole languages, American Sign Language, Black English and other speech varieties– their development, interactions, and preservation. He has also taught the seminar “Language Contact,” which focuses specifically on the mixture of language in North America, and studies the development of creoles, pidgins, koines, “vehicular” languages, and nonstandard dialects. Both seminars consider perceived legitimacy of languages, and the standing of language mixtures in media and education.

Professor McWhorter also teaches various other courses for the Linguistics Program and Music Humanities for the Core Curriculum program.

Professor McWhorter is an author of more than twenty books including The Power of Babel: A Natural History of Language, Losing the Race: Self Sabotage in Black America and Our Magnificent Bastard Tongue: The Untold History of English. In 2016 he published Words on the Move: Why English Won’t – and Can’t – Sit Still (Like, Literally), while in 2021 he published Nine Nasty Words and Woke Racism. He also writes a weekly column for The New York Times and hosts the language podcast Lexicon Valley.

Lecture

Training Bourgeois Selves: Magnus Hirschfeld and the Subsumption of Pederasty

Recorded on February 22, 2023, this video features a lecture by Professor Kadji Amin, Associate Professor of Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies at Emory University.

In this talk, “Training Bourgeois Selves: Magnus Hirschfeld and the Subsumption of Pederasty,” Amin discusses a key architect of Modern Sexuality, the German Jewish homosexual sexologist Magnus Hirschfeld. Amin argues that Hirschfeld’s work allows us to track the process by which the bourgeois Western notion of sexuality as a form of innate selfhood subsumed sex as a social and spatial practice. By turning to Hirschfeld’s work, Amin’s talk argues that the fundamental problem of queer of color critique — that of how sexuality conceals and transacts more salient hierarchies of power — was born with the epistemological invention of sexuality.

The event was co-sponsored by Social Science Matrix and the UC Berkeley Department of French. Additional support was provided by the Department of Ethnic Studies and the Center for the Study of Sexual Culture. The event was organized and moderated by Professor Salar Mameni, a Matrix Faculty Fellow.

Listen to this talk as a podcast below, or Google Podcasts or Apple Podcasts.

Transcript

[MUSIC PLAYING]

[SALAR MAMENI] Good afternoon, everyone. Hi. My name is Salar Mameni. I’m assistant professor in the Department of Ethnic Studies. And I’m also a faculty fellow here at the Matrix for this year.

So this talk is first of a series of talks in transgender studies that are being hosted here at the Matrix. I’m very excited to have Professor Kadji Amin here with us today. I have a few people to thank before I introduce Professor Amin.

So the event today is co-sponsored by the Department of French. I’d like to thank Professor Michael Luisi for organizing this event with me. Other co-sponsors are the Department of Ethnic Studies and the Center for the Study of Sexual Cultures. I’d also like to acknowledge everyone here at Matrix who have made this event possible, in particular Eva Seto, Julia Sizek, and Marion Fourcade.

Professor Amin is associate professor in Women’s Gender and Sexuality Studies at Emory University and the author of Disturbing Attachments– Genet, Modern Pederasty, and Queer History. The book was published with Duke University Press in 2017 and won an honorable mention for Best Book in LGBT Studies from the GL/Q Caucus of the MLA. For those of you who have not read Disturbing Attachments, it is a study of Jean Genet’s coalitional politics with the Black Panthers and Palestinians foregrounding outdated modes of attachment, including pederasty, racial fetishism, nostalgia for prison, and fantasies of queer terrorism.

Professor Amin is currently at work on a second book project tentatively titled Transmaterialism Without Gender Identity. He’s also the author of many articles in a number of journals, including TSQ, GLQ, Social Text, differences, and Representations. He’s the co-editor with Amber Jamilla Musser and Roy Perez of a special issue of ASAP on “Queer Form.” He also serves on the editorial board for TSQ and Gender and Women’s Studies and is the state of the field reviewer for GLQ.

His talk today is titled Training Bourgeois Selves– Magnus Hirschfeld and the Subsumption of Pederasty. Please join me in welcoming Professor Kadji Amin.

[KADJI AMIN] So first of all, thank you, Salar, and also Michael Luisi for having me over here. It’s really great to be at Berkeley in person. I was here virtually about a year ago, I think. And it’s wonderful to see so many familiar faces as well as a lot of new ones.

So I’m presenting today some new work that is in process. And I’ve condensed quite a bit into this paper. So I hope that you’ll just hold on and go along for the ride.

This talk argues that the fundamental problem of queer of color critique, that of how sexuality conceals and transacts more salient hierarchies of power was born with the epistemological invention of sexuality. I turned to a key architect of modern sexuality, German-Jewish Homosexual Sexologist Magnus Hirschfeld to track the process by which the bourgeois Western notion of sexuality as a form of innate selfhood subsumed sex as a social and spatial practice. I then turn to the sexological debate over the mujerados of the Pueblo Indians to consider how Hirschfeld’s project of subsuming non-Western and Indigenous cultural practices continues today.

But before I can continue, let me explain my use of the Marxist term “subsumption.” For Karl Marx, as capitalism expands its geography, it subsumes precapitalist labor forms such as family handicraft work and small-scale peasant farming, as well as, I would add, forms of unfree labor that become racialized under capitalism, such as slavery and indenture. Subsumption explains the heterogeneous nature of capitalism, the fact that capitalism is defined not by the universalization of wage labor but by the incorporation and sometimes transformation of precapitalist labor forms under the hegemony of capitalist accumulation.

Subsumption, therefore, presents itself as a useful term for queer of color critique, which, in Rod Ferguson’s materialist lineage has always been concerned with capitalism’s racialization of labor and of the social forms that sustain it. In The Specter of Materialism, which was just now published in 2023, Petrus Liu extends subsumption from a description of the labor and production process to an index of the social kinship, racial, and sexual arrangements that sustain these production processes.

One might say, for instance, that in the late 18th through the 20th century, the sexual arrangements that sustained bourgeois hegemony in Europe subsumed those that sustained plantation slavery, migrant indentured laborers, and Indigenous agriculture in the Americas. This is how the sexual preoccupations of the bourgeoisie during this time with eugenic marriage, the presexual and sexually vulnerable child, and those perversions of the sexual drive that threatened bourgeois marriage and property relations were able to become hegemonic, definitive of sexuality itself despite their distance from the then equally significant sexual worlds of the plantation, the prison, the streets, and the migrant laborer.

Also significant to queer of color critique is the fact that subsumption bifurcates the temporalities that coexist under capitalist hegemony. Under bourgeois sexual hegemony, the life worlds of the plantation, the prison, the streets, and the migrant laborer would be consistently deemed backward and barbaric by the reformist observers. Subsumption might, therefore, be used as an analytic of sexually heterogeneous geographies as Liu demonstrates and as one of sexually and temporally heterogenous race and class social forms.

If with regards to labor processes, subsumption means being made disposable, appearing irrelevant to the development of capitalism as Liu writes. With regards to sex, subsumption means being made irrelevant to the epistemology of sexuality itself. This is why the monstrous intimacy is, to quote Cristina Sharpe, “of the plantation the apparent anachronisms,” to quote Reg Kunzel, “of prison sex,” and the “bachelor subculture,” to quote George Chauncey, of the streets of 19th and 20th century US port cities as well as the intimate dependencies, to quote Nayan Shah, “of migrant laborers” have been so persistently difficult to square with the hegemonic epistemology of sexuality as a form of selfhood.

What all of these sexual life worlds have in common is that in them, sexuality was not primarily a form of selfhood but rather a social and spatial practice. Sex was social for it expressed properly social relations of domination, violence, solidarity, mentorship, pedagogy, and protection. Sex was spatial for it took place due to spatial concentration, incarceration, isolation, and anonymity as well as the masculinization and sexualization of urban public space.

What’s more, populations who were confined to or who circulated predominantly within these life worlds likely experienced and understood sex as social and spatial rather than as an expression of selfhood. This talk recasts the story of so-called modern sexuality as that of the subsumption of social and spatial forms of sex by a bourgeois epistemology of sexual selfhood. But what was so bourgeois about sexual selfhood? Or to ask a better question, why did sexual selfhood prove a significant thesis in the making of what Christopher Chitty has called bourgeois hegemony.

Michel Foucault provides the canonical answer. Writing of sexuality first being used to enhance and distinguish the value of the bourgeois body and later being extended in a more disciplinary fashion to the European working classes. However, as Greta LaFleur and Christopher Chitty have pointed out, sexuality first emerged in the late 18th century as an object of statistics through efforts to control prostitution, the spread of venereal disease, and sites of urban interracial and cross-class sex.

In Foucault’s terminology then, sexuality first emerged in efforts to control racialized, class, and gendered populations, not through the techniques of introspective discipline that would later be trained on bourgeois bodies themselves. To rephrase this in the terms of this talk, sexuality was first targeted in its social and spatial manifestations, not in the selves later thought to anchor it.

It was not until the late 19th century that sexologists at last began to theorize sexuality in the terms that most interest Foucault as what anchors and individuals the self while opening it to the normalizing technologies of outside experts, including psychoanalysts and sexologists. This shift, however, was predicated on an even more significant prior shift, that by which the bourgeois men learn to understand themselves as possessing unified interior selfhoods in the first place.

The sexological and psychoanalytic conception of sexuality as the core motivating secret of the individual self was accessory to the production of bourgeois interiority. A production historians have dated to the late 18th century in Western Europe and the US, why did a new conception of interior selfhood not only emerge at this time but also become so hegemonic as to render prior understandings of selfhood virtually unintelligible within a few short decades?

Post-revolutionary France offers the clearest example of both the political utility of this concept of selfhood and the speed with which it was– with which it subsumed prior conceptions of the self. Historian Jan Goldstein explains how a new model of selfhood as interior, unified, and agential emerged in post-revolutionary France and rapidly attained hegemony, eclipsing 18th century models of selfhood in the process. One such 18th century model of selfhood was that of the corporate self.

During the demonstrants of the Parlement of Paris against the 1776 royal edict abolishing guilds and trade corporations, the parlement advanced the argument that the integrity of the self was sustained by membership in a corporation. In their protest, the Paris glovemakers asserted that, quote, “each person, particulier, has an existence only through the corporate body or corps to which he is attached.” The dominant fear at the time was that selves without corporations would wander off in total enemy without moral norms or standards of craftsmanship, prey to their impressionable imaginations.

Materially, this sphere was the product of a shift to a laissez-faire economy in which individual artisans would sell their wares to strangers without a mediating corporate body to guarantee quality and trustworthiness. Soon, this economic shift would be hitched to a revolutionary overturning of the old regime and a set of experiments in Democratic governance.

Once all property-holding male citizens became eligible to vote, a means was needed for them to internalize forms of discipline that under the monarchy had been guaranteed by external bodies and hierarchical superiors. This means would be a new philosophy of selfhood as innate, internal, authentic, and unified. A self possessed of all of these qualities would be a sturdy unit of governance in a newly atomized laissez-faire Republican France.

In France, the philosopher who popularized this model of selfhood was Victor Cousin, a professor at the École Normale Superieure and the Paris Faculty of Letters, who preach the gospel of selfhood to overflowing auditoriums. He was something of a youth guru. Goldstein argues that Cousin’s project was that of repairing itself compromised by the outside in model of selfhood characteristic of impressibility in order to set a Republic bruised by a revolutionary decade onto a more stable foundation.

Cousin explicitly theorized selfhood as a model for bourgeois property ownership. John Locke is typically credited with originating the legal doctrine of possessive individualism. However, whereas Locke’s model of possession and property rights begins with the body, Cousin locates the grounds of possessive individualism in the moi itself. “Our original property is ourselves, our moi,” Cousin proposed. “Our first step to free personal thought is the first act of property.”

He went on to pose free personal thought, the characteristic activity of the self, as the basis of an expanding circle of property rights in things. Given that Cousin posed private property the quintessential mark of bourgeois status as the natural extension of selfhood, it is not surprising that he restricted the ability to perceive one’s selfhood to bourgeois men. He consistently suggested that the working classes were incapable of introspective reflection and, therefore, of empirically locating the self within them.

In Goldstein’s analysis, Cousin’s doctrine asserted a fundamental distinction between the selved and the unselved as a distinction that mapped neatly onto that between the bourgeoisie and the working classes. While Cousin himself did not seem interested in asserting racial distinctions, his devoted disciples would have had no trouble discerning where most racialized peoples, some of whom, after all, were legal property at the time fit into his selved/unselved binary.

Cousin did not just convince bourgeois youth to believe they had selves. He required them to discern and activate these selves through his psychological method. The psychological method consisted essentially of looking within, witnessing the free activity of thought, and thereby empirically verifying the existence of one’s selfhood as innate, unified, and agential.

From 1832 onward, the philosophy class of the third and last year of the French lycée system opened with Cousinian psychology positioned as the foundation of philosophy itself. Until the 1880s, the lycée system designed to train all civil servants, including teachers, admitted only bourgeois boys. Ascertaining oneself became a literal rite of passage for bourgeois boys.

To pass the dreaded baccalaureate examination, which certified them as fit for public service, students after 1832 had to pass an examination in Cousin’s philosophy. Henceforth, to become fit for public service, all bourgeois boys would have to learn to discern and activate an elite class selfhood.

Though France provides the clearest example of the class politics of selfhood and its role in sustaining bourgeois hegemony, the shift to understand– the shift to an understanding of individually anchored agential selves seems to have occurred throughout Western Europe and North America between the 18th and 19th centuries as these regions underwent interlocked transitions to bourgeois capitalist hegemony.

This set of parallel transitions suggests that newly atomized capitalist social orders in the West banked on inculcating bourgeois men with innate agential and individual selfhoods as a basis for self-governance. By the late 19th century, a bourgeoisie trained to perceive itself as possessing unique internal selves would prove fertile soil for the implantation, to use Foucault’s word, of a new model of sexuality based on inner sexual selfhood.

This new model of sexuality would have to subsume a prior and ongoing understandings of sex as ontologically social and spatial. Modern pederasty is one such social and spatial understanding of sex. It’s a plug for my book.

Unlike institutionalized pederasty in ancient Greece, an institutionalized modern pederasty was a flexible form that could accommodate greater or lesser differentials of age, age-differentiated sexual relations that continued well into adulthood, reversals of the expected power differential between elder and younger partner, and slippages in the expected correspondence between active/passive sexual roles and superordinate and subordinate social roles.

In Disturbing Attachments, I use modern pederasty as an overarching umbrella for a dominant form of male same-sex practice animated and structured by eroticized hierarchies of age, class, race, and knowledge. Modern pederasty names the practice and epistemology of sex as primarily social. It was understood to be about transactional sex, mentorship, protection, pedagogy, coercion, patronage, blackmail, and the pursuit of some social or economic advantage to a greater extent than as the expression of a unique sexual subjectivity or of a sex drive-oriented toward a particular object.

The story of the subsumption of pederasty by modern homosexuality is, therefore, the story of the subsumption of sex as ontologically social by sex as an expression of inner selfhood. The significant historical shift, I would argue, is less from sodomy to inversion than from pederasty or sex as primarily social to homosexuality or sex as the expression of an internal sexual subjectivity. Only the latter is what would come to be known as sexuality.

This new epistemology was distinctively white bourgeois and male. But it was ancillary to the innate individual agential self that white bourgeois men had only recently been trained to perceive, although some educated women and people of color would attempt to lay claim to it as well.

The Homosexuality of Men and Women published in 1914 is indicative of the intellectual labor required to subsume prior spatial and social models of sex by a new epistemology of sexuality as an expression of inner selfhood. The book was based on early data from what was to be the largest study of sexual behavior of the early 20th century. To gather this data, Hirschfeld created a 127 question-long psychobiological questionnaire that he administered to more than 10,000 people.

Hirschfeld’s questionnaire is paradigmatic of the technologies of the self, by which, in Foucault’s words, “The 19th-century homosexual became a personage, a past, a case history, and a childhood in addition to being a type of life, a life form, and a morphology with an indiscreet anatomy and possibly a mysterious physiology.” Responding to the questionnaire in full demanded an exercise in gender-sexual introspection. And throughout, I’m going to use the word gender-sexual with a dash in between them to signify that at this time, gender and sexuality were not understood as separate from one another.

So to respond to the questionnaire in full demanded an exercise in gender-sexual introspection that began with one’s ancestry; turned to one’s childhood gender-sexual development; covered one’s history of sexual experiences, desires, and fantasies; described one’s current sex to morphology in gender-sexual character; and concluded with one’s own judgment about one’s sexuality. And this is a small portion of this long survey.

Throughout leading questions encourage respondents to narrate and interpret every possible bodily characteristic and personality trait as either masculine or feminine. And therefore, depending on one’s sex, as indicative of either sexual normalcy or sexual variation. The questionnaire is so comprehensive that Hirschfeld follows its reproduction in The Homosexuality of Men and Women. And this is with the sample answers of somebody that he said was a obvious female homosexual.

So he follows it with the acknowledgment, “It may appear to many people an unfair demand to request a conscientious answering of so many questions, a task that claims many hours, even days.” He continues, “But experience has shown that many people, particularly educated ones, have found direct and deep satisfaction and relief in this manner of confronting themselves.”

Referencing one exemplary response that comprises no less than 360 pages of tightly written quatre pages and that took nearly 6 months to complete, the fact that more than 10,000 people responded to such a comprehensive and time-consuming survey may be more significant than Hirschfeld’s theory of sexuality itself. Or it gives us a sense of how far reaching Hirschfeld’s project of sexual objectification was.

The questionnaire walked respondents through a process of self-inquiry and self-reflection worded so as to ensure the discovery of gender-sexuality as the hidden principle of the self. As a technology for the discernment and discovery of sexual selfhood, the psychobiological questionnaire drew on and redirected prior technologies for the discernment and production of bourgeois interior selves, such as the journal, the memoir, and the novel as well as Cousin’s own psychological method.

And indeed, the selves Hirschfeld helped produce were distinctively bourgeois. To be capable of responding to such a detailed questionnaire, particularly in writing required education, leisure time, and a quiet solitary space. It was greatly facilitated by a prior training in introspection and self-reflection and a learned ability to discern the contours of a unique selfhood within.

Although exceptionally motivated exceptions did exist, particularly among the transvestites, such requirements would have ensured that nearly all of Hirschfeld’s respondents would be bourgeois or aristocrats. Training in sexual selfhood was anything but equitably distributed. For it built on the new forms of sexual selfhood, the new forms of selfhood characteristic of the bourgeoisie. If the aristocracy had based its class distinction on the mythos of blood, the bourgeoisie’s blood was itself before it could become its sex.

Hirschfeld’s psychobiological questionnaires were scientifically super productive. They yielded the first diagnostic distinction between homosexuals and transvestites, the seed of what would become in the mid-century United States the now canonical distinction between gender and sexuality. They also yielded two extensive taxonomies of types of biologically innate sexual being, the second, which is published in The Homosexuality of Men and Women, focuses on the categorization of homosexual men and women.

Hirschfeld attempts to account for pederastic sexual practices in the second rank of this taxonomy– orientation to distinct age groups. It is intriguing that Hirschfeld includes age as a type of orientation at all, ranking it second only to sex-based orientation. In the history of sexuality, age-differentiated male-male sexuality is often understood to be part of a circa Mediterranean pederastic model that spans Southern Europe and North Africa.

As I demonstrate in disturbing attachments, however, modern pederasty exceeds this narrow region by far. Hirschfeld’s Germany is well outside of the Mediterranean basin, not to mention the conventional early modern historical periodization of pederasty. And yet, age-differentiated sexuality is a central concern within The Homosexuality of Men and Women.

Within Germany, Hirschfeld’s theory of homosexuality as a form of biological sexual intermediacy is often contrasted with pederastic masculinists, who promoted pederasty unlike medicalized inversion as a natural extension of virile and even patriarchal masculinities. The contrast between the two camps, however, is not black and white. Hirschfeld after all was an empiricist with the ambition of creating a classification system that could account for all homosexual behavior.

As a homosexual himself, he was well acquainted with homosexual vernaculars, cultural practices, and haunts, mentioning in passing the Friedrichstrasse, where young hustlers could be found, a bar for soldiers in search for sex with men, and bars where transvestites would congregate. As evidence for the significance of age orientations, Hirschfeld references in group conversations in which, quote, “discussions of these criteria of discernment play a significant role.” For example, when they raise the question of whether or not one loves younger or older persons as it were to employ a phrase they frequently use with or without a beard. Or if they are homosexual women, whether or not they prefer older or younger women.

Age-differentiated sex simply had too well established of a presence within German homosexual culture for Hirschfeld to ignore it. But then, again, why would he have wanted to? For Hirschfeld himself was a pederast.

His life partner Karl Giese, the man you see here, was an upwardly mobile working class man 30 years Hirschfeld’s junior, who met Hirschfeld while the former was still a student. Hirschfeld met his second significant life partner who overlapped with Giza, Li Shiu Tung, who is in this image, a Chinese student 39 years his junior while on his world lecture tour in exile from a rapidly not so fine Germany. Both relationships conform to the pederastic teacher-disciple and patron-client patterns.

Hirschfeld first employed Giese in his Institute for Sexual Research then appointed him to run it upon fleeing Germany, a significant position for a man from a working class family. With the blessing of his wealthy father who hoped Tung would become the Hirschfeld of China, the latter abandoned his studies to travel and study sexology with his new mentor/lover.

Given his personal investment in pederasty and empirical attention to it, Hirschfeld’s ambition was not to supplant pederasty and replace it with homosexuality. It was to reframe pederasty within an overarching master theory of sexual selfhood. Modern pederasty, however, proves difficult to square with a theory of biologically innate age-based sexual orientation.

Hirschfeld suggests improbably that age-based orientations remain fixed across a life span. That is, that someone who is attracted to youth in their youth will remain so well into old age and likewise for each age group. This fails to account for the common incidence of attraction to those of approximately one’s own age, even as that age changes across one’s life. It also fails to account for the common pederastic pattern in which relationships with older men as a youth are followed by relationships with youths as an adult, except by discounting youth as a period of sex plasticity, in which one’s sexual orientation has not yet had the chance to fully emerge, which is an argument that he makes.

In the narrative portion, the topic of age preferences seems to slide as if by association into that of class preferences. Hirschfeld notes that within each age range, there are specifics, including the educational and social class whose significance for spontaneous attraction should not be underestimated and goes on to develop the notion that class-based attractions might be divided into loving those of the same class, of a lower class, and of a higher class than oneself, all of which he asserts are “so frequent that the introduction of examples is unnecessary.”

Clearly, Hirschfeld expected his readers to be familiar with pederastic patterns of cross-class sex. In turn, class-based attractions slide into the topic of intellectual attractions, including attractions to such persons from whom they can learn and towards people on whom they can have a pedagogical influence. However, if age as a tangible feature of the sex to biological body can be fitted with some difficulty into a theory of biologically innate sexual selfhood, class and intellectual ability cannot.

Despite repeated statements as to the importance and prevalence of class-based attractions, neither they nor pedagogical attractions make any appearance in Hirschfeld’s classification system. They dropped out entirely. Despite both his personal investment in pederasty and his efforts to subsume pederasty into age-based sexual orientation, neither pederasty nor age-based sexual orientation, with the exception of pedophilia, which we can talk about in the Q&A if you want– so neither of them would survive into the bourgeois sexual hegemony that Hirschfeld’s own sexology helped solidify.

Pederasty was conceptually, though not materially incompatible with bourgeois modernity for pederasty, carried the taint of precapitalist sexual arrangements. Pederasty emanated rather too obviously from the worlds of the feudal lord and his vassal, the master craftsman and his apprentice, and the master and his slave.

As Christopher Chitty writes, “Records indicate that sodomy across hierarchies of age and status was an inevitability in societies whose economies were structured by relations of dependence and servitude.” In such societies, it was obvious to all that while some men might have a particular predilection for it, pederasty was a product and a barometer of social and economic relations of dependence and direct domination between men as well as between men and boys.

Around the late 18th and 19th centuries, when the bourgeoisie came into power and capitalism became the hegemonic mode of accumulation in Europe and its colonies, the overt lens on power that pederasty provided grew embarrassing. “Cross-class cultures of sodomy were problematic to such Republican experiments,” Chitty writes, “because they dramatize the social hierarchy and inequality of their mixed social form.”

In a world restructuring itself, according to the enlightenment values of liberté, fraternité, and égalité yet riven by new inequalities between the bourgeoisie and the working classes as well as Europeans in their colonial subjects and plantations slave owners and their slaves, pederasty and the long tradition of critiques of domination that came with it testified all too blatantly to the gulf between enlightenment theory and its praxis.

The problem was not that pederasty as a sexual arrangement was not well suited to the new social hierarchies of bourgeois modernity. In fact, pederastic practices would continue to prove quite popular for another 150 years or so until they eventually proved incommensurable with the bids for legality and respectability of new movements for homosexual rights. The problem was that pederasty gave the lie to the theories of freedom and individual rights, on which the forms of domination inherent in bourgeois hegemony rested.

This is why any effort to make pederasty modern again would stake its claims on historically new terms. For Hirschfeld, that of a core and innate sexual individuality. And for boy lovers of the 1970s, that of the supposed liberation of the sexuality of children.

Such rationales would have rung false to earlier practitioners of pederasty. And, in fact, they failed to sway the majority of same-sex practitioners even during their own times. For however cloaked in the language of sexual liberation or innate sexual orientation, pederasty spoke too loudly of what had become inadmissible– sexual desires that were direct expressions of social structure rather than of the primacy of the bourgeois individual.

Sexual desires that were the product of racial class and age hierarchies continued to be elicited. And men and boys continued to act on them over the course of bourgeois sexual modernity. But they had been subsumed, rendered backward inexplicable and peripheral according to the sexual epistemology of bourgeois hegemony.

This sexual epistemology dictates that any sexual desire that does not emanate from one’s deep innate and uniquely individual sexual selfhood is not true but false– this was one of Hirschfeld’s divisions as well, true and false– not natural but criminal, and not modern and Western, the backward and racialized.

So I’m going to switch gears a little bit. And in the final part of this talk I turn to the sexological debate over the mujerados of the Pueblo Indians of what is now the Southwestern United States to illustrate the continuing colonial stakes of sex and gendered selfhood today.

This debate began in 1847 when William Hammond was stationed in New Mexico, where, as the assistant surgeon for the American army, he treated soldiers wounded while battling native tribes in the US quest for westward expansion. Details from Hammond’s service and settler colonial warfare would become retrospectively significant 50 years later when he made them the basis of a case study for sexual impotence in the male and female originally published in German in 1891.

In it, Hammond details physically examining and verbally questioning two mujerados from Pueblo tribes. Mujerado was a Spanish colonial neologism applied to Pueblo males who, in the view of Spanish colonials, had been transformed into women. Hammond’s account, however, is too saturated by settler colonial ideology to offer any insight into the role of mujerados in Pueblo culture.

In brief, Hammond asserts that Pueblo traditions decree the selection of a mujerado from among the most virile adult men of the tribe. This man is then made to ride constantly on horseback while being repeatedly masturbated. Eventually, he claims that this results in the atrophy of their genitals, impotence, bodily feminization, and the total transformation of their character from masculine to feminine.

The ultimate purpose of this tradition, according to Hammond, is to transform the mujerado into the passive recipient of intercourse during annual ceremonial orgies. Chiefs, he suggests, may also have sexual rights over them during the rest of the year. Hammond’s salacious account was a handmaiden of genocidal violence against native peoples.

It participates in the denigration of native religious ceremonies as savage sexual orgies, a trope used to ban and even criminalize native ceremonies. Both Hammond’s fanciful explanation for how the mujerados were rendered impotent and his initial surprise at inspecting the anatomy of one Laguna mujerado and discovering that they were not, in fact, a hermaphrodite are symptoms of a specifically medical colonial logic, one that insists that complex native social and spiritual roles originate from bodily abnormalities.

Hammond also draws on 18th century naturalist characterizations of natives as possessing small organs of generation and, in the Comte de Buffon’s words, an “indifference for sex that dooms them to extinction.” Indeed, Hammond reassures readers that the traditions of the mujerados will doubtless disappear ere long before advancing civilization, even if they have not already done so.

In a demonstration of the faulty empirical basis of much 19th and early 20th century science, Hammond’s politicized and dubious account inaugurated a sexological debate over the mujerados in Germany. Richard Von Krafft-Ebing included Hammond’s account of the mujerados in the chapter of Psychopathia Sexualis on acquired homosexuality and the degree to eviration and defemination. Yes.

So this was supposed to be an example of eviration. Thus, situated Krafft-Ebing recasts the mujerados as a warning to Europeans about the potentially drastic feminizing results of long-term acquired homosexuality. By comparison, Hirschfeld’s intervention in this debate might seem refreshingly liberal.

He dismisses as improbable the idea that the condition of the mujerados is caused by horseback riding and proposes that they are instead androgynous transvestites, a harmless natural variation. The principal purpose of Hirschfeld’s corrective, however, is to demonstrate the universal applicability of the two pillars of his sexological theory– one, his diagnostic distinction between transvestism and homosexuality and, two, his bedrock understanding that sex gender proclivities are only epistemologically true when they are rooted in someone’s innate selfhood.

These core tenets come together in Hirschfeld’s definition of transvestism as when, quote, “the core of the sexual individuality forms the need to live in the clothing, lifestyle, and occupation of the other sex.” Distinguishing homosexuality from transvestism, thus, amounted to nothing less than parsing the truth of someone’s core sexual selfhood, which in Cousinian fashion, Hirschfeld understood to be innate and unchanging.

The mujerados varied distance both geographic and temporal as implicitly uncivilized people from European norms of gender-sexuality is useful to Hirschfeld because it serves as evidence of the universality of his diagnostic category of transvestism. By categorizing the mujerados as transvestites, Hirschfeld projects the epistemological basis of transvestism, core and innate sexual selfhood, onto them.

However, as a tribal people who engage in small-scale agriculture and hunting, the Pueblo Indians lacked the key material conditions– capitalist political economy and large-scale Democratic state formations for the adoption of a Cousinian innate core selfhood. Without a basis in bourgeois selfhood, their cross-dressing could not have been the surface symptom of a core transvestite sexual selfhood.

Like other Western sexologists, Hirschfeld relied on what historian Durba Mitra has termed “the primitive exemplar” as evidence of the universality and, thus, the scientificity of his sexology. Indeed, the mujerados were one of countless primitive exemplars that are cited only to be subsumed into Hirschfeld’s universal theory of sexual selfhood.

We might understand sexual selfhood as akin to the money form. Like the money form, sexual selfhood is both abstract and fungible. It produces equivalences, commensurabilities, and measurable differences in degree but not the kind between sexualized and gendered practices emanating from otherwise incommensurable social and material conditions. In their very abstract universality and their fungibility, sexual and gendered selfhood continued to be used to produce such false equivalencies today. Indeed, progressive thinkers and activists today routinely employ the same logics as Hirschfeld without awareness of their colonial basis.

In Extermination of the Joyas– Gendercide in Spanish California, Deborah Miranda performs a speculative Indigenous reading of the genealogy of both the term joya and of contemporary to spirit identity. The term joya first appears in Spanish colonial texts from 18th century California to name native Chumash men wearing the dress of women.

Miranda traces Spanish colonizers campaign against the joyas back to 16th century conquest when they would use mastiffs and greyhounds to kill natives whom they then– whom they then understood to be sodomites. And this is a famous woodcut rendition of one such incident in contemporary Panama. In a central passage, Miranda argues that this colonial violence against joyas was not homophobia but rather gendercide.

Miranda uses the term gendercide to call attention to the genocidal intent and the culturally disorganized impact of these mass killings. In human rights discourse, gendercide describes not only the internationally recognized wrong of singling out victims on the basis of sex but also the terrorizing and genocidal effects of the elimination of an entire sex. If carried out to completion, gendercide would effectively become genocide since a culture without women, for example, would no longer be able to reproduce itself.

The term gendercide helps Miranda underline that far more than sodomy or homosexuality was at stake here. While joyas were not necessary for biological reproduction, like any sex class, they played a crucial role in social reproduction. Specifically, their gender liminality made it possible for joyas unlike ordinary women or men to perform burial rites for the dead without risking spiritual pollution. During a period of settler colonial violence, losing an entire class of people responsible for burying the dead and ensuring proper mourning rituals would have thrown native tribes into a state of crisis.

In using the term gendercide to draw our attention to the culturally and spiritually disorganizing effects of the mass killing of joyas, however, Miranda ends up leaning on the concept of gender identity, despite the fact that the complexity of the role of joyas, as she describes, it cannot be contained within that concept in order to extend the use of gendercide from a descriptor of the mass killing of men or women to one of the mass killing of gender-variant peoples, Miranda redefines gendercide as an act of violence committed against the victims’ primary gender identity.

It would be reductively secularizing, however, to recast the balance of female and male spiritual energies that characterized joyas as a gender identity. The very point of Miranda’s article is both to critique the harm and repair the splitting wrought by settler colonial epistemological and material violence on native peoples. In a visionary act of Indigenous historical speculatization, Miranda proposes that joyas survived settler colonial efforts at gendercide by going undercover, so to speak, and splitting the sexual from the spiritual aspects of their role.

In short, they either became homosexuals or took on a role as the caretakers and grave tenders, in her words, of native culture, keeping native history, traditions, and storytelling alive. Amidst the contemporary to spirit resurgence, she proposes that the time has come to undo the splitting caused by settler colonial gendercide and reunite the gendered, sexual, spiritual, and cultural aspects of the role of the joyas, which were historically torn asunder in order to survive colonial violence.

However, just as Spanish colonizers never grasped the intricacy of the joya rule, secularizing it in order to cast joyas as men in the dress of women or as heathen sodomites, just as Hirschfeld blithely cast mujerados as transvestites without any regard for the meaning of their practices, so the contemporary term gender identity cannot offer justice to the antecedents of contemporary two spirit peoples. To define joyas by their gender identities, even for the sake of naming the genocidal violence against them, is to separate the gendered aspect of their roles not only from the spiritual but also from the sexual, ripping them asunder in order to fit constricted colonial epistemologies once again.

The fault, to be clear, is far from Miranda’s alone. Some of the very best new texts in gender and sexuality studies referenced gender identities in the past and in the non-West, even as they include a judicious caveat explaining that contemporary transgender identity does not apply to them. Such caveats do not solve the problem for I submit that the aspect of contemporary transgender identity, that is the least universalizable is gender identity itself.

Until we historicize and particularize not only contemporary transgender and gay/lesbian identity but also the very notions of a core gender and sexual identity and an innate core self, we will find that we have continued Hirschfeld’s gesture of universalizing bourgeois Western sexology along with the intellectual and material histories it indexes. Ultimately, what we need is an alternative principle of trans politics and a rationale for trans existence apart from gender identity. And this is what I’ll be working towards in my book on trans materialism.

Hirschfeld’s slogan, justice through science, telegraphs his faith in rational scientific research as the basis for homosexual and transvestite rights. However, the diagnostic basis of homosexuality and transvestism, he purported to have empirically discovered innate sexual individuality was, in fact, produced by his very methods of inquiry. As I have shown, Hirschfeld’s psychobiological questionnaire trained his mostly bourgeois European respondents to discern a core innate sex individuality within them and to narrate it as the hidden motivation behind their every behavior and characteristic.

Hirschfeld’s theory of core sexual individuality was able to aspire to universality because he cannily allied it to a key principle of bourgeois hegemony, that of a core and innate self, the first and most significant property of the self-governing individual. Thus, legitimized as a peace with modern bourgeois common sense, Hirschfeld had only to match his diagnostic entities of homosexuality and transvestism to colonial reportage on the gender-sexual abnormalities of far-off peoples to make the case for their scientific universality.

In the process, Hirschfeld helped set into motion a bourgeois sexual hegemony that subsumed an enormous range of gendered and sexual practices, conditioned more by space and by social relations than by innate sexual selfhoods. It is today the Hirschfeld’s project of universal subsumption into bourgeois sexual hegemony is at last coming to fruition. The vectors are sexual orientation and gender identity, the contemporary versions of Hirschfeld’s diagnostic principles of core sexual individuality.

Sexual orientation and gender identity have become part of neoliberal hegemony institutionalized globally as scholarly analytics, medical entities, legal principles, human rights principles, and NGO-funding streams. However, they do not begin to describe how the vast majority of peoples across the globe practice and understand gender and sex. As scholars and activists, we must contend with the continuation of Hirschfeld’s project of subsumption if we are to develop an adequate response to sex and gender politics in the present. Thank you.

[SALAR MAMENI] Thank you so much for that wonderful talk. We do have time for Q&A, if you have questions.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] Hi.

Hi.

Thank you so much for your presentation. It’s quite fascinating. I’m AJ. I’m a first year in the ethnic studies PhD. I work with the wonderful Salar Mameni here.

What struck out to me particularly was the notion of subsumption in Magnus Hirschfeld’s diagnostic practices. And I was wondering, if we’re to situate sexuality as a social and spatial process, how do we see sexual selfhood through the lens of the repressive hypothesis and broader eurocentric knowledge production, whether it be social theory, an égal libéral, or [FRENCH] or even continental literature from the Enlightenment and up to the late 20th century?

And another question I had is more of a personal one. For scholars that work with– that use queer of color critique as a framework, how do we grapple with this problematization of it? Thank you.

[KADJI AMIN] So your question was, how do we locate it– how we locate the sexual selfhood in the repressive hypothesis? Yeah, I mean, I think that– I think it’s a key part of the repressive hypothesis, the idea that what’s being repressed is something core to your self and that resistance to this repression would consist in expressing that core sexual self.

So I think that it’s quite– what I’m saying here about sexual selfhood coheres quite well with Foucault’s critique of the repressive hypothesis. I’m just trying to situate specifically its class role slightly differently than he does and also try to read it backwards a little bit into the production of innate selfhood in the bourgeoisie in general.

Because once you look at that, you start to see how much it’s tied to the question of governance, how much it’s tied to certain political forms as well as certain economic forms like the laissez-faire economy. So I’m trying to really extend his inquiry a little further there. And I think you would find a vast archive of works describing sexual selfhood as something that could be repressed, if one were to look for that.

And your second question, how is queer of color critique to contend with what exactly?

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] The problematize the notion of– or problematize queer color critique effort to take sexuality for granted without destabilizing it as a social and spatial process. How do we grapple with it while using it as a framework?

[KADJI AMIN] OK, yeah. Yeah, so it’s not specifically– I’m not specifically critiquing queer of color critique here. So, in fact, I think in Rod Ferguson’s book, he is interested in sexuality not primarily as a form of selfhood or individuality. And what I’m trying to do is tell a long story about why it is that we continue to find so many exceptions to bourgeois sexual subjectivity because I feel like queer of color critics and historians of different sexual subcultures or sexual cultures can keep producing books and articles, saying, well, actually, it’s not like that like here, among this particular group of people.

But in my view, what we need is a narrative to explain why this is the case and why this is– why we’re going to keep finding that this is the case. Because we have to denaturalize this idea of sexual selfhood and also see where it comes from specifically and whose interests it serves and what kinds of subjects it was modeled on. And so that’s the part of the puzzle that I’m trying to supply here.

And so yeah. So I do hope that this will be– that having this part of the puzzle will make it easier for scholars in queer of color critique and other fields to be able to do their work without– to essentially dispense with the question of sexual subjected as they do their work rather than, say, going into something, looking for that, and then not finding it and having to come up with an explanation for why not.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] Thank you so much for a really generative talk. I’ve been writing about sex work and really thinking about why queers don’t care about the ongoing criminalization of sex work and how something like this, in fact, shifts politics. So I guess I have two questions. The first is, what do you see as the implications for politics? Because I think that’s really so core to what you’re doing.

Second part is I get, well, the selfhood not sexual selfhood. Like, is there a selfhood outside of a bourgeois selfhood, outside of the sexual selfhood that prefers spicy food, that prefers– Yeah.

[KADJI AMIN] Yeah, thank you. Great questions. So yeah, I feel like sex work in the history of sex work is really, really key here. And the more that I research into the history of sexuality, the more clear it is to me that sex work is the history of homosexuality. It is the history of transness, especially– or specifically of transfemininity.

And it should be core to those histories. And in some ways, transactional sex offers a far better basis of thinking about queer history and also those who are most marginalized in queer communities today than does sexual selfhood. And yeah.

So in terms of politics, I think that that’s the ultimate horizon of this work is that I really think a politics based on either sexual subjectivity, sexual selfhood, or gender selfhood is a bad one. And that’s what I was trying to say– part of what I was trying to say in the beginning is that the epistemological invention of sexuality as well as gender identity is a very bourgeois invention.

And much of my book will deal with the bourgeois invention of gender identity. But I wanted to do this piece on the side. So yeah. Because it makes commensurate a whole series of practices, of life worlds, of types of people, of material conditions that really have very little in common. And I think we have the work now of wonderful intersectional critics and Black feminists explaining some of the problems with the category of women or with just homosexuality as a single issue politics or as an identity category.

But I think we also have to think of– I don’t know. I guess on the one– so on the one hand, we have that. But on the other hand, I think we live in a culture, particularly in the contemporary United States in which selfhood is becoming– and sexual and gendered selfhood, particularly, are acquiring more and more outsized importance regardless of material conditions that subtend them.

And so I think part of this project is coming out of my question of why that is. And so one, why that is. And then two, what can be done to jostle people out of that. Because there’s absolutely nothing radical about any form of identification or selfhood.

So what I’m trying to do is to shift the ground of politics onto material practices. It’s always the material practices of queer people, of gender variant people, of trans people that have been policed and pathologized. The self, nobody cares about selfhoods.

Even the most homophobic Christian evangelicals will welcome people who understand themselves as having a gay inner selfhood as long as they’re not practicing. Likewise, nobody cares– people along with all these bills trying to keep trans people out of public space and take away resources or the ability to transition, particularly for trans youth, people will say– the same people who are promulgating such bills will say, well well, it’s fine. You can be whoever you want to be on the inside. We’re not taking away your identity at all.

And, in fact, there was a press conference with David Cameron– I don’t know, a session with David Cameron that I watched online, which was about the request for a gender identity document for those who didn’t identify as either male or female. And a large part of his discourse was saying, look, this doesn’t invalidate you at all. I respect you as people. And I respect your innate selfhood and your right to be a gender other than man or woman. I just don’t want to tie it to any other material rights.

So I think that that’s where the political focus needs to be as well as the intellectual focus, really, in thinking about these practices and what their relation has been historically to identities and the way that practices or identities have been used to disqualify certain practices. So specifically in the case of gender identity, being invented and used to gate keep who can and cannot access trans medical procedures.

The whole point of it was to say that drag queens are not trans women, that drag queen sex workers are not trans women and cannot transition. So thank you for asking that question because I think it points to the larger horizon that I’m working towards.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] Hi. Thanks for such a wonderfully thoughtful talk. You made us side comment in your talk that I was curious if you could maybe speak to a little bit more.

You mentioned when you went over Hirschfeld’s questionnaire that you could maybe understand it as something that replaced the things like the genres like the novel or the memoirs, something, a narrative that category that’s generative of bourgeois interiority. And I guess I was just curious if you could talk a little bit more about what that transition from something like fictional narratives to an analytical questionnaire might mean for the narrative categories to which we understand and express sexual identity.

And to give a little bit of ulterior motive context for this, I just finished a dissertation chapter where I was writing about Venus in Furs on the one hand and Psychopathia Sexualis on the other. And I think I can discern Sacher-Masoch received these fan letters that had fan fiction where the people identified themselves within the fictional narratives of Venus in Furs versus Krafft-Ebing b got these letters from people where they started writing these case histories about themselves where they identified themselves in his medical pathologies.

And I guess my question is where we might look for alternative models for narratives for the expression of sexuality when is there possibility in something like fictional narrative versus the analytical questionnaire or the case study because I argue that I can discern in this a model of sadomasochism that might have been– from Venus in Furs that might have been more aesthetic or teachable rather than a sexual identity category. Just curious if you had some thoughts about that.

[KADJI AMIN] Yeah. No, that sounds like a great thesis. And yeah, I think I would put it not as a transition from one mode to another but as things that were overlapping and happening simultaneously. And one thesis that I’ve been– or one hypothesis that I’ve been toying with but I haven’t yet decided if I’m going to stand behind it is the idea that these were different gendered types of technologies of the self.

The major consumers of the novel at the time were bourgeois white women. And in terms of Cousins’– what was it– psychological method, the people that those were supposed to train were white bourgeois men. And then in all the writing that is pouring out of this time about novel-reading women, it’s never a question of praising the fact that they’re acquiring this highly developed interiority, much less of seeing it as something that could be sturdy and that could help them be self-disciplining and good subjects and so on, but rather fear of their imaginations running amok or of hysteria, of nerves.

So there isn’t the same sense of a stable novel-reading subject, at least in those tracks written against women who read novels. So I think that possibly one might use that to develop as it sounds like you are a reading of some certain more fictional writing technologies as allowing actually a way out of sexual selfhood. One would have to look on a case-by-case basis and see what exactly is happening in those works. . But yeah, it does seem plausible. Yeah. Was there another part of your question that I’m missing? Or did I get it?

Yeah.

OK, yeah, I just realized also that I didn’t respond to the second part of Juana’s question about other selfhoods. So I just wanted to say that there are many selfhoods. And there are many different types of interiorities. Spiritual and religious interiorities are probably among some of the first recorded instances or theorizations of different types of interiority.

And so individuality, interiority, et cetera, are not terms that in and of themselves belong to the modern bourgeois era. One thing I like about the historian Jen Goldstein’s book is that she differentiates between different types of interiority to demonstrate the newness of Cousin’s idea of this innate, solid, unified interiority, which in some ways is the dumbest theory of subjectivity. We have many other theories of subjectivity that are better.

But it’s an extremely influential and powerful one because of the way– because of how congruent it is with liberal law, which, as we know, is founded on bourgeois property rights. So that link that is made at that early point is so powerful that it’s able to carry through even to today, despite all the many theoretically better but also highly differentiated in terms of culture, religion, et cetera, accounts of selfhood that we might have.

So I just wanted to clarify that there are many types of selfhood and interiority. But I’m tracking the hegemony of this certain version of it.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] Thank you for lots of sparks going off. I’m wondering if you have any thoughts on how Hirschfeld’s notion of pederasty– and if I interpreted you correctly, you were suggesting that despite his efforts, pederasty could not be subsumed under the logic of interiority that he was proposing. So if I understood you correctly, I’m curious how you understand pederasty in relation to the Oedipal triangle, which represents a non-homosexual youth-adult formation that in fact does get subsumed into the production of a subject and becomes the very basis of subject formation for Freud, normative subject formation.

So that’s one question I have is, how do you understand pederasty in relation to the Oedipal triangle? And then the second question I have, I was really interested in your political, economic– sorry, I’m trying to find you– political, economic strand to your thesis on possession of the self and also, parallel to that, your thesis on the sociality of pederasty and the function that pederasty has in a social world.

And so I’m thinking about the notion of social capital, which is perhaps what something like the Oedipal triangle is producing for a normative subject is a social capital that then gets exploited in society. Is that also perhaps what’s happening with pederasty in Hirschfeld’s desire to suggest that pederasty could be subsumed in the production of an interiority, that, in fact, what is being produced as a social capital for the homosexual that previously was denied as a result of essentially not being figured into the Oedipal triangle?

[KADJI AMIN] Whoo. That’s a really interesting question. I don’t know if I’m going to do justice to it because I don’t really think in terms of Oedipal triangles. Yeah, I think one thing that I was saying in terms of Hirschfeld’s attempt to subsume pederasty into a theory of age-based innate sexual orientation was not that it could not be subsumed. Because sexologists make all kinds of terrible claims, just like really silly claims.

And so it could be yet another one of these really silly claims that nevertheless become quite important and are taken seriously. But it was not. So the question is, why was this not the case? And so rather than saying it was a logical incoherence– I mean, I was pointing out the logical incoherence. But that’s not the reason that it didn’t become influential.

I think the reason it didn’t become influential was precisely because of the way it was associated with earlier forms of political economy and of unfreedom that were dangerous. It would be dangerous to reveal that bourgeois hegemony continued to be based on similar types of structures.

Yeah, in terms of the Oedipal triangle, I don’t know. It’s very intriguing what you’re suggesting to me. But I don’t think I’m the person to do that kind of work. For me– I mean, the reason that I got interested in pederasty in the first place was that it became clear to me when I was studying [INAUDIBLE] or– yeah, to me, it became clear that we had to think about– we had to think about the effects on sexual subjectivation of structures far beyond the Oedipal triangle, especially when you’re talking about a large proportion of people who didn’t grow up in bourgeois nuclear households.

And so, for instance, in [INAUDIBLE] writing, prison is figured as a mother. And the familial– all of these highly sexualized familial dynamics that are subject to forming happen in the context of prison and in the context– well, this is a boys penal colony. So a youth prison and in the context of male-male hierarchies within the prison.

So that’s part of why I’ve moved away from thinking in Oedipal terms. But there is surely something interesting going on that I think you’re pointing out in terms of this older, younger, erotics of the Oedipal triangle and how that is subject to forming. And I would have to brush up on theories of social capital to answer that other question as well.

But yeah, I think that Hirschfeld was trying to get– I mean, as I understand it, Hirschfeld’s theory of sexuality was trying to attain a social capital for homosexuals that he didn’t think existed at the time. And that’s one of the difficult things. In all this literature– in all this sexological literature, you see that one of the big things that they’re fighting against is the notion that homosexuality is contagious, particularly through pederasty, that older men could initiate youths, and that those youths might be ruined for life and become homosexuals themselves.

And precisely the same discourse has come back around transness today, the contagiousness of transness, the vulnerability of youth, such that if they’re even exposed to the idea of transness, they might become trans. And the falseness of transness, if it’s because they learned it from a peer or an educator.

So in a sense, we’re still caught in the same political trouble that Hirschfeld was in in the early 20th century when the solution that was staked out was to say, OK, let’s say that these are congenital inverts and that they can’t help it and that they’re completely different and discrete from this other population of men who might have sex with men for gain or for money or temporarily or something like that as a way to base our rights and our non-responsibility on our innate sexual selfhood.

So I think that that’s part of the resistance to moving away from discourses of sexual selfhood or of gender selfhood is a fear of the ammunition that that might give people on the right. But on the other hand, I believe strongly that selfhood is a very poor foundation to base a politics on, particularly when– I mean, for reasons that I already mentioned, but also around the question of the unprovability of subjective, say, identification and the way that it can always be cast aside and said, well, the only reason this person believes that they’re trans is because they’re misinterpreting this or that or because it’s just a phase or because they learned it from this thing. But in reality, they’re not trans.

So in other words, I don’t think that it necessarily gets us out of that bind. And at the same time, I think that we’ve ceded ground in a way by refusing to fight the battle of the– yeah, that would argue for– yeah, that wouldn’t base the right to transition or the right to engage in homosexuality on an innate sexual subjectivity.

So a lot of the ground– a lot of the arguments that these sexologists made in the early 20th century continue to be the foundation of contemporary politics, even though we know they’re wrong and even though we know that they don’t account for large populations of people. So I know I went a little bit of field of your question towards the end there. Sure.

[INAUDIBLE]. [AUDIENCE MEMBER] Thank you so much. As always, absolutely riveting. And my question is about the idea of two-spirit identity. And you mentioned earlier the idea that gendercide doesn’t do justice to these antecedents of two spirit as social and ritual positions. And my question is just how you see two spirit today of negotiating the fallout of this shift from social to self, whether you see it as just a variation on non-binarity, whether it’s trying to do something else, and maybe more broadly, just what your engagement with Indigenous queer critique is.

[KADJI AMIN] Yeah, so two spirit today– I mean, I’m not the person to issue a pronouncement on what’s going on with two-spirit identity today. I think it’s very in process and very variable in terms of how individual people engage with two-spirit identity. I think that many of them who do engage it do see it as some kind of recognition of the traditional significance of this kind of role.

So it is an attempt to write themselves into native history and to write people like them into native history. And I think that they do also see it as a place or as a term for people who don’t fit into settler colonial definitions of gender and sexuality or homosexuality and transgender for that matter. So I think that– I mean, my impression is that it is operating to some extent, the way that Miranda wants it to operate. But it’s neither my object of study nor my place, really, to say what’s going on with it and what should go on with it.

So yeah, my purpose in referencing her article was more to demonstrate both the kinds of epistemological harms that were being brought by people like Hirschfeld and the fact that this continues well into the present with the– even though we might look at what Hirschfeld is doing and say, yes, I’ve seen that happen a billion times with sexologists and these primitive exemplars. That’s nothing new.

But what I was trying to do through reference to Miranda was to show how even the most progressive contemporary thinkers who are with good politics end up using this term gender identity when they know very well that it’s not what they’re describing because of the currency that gender identity has and because of what they think that they may be able to access through it. Same with sexual orientation. So I was really just using that to project us into the present and to show how salient these processes still are.

And yeah, in terms of my relation to critiques of settler colonialism, yeah, I think that I’m very on board with them. What I’m doing is– I don’t know. It’s not specifically situated within settler colonial critique. But I’m trying to see it as one instance of something that is being subsumed in this much larger project of subsumption.

And there are so many things being subsumed. Pederasty is one of them but not the only one; transactional sex; later on, drag as well as forms of transness that can’t be reduced to drag but that also can’t be reduced to gender identity. So the field is quite vast in terms of what is not being described and what is being subsumed.

In the contemporary moment, I’m interested in how gender identity is functioning in the global South. And there’s been some great scholarship on hijras in India in the way that they have not been served by recent legal wins. And so I think that all of this is very telling of the inadequacy of gender identity for politics and the way that it continues to participate in this project of fungibility and commensurability, which can sometimes come with wins, but which always comes with losses.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] Thank you so much for your talk. I was wondering if you’d speak more to the connection between a epistemology of self and a statistical epistemology of population, the ways in which Hirschfeld’s survey which surveys a population comes to construct the individuality of a self.

[KADJI AMIN] Yeah, so thank you for that question. Yeah, so I think– one thing that I wanted to emphasize in this talk was that population came first in terms of where sexuality came into focus as a kind of object of governance. But nonetheless, when self came along, population did not go away. They continued to operate in tandem.

And so it’s very common among sexologists to see a simultaneous concern with the self and the population. And the way that sexology, which was a kind of upstart science that was derided as not real science largely because it was concerned with these dirty sexual matters, the way that it attained or sought to attain legitimacy was by saying, no, we’re about the population. We’re about the reproduction of the race. That is like the white race of the Germanic race. And thus, we are talking about things that are important to the state and to governance.

So there’s always a eugenic wing to things that sexologists are saying that go along with their focus on, say, the bourgeois pervert. The bourgeois pervert is important in the first place because of the fact that they may not reproduce their social station, which is what they’re supposed to do, which is a crisis. And so yeah.

So those two things very much work in tandem. Hirschfeld’s sexual Institute had a eugenic wing that was focused specifically on eugenic marriage counseling. And I think, yeah, you’re right to point out how the survey is functioning on both ends at the same time, on the one hand in order to come up with these slightly specious statistics about what percentage of homosexuals are this or that.

And also, that’s part of his argument that it’s innate, that this percentage is going to be stable across time and place. And then at the same time, in order to incite the production of sexual subjectivities in people who take those surveys and in people who are called upon by those surveys and by other case studies to narrate their lives in those kinds of terms. So yeah. So I think they work in tandem.

[SALAR MAMENI] Thank you.

[KADJI AMIN] Thank you

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Lecture

The Modern American Industrial Strategy: Building a Clean Energy Economy from the Bottom Up and Middle Out

A presentation of the Berkeley Economy and Society Initiative

Recorded on March 22, 2023, this talk — “The Modern American Industrial Strategy: Building a Clean Energy Economy from the Bottom Up and Middle Out” — features Heather Boushey, a member of President Biden’s Council of Economic Advisers and Chief Economist to the Invest in America Cabinet.

Boushey is co-founder of the Washington Center for Equitable Growth, where she was President and CEO from 2013-2020. She previously served as chief economist for Secretary Clinton’s 2016 transition team and as an economist for the Center for American Progress, the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress, the Center for Economic and Policy Research, and the Economic Policy Institute. This talk was co-sponsored by the Berkeley Society and Economy Initiative (BESI), the Network for a New Political Economy (N2PE), the Stone Center on Wealth and Income Inequality, and Social Science Matrix.

Abstract

The Biden-Harris Administration began at a time of intersecting crises, including the pandemic, rising inequality, stagnating economic growth, and the large and growing costs of climate change. The President, in partnership with Congress and state and local governments, took rapid action with policies that have spurred the strongest and most equitable economic and labor market recovery in modern history — including legislation to enhance the resilience of our supply chains, rebuild our physical infrastructure, and accelerate the transition to a clean energy economy. These historic measures, together forming the core of the Modern American Industrial Strategy, were designed with an understanding that strategic public investments are essential to achieving the full potential of our nation’s economy — one built from the bottom up and middle out, where the gains of economic growth are shared.

Listen to this talk as a podcast below, or on Google Podcasts or Apple Podcasts.

 

TRANSCRIPT

Heather Boushey, “Building a Clean Energy Economy from the Bottom Up and Middle Out”

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[PAUL PIERSON] Good afternoon and welcome. I’m delighted to have people here today to hear this really important, interesting talk that we’re going to hear. I’m Paul Pierson. I’m the director of the Berkeley Economy and Society Initiative, which is cosponsoring this talk along with the Network for a New Political Economy and the Stone Center on Wealth and Income Inequality.

And before I introduce our speaker, just one quick note for those of you who are on Zoom. I wanted to remind you that you can submit questions through the Q&A feature on the Zoom site. And if you have any AV trouble and would like assistance, you can send a message in the chat function, and we’ll try to help you out.

So last night, a few hundred thousand people in the Bay Area lost power due to high winds. So maybe it’s a good day to hear about the clean energy economy and building infrastructure. But the winds of change on economic policy and thinking about the economy have been blowing hard in Washington.

And I can’t think of anybody better to talk about that with us than Heather Boushey, who’s been at the very center of this process for over a decade. Prior to joining President Biden’s Council of Economic Advisors, she served as the Chief Economist for the Clinton-Kaine transition team. And she was the co-founder and the longtime president of the Washington Center for Equitable Growth.

Dr. Boushey has long been a leading voice in stressing that family policy is economic policy and in developing and promoting the ideas that have brought much needed attention to the care economy. And, today, she’s going to talk to us about the clean energy economy. And, Heather, we couldn’t be happier to have you here with us. Thank you for coming.

[HEATHER BOUSHEY] Thank you. Thank you, Paul. Thank you for inviting me to be here today to come up and get to see your new matrix. This is all very exciting. And to be able to be with you, I couldn’t be happier to be able to join you today.

So a lot of times, people ask me, what it is that an economist working for the president does? So I thought I would just start by spending a couple, just like– I don’t know– a few sentences. I am one of the members of the Council of Economic Advisors. And now I’m also the Chief Economist for the president’s Invest in America subcabinet.

And we, the Council of Economic Advisors, we get up each and every day thinking about the economics behind the president’s agenda and how we can deliver on that agenda in a way that is good for the economy, how we can enact policies so that the economy actually delivers on the president’s goals. And the president has made clear, I feel like gazillions of times at this point, that his goal is to build an economy from the bottom up and middle out.

He wants an economy where growth is strong, sustainable, where gains are broadly shared, where the economy is stable, not just strong, where our industries are globally competitive, where we have a strong and vibrant middle class, where we run our economy on clean energy and we bring down carbon emissions, and where we move beyond longstanding inequities. And so we at the CEA, we help the president as he is thinking about the economics behind how we’re going to do this.

And so today’s conversation, what I want to spend the next little bit of time talking to you about is about the president’s economic blueprint to reach his goals– what motivated it, what it is, why we believe that the evidence shows us that will be effective, and what successes that we’re already seeing. So that’s my opening slide here.

So, also, just a warning, this is a new slide deck. So while I feel very comfortable with all the material, if I’m like, oh, wait, which slide is this, just please no judgments here. I did have a late delayed flight because of weather. So we are here to talk about climate, so all the things.

So I want to start with the fact that the president came into office at the time of both immediate and long-simmering crises. It’s something he talked about a lot on the campaign. And we had the immediate crisis of the global pandemic and the pandemic-related recession.

And then candidate Biden also saw deeper structural challenges. And there were four or five of them I want to go through. So the first is that we learned a lot during the pandemic about how brittle our supply chains were, something that I think many of us were not talking about prepandemic, but we all learned.

And one analyst estimated that during the COVID-19 pandemic, a global semiconductor shortage affected as many as 169 separate industries. And this is a chart that shows the prices related to the contribution of vehicle prices to year-on-year inflation between 2019 and 2023. In 2021, all vehicles contribute about a third of annual core CPI inflation. And, of course, semiconductors were a big part of that.

There are the things going on in used cars. But in terms of new vehicles, just wanted to connect the dots between the semiconductor crisis and prices people faced. And the US share of modern semiconductor manufacturing capacity has dropped about 25 percentage points since 1990. So we saw that a factory closure somewhere around the world could affect what US consumers could buy but, more importantly, what prices we were paying.

The second big challenge that we saw– and I think this also was shown during the pandemic, but we knew that it had been emerging– is greater market concentration and less overall economic competitiveness. According to one estimate, since late 1990s, over 75% of US industries have experienced an increase in concentration levels. This is something that I know economists have been especially focused on.

What is this rising concentration mean? And the president, of course, has been focused on this. We will get to that.

The third crisis, the third challenge that the president had identified as a candidate is, of course, the growing issue of climate damages. This is a chart of the number of billion-dollar natural disasters, which have become increasingly common. I mean, Paul, as you said, I don’t have to tell anyone in California, I’m guessing, just how challenging this is.

But we know that there’s been an increase in the number of billion-dollar disasters rising from around five annually to over 20 in the past 40 years. We just got a new report this week from the UN IPCC that the frequency of events is likely to continue. And we know that there’s enormous costs associated with this, both in terms of the immediate addressing the damages, but what this does to state and local budgets, the federal budget, and the like and what this does to insurance markets and all sorts of different challenges that families face.

And then the other challenge– and this is a chart that is near and dear to the president’s heart. Near and dear is a weird way to describe a chart, also a kind of grumpy chart. But I will say that one of the things– and I’ve worked with the president a little bit before this campaign and over the years.

And this chart, which I think of as the Economic Policy Institute special– so, Larry Mishel, if you’re watching, I did say that. But this chart shows the gap between productivity and wages over time. And what it shows is that in the post-World War II period leading up to the late 1990s when the economy grew, when productivity grew, workers saw their wages rise commensurate.

But then since then, productivity has been growing. And yet workers’ wages haven’t been rising in lockstep. And that means someone has been gaining, has been accruing the gains of economic growth. But that has not been going to workers.

There are so many slides that I could show you on rising inequality. We could talk about rising wealth concentration. We could talk about rising inequality, looking at debt styles. I know that Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman were here and all of that work looking at that.

We could talk about the decline in economic mobility. But I think this chart is one that particularly speaks to the economic agenda that I’m going to talk about, which is, how do we reconnect the dots, reconnect what is happening in our economy to what it means for workers and families, a core goal of the Biden administration, and what it means to grow from the bottom up and middle out?

So the president came into office, and he called for a new course of action. And the first step in this new course of action from day one was to contain the pandemic and get the economy back on track. So in January of 2021, over the three months prior to the president’s inauguration, jobs were being created to the tune of 60,000 per month, which, if you follow the labor market, is very small, especially given the big hole we were in, in terms of the economy.

We were still suffering from the widespread pandemic. I did not bring charts on that today, because I wanted to focus, keep us moving. I think we all remember how bad that was.

And the very first thing that we focused on was the American Rescue Plan, which brought forth the fastest and most equitable economic recovery in decades. We deployed the policy tools that we had, worked to make sure that states, communities, localities had the resources they needed to get schools reopen, to get the vaccines out there to contain the pandemic and make sure that businesses and communities and families could weather the crisis and get back on track.

So we gave lots of money to child care centers around the country, lots of money to families, lots of money to schools to get everything going again.

So the outcome of that– and I will say this is one of the charts that I’m very proud to be able to have served in this administration. And this one brings me personally great joy that looking– we have seen the sharpest job market recovery relative to previous recoveries. And this is important because a pandemic recession is different.

During the pandemic, when we all knew that the virus was amongst us and we didn’t have the tools to fight it, it was really important that we shut down the economy, send people home for a while. So, of course, we cut off economic activity. But what we also needed to see is that activity coming back really quickly as soon as things were back up and running again.

And this chart shows that we have seen that in terms of jobs. So the dark blue line that goes in a sharp V down and then back up, that’s the 2020 recovery in terms of payroll employment. We’ve created almost 12 million jobs since the president took office. In the last year, we’ve seen the lowest unemployment rate on record for Black men, Hispanic workers, and workers without a high school degree.

We’ve seen this two strongest years of small business applications on record. Because of this, the United States leads the G7, which is the other advanced economies, in the pandemic economic recovery. And so this is really an important set of accomplishments.

And we can talk in the Q&A, if you would like, about some of the challenges that we’ve also faced. I don’t want to ignore the fact that, of course, prices have been high over this period. We have seen inflation. And I’m happy to talk about that, but I do want to emphasize the strength of this economic recovery.

I also want to emphasize that this recovery was particularly good for workers at the bottom of the wage distribution. This is a figure that builds on work that the– I believe it’s the Atlanta Fed. Apologies if I’m getting it wrong. I can never quite remember which fed it is.

But looking at wage growth by quartile and what is important here– I don’t have a little thing. But what is important here is down here at the end, you can see this dark line, which is the bottom quartile, has seen the sharpest growth in yearly nominal wages over workers in the top quartile, the third quartile or the second quartile, meaning that as we’ve had this recovery, we’ve seen workers at the bottom see economic gains.

So, again, when the president says he wants to build an economy from the bottom up and middle out, these are the kinds of outcomes he is looking to see. One more chart because I’m at Berkeley, I thought I would bring my Blanchet, Saez, and Zucman. This is their new real-time inequality chart.

And this shows real market income by income group. It’s looking at the top 10%, the next 40%, and the bottom half.

And, here, we can see that the bottom half has seen the strongest income growth relative to the top half, again, evidence that we’ve been growing this economy in a way that has been very inclusive, which I think is especially important given how many challenges families have faced in terms of high prices, but also just the challenges of the pandemic on top of that, which we know had severe equity implications in terms of which communities were hit the hardest.

Finally, one more indicator of the strength of the first step of the president’s plan to get the economy back on track has been that we’ve seen that family balance sheets are stronger than they were prepandemic. And this has been ongoing that we’ve been tracking this at the Council of Economic Advisors, just making sure that we’re getting a sense of just how this recovery is flowing.

One of the questions that I get asked all the time, especially when I go on television, is are we in a recession? Are we going to have a recession? Where we are seeing the data right now, things certainly are not– unemployment rates at near historic lows do not in themselves indicate we are in a recession. Of course, we’re seeing some challenges over the past 10 days with finance, which we won’t get into today.

But this economy has been able to adapt to– a variety of challenges have been thrown at it, various variants of the virus that have popped up. And we’ve had the resources to deal with them. Of course, Putin’s unprovoked war on the Ukraine, which has upended global energy prices, caused this large spike in energy prices that have been challenging.

Those have, in large part, come back down, including gas prices. And we are seeing that there’s still some strength in family balance sheets. So all of that bodes well for this recovery so far.

And now I want to move on from the immediate economic challenges to what I want to spend the most of my time talking about, which are the deeper structural challenges. As an economist who’d been working for a long time and had started an organization focused on the economic paradigm, having been candidate and then President Biden say that he wanted to change the paradigm feels very powerful. I want to spend a little bit of time talking today about what that means.

But what the president meant when he said that is that he repeatedly has said that recovering from the pandemic recession wasn’t good enough. During the campaign in the early years, we talked about the need to build back better. He knew that the challenges facing our economy– climate change and its effects, rising economic concentration, fragile supply chains, inequality, especially inequality by place and by race and ethnicity– these were structural challenges.

And so it wasn’t enough to get back to where we were. We needed to move. We needed to do better, which was core to the Build Back Better frame.

And in August, we laid all of this out in an economic blueprint for what the president is trying to achieve with his economic agenda. And this blueprint laid out five core pillars. And all of this, by the way, can fit on one tweet. So if you’re looking for a tweet, you can do this. You have to shorten the words a little bit.

But the first is to empower workers, to make sure that workers benefit from the economic recovery. The second is to focus on making it and building it in America. The president talks a lot about how our best days are not behind us, that we can build big things here in the United States. Giving families some breathing room– the president has made it very clear that his priority is to get prices down for families to deal with inflation and the high cost families are facing.

To make industry more competitive, less concentrated, more resilient, we need to deal with the challenges in our global supply chains. We need to deal with the challenges of rising economic concentration, what that means for workers, what that means for consumers, what that means for the little guy for small businesses.

And we need to make sure that we are rewarding work and not wealth. I said that wrong. I’m tired, so it’s like a little slip there. Rewarding work, not wealth.

The president has made very clear from day one, and is also clear on the budget that he just released a couple of weeks ago, that under his watch, he will not raise taxes on anyone making less than 400,000. He has also put forth a budget this year on top of being able to reduce deficits already, a budget this year that would reduce the deficit over the next decade by $3 trillion, doing that by focusing on fixing the tax code to make sure those at the top pay their fair share, so a very important value.

And, also, I believe, a lot of Berkeley folks have done a lot of research showing how those kinds of tax policies can be good for the economy. So I would refer you to the econ department. And you can talk more about that with our friends Danny and all the rest there. Wonderful.

So here’s the goals. So how are we going to get there? So to build this economy from the bottom up and middle out, we have to make strategic investments. So where step one was to contain the pandemic and get the economy back on track, step two was to identify and deliver on the strategic public investments that are essential to achieving the full potential of our nation’s economy.

And a lot of this was laid out during the campaign. And a lot of it has been refined over the course of the pandemic and built into a set of policies. So I’m going to walk you through the arc of this, but a set of policies working hand in hand with Congress.

So while we haven’t gotten everything done that the president set out to do, I do want to lay out to you how we thought about these strategic investments and why we think that there’s economic evidence that shows that this is a path that’s going to deliver on that bottom up, middle out strategy that the president is calling for and what the evidence we’re already seeing.

So the first thing is that– the fundamental idea here is that what we make it in America and how we make it matters. And I want to emphasize that this is a longstanding American idea. American policymakers have always cared about what we make here. There are a lot of strategic reasons to think so.

But what we make is, what are the strategic industries? What are the places where, if we don’t produce this here or have a sense of how we’re going to get it, we’re going to be creating challenges for ourselves. Again, think about the fragile supply chains and how, during the middle of a pandemic, we could not get enough face masks. We didn’t have the personal protective equipment that everybody needed.

Or think about the challenge that we faced with infant formula more recently, or think about the challenges that we face with semiconductors. What is it that is actually important for Americans? Then I will spent a lot of time talking about clean energy and why that is strategically important. But it really requires us to think hard about the areas where relying on private industry on its own will not or has not yet mobilized the investments necessary to achieve our core economic and national security interests.

So we’ve long had a strategy for defense industries. We know that it’s important that we have the capacity to make airplanes that can fly around and defend our country and all the other things that we need for defense. And they’ve long had an industrial strategy to make that happen.

And, of course, the military has long had a robust set of policies around that to make sure that they’re delivering that in a way that works for communities. I often think of their commitment to child care. And we can talk about that in the Q&A because I’m not going to talk about that too much up here, but wanted to at least ping that there.

We’ve also long had investments in other kinds of industries, investments in public universities, roads, railroads, public sector dollars building our industrial base and America’s middle class around the country. We put together the kinds of industries we needed to put a man on the moon. We put together the kinds of industries that we needed when it mattered to the United States.

And, today, we have an enormous set of significant challenges in front of us. And that is why one of the first things the president did when he took office, because we knew how brittle our supply chains were, was to ask a number of agencies across government to identify key strategic supply chains, few among them in energy, and to go through and say, what is going on with these supply chains? How can we make sure that we are having access to the things that we need, particularly, again, in the energy space?

And, of course, we all know that climate change is one of the biggest threats we’ve ever faced to our national, our economic security. It’s an existential threat. And that is why a series of pieces of legislation– the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, the CHIPS and Science Act, and the Inflation Reduction Act– are targeted to make the necessary investments in these most critical technologies, identifying where along the innovation to commercialization pipeline new investments are needed and how we can spur that.

So that is the what. So I want to get into the how. So the second part is how we make it. How is a very important piece of the puzzle. And we’ve seen a lot of this, just to pause for a moment before you read the slide. And I’ll get to this in a moment as well.

But a couple of weeks ago, the Department of Commerce released a Notice of Funding Opportunity for entities that want to apply for money to build a semiconductor factory, or they call them fabs. I guess they’re fabulous. It’s a new word I’ve had to learn, their fabs, these semiconductor fabrication plants.

We released this. And in it were a series of steps that weren’t just about making these tiny little semiconductors, but about how we make it. And it was very interesting to watch the national debate about whether or not how matters.

So I’m going to come back to that in a moment. But I want to just put that in the back of our minds as we’re thinking about what we mean by how. If we’re going to use taxpayer dollars to invest in strategic industries where the private sector is not already making those investments, how we do it is going to matter.

In my window, in my office at the Council of Economic Advisors, I can see down the mall a little bit. And I’m often reminded that there’s a whole bunch of agencies that the federal government has set up to deal with a variety of economic and social issues. We have an Environmental Protection Agency.

So we need to make sure that when we are inducing new private capital that we are not adding to– I think which one is this? Number 4– that we are not adding to environmental damage. If we are allowing these new investments that we’re making to add to the problems that we’re creating for this agency down the line, we wouldn’t be making good investments. We have to think about that from the get-go.

So how we make it means using public investment in the public interest, spurring private investment in innovation, shaping the market to make sure it works for American workers, families, and communities, as well as our national security and economic competitiveness. It means using or developing the policy tools to facilitate these investments.

And so these are the five core pillars that we’ve been talking about a lot inside the administration. So first is that we are working to crowd in private investment by spending government dollars strategically. That is the focus of particularly the Inflation Reduction Act and the CHIPS and Science Act, which is we’re going to put a lot of federal dollars out there and encourage private market to crowd in those dollars. And we know that that is an important place to start.

Second is that we need to make sure that we are shaping markets in a procompetitive way. One of the things that we did early on in the administration that the president did– and I believe it was May of 2021– was a executive order that put in place a whole-of-government effort around market structure and competition. In that executive order, there were 72 specific actions that he was directing agencies to take to be more competitive, to make sure that they were not fostering economic concentration across industries as they were doing other things.

So we’ve often thought of market structure as just this thing over there that the Federal Trade Commission or the Department of Justice deals with. And we’ve said, no, this is everybody’s problem. If you’re doing a reg, a regulation, if you’re spending money, you have to think about how we as policymakers are shaping markets. So as we are making these investments in strategic industries, the how, how are we shaping markets is of utmost importance.

Promote macroeconomic stability– so we want to make sure that we are not adding to macroeconomic instability as we are doing this. I’ll get to this in a moment. But one thing that we have been working on at the Council of Economic Advisors with the Office of Management and Budget is, how do we integrate climate change and transition risk and opportunity into our macroeconomic forecasting? So a little bit separate, but as we’re thinking about these investments that we’re making, we have to think about what the macroeconomic implications may be.

And then number 5, number da da, da, da. Mitigate, I already mentioned that one. And then making sure that we are creating good jobs– we need to make sure that we are always thinking about the kinds of jobs that we’re creating.

Again, I think about the Department of Labor where you have a Division of Occupational Health and Safety, you have a Wage and Hour Division who are enforcing the nation’s labor laws and making sure that we are doing our part to have good outcomes for workers. And so as we are making these investments, are we taking all that into account and focusing on the good jobs that the president wants to see?

And I know that this is a challenging issue for some. But the president has also been very clear that it’s not just what we invest in and how we do, but where, that it is important that some things are made here in the United States. And so I want to just put up a few notes on why we think it is important that we have industry in this country.

First is to think about the nearly half century of economic inequality. What does it mean to foster good jobs? How do we think about the role of economic policy?

We know there’s been a lot of economic research in recent years on the role that opening up the United States to competition in terms of trade with China, allowing them into the WTO in the year 2000, what that did to particular communities around the country, called the China shock literature, that those economic effects were long lasting.

So we need to make sure that we are thinking about how government policy is affecting good jobs and communities all across the country. In the president’s word, “Too many people have been left behind in the past, and too many people were treated like they were invisible.” So how do we do that? And that making things in America and what we make matters.

The second is about economic competitiveness. We know because there’s a lot of research on this that shows that there was a theory many decades ago that the United States could focus on just the intellectual pieces of the production process, just the engineering, or the very highly sophisticated and all of the manufacturing and production could be done somewhere else. But we also know from a lot of literature on agglomeration and the effects of that, that we need both the strength in manufacturing as well as the ability to invent and commercialize future generations of technology.

We need to make sure that our supply chains aren’t brittle, but are resilient. And that requires thinking about place and where things are produced around the world.

One statistic here that comes to my mind a lot and that came out of looking at all of the supply chain reports that the president had the agencies do, one thing that is true is that OPEC is an important oligopoly in the world. We know that when OPEC affects oil prices, that affects– or changes prices or their supply, it affects everyone. OPEC only controls 40% of the world’s oil supply. And yet that is one of the most– it’s like the textbook case of an oligopoly.

Yet when you look at the clean energy supply chain, China currently controls over 80% of core parts of that supply chain. That is a monopolization of a supply chain that is incredibly important to our future, to economic competitiveness. And so thinking about place-based strategies is really important, especially as we’re thinking about what it means to be market shaping and to have a competitive economy.

And then, finally, the administration has been doing a lot of work with friends and allies around how to think about the pieces of the president’s vision and what kinds of partnerships. And I want to just elevate something that happened just last– I think it was last week, that is really important, which is the United States and the EU have now forged a new partnership on critical minerals.

The president, working with European Commission President von der Leyen, worked to immediately begin negotiations on a targeted critical minerals agreement so that relevant critical minerals extracted or processed in the European Union will count towards requirements for the electric vehicle credit, which I will get to in a minute. And this is an important piece of the puzzle about creating that resiliency in supply chains, but thinking about place-based strategies.

There’s other things I could focus on there, but I’m watchful of time. And I want to move on to focusing on the new toolkit that we are developing as we are thinking about this strategy. So if we are focusing on what we make in the United States, thinking about what is strategically important, how we do it, so how are we actually executing on that? And now we get some little graphics, moving on in the slide deck.

So we know that this modern American industrial strategy will require a new toolkit. And so there are four basic components of this that are top of mind. So the first is that we are tapping into the productive potential of people and places across the country.

And you can think of this in terms of not just looking at a model, but looking at a map, tapping into the potential all across the United States, targeting employment growth in economically distressed areas where you can get a big return on investment, and by leveraging dormant infrastructure assets and skill-ready workforces, also focused on supercharging innovation by triggering these agglomeration benefits in new research and development hubs. So it’s the first one.

A second tool in our toolbox is to provide long-term incentives to encourage the private sector to invest at massive scale. So a big part of what the administration is doing– and I’ll show you some visuals on this in a second– is creating that demand signal. Here is where we’re going, especially on clean energy, sending that strong demand signal, coupled with regulations that give investors certainty of where we’re headed to spur those mature technologies, to deploy more quickly and pull innovation into the market faster. And our goal is for this to reduce prices for families and create high-quality jobs for workers.

Third is to encourage. And so I’m transitioning a little bit here. I really want to hone in on our specific strategies around clean energy. So the president has been thinking about the CHIPS and Science Act. I’m going to leave that aside for a moment and really focus on what this means in clean energy because this– and I will use this as just a moment to segue for a second.

When I took my role at the Council of Economic Advisors, and the very first conversation I had with CeCe Rouse on our portfolios– because this president, his three members of the Council of Economic Advisors are all, first and foremost, labor economists– myself, CeCe Rouse, and Jared Bernstein. And that was a unique configuration.

And so the first question is like, who’s going to do what? It’s not all labor. But my first conversation with Chair Rouse was that I wanted the climate portfolio for this reason, which is that if you look out over the next 10 to 50 years and you care about where jobs are going to be created in the United States, thinking about our movement to clean energy seems to me probably the most important industrial question, because this is the industry that’s going to be leading the future.

We are all on a race to save the planet as quickly as we can. And there’s a lot of things that we need to invent, produce at scale, and export and produce all around the world. And so we need to be encouraging these investments throughout these clean energy supply chains as quickly as possible. But that both creates opportunities and challenges. But this is, I think, how we’re going to create good jobs across the country. So that was just a little bit of a segue there.

But back to the slide here, this last bullet, I think, is incredibly important. As we’re thinking about our toolkit, we’ve been focused on facilitating a government-enabled, private sector-led economy. What can we do so that government is shaping the market in the direction that we want it to go, and yet we are still getting all of that innovation, all of the wonderful things that the private sector brings to the table and lower costs over time? So our toolkit has been put together with all of this front of mind.

So I wanted to spend just a couple of seconds on some of the economic arguments and evidence behind this. As I think about this agenda that we have been putting together in the Biden administration, I have often thought about– and, actually, I don’t have in my notes here exactly where he said it.

But Dani Rodrik has called this kind of theory of the case productivism, which is a reorientation toward an economic policy framework that’s rooted in production, work and localism instead of finance consumerism and globalism. And you can see that here, we’re prioritizing what we make, how we make it, where we make it as the core economic question that we need to be focused on.

Janet Yellen has spoken and written about a new modern supply-side economics. She said, and I want to quote here, “Modern supply-side economics prioritizes labor supply, human capital, public infrastructure, research and development, and investments in a sustainable environment. These focus areas are all aimed at increasing economic growth and addressing longer-term structural problems, particularly inequality.”

Chair Rouse has called– and we just released a new economic report of the president. But in the last years, we focused a lot on calling for government to be a partner, not a rival, to private action. So those are some of the big-picture economic themes that we’re focused on here.

But in terms of focusing just on the clean energy piece, I wanted to put up my favorite quote from an economist about how some of our ideas are connected to the cutting edge of where folks are thinking. This is a quote from Daron Acemoglu. We had him talked to some folks about– as we were thinking about some of these issues.

And he has written that, quote, “The climate crisis demands that we consider more radical ideas” than just think– and this is my brackets– just thinking about pricing. “If we can reach a consensus on the need for massive investments in the clean-energy transition, perhaps we can agree to orient that spending around the creation of good jobs.

That might well violate the Tinbergen principle that the best way to neutralize a market failure is with a policy instrument designed specifically for that purpose. But if it helps to prevent the deepening of social, economic, and political fault lines that have appeared in many Western advanced economies, it will have been well worth it.”

So for a long time, as we thought about what to do about climate, the first best answer that economists gave was to focus on pricing, carbon tax. That’s the obvious thing to do. It’s a bad thing. Tax it. That’s the obvious thing to do.

But what we have learned– we’ve learned a number of things. One, not clear that there is a political path to actually do that. So, personally, I was like, how long do we have to wait for people to realize that that’s the best idea? And that seemed like too long.

But second– and I think this is really important. And there’s been a lot of especially political science research on this question. As it turns out, different industries have different needs. And it is not just that we need to get rid of emissions. That is important for the climate. That’s super important.

If you’re a climate scientist, that is like 100% job one. That is what you’re thinking about. Hi, I’m a labor economist. What I care about is, how are we going to do this in a way that creates industries and jobs and doesn’t just destroy our economy in a way that would be both politically unpalatable and also add to the structural challenges that I talked about at the beginning of this slide?

There are people that work at manufacturing facilities that produce cars that run on gasoline. If we just start taxing all of that but don’t have a plan, then what happens to them? How do how do we adapt? And that is the challenge that we’ve brought on.

So in the beginning where I talked about what we make, strategic investments, our strategic investments in clean energy are grounded in the idea that we need to make sure that we are facilitating this building of a new clean energy economy and not just assuming that the market will do everything on its own if we do not provide that support.

So I wanted to put up Daron’s quote here because I thought that that was– I feel like people smarter than me were saying similar things. So that’s always a good thing. Go to the experts.

OK, so as we’ve thought through, I think the other thing, I just wanted to note on the economics of this. So one of the challenges– if you’re an economist or an economist-akin audience member, one of the challenges with doing the kinds of industrial strategy that we are involved in is whether or not you feel that we are just picking in winners and losers. Oh, my goodness, this is so inefficient, even if you think that a carbon tax was maybe not politically palatable or maybe even if you thought that there were other policies.

So I wanted to just spend a couple of moments on noting that so much of what we have focused on are building the kind of productivity-enhancing infrastructure that we need to be building as well as solving specific market failures. But as we’ve thought about these market failures, we’ve thought about them broadly. And I think that’s an important piece of the puzzle.

In 2021, early on in the administration, the Council of Economic Advisors, we put out a paper called Innovation, Investment, and Inclusion– Accelerating the Clean Energy Transition and Creating Good Jobs. And, there, we laid out the series of market failures that we saw in this energy transition.

And, of course, there is the negative externality of emissions. But there are also a number of classic market failures. One that we’ve spent a lot of time on in the administration is thinking about coordination problems.

So think of the challenge with electric vehicles. Very difficult to think, I’m going to go out and buy an electric vehicle if there isn’t a network available for you to charge that vehicle, or if there is a network. But it doesn’t use your charger, because there’s been a private actor who’s been trying to monopolize it and not sharing those chargers with everybody.

So those are the classic kinds of problems where we believe that government can play a role helping to set standards, but also to solve this chicken and egg problems. Which comes first, the charging network or the electric vehicles? So we said, yes, let’s do both.

So in our policies, we have both spent $7.5 billion on a nationwide charging network as well as supported the development of electric vehicles. But I think I want to just elevate that many of the ways that we’ve targeted the specifics of our industrial strategy are grounded in strong economic principles trying to solve these classic problems of externalities, coordination failures, various sets of market structure questions.

So now I’m going to just take a few more minutes to go through some specifics. Hold on here. And then I want to get to questions of what we’re actually doing. So this is the theory of the case. And now I want to get to the legislation, which is the core pieces of the toolkit that we’ve put in place.

So by now, I’m sure everyone is familiar with the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, also known as the IIJA, which I don’t know what it stands for. But we call it the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law because, very proudly, it was bipartisan, hundreds of billions of dollars for all sorts of things across the United States.

I will note that the 7.5 billion, there’s a really set of interesting papers by Jim Stock and colleagues on how this money that we’re spending on the network may be some of the most efficient dollars that we’re spending, moving the electric vehicle transition– which was good to hear, because it’s a small amount of money, but also could be very impactful– but money on the power grid and the like.

And then the Inflation Reduction Act, which passed in the summer in August– loans and grants to industry, clean energy production investment tax credits, consumer tax credits, all of which focused on spurring this new vital industry that we need to build a clean energy economy.

Now, there’s a lot of details in all of this. And I’m going to put up a very difficult slide for you to read. Oh, no, I’m not. Wait, hold on. Wait, I thought– wait a minute, my notes– we’re going to just skip this one. There we go. We’re just going to go to the difficult side to read.

So I wanted to put this one up. Even though it’s difficult to read– and I don’t like slides like this because I can’t see very well sometimes. But the reason I wanted to put that up there is that we are doing all of these things to spur a new clean energy economy.

And as we are doing so, we are making sure that this is good for communities, using every tool in our toolbox. So all of these little numbers and little details here are different elements of different pieces of the legislation that focus on things like prevailing wages and apprenticeship requirements. So there’s a set of the credits to businesses that say, if you want this credit, it will be increased by 5% times for projects that meet prevailing wage and apprenticeship requirements.

There are also various ones where there’s a 30% credit for projects meeting these requirements. These are additions, usually, on top of things where we are making sure that we are adding domestic content requirements, focusing on energy communities and low and moderate-income communities so that you get more of a tax credit if you put your investment in places that need it most, so trying to leverage these public dollars in a way that can induce private capital to the places where it will be most effective.

The two at the bottom around Direct Pay is making sure that entities that do not generally benefit from income tax credits, like state, local, and tribal governments, nonprofits or churches, can also benefit from some of these, which is a small thing, but could be huge to those organizations and being able to benefit from them.

I mentioned earlier the CHIP’s Notice of Funding Opportunity and how they were doing this as well. They said that applicants for major projects have to include a detailed plan for providing affordable, high-quality child care to both the construction and fab workers. And they have to pay prevailing wages while encouraging them to create high-quality jobs.

So we’ve decided on these strategic industries. And we’re investing in them in a way that will hopefully address– doing our best using all the tools in our toolkit to address these longer-term structural issues.

So I’m going to skip this next slide, and I’m going to go straight to some success. OK, so building the economy from the bottom up, some successes– so we are already spurring private investment in construction and manufacturing.

So these charts go from 2010 through 2022. You can see an uptick in real manufacturing construction being put in place that is equivalent to the run-up in the recovery from the Great Recession in the early teens. And this is real electronics manufacturing put in place, so millions of US dollars, a spike there.

Our goal is to crowd in private investment. So this is publicly enabled but private sector driven. And you can see this in some of these numbers.

Here is a map. This is one that the president likes to tweet out a lot. Manufacturing is on the rise. For a while, we were all saying, everything’s on the rise.

So we’re already seeing companies responding to the president’s investments. We were able to start tracking this within weeks of the Inflation Reduction Act being signed. So the president signs this law putting all of these subsidies in place. And, very quickly, the private sector started to act. And I think in clean energy, this is so important.

The president told the country, told the world these are the strategically important industries we need to be focused on. We need to make sure that this is what we are doing, and the private sector has acted. And you can see they’re all across the country. And it’s too small to read all of that. But if you go to the president’s Twitter feed, you will be able to see this chart.

The next one, we’ve seen that manufacturing employment has been growing apace. We’ve seen the fastest two-year manufacturing job growth in nearly 40 years. And the economy has added nearly 800,000 jobs in manufacturing. Again, like the earlier chart I showed you on overall total payroll employment, this has been the fastest growth relative to other economic recoveries.

I’m sure somebody is asking or thinking, gosh, Heather, is everybody going to become a manufacturing worker in the United States? Probably the answer to that question is no. But in terms of being able to build things and make things in the United States and have some greater resiliency in our supply chains and also the innovation and technological advances in clean energy, this is certainly an important achievement.

These are some cool maps from the Department of Energy, focusing on new investments in battery manufacturing and supply chain investments and American-made solar happening all across the country. So, again, these are a little bit small. But these are available on the Department of Energy’s website. Again, you can see these investments going up all over the country.

North American battery cell manufacturing is now set to grow nearly 15-fold by 2030 based on tracked announcements, enough for 10 to 13 million electric vehicles. Nearly 40% of these announcements have been announced since the passage of the Inflation Reduction Act.

In August of 2021, the president did an event where he had the big three auto companies and the UAW, and he said, we want to make sure that by 2030, half of all auto sales in the United States be electric vehicles. We are now on track to make enough batteries to do so.

Yay. I’m just like, OK, great. Yeah, little confetti here. Since [INAUDIBLE], it’s nice to set a goal and meet a goal, even when you thought– we did the analysis on that. Could we do this? And yes, it was theoretically possible. But I don’t know where all the pieces come into play. So it’s very exciting.

We’ve seen over 95 gigawatts of domestic solar equipment manufacturing capacity has been announced across the country as well. We have seen– and then I think this is just some stats on different investments that have been announced or things that are happening. We’ve seen electric vehicle shares are projected to be 56% to 67% for light duty. I think you can read all of these. I do want to get to Q&A.

So I have a couple more– let me just see here. So I have a couple more brag slides, just going to go through them and let you just mull on all of the accomplishments.

This new National Renewable Energy Laboratory study just came out that said that, combined, the Bipartisan Infrastructure and the IRA are– you can read the things. Make clean energy more abundant, slash power sector emissions, deliver cost savings, but some good assessments of just how far we are going.

And for those of you who really are focused on emissions, because if that’s why you care about climate change its emissions, not just jobs like me, we are seeing that the emissions reductions are significant. And we are on track. At this point, we believe by our analysis and other outsiders to meet the president’s goal of cutting emissions in half relative to 2005 by the president by 2030, which is important for us to meet our Paris Agreement goals.

And a lot of this is being done through the Loans Program Office. I skipped that slide in the interest of time. It’s one of the offices that is making the investments. They are giving loans to cutting-edge companies across the country to help spur this clean energy transition.

So this is an assessment of how much money has gone out. As of February 2023, they do a monthly assessment. Again, this is on the web page, but just to show how much is going out. And this is where their applications and activities are.

So with that, I’m going to stop because I wanted to stop five minutes ago. I have too many slides because I’m just too excited to tell you about all the things we’ve accomplished.

Just to end, I think what is important here is that the president came into office understanding that there were a series of economic challenges, an immediate crisis, long-term structural issues. He said, we needed to build back better. We need to build an economy from the bottom up and middle out.

The core way that, in his view, we needed to do that was to change our thinking from just assuming that if we just let our hands go and let markets do whatever they wanted, everything would be OK and focus on the strategic places where government could really make a difference and making sure that we do that in a way that benefits people in communities all across the country. That is the core economics behind this and economics, because I’m here at the matrix that has been informed by lots of social science researchers, not just economists.

And I think we are already– as I’ve shown, there’s a lot of evidence that this kind of approach can show good strong results. With that, I will stop. Thank you.

[PAUL PIERSON] So we’ve got some questions online. But I always think that we should start by rewarding people who have made the trek here. So Eva can walk around. And if you raise your hand, we’ll get some questions.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] I’m going to start with the softball question.

[HEATHER BOUSHEY] Tell me who you are.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] Yeah, I’m Larry Magid. I teach at the Goldman School of Public Policy here on campus. So I’m curious about the structure of the president’s– and I’m going to try to say this right– the Invest in America cabinet. So who’s in it? How is it structured? What is your role? And are there specific goals that that cabinet has set?

[HEATHER BOUSHEY] I’m going to cheat because I have a note on who’s in it right here. And I have my– yeah. So the Invest in America cabinet was announced. The president gave a major economic speech on January 26.

And in it, he said that he was forming this new cabinet. It was about the same time that Ron Klain got his well-deserved time away from the White House, and Jeff Zients took on as Chief of Staff. And there was a lot of discussion about really moving fully into implementation, although, of course, we were doing that before.

The subcabinet includes Department of Commerce, Department of Labor, Department of Transportation, the Treasury, the Department of Energy, and Health and Human Services. And the purpose is to focus on implementing the variety of pieces of legislation that the president has put into place. So one of the wonderful things about a democracy is that you don’t always know how things are going to end up.

So the president was able to get the bipartisan infrastructure laws passed earlier than the other pieces of his agenda. So, of course, when that happened, he brought in Mitch Landrieu to help to head up the implementation of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law. He’d also earlier brought in Gene Sperling to head up the implementation of the American Rescue Plan.

But then once the Inflation Reduction Act and the CHIPS and Science Act were passed, wanted to really make sure that everybody is focused on executing on all of these together because the American people don’t see specific pieces of legislation. They see the outcomes they want to see in the world. And these are a package so that you need the infrastructure.

You need the power grids. You need the EV charging stations to go with the investments that are happening in the other pieces of legislation. So that’s what the subcabinet is focused on.

I’m the chief economist. Never know what a chief economist does. I think my job is to help people, help the community understand what the economics of this are and how we can do this in a way that will have the desired economic outcomes. Thanks. That was a great little– pshoo.

Softball.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] Hi. I’m Jonas Meckling. I teach climate and clean energy politics. Thanks so much for a fascinating overview. I have questions about the government’s ability to make and manage these investments.

The first one is around bureaucratic capacity. It takes a lot of government officials to make these investments. We’ve seen changes to the Department of Energy, for instance, the Office of Infrastructure. How concerned are you about this becoming a bottleneck for implementing these investments? And if so, what kind of changes would you like to see?

The second one is around coordination. You mentioned the coordination market failures. What mechanisms does the federal government have to coordinate across agencies, but also with state governments in making these investments for clean energy future?

[HEATHER BOUSHEY] OK, coordinated across state governments– so in terms of bureaucratic, I mean– so I think that that is a great question. There is, I will say, a couple of things. One, there is an enormous resource of incredibly talented civil servants and political appointees across government that are dedicated getting up each and every day figure out how to do this.

The Department of Energy has hired or is hiring– I don’t want to give a number, because I’m not sure exactly how many– but lots of people to help execute on this. So this is something certainly that they are focused on each and every day. I can tell you from where I sit, something like the Loans Program Office or the other offices are doing the hard work to lay out the strategic needs and then how they are going to implement and execute on them.

So, for example, there are a set of– and I probably– so the slides that I showed you from the Loans Program Office gives you a sense of their strategic investments. They have also released a series of pathways reports. I have too many pieces of paper here. And they don’t have page numbers, so I won’t be able to find them.

But those were just released, I believe, earlier this week that lay out the strategic ways that they are guiding their investment decisions. And so I think my answer to you is that people understand the challenge and are stepping up to it.

I think the other question we need to ask ourselves is, if not us, who? And so what I saw in the supply chain reports that came out earlier in the administration is that the private sector created a set of supply chains– these were their independent decisions– that are very difficult to track. If you talk to the supply chain people, they’ll start throwing up these charts that just literally look like bowls of spaghetti. You don’t know what’s coming from where and how you track it.

So as agencies went out there to look at, how do we make sure that the things that we really need to get to where they need to go that are of national importance, government is particularly equipped to be able to help provide that guidance and that analysis. And I think you saw that in those supply chain reports, to ask some of those tough questions.

Your second question was coordination. I think you said coordination across federal and state. Is that what you’re asking? Or across agencies?

Federal and state.

  1. So, well, I think that the Invest for America subcabinet is emblematic of the kinds of coordination. There is a daily coordination across agencies. But I think when the president put that forward, he wanted to make sure that at the highest level, there was that connective tissue to make sure that– as one of my colleagues says who works on industrial organizations, she’ll look at these things. She’s like, there’s a lot of steel in all of these.

Are all the right people across agencies talking to each other about how we’re making sure that we are producing that clean steel? We’ve got the green steel deal with Europe that we are still talking about, the steel and aluminum. Like, are we thinking about all these pieces and how that’s fitting into everyone’s plans? And yes, people are coordinating and working on that.

I will say, in some ways, the pandemic, challenging as it was, my experience in government is that because Zoom is so easy, I’m on a video call with someone from an agency multiple times a day. And I’m at the CEA. I’m not even at the NSC, or I’m not on one of the policy councils. So there’s a lot of connective work happening across those teams.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] Thanks. Thanks for sharing all this and all of the great work. I wanted to ask about another part of innovation policy. So we’re talking about industrial policy and all the new work being on it.

But people like Fred Bloch have been writing about how the US has had a hidden developmental state and an industrial policy over many decades of a lot of innovation coming through the military, DARPA, et cetera. And then the model, typically, is that those inventions are provided open source, free. The government doesn’t retain any intellectual property rights.

And then they get taken up by people in Silicon Valley and elsewhere and then often wind up privatizing a lot of profits. And I was wondering if there are parts of this that address some of that issue. And I know that one of the people who’s advocating for this now is Mariana Mazzucato, for instance, the idea that the government should retain some kind of a residual right to participate in some of the upside. And so I just wanted to see if there’s anything to say about that.

[HEATHER BOUSHEY] That is a great question. I do not want to misspeak. So let me pause on that question because I don’t have the notes that I am looking for. I mean, I think that that is a great question.

One thing I wanted to note is that I– and I think this is where the administration is really pushing into new areas. So there’s a lot of– so the economists will be the first one to tell you that things that government should invest in are research and– like, the early stage research, the science bit of it.

I think that one of the challenges that we have both identified and are trying to fix right now is that that’s super important. Yes, we should do it and especially in clean energy, given the urgency, but also in some other sectors. And semiconductors is certainly one of them.

There is a role for government on not just on the pure research side, but on the getting to commercialization side. And so that brings up new issues, which we’re getting at. If it’s science, if it’s research that anyone can benefit, OK. But once you’re getting into, how is it that you’re going to help a particular firm move faster to create clean energy vehicles, or how are you going to help a particular firm make the kind of green hydrogen that we want, how do you think about some of those?

So I think there are great questions to ask. I would want to consult– I don’t have my notes that I would want to give someone the specific answers. But I’m happy to follow up with you on that. And then there’s a question. There’s questions here.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] Steve Vogel, Political Science and Political Economy. In terms of supply chain resilience, I just would love to get your thoughts on how we wrap our heads around, what makes a sector or a technology more or less strategic? As you suggested, the definition of strategic used to be strategic in a military sense. And, obviously, you’re thinking about something much more expansive.

So if we’re replacing that definition, then what do we replace it with? Are there principles or modes of analysis that can help us think through what needs to be made here versus what doesn’t?

[HEATHER BOUSHEY] Yeah, that is the question, Steven. I mean, that is literally the question. And I have spent a lot of time mulling on that and knowing that that is like, where does it end? Where does it end? What do we think is important?

I think, especially myself, I saw that over the pandemic, when it started to feel like everything was on government– we were going to save Christmas the first year because we’re making sure that things got to market. And there was a little bit like, where’s the responsibility?

But I think that gets to the thing that is so important, which is that in a crisis, people turn to government. So part of my answer back to you is that’s actually the question we need to be thinking about right now. We started off with Paul talking about last night’s weather. Extreme weather is happening all across the country, all across the world.

We know that we are living in a time that is more uncertain, more volatile, potentially more chaotic than humans have faced before because of the nature of climate change and the damages. And we know that things like the pandemic– I’m not a real scientist. Economist here. But I understand from people that study viruses is that these things may become more common as we have climate change.

So I think a question that we need to ask now that might be different than in 1952 or 1972 or 1982 is, how do we as societies make this transition to build clean energy economies and make that as smooth as easy as possible? And that feels to me like– that is certainly where this administration has come down. But I think that there’s a deeper set of answers, one that all of you that are here at Berkeley– I mean, this is the conversation we need to have.

But I will segue going to something that I did not talk about up here. But I’ve become a little like, ugh, with– as I mentioned, we have been working on incorporating climate risk and transition risk and opportunity into our macroeconomic forecasting. One of the things that I’ve learned through this work is that our energy models, our climate models– looking at you, climate people– they assume a transition.

Most of these models use carbon pricing to say, here, today, we use fossil fuels. Tomorrow, we’re going to do something different. It’s going to be awesome. But we’re going to get from here to there by assuming a price transition. But all of this stuff in the middle, literally everything that I just spent the last almost hour talking about, that is messy and complicated.

And to your question, where does it end, what industries are strategic, well, it seems to me that the most important thing is that we build this clean energy economy as quickly as possible and as smoothly as possible. And we get all the private capital to help us do it. And we make sure that it delivers for communities. That seems like where we need to start. I’ll stop there, pontificating.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] Thanks. Hi, Heather Haveman, Sociology and–

[INTERPOSING VOICES]

I just want to [INAUDIBLE] Heather.

The other Heather.

Yes.

So I want to thank you, first of all, for the child care provision in the CHIPS and Science Act because I know that that matters to you. And it matters to many working parents. But I also want to ask you about how the government plans on dealing with not just in bringing business in, but also dealing with resistance from existing business, because there’s always going to be a sense of winning and losing in this world.

I mean, it’s been heartening that the automobile industry was like, oh, no, raising emission standards is actually good fo us, when the former guy’s administration was pushing back on that. But there’s also been pushback on all sorts of antigreen economy stuff from existing industries, like coal and natural gas and oil. So how do we shift them to make them part of the solution rather than part of a continuing problem?

[HEATHER BOUSHEY] I think it’s a great question. A couple of answers– the first one is that our basic tactic is throw money at– like, let’s focus on making this palatable. So let’s throw money at this challenge rather than– I mean, again, the economists’ preferred method here was a pricing mechanism. Let’s make it harder to do.

Let’s make something more expensive so then people will say, OK, well let’s do this other thing. Let’s actually make that easier. And then let’s figure out how to make this hard thing go away. I think that creates a lot of opportunity.

It creates a lot of opportunity to say, oh well, I’m over here doing this thing. The writing is now on the wall. I think that’s what’s so powerful about the maps that I showed you. Those people haven’t gotten a tax credit yet. They haven’t seen a single dollar. And yet they’re announcing all of this investment. It’s a demand signal.

So some of that capital is coming from the folks that may feel like, oh, wait. They weren’t going to– I mean, I don’t have analysis on that data. But I have to imagine that private capital is making choices. So you’re creating opportunity so that those that might lose out they have something else they can go into. So I think that’s the first thing.

Any economist will say, oh, maybe that’s not so efficient. I don’t know. Let’s just get it done. I think that’s kind of we have to focus on. What’s most efficient is getting it done. I think that’s the first thing.

The second thing is that the administration has been focused like a laser on making sure that communities left behind aren’t left behind. So one of the first things that he did was set up the Energy Communities Task Force, which has been working around the country to focus on energy communities. What do they need? How do we support them through this transition? How do we make sure that resources are going there?

That slide I showed– that all those little details, making sure that investments go to disadvantaged communities so that those communities aren’t left behind, so that those potential entrepreneurs can get access to this money and credit. So I think there’s also a question of, who’s been left behind for 50 years? And what do they want? So I think that’s also–

So yesterday– what is today? Wednesday, so either Tuesday or Monday. Time, it’s a concept. The president vetoed the ESG rule saying that, hey, environmental, among other things, matters in our investments.

And, again, those are those signals that we think that as investors are looking to make decisions, they should be taking these into account. So continuing to push back on the narrative that you can’t make money doing this, I think, is an important piece of the puzzle.

I spent the morning at a conference over at the Haas Building on climate finance, listening to people talk about how there is so much need for investment. There’s so much money to be made. It’s a little bit like there’s no reason for anyone to be left behind.

The other thing I will note is that the thing about transitioning to clean energy away from fossil fuels is that there’s a lot more stuff to build. So, again, there’s a lot of money to be made building the things that we need, building the solar panels, the wind turbines, all of the things rather than just the person who happens to own the plot of land where the natural resource is. So there’s a lot of opportunity there as well. So I think focus on the positive. That’s all I got.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] Thank you. I’m Dennis Best. I’m a doctoral student here at Berkeley in the Energy and Resources group and, also, a graduate affiliate in the Center for Latin American Studies. I have a question regarding coordination broadly and the mechanisms for coordination, going back to the maps that you showed, and then, also, the questions about local content.

As we know, coming from the perspective of California, our industries are heavily dependent on labor migration and heavily dependent on the interdependencies historically in North America and, particularly, at the US-Mexican border. I would like to understand a little bit more about the questions about– I attended in 2018 a EPRI and IEA discussion about capacity market trading on the energy side.

And then we think about the industrialization that requires that energy capacity. So I would like to ask you about the mechanisms for coordination to deal with some of those questions about local content and as they relate to questions about migration flows across the maps that you showed.

[HEATHER BOUSHEY] So I understood the words. I didn’t quite understand the question. Apologies.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] The coordination question, you said we have a bunch of bureaucratic forces working within questions of coordination as one of the things. So as we talk about the 10% local content clauses that you showed and other questions about local content, I’m interested to understand, what is the scope of thinking about that in a North American context? And then what are the mechanisms that are established or that would be developed to deal with those questions about local content?

[HEATHER BOUSHEY] So those are in process. So the Treasury is working on the tax– so a lot of those are through the tax code. So the Treasury Department is working through the rules on how to define all of that and work through those challenges.

What the president has made clear is that– and what the Senate has made clear in the law that they passed is that domestic content matters. Of course, we have trade deals with countries. And some of these definitions are being worked out as we speak. But making sure that the United States has the capacity to produce here is a core part of the president’s agenda. I don’t know if that got at your full question. But I’m happy to talk to you.

[PAUL PIERSON] So we’re almost out of time. We’ve got a bunch of online questions. But we’re not going to get to most of them, I’m afraid. But there’s one here that I thought might be a good place to end, pulling you a little bit out from the specifics of your talk, but I think really appropriate for this audience.

“Could you comment on how you’ve seen economist ideas about what is economically possible in the US evolve and filter through the bureaucracy and how these have shifted between the Obama and the current administration?”

[HEATHER BOUSHEY] Well, that’s a big question. So economists are– we’re an interesting bunch. So I’ll say a couple of things. One, right before I joined the campaign, the Biden campaign, I had published a book called Unbound, where I wrote about what I called a paradigm shift in economics, focusing on how to think about inequality.

But through that work that we did at the center that I ran and the research that I did for the book, seeing that there was a lot of work in economics questioning some of the simple assumptions around the equity-efficiency tradeoff and new data, new methods were allowing us to ask new and different questions. And I think you see that in the policy world. I think you see that in the transition between what happened during the Obama administration and what happened here. I also think you see a difference in the political landscape in which we’re working.

In the Obama administration, there was that whole discussion around how big the recovery should be. It was capped below a trillion. They did all this. It was a very, very slow jobs recovery.

And that was, of course, influenced by the economic advice that the president got, but also the political reality. This president did not want to make that mistake. But, also, there was a lot of economic evidence that showed, hey, we could make these investments in people and communities, and we could see outcomes.

Now, and thank you, nobody, for asking me about inflation. But that, of course, was one of the challenges that we’ve been dealing with. But it’s not just been us. It’s been global. You cannot pin all of that on the money that we spent through the American Rescue Plan, given the fact that it wasn’t just us that has experienced that, even though it is certainly a piece of the puzzle.

So I think that the political economy in which economics is functioning is both different politically, but also within the profession. And the willingness to take on the real-world challenges, I think, is what the hallmark of the colleagues that I see in the administration. We have a number of things that we need to move on. We need to move on them on them quickly. And we need to make sure that we are doing the best that we can given the tools we have, not just what the best might be in a textbook chart.

I don’t want to say that other people made decisions that way. But that is certainly not the way we’re making decisions.

[PAUL PIERSON] OK, before we finish, I wanted to make sure that I thank the amazing Matrix staff, Eva and Chuck in particular, for putting this event together. Thank you all for coming rather than darting off for a spring break. And most of all, Heather, thank you so much for sharing your time with us and sharing your ideas and your work.

Thank you.

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Book Talk

The Flag and the Cross: White Christian Nationalism and the Threat to Democracy

Presented as part of the Berkeley Center for the Study of Religion’s Public Forum on Race, Religion, Democracy and the American Dream

Recorded on March 23, 2023, this talk featured Phil Gorski, Frederick and Laura Goff Professor of Sociology and Religious Studies at Yale University, discussing his new book (co-authored with Samuel Perry), The Flag and the Cross: White Christian Nationalism and the Threat to Democracy. The respondent was David Hollinger, Preston Hotchkis Professor Emeritus of History at UC Berkeley. Carolyn Chen, Co-Director of the Berkeley Center for the Study of Religion and Professor of Ethnic Studies, moderated.

The talk was jointly sponsored by the Berkeley Center for the Study of Religion (BCSR), the Center for Right-Wing Studies, and Social Science Matrix. The event was part of the BCSR Public Forum on Race, Religion, Democracy and the American Dream.

Listen to this panel as a podcast below, or on Google Podcasts or Apple Podcasts.

About the Speaker

Philip S. Gorski, Frederick and Laura Goff Professor of Sociology and Religious Studies at Yale University, is a comparative-historical sociologist with strong interests in theory and methods and in modern and early modern Europe. His empirical work focuses on topics such as state-formation, nationalism, revolution, economic development and secularization with particular attention to the interaction of religion and politics. His other current interests include the philosophy and methodology of the social sciences and the nature and role of rationality in social life.

Among his recent publications are The Disciplinary Revolution: Calvinism and the Growth of State Power in Early Modern Europe (Chicago, 2003); Max Weber’s Economy and Society: A Critical Companion (Stanford, 2004); and “The Poverty of Deductivism: A Constructive Realist Model of Sociological Explanation,” Sociological Methodology, 2004. Gorski is Co-Director (with Julia Adams) of Yale’s Center for Comparative Research (CCR), and co-runs the Religion and Politics Colloquium at the Yale MacMillan Center.

About the Book

Most Americans were shocked by the violence they witnessed at the nation’s Capital on January 6th, 2021. And many were bewildered by the images displayed by the insurrectionists: a wooden cross and wooden gallows; “Jesus saves” and “Don’t Tread on Me;” Christian flags and Confederate Flags; even a prayer in Jesus’ name after storming the Senate chamber. Where some saw a confusing jumble, Philip S. Gorski and Samuel L. Perry saw a familiar ideology: white Christian nationalism.

In this short primer, Gorski and Perry explain what white Christian nationalism is and is not; when it first emerged and how it has changed; where it’s headed and why it threatens democracy. Tracing the development of this ideology over the course of three centuries—and especially its influence over the last three decades—they show how, throughout American history, white Christian nationalism has animated the oppression, exclusion, and even extermination of minority groups while securing privilege for white Protestants. It enables white Christian Americans to demand “sacrifice” from others in the name of religion and nation, while defending their “rights” in the names of “liberty” and “property.”

White Christian nationalism motivates the anti-democratic, authoritarian, and violent impulses on display in our current political moment. The future of American democracy, Gorski and Perry argue, will depend on whether a broad spectrum of Americans—stretching from democratic socialists to classical liberals—can unite in a popular front to combat the threat to liberal democracy posed by white Christian nationalism.

Transcript

The Flag and the Cross: White Christian Nationalism and the Threat to American Democracy

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[CAROLYN CHEN] Well, I am so thrilled to be introducing Dr. Gorski and his important book today. I first heard about Dr. Gorski in the mid-1990s when I was a graduate student here in sociology in my first year theory course taught by Dr. Anne Svidler, who’s in our audience here today. And Phil, we read your amazing 1993 American Journal of Sociology article on The Protestant Ethic Revisited. And I was a big labor nerd at the time, and I still am. And I knew that you had graduated ahead of me in the doctoral program. And I remember thinking, whoa, if only one day I could write like Phil Gorski.

So Dr. Gorski is the Frederick and Laura Goff Professor of Sociology and Religious Studies at Yale. He is a comparative historical sociologist with a strong interest in theory and methods in modern and early modern Europe and North America. He’s the author of five books that range a topic from the German left, Calvinism in early modern Europe, a revisiting of Weber’s Protestant ethic, American civil religion, and now white Christian nationalism. He’s edited three books, one on Max Weber’s economy and society, one on the post-secular, and one on Bourdieusian theory.

He was also the co-PI of a significant grant from the John Templeton Foundation that examined human flourishing and critical realism in the social sciences. And as I mentioned earlier, Dr. Gorski received his doctorate at UC Berkeley in sociology and is a product of our great sociology department. So welcome home, Phil.

So I can think of no one better than our own Dr. David Hollinger to respond to Dr. Gorski today. Dr. Hollinger is no stranger to most of us. He is the Preston Hotchkiss Emeritus Professor of History at UC Berkeley. He’s the author of 12 books on topics such as American intellectual history, American Protestantism, and religion and ethnicity in the US. His most recent book is published in 2022 is Christianity’s American Fate– How Religion Became More Conservative and Society More Secular.

If you’d like to learn more about Dr. Gorski and Dr. Hollinger’s latest books, you can read a recent article in the February 9 issue of The New York Review of Books, where both books are reviewed together in an article on Christian nationalism.

Now, before I turn the mic over to Dr. Gorski, I’d like to thank the wonderful staff at the Berkeley Center for the Study of Religion and the Social Science Matrix for making this event possible, Patty Dunlap, Bex Sussmann, Victoria Jaschob Chuck Kapelke, and Eva Seto. Today’s talk is part of the Berkeley Center for the Study of Religion Speaker series on race, religion, American democracy, and the American dream, as well as the Social Science Matrix book talk series. We are grateful for the co-sponsorship of the Department of Sociology and the Berkeley Center for Right-Wing Studies. Finally, this event has been made possible by the generous funding of the Henry Luce Foundation.

And for those of you who are joining us online, please submit questions and comments through the Q&A feature through the conversation. And if you’re having any AV trouble and would like assistance, please send a message via the chat function. Now, please join me in welcoming Dr. Gorski.

[PHIL GORSKI] Thank you for that warm welcome, Carolyn. Let me echo the thanks to Patty and Chuck and the crew here at the Berkeley Center. It’s great to be back. So I’m sure that you’ve all seen photos like this by now, photos of the failed coup. And perhaps you also notice the strange jumble of symbols– Christian flags and Jesus banners, but also Confederate flags and a wooden gallows, Stars and Stripes and Don’t Tread On Me flags, and of course, lots and lots of Trump flags, too.

Many secular observers were confused by this juxtaposition of symbols. They saw apples and oranges, symbols of religion and nationalism, racism and vigilantism, libertarianism and authoritarianism. What Sam Perry and I saw was something different, a fruit cocktail, which we call white Christian nationalism.

My talk today is based on our recent book, The Flag and the Cross– White Christian Nationalism and the Threat to American Democracy. The book is in four parts as is my talk. First, I’ll talk about what’s in the fruit cocktail and who’s drinking it. Second, a little bit about the original recipe for the cocktail, how it was devised and how it’s changed over time. Third, I’ll focus on its effects in our politics over the last decade or so. And I’ll then conclude with some reflections on where white Christian nationalism is headed and what can be done to counter it.

Let’s start with what question, just what exactly is white Christian nationalism? Well, one way of thinking about it is as a political vision, a set of attitudes and preferences about politics and policy. My co-author, Sam Perry, has constructed a scale that he uses to measure white Christian nationalism. It’s based on a series of questions that have been asked in several surveys over time. Here they are.

In a study released a few months ago, Robbie Jones of the Public Religion Research Institute in cooperation with the Brookings Institute constructed a similar scale using a more carefully targeted set of questions. So just how many white Christian nationals are there? And who are they? In an earlier book with Andrew Whitehead, very divided survey respondents into four categories based on their scores on the Christian nationalism scale.

They found that almost half of Americans partly or strongly affirm Christian nationalism. Jones’s estimates you’ll see is somewhat lower, around 30%. Is white Christian nationalism just another way of saying conservative white evangelical? No. Here’s Jones’s breakdown by religious traditions, quite similar to the ones that Perry and I constructed.

As you can see, not all conservative white evangelicals are white Christian nationalists. And many non-whites and non-evangelicals embrace white Christian nationalism to some degree. To this I would add another finding by the political scientist Ryan Burch. Many non-churchgoers and even some non-Christians now identify as evangelical. But the crucial takeaway is this, Christian nationalism and white evangelicalism overlap a great deal. But they are not the same. And evangelicalism is increasingly apolitical as much as religious label.

So just what do white Christian nationalists believe? Obviously, they believe that America is a Christian nation or at least that it was and should be again. They also believe in a strong military. They support the police. They want law and order. But they also oppose gun control. And they’re against government regulation, including mask mandates and vaccination requirements. And they’re for free market capitalism and against government handouts at least to people different from them.

But what does any of this have to do with Christianity? And yet ask many conservative white evangelicals, and they will insist that it is all just part of a biblical worldview. Why don’t we call it white Christian nationalism? Because Christian nationalism is strongly associated with various indicators of racial animus and opposition to non-white immigration and also with a strong sense of racial grievance and white identity. That is a combination of religious and racial identity.

So that’s my first pass at what question. Let’s now turn to when question, that is, when did white Christian nationalism first emerge? The short answer is 1690, not 1990– 1690. White Christian nationalism long anticipates the rise of Christian evangelicalism and the Christian right. Before I explain why, let me take a second pass at the what question.

One can also understand white Christian nationalism as a deep story in my fellow sociologist Arlie Hochschild’s sense. This story goes something like this. America was founded as a Christian nation. The founders were Orthodox Christians. The founding documents are based on biblical principles, maybe even divinely inspired. America is in any event divinely favored, hence its power and prosperity. But America is also threatened today by non-whites, non-Christians, non-Americans. On its soil, on its borders, it must be kept white and Christian or made so and by whatever means necessary.

Now, for some Americans, the story is quite explicit. Crack open the history textbooks used by many Christian homeschoolers, and you’ll find it right there in black and white. And if you’re not a reader you can attend one of Michael Flynn’s Revive America rallies. For others, though, the deep story remained implicit. It just goes without saying that white Christians built America.

The deep story and the political vision are connected. In fact, it’s the story that holds the vision together. It explains how and why religious racial and national identity go together and also with things like support for free market capitalism and gun rights. As I said, the deep story is an old story, in a sense as old as the Christian Bible itself or rather a certain Puritan Protestant reading of it. Three readings of three stories to be precise. We call them the Promised Land story, the End Time story, and the Racial Curse story.

In the Promised Land story, the New England Puritans imagined themselves as new Israel. Over time, they came to see the new world as their promised land. And the native tribes as Canaanites or Malachi, too, had to be driven out or destroyed. In the End Time story, the Puritans wars with the Native Americans were recast as a cosmic struggle between the forces of good and evil, the denouement of the eschatological drama in which God’s new chosen people confronts hordes of quite literally demonic others.

Finally, in the Racial Curse story, Noah places a curse on one of his three sons. Ham’s descendants bear a mark on their body, a black mark. They are condemned to perpetual servitude. And of course, where do Ham’s descendants settle down? Why, in Africa, of course, which is why Africans are marked with Blackness and why it is God’s will that they be enslaved.

By 1690, the three key ingredients of white Christian nationalism were ready to be mixed together. And the original mixologist was none other than the famous Puritan divine, Cotton Mather. His ecclesiastical history of New England remains in a sense the urtext of white Christian nationalism, the original recipe.

Now, like other fairy tales, the deep story has been told and retold over time and comes in many different versions. Who counts as white, who counts as Christian, who counts as a real American, all that has changed over time. And Perry and I sketch out these changes in some detail and the flag and the cross. But for now, I’d like to move on to the third question, the how question, as in, how does it work, especially in our contemporary politics?

Well, when white Christians make claims on other Americans, they do so in the name of national unity and solidarity. But when racial and religious others make claims and white Christians, they are refused in the name of individual rights and personal accountability. In other words, heads, whites win. Tails, everyone else loses. In a phrase, freedom, order, and violence. Perry and I call this the Holy Trinity of white Christian nationalism. Freedom and rights for people like us. Order, gender order, racial order, for everyone else. And righteous violence for anyone who steps outside of the lines.

Let’s take a quick look at contemporary politics to see how this works. Remember, the Tea Party? It all started on February 19, 2009, when Rick Santelli, a financial reporter with CNBC, delivered a viral rant from the trading floor of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. He blamed the 2008 financial crisis on losers who had taken out mortgages they couldn’t afford and excoriated America’s first Black president for bailing them out. He then called for the formation of a new Tea Party to resist federal taxation and defend individual rights– freedom, in other words.

At first glance, this sounds secular and libertarian. But here’s the thing, as academics and journalists began researching the Tea Party supporters and organizations, they found that most Tea Partiers were older white evangelicals. And that well-known evangelical political activists, such as Ralph Reed, were centrally involved. More religion was also raised. Tea Partiers were generally opposed to non-white immigration. Indeed, some Tea Party groups even emerged out of white vigilante groups patrolling the Southern border.

Now, let’s shift our focus to the MAGAverse. In his 2017 inaugural address, you’ll remember perhaps President Trump promised that the American people would take back their country, that they would band together around Christianity, that they would start winning again and saying Merry Christmas again, and bring Christianity back because it’s a good thing. They would also put America first, restore law and order, build a great wall around the nation to keep out criminals and illegals, and institute a total ban on Muslims. Sure sounds a lot like white Christian nationalism.

And indeed, one way of understanding Trumpism is as a reactionary and secularized version of white Christian nationalism. Reactionary in the sense that it abandoned the polite rhetoric of colorblindness and American exceptionalism in favor of openly racist language about blood and violence. And secularized in the sense that apocalypticism gives way to catastrophy them. And good and evil are now replaced by friend and foe. It’s sort of Carl Schmidt for the uninitiated.

But just as the Tea Party’s libertarian facade hit white Christian nationalism, so too does Trumpism resonate with the Holy Trinity of white Christian individualism, the Holy Trinity of freedom, violence, and order. We all know that Trump is a master of verbal violence. He uses words as weapons to wound his opponents and intimidate his rivals– Crooked Hillary, Sleepy Joe, Lion Tat, Little Marco. We’re still working on something for DeSantis. Of course, he is not above threatening or inciting physical violence. He did so on the campaign trail and on January 6. And it appears that he has engaged in physical violence against women and on more than one occasion.

Now, for freedom. When criticized for his intemperate speech, the insults, the threats, and the profanity, Trump and his supporters styled themselves as defenders of free speech and opponents of cancel culture dare to be politically incorrect. In other words, claim the God-given right to use racist and sexist language with impunity, as in the good old days of Jim Crow and Mad Men.

Finally, order, by which I mean racial order. Trump’s response to Black Lives Matter was to call for law and order, which is to say white male violence, police violence, vigilante violence, even military violence. His response to white male violence was unrepentant words about very fine people and patriotic Americans.

Let me conclude with some thoughts about where white Christian nationalism is headed. The short answer is in an increasingly alarming and anti-democratic direction. Paradoxically maybe in a less racist and more nativist one, too. To see why, let me begin by showing you some images from January 5, the day before the failed coup.

These are scenes from a sort of pre-rally that took place in Washington DC that day, the so-called Jericho March. Mimicking the biblical Joshua and his Israelite army, the protesters marched around the Capitol singing, praying, and blowing show fires in hopes of retaking their city. They understood themselves to be engaging in spiritual warfare against demonic forces that had taken possession of the capital and its occupants.

The organizers and speakers were a loose network of a growing movement of radical Pentecostals, commonly known as the New Apostolic Reformation. Key leaders of this movement include Peter Wagner and self-proclaimed apostles, such as Che Ahn, Mark Gonzalez, Cindy Jacobs, Dutch Sheets, Lance Wallnau, and TD Jakes. Trump’s spiritual advisor, Paula White, is also part of this network.

Now, as you may have notice from the names, this is a multiracial movement. These are some of the most influential Americans that you may never have heard of. They have grabbed the torch of Christian nationalism from its one time evangelical guardians and are marching off with it in even more radical direction. The roots of their radicalism are both theological and organizational.

I’ve already mentioned one key doctrine– spiritual warfare. This is the belief that a battle between the forces of good and evil, natural and supernatural, is taking place around us all of the time. The demonic and satanic agents can and do take possession of specific people and places– Nancy Pelosi, the US Capitol, for example. And the Christians can and must combat them with spiritual weapons like prayers and chauffeurs and perhaps more.

The second key doctrine concerns the so-called Seven Mountains Mandate. And this may be the most viral meme that you’ve never seen. This is a view derived from Weber’s theory of value spheres, I kid you not, that Christians must seize control or dominion over the seven societal spheres or mountains of influence and by any means necessary, Democratic or not.

The third key doctrine is Kingdom Now. This is the view that the second coming of Christ will be triggered by the fulfillment of the seven mountains mandate. In a way, this quest for political power is thereby linked to a yearning for the last judgment and given a heightened urgency. After all, why wait passively for the end on a mountaintop when you can take political action to bring it about right now?

Let me say a few words about the organization of the NAR. It’s not a denomination. It has no formal organization. Rather, it’s a loose network held together by a clerical oligarchy. Its basic unit of organization is the event, not the congregation, events like Michael Flynn’s Renew America, a tour. Its leaders are not pastors but self-proclaimed apostles. Entry into this clerical oligarchy is not by means of ordination or education but rather by means of cooptation.

The only way to become an apostle is to be is to be proclaimed one by other apostles. The idea, inspired by Weber once again amazingly, is to prevent the brutalization of charisma by assuring that leadership is recruited always and solely on the basis of certain kinds of recognized charismatic gifts– the power to heal, prophesy, pray, speak in tongues, and so on. In some, the NAR combines a radical antidemocratic ideology within a selfless and decentralized leadership structure. And in this, it resembles some of the most successful revolutionary terrorist organizations and movements of the past and the present.

Now, it would be easy to dismiss that NAR is a radical fringe. But it would also be a mistake. And let’s not repeat this mistake, because, if there is one universal law in political sociology, and as some of you may know, I’m no friend of law-like statements, it’s that well-organized minorities can dominate disorganized majorities, especially if support for that minority extends into a wider population, which is precisely the situation we find ourselves in today.

So just where does this leave us? I see four possible outcomes. One is what the late Pierre van den Berghe called the Herrenvolk democracy or master race democracy. It is a parliamentary regime in which the exercise of power and suffrage is restricted de facto and often de jure to the dominant group, and in which that group understands itself as a superior race or culture and subjects other races or groups to varying degrees of legal repression and extralegal violence. In other words, Jim Crow 2.0.

Another closely related scenario is what we might call Urvolk democracy, a scenario in which native birth replaces racial identity as the basis of citizenship rights and democratic participation. It’s not hard to imagine either of these outcomes should Trump and the GOP regain control of both Houses of Congress and the White House in 2024 and are able to successfully manipulate election results thereafter. This, of course, is not the only possible scenario. There are at least two others.

One is the mere survival of liberal democracy, which is to say the status quo ante since the Civil Rights movement and the Civil Rights laws of the mid-1960s. The second is the achievement at last of multiracial democracy, a nation of nations and the people of peoples, in which these rights are enforced and extended. And historic injustice is recognized and perhaps even recompensated.

Which of any of these three scenarios will become reality is, of course, hard to say. Historical outcomes are highly contingent, which is why social scientists are notoriously bad at prediction. This much is certain though, much will depend on the choices of American Christians and their leaders but also on those of secular progressives and their leaders.

America is at a crossroads. It has been there before and more than once. To the left lies a path towards multiracial democracy. To the right, a path towards continued white dominant. In the past, America has sometimes turn left for a time only to veer sharply back to the right. This is what happened in 1787, in 1877, and again in 1968, when it incorporated slavery into the Constitution, turned the South over to confederate redeemers, and chose law and order over civil rights. Each time the country took two steps forward then one step backwards. Which way will America turn this time?

The answer will depend on the choices Americans make in the coming years. Will conservative white Christians accept into minority status? Or will they attempt to cling to power by means of minority rule? In short, will they choose democracy or power? And what if secular progressives, will they make room for people of faith and their vision of a multiracial democracy? Will they accept religion as an element of diversity? Or will they instead fulfill conservatives worst fears about progressive attacks on religious freedom?

For my part, I hope America will finally take the road towards an inclusive multiracial democracy. Thanks. [APPLAUSE]

[DAVID HOLLINGER] Can you hear me? Phil’s work and mine complement each other quite neatly in the effort which now includes a whole lot of scholars and journalists and writers of various kinds to the effort to understand Christian nationalism and its relation to American democracy. Two contributions of the flag and the cross, and I’m going to be speaking directly about the book rather than the lecture since I prepared my remarks based on the book, which Phil has done a very good job of summarizing. Well, there are some parts of it I’ll refer to that are not in his lecture.

Two contributions of this book are especially important. One is the statistically intensive portrait of Christian nationalism and its demographic foundation. And there’s a lot of very detailed accounts of this in the book, which I strongly recommend. The second is the demonstration that versions of Christian nationalism have been around for a long time. This is not a new thing, Christian nationalism taking many different shapes over the course of the different epics in American history.

Now, the second contribution is the one that most interest historians. And it’s appropriate for me to enter the conversation through that part of Phil’s work. And I should indicate that the book includes quite an extensive historical account of the different episodes that he only alluded to here. And so I’m going to be referring to that implicitly along the way.

Phil does treat the history of Christian nationalism as a script, a script that’s rewritten in different terms and by different sets of historical actors from epic to epic. And this is all to the good. But this account can be collegially supplemented as I believe Phil would be quick to agree, by greater attention to styles of Christianity that were different, alternate styles of Christianity that were available to empower white people along the chronological way.

Especially prominent– especially pertinent, I should say, were the steps taken in the 20th century by the ecumenical leaders whom historians often called Christian globalists. We now have a substantial literature on Christian globalists– in all the books by Michael Thompson and Gene Zubovich, Peggy Bendroth, there’s really quite a lot– tracing the development of the social gospel and its international coordinates, its adamant opposition to immigration exclusion in the 1920s, its championing of the National Association of Colored People or the Advancement of Colored People, its severe criticism of the British empire, its adulation of Gandhi, its extensive celebration of kagawa, its major role in the development of human rights ideology and the institutions to support it, its opposition to lynching and the Jim Crow system down through its conspicuous opposition to the Vietnam War.

Now, to be sure, there were always within the mainline churches, people who were OK with American global hegemony, who were OK with white supremacy, at least up to a point who were very slow in opposing it. But if we look at the entirety of white America during the half century between about 1920 and 1970, the ecumenical protestants were way out in front of most others, especially out front of the evangelical protestants in supporting causes that went against Christian nationalism.

White Americans had a choice. Those who gravitated toward Christian nationalism were rejecting an alternative that espoused a more inclusive gospel and a more pluralistic nation. This alternative was easily available and was led by people who were just as white as Billy Graham. Taking account of this part of American history, it’s important for those of us that are concerned with the issues that we’re discussing today, it’s important for two– in two closely related ways.

Take an account of this part of American history is important, first, because attention to the religious choices made by successive authors of the Christian nationalist script can enhance our understanding– I guess as I put my hand on my manuscript, I’m reminding us of the wonderful slides that Phil has given us. I’ll try not to do that. One value of our attention to these other voices is that it can enhance our understanding of the distinctness of Christian nationalism and can inoculate us against the mistake of conflating Christian nationalism with the whole of American Christianity.

Phil correctly complains that the 1619 project can leave the impression that American history is almost exclusively a story of white supremacy, diminishing public awareness of the reality and power of contingency. But Phil’s own account of the enduring core of Christian nationalism risks partaking of the same syndrome, leaving readers with the impression that the Christian project in the United States has been entirely captured by nationalism, a force so overwhelming that it reappears no matter what the historical conditions and controls the politics of religion in the United States.

Second, attention to the history of religious choices can remind us of a range of potential resources for fighting Christian nationalism today. At the end of the book, Phil devotes three pages to what can be done. But in which he sensibly calls for a united front embracing a range of religious and secular groups and individuals. But the book doesn’t give us access to what such people have to offer.

So why should we turn to these people with any hope if we don’t have any indication of what they’ve been up to and what the deeply embedded aspects they have of American history? So if we need to be reminded of the deeply embedded foundations of Christian nationalism– and certainly we do, and that’s a good thing– we need also to be reminded that the United States is not without resources that are similarly deeply embedded. The opposition to Christian nationalism for which Phil rightly calls is not likely to succeed if it is created out of contemporary whole cloth.

It’s a good thing that Christian nationalism has been opposed, as often as it has, because, if we didn’t have that part of our history with that cent of historically bounded resources, we would be in even worse shape than we are now. To be sure, the old Protestant establishment, all those ecumenical denominations, the congregationalist, the Methodists, Presbyterians, and so forth, they’ve been in steady decline for the last 50 years. But those churches still exist. And they should be recognized as contemporary players in the struggle against Christian nationalism. So too should the tiny group of progressive intellectuals that Phil does mention at the end of the book, although I think it is very easy to exaggerate the significance of the progressive evangelicals, the progressive evangelicals that he talks about at the end.

More important than the progressive evangelicals and more important, I think, than the residual ecumenical Protestant population, more important than either of those constituencies, I think, are today’s errors of the Americans who resisted Christian nationalism on secular grounds. Now, we have a good literature on these people, too, especially the books by David Sehat and Leigh Schmidt. And although we can go back to the Enlightenment themes and the founders and 19th century figures like Robert Ingersoll, the relevant– the most relevant secularists are again 20th century figures like John Dewey, Hannah Arendt. The American Civil Liberties Union is relevant here along with the American Jewish Committee and other advocates of sharp or church state separation in the great court cases of the 1940s, ’50s, and ’60s.

Central to the saga of secularization in the United States has been the increasing prominence of Jews in their specific capacity as non-Christians and thus, as a challenge to Anglo Protestant cultural hegemony. Although some of today’s Christian nationalists repeat the explicit antisemitism of earlier writers in the script, most of them shy away from this. That is all the more reason surely why the statistical overrepresentation of Jews in academia, science, the arts, and popular culture needs to be emphasized rather than ignored.

The prominence of Jews, Judaic and post-Judaic in the United States, is a formidable resource against Christian nationalism. Jewish prominence diminishes the credibility of claims to the country on the part of Christianity. So shouldn’t our critique of Christian nationalism involve frequent and loud reminders that the Christian nationalist program is structurally anti-Jewish?

We need to remember, too, that many secular Americans today are post-Protestants, a point that Phil makes in a kind footnote to a book that I wrote about a decade ago. Lots of ecumenical Protestants have become post-Protestant secularists transferring their globalism from religious to secular modes of thought joined there by smaller numbers of post Catholics who are also a relevant group.

Yet Phil is surprisingly ungenerous I think to secular opponents of Christian nationalism. In his brief discussion of secularists in the last few pages of the book, Phil correctly notes that some secular progressives have been imperialists and eugenicists. But I was surprised that his main point about today’s secular liberals is not the resources on which they can draw. His main point about secular liberals is that they must set aside some of their most deeply held prejudices that have played an important role in stoking populist resentment and driving political polarization.

In what I find to be an uncharacteristic lapse into two-siderism, Phil sardonically mocks the deep story according to which a morally and intellectually advanced elite shepherds that backward and benighted mass toward prosperity and enlightenment. Well, arrogant snobs do exist. And they have a lot to answer for. But having spent the last 50 years writing book after book about exactly that deep story of the Enlightenment and its progress in the United States, I don’t find that story so easily burlesque.

The Protestant accommodation with the Enlightenment is a huge and central saga in the history of the United States. And I hope I can persuade Phil to take a more generous view of it. And what is Phil’s book, if not a signal example of the continuation in our own day of the precise story I have been writing about all these years? Phil is bringing evidence and reasoning to a discourse in which ignorance and willful obscurantism are prominent features. Phil and I are even better comrades than he realizes.

[PHIL GORSKI] Well, thank you much, very much for that kind and insightful words about the book, in particular for really kind of inventorying in such a detailed way the different groups and traditions that might flow into a sort of popular front against Christian nationalism that I’m calling for. I certainly appreciate your emphasis on the kind of deep invocation of a certain kind of Protestantism and Enlightenment.

And I think your point, which I’ve certainly learned from your work, David, about the deep genealogical connection between what we would broadly call secular progressivism today and liberal Protestantism, central values of equality, inclusiveness, pluralism, cosmopolitanism, I think that’s all absolutely right. And I think in calling out a certain kind of technocratic elitism or snobism, I think really what I had more in mind there was the sorts of folks who are in that little Peninsula jutting South from San Francisco–

[DAVID HOLLINGER] Stanford people.

[PHIL GORSKI] Thinking more of Silicon Valley about the sort of technocratic libertarians in particular and its kind of antidemocratic form, I mean, that I would take is sort of the most extreme version of that, as opposed to more egalitarian and inclusive version of progressivism. But, yeah, I’m very grateful for questions.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] Going across between the two of you, going back to these previous waves, you took us back to 1690, you do see different fluctuations I think. So if you look back to the 1930s, ’40s, you have this powerful antisemitic movement in the rise of Ku Klux Klan, Father Coughlin, neo-Nazis. And you didn’t mention Nazis per se, although they were very powerful then and have resurged again, of course.

And then here seems to be a shift in the Christian response to it, because a generation or two ago, the Protestants, particularly evangelicals, really hated the Catholics. And now they have seemed to have coalesced without so much of that. So I wonder if, as David says, emphasizing the prominence of Jews in the academy and other positions of prominence, isn’t this that red meat to those groups? That’s their big complaint now that Jews have taken over everything. And we hear about George Soros every five minutes. So. Isn’t there some issue there that we need to think about?

[DAVID HOLLINGER] Well, whether or not it’s a good idea to emphasize the Jewish contribution to American democracy, I suppose is a question that one can take different ways. Generally, my view is that there’s a lot of evidence that the United States is a more open, tolerant, diverse, democratic society because of the prominence of non-Christians.

Now, the significance of Jews is that they’re non-Christians, whether they’re Judaic or non-Judaic. And if you look at the whole span of American history, when the Jewish immigration comes in the late 19th and early 20th century, this is the first time that you have a substantial population that doesn’t at least have a Christian background. Sure, there’s a lot of anti-Catholicism in American life and very widespread among these ecumenical mainline Protestants, but at least the Catholics, there’s all this stuff about God and Jesus.

And the Jewish population, it’s different. So the threat to Anglo-Protestant hegemony and the advancement of secularism, and you find this especially in the ’40s and ’50s and ’60s, all of these state church litigations are led by Leo Pfeffer, a guy whose name I misspelled. I called him in my book Leo Pfeiffer, because I love Pfeiffer Big Sur State Park so much. So so Leo Pfeffer the counsel for the American-Jewish Committee. He’s the one that runs this.

Now, he’s concerned about the same issue that you raise, Bob. And as a result, he gets a lot of Episcopalians to front for him, because he doesn’t want the public to know the extent to which separation of church and state is a Jewish conspiracy, which to a large extent it was, and a good thing, too. So if you take the view that the United States is a lot better because of this diversification, then there’s a case made for celebrating it.

Now, does this mean that these reactionaries are more likely to make antisemitism part of their program? Or are they likely to get again and more often George Soros possibly? And I don’t mean to say that there’s no risk there. But my own view is that we’re far enough in American history that we ought to stand these people down by celebrating the Jewish aspect of American life. I don’t know if you agree with that.

[PHIL GORSKI] Yeah. I was going to actually to speak to the issue of Catholics and evangelicals. I think there’s– I can’t really add much to that answer. So this really was the result of a very systematic coalition building that was driven mainly by a relatively small group of Catholic political activists and intellectual leaders. So I would point, especially to the work of people like Richard Viguerie fairly early on and then also of people of a group around the journal First Things in New York City, John Newhouse, and a few others in building this Catholic evangelical alliance.

And in a way, this is one reason why abortion has become such a prominent issue in American politics. It was originally a Catholic issue and generally regarded as such by evangelical Protestants in the late ’60s and early ’70s. And therefore, it’s an issue that they were not particularly concerned about. And this was also putting that issue front and center was all in getting evangelicals mobilized around. It was also a subtle way for some of the Catholic activists who were working behind the scenes to make it look as if the Christian right were an evangelical and Protestant project as opposed to an alliance between evangelicals and Catholics.

I mean, that doesn’t– it’s not really made explicit until the late ’90s, or early aughts. And it is, of course, also partly just a function of religious demography. Is the number of white Protestants and white evangelicals has shrunk? I think by some measures, it’s under 20% now. That doesn’t get you to a majority of regard no matter how well-organized you are.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] Thanks, Phil and David. So Phil, I want to ask whether maybe your story lacks a certain degree of empathy. You talk a lot about the people who are the spear, the tip of the spear for the right wing and their very strong elaborated ideologies. But they would be nowhere without a sort of larger base of people who are disaffected.

And I would just suggest the argument that those people, that is the base that enables the flamboyant leadership to thrive, have suffered great losses from their point of view over the last 50 years. They’ve lost economically. They’ve lost socially. They’ve lost culturally. Almost every front, the left or the secular left has taken their children, has moved the culture, moved the media. So should we not try to understand the sense of loss and sense of being beleaguered, and it provides a lot of the support for this right-wing movement?

[PHIL GORSKI] Sure. Absolutely. I think my view on this is that a lot of the folks that are being mobilized have every right to be angry. It’s just that they’re angry at the wrong people for the most part. So I certainly understand the impact that this has had on some rural communities. Much of my maternal side of my family settled in eastern Iowa and downstate Illinois.

And so you look at these communities and what’s happened to them since I was young, the family farms, the local factories, the mom-and-pop shops and restaurants. I mean, all of that have been wiped away, but I don’t think it was wiped away by liberal college professors in Berkeley and New Haven. I mean, it was wiped away by deregulation and globalization.

So I do totally understand their anger. And I suppose, if I were a better person like Charlie Hochschild, I would be better at climbing that empathy wall and portraying them in that way. But you know, I suppose, this book is a sort of– there is no doubt that this book is a sort of a polemic. I mean, it is meant to be kind of a Cassandra’s cry about what we see as a very serious threat to American democracy.

As a matter of political strategy, I mean, I do think that it would be very important to combine concerns about racial injustice and inequality with attention to class, inequality and injustice. And that is a difficult thing to do, I mean, to really powerfully combine those two things and in the same rhetorical frame. But most of the successful Democratic politicians of the last decade or so have one way or another sort of managed to do that.

[CAROLYN CHEN] I’m going to turn to a question now from our virtual audience here. And this is about other groups, particularly Catholicism. So I’m going to combine questions and then combine it with my own in a way. So it’s a question as to what extent are Catholics considered to be part of this movement or even Mormons, particularly with ultra-conservative Roman Catholic bishops. Do they augment or diminish white Christian nationalism with their stance and statements? And I would add to this, too, is the Catholic Church in the United States is increasingly nonwhite really and the leadership is becoming non-white as well. So if you can comment on that.

[PHIL GORSKI] So it’s really about the Catholics. I mean, are they part of the White Christian nationalist coalition? Might that change, given the fact that they are increasingly diverse group within the United States? I guess, so couple of thoughts. One is I think that– on the one hand, yes. So there’s less support for Christian– white Catholics scores somewhat lower on the Christian nationalism scale on average. But by our reckoning around half of white Catholics would be supportive or strongly supportive of Christian nationalism. That’s less than white evangelicals, but it’s not insubstantial.

I mean, my sense of why that is that two reasons. And one is that they’re cross pressure between their values around sex and family on the one hand and social teachings of the church pull them in an opposite direction. I think another reason is that, unlike a lot of American Christian churches, they’re a global movement and have– there’s a tension between their sort of nationalistic commitments and their religious commitment that doesn’t exist, that doesn’t exist for many, many Protestants.

And of course, the Mormons are a particularly interesting case and I think also illustrative of why there is resistance in some quarters of Protestantism. So I think in particular groups that maintain a strong sense of marginalization within their historical memory, and this is particularly true of the Mormons, are averse to very strong forms of Christian national. Although, on the other side of the ledger, one must say that there is in a sense no more Christian nationalist form of Christianity than Mormonism in certain versions of it, so through line from the John Birch Society up to the present. So that in the sense, it’s I think also like the Catholic community one that’s very sort of cross pressured around this.

[DAVID HOLLINGER] Could I just briefly, though? I think we need to remind ourselves that– and I think this was pointed out in a recent book that Claude did with my count that the Catholic Church has lost about 40% of its traditional White ethnic base during the last half century. So when we talk about the role of Catholicism and the religious politics of the United States, we need to understand that if it’s not in freefall, it’s almost.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] I Thank you both. I really appreciated the reminder that there is a much deeper, longer history to the Christian progressive left. And as a millennial, as someone who grew up in an evangelical community where a lot of Christian nationalism lives, I just wonder, what does that look like a response from the Christian left, especially for– when I think about my peers, progressive, college-educated millennials, many of them don’t really think this as a threat because they think of these people as wacko, anti-science type folks, and they’re quite anti-religion, I would say, in general.

And studies after studies show that mainline churches are losing numbers. When I go to episcopal services, I’m often the youngest person there by 30 years. And evangelical spaces offer a very hip cultural aesthetic often. There’s music.

They look like they’re surfers from Santa Cruz. And they’re speaking, I think, to people of my generation that maybe don’t see the very harmful politics that are at play in evangelicalism and Christian nationalism. So I just wonder, what does a robust Christian progressive left actually look like in responding to all of this?

[DAVID HOLLINGER] You should answer that first.

[PHIL GORSKI] I feel like you should answer that. I feel like–

What’s really your–

[DAVID HOLLINGER] All right. Well, I’ve heard about some of these folks, and I’ll tell you what I think it looks like. And I’ll get into it by recounting an anecdote, which I think tells you a lot. Richard Cizik, the lobbyist for the National Association of Evangelicals, who was fired in 2009 for deviating from the standard evangelical line and emphasizing the environment equality and so forth.

Cizik and I were the main speakers at a Convention of Reformed Jews at which we were to talk about what it’s like to be a Protestant, basically, or to once have been one, in my case. And the interesting thing about Cizik’s speech is that it was right out of a liberal Protestant sermon of 1955. So he was basically taking the old liberal Protestant line on tolerance on equality, on diversity, on love, on internationalism, and on globalism. He was taking all of that and presenting it as the evangelical witness.

So afterward, I ask him, do you realize what you’re doing here? And he admitted it. I wouldn’t out him had he not already outed himself, but he admitted it. And he said that the only way that he can present evangelicalism is to hide it within a liberal Protestant entanglement.

Now, I believe that that is basically what has happened with progressive evangelicalism to this day. It is an enterprise of appropriation and effacement. And you find this, for example, in David Guzik’s book, The New Christianity. This is a very prominent evangelical, one of the big guys.

So I’m reading through this book. What’s new about Christianity? I’m saying, hey, Jesus, this is what liberal Protestants have been arguing since the ’20s. The media aspect that you’re talking about and the dancing and the singing, all that, that’s a hip aspect beyond what I’m saying. But the people that are leading progressive evangelicalism and are trying to present it that way are interestingly copying the liberal Protestant script.

Now, that may not be a bad thing. And perhaps it’s too fussy of people who say, oh, well, that’s appropriation, not effacement. But it’s historically interesting that these people are basically saying the liberals whom we’ve hated, who we’ve excoriated, whom we’ve condemned for 100 years. They were right all along.

[PHIL GORSKI] Couldn’t have said it any better myself. I’ll just add one thing, which is, I wonder in a way whether certain kinds of traditional liturgy are not going to be cool again. Again, this is a prediction that might be completely off base.

So many folks are younger folks are searching for a kind– this is what I mean authenticity means for many of these folks these days. And so maybe suddenly, the smells and bells of an Episcopalian liturgy are going to be attractive again. I don’t know.

[DAVID HOLLINGER] Traditional Methodist technology out of Charles Wesley rather than rock music?

[PHIL GORSKI] Yeah.

I’ll sign up for that.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] Who would you consider in your book the leaders of the progressive evangelical movement?

[PHIL GORSKI] I think some of it’s usual suspects. Although, this is an older generation. I mean, I think maybe more– people may to be paying more attention to right now are kind of never prominent, never trump evangelical. So I’m thinking of people like Russell Moore who is now Christianity Today, or Beth Moore, the famous Bible interpreter, I guess, or even in a way David French, the kind of evangelical.

I mean, these are all people who– I mean, French would probably define himself as a classical liberal. For Moore, it was about me, too. For Russell Moore, it was about racism. But I mean, in certain way, I mean they are out of their own deeply evangelical commitments arriving back at some of the causes that liberal Protestants were fighting for mid-20’s–

[DAVID HOLLINGER] What about Jim Wallis?

[PHIL GORSKI] Yeah. I mean these are sort of old guard. I mean, Wallis must be pushing 80 at this point.

[DAVID HOLLINGER] But he could still be good sure.

Sure.

[LAUGHTER]

I’m 82.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] I have a question with regard to the categorization of American Jews as progressive. Sheldon Adelson was a big financier of Trump. The two multibillionaires who own TikTok– I forgot their name– I think they’re from around Philadelphia– are also a big financiers of the American alt-right. And also, they finance what is now called the legal reform in Israel that is about to bring a civil war over there.

So there was always Jewish engagement in the extreme right wing, mainly through libertarian concerns. And if you talk about American Jews who are reform, their progressiveness ends around the colonization of Palestine, that is they do support Jewish nationalism and Israel, which is quite separatist.

[DAVID HOLLINGER] It certainly would be a mistake to claim that All-American Jews are identical, politically. And it would be a mistake to say that all American Jews have advanced progressive causes in the United States. But if you look at the whole range of the Jewish impact on American life in the 20th and 21st century, I think the cases that you’re referring to are genuinely anomalous.

Now, to say that they’re anomalies doesn’t mean that they’re not important. And I think you’re absolutely right to say that when questions of Zionism and Israel come up, the tone changes even with a lot of people who are against Christian nationalism in the United States. Very valid point. So it does make a difference as to who specifically we’re talking about. I should point out, Carolyn, that there’s a gentleman in the front that’s been trying to get your attention for quite a long time.

[DAVID HOLLINGER] The other guy was pushing her.

Well.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] as hard as you.

[DAVID HOLLINGER] Yeah. Well, doing the best I can.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] So Daniel Patrick Moynihan will be forever famous for his observation about, “You’re entitled to your own opinions but not to your own facts.” It seems to me that that’s a big part of the mess we have, politically, in the United States. There are two readings of what’s going on, where it came from, what it means, how to deal with it, the fundamental facts of the situation.

The problem is that when you try to take a run at this through the religious channel, it seems to me you find yourself in a channel where when people speak, they don’t speak as if they are speaking from fact. It’s always speaking from faith. And faith doesn’t necessarily anchor in fact, or facts are subordinate to faith. So you have this situation where no matter how whackadoodle there facts are, if they are consistent with some faith reading, they feel completely vindicated, and there is no possibility of persuading them to the contrary.

And you describe some of the roots of Christian nationalism as picking and choosing biblical text, as if these things are historical photographs, not historical literature. And then picking and choosing political events and so forth in the United States as if they have the one right explanation when all these things are really chosen and selected through a very religious set of lenses. I’m looking for a question mark. Let me just say discuss.

[DAVID HOLLINGER] I’ve got some thoughts, but you should go first.

[PHIL GORSKI] So I guess my main response would be that you’re, of course, right about the impenetrability of these epistemological bubbles, which is one reason why I actually think it’s quite important that progressive or liberal Christian be part of the coalition because they are really the only people who are in a position to speak to the persuadables in a language that will persuade them. I can stand up here forever and present tables and statistics.

But at the end of the day, I’m just a liberal, elite professor who doesn’t have any credibility. But somebody who’s sitting with the pews in them, who shares values, I think, many of us share– equality, inclusion, pluralism, and so on– but can frame those arguments in biblical or Christian terms, I think it’s just a much more effective interlocutor. So I think it’s actually crucial to include folks like that in this coalition for that reason.

[DAVID HOLLINGER] I think a difficulty with the ecumenical Protestant intellectual leadership over a good many years is a certain humidity in criticizing evangelical theology and evangelical notions of what the Bible is. And this notion of a Christian worldview, which is the way they put– what you’re talking about– so that you’re really have to speak from faith.

The liberal theologians are actually in a position to make some pretty good arguments against that, especially stressing the historical character of the scriptures and going against a lot of conventional evangelical ideas, which do not engage the historicity of the scriptures and this fragments coming together. I mean, held or what? 30,000 verses in the Bible created by different people and different historical circumstances. And the whole notion that this is somehow a single message is mystical claim, which ecumenical theologians are actually very good at dealing with if they’re willing to.

Now, I’m not quite sure what’s going on there, but a big complaint that I make in this book of mine that Caroline mentioned at the start is that I’m suggesting that ecumenical Protestants could really help a lot in diminishing the threat of Christian nationalism if they would use their intellectual resources to undercut the theological presuppositions of Christian nationalism. And they have the tools to do it.

Why are they not doing it? Well, I’ve written to various seminarians about this, and the impression that I got is that they’re afraid if they tell the public what they really think about the Bible, that the number of members that they have will diminish even further.

Now, I’m not sure that applies to all of them, but there are a handful of these Protestant theologians that have actually gone out and attacked inerrancy, have attacked a lot of these quite hokey hermeneutic ideas that a lot of evangelicals have, but there aren’t very many of them. And the big seminary establishment, I mean, the guys at Union and Chicago, Dibb and Yale Dibb and so forth, have been very reticent about this.

And one of the interesting themes in the new atheist literature– Dawkins, and Harris, and these guys– they actually go after the liberal Protestant intellectuals for tolerating evangelical ideas. And generally, the ecumenical Protestant establishment was harder on the new atheists than they have been on the evangelicals. And I think that was a mistake. I think the liberal Protestants don’t know who their friends really are.

[CAROLYN CHEN] Let’s take a question from the virtual audience. There’s a question here about the way that region intersects with this. It says, this person writes you, both spoken at the scale of the nation, and I’m wondering if there’s anything you would say at the level of region and how we see regional patterns of White Christian nationalism.

[PHIL GORSKI] So the data that we have doesn’t really allow us to say anything meaningful about region, but I’m pretty confident that if it did that you would find certain fairly predictable patterns that you would find by Christian nationalism much more concentrated in the old confederacy for starters. And that you would find it heavily concentrated in rural areas and exurban areas, as opposed to urban and suburban areas. And to some degree, also, in those parts of the United States that were influenced strongly, culturally, by in-migration or church expansion from the southern states.

So this would be some of the border states in the Midwest. At least until about five minutes ago, it would have been parts of Southern California, especially Orange County. Although, that’s changing very, very, very rapidly.

[DAVID HOLLINGER] 43% of the population of Tennessee are White evangelical Protestants. Now, that’s the extreme case, but the other states of the old confederacy are also very heavily White evangelical Protestant. Now, the Republican Party figured this out quite some years ago. And that’s why they actually put less and less energy into trying to win votes among the most highly educated states– California, Oregon, Washington, all the New England states, New York, New Jersey, Maryland.

Now, you can see this even by 2016 before the Trump era. The 30 coastal states had only two Republican senators by 2016, and that’s because the Republicans knew full well that it just wasn’t worth trying to go after all these educated voters. The way to get votes is to go for the evangelical Protestants and their extension beyond the south.

So I think region does have an enormous amount to do with this. And we shouldn’t forget that the most important of the evangelical organizations, and the largest by far is the Southern Baptist Convention. This is an organization that was founded to defend slavery. So the tradition of Southern White racism and its close connection to evangelical Protestantism and regionalism is extremely important.

[PHIL GORSKI] I’ll just add two quick little footnotes onto this. So there is a kind of important revisionist history of American evangelicalism which is really challenging, the narrative that has been presented by evangelical historians, and is widely accepted amongst practicing evangelicals, which foreground the late ’60s, and the early ’70s, and the sexual revolution, and the Roe v Wade decision, and really emphasizes the catalytic role of Brown v Board and desegregation in the initial phase of mobilization of the contemporary Christian right. So it is here as much about Whiteness as it is, about family values, and has been from very early on.

The other thing I would just quickly say is that there was a sort of a Southern factor, has been a sort of a Southern effect on the character of contemporary Christian nationalism. So if you turn the clock back 100, 120 years, the real torchbearers of White Christian nationalism are not conservative Southern evangelicals. They’re actually liberal Northern Protestants, who are championing World War I, who are often eugenicists, who are nativist.

And they have, however, a kind of a triumphalist version of WASP imperialist Christian nationalism. What the sort of shift from liberal Protestant to conservative evangelicals and the shift from North to South does is it fuses in a way the Southern ideology of the Lost Cause with its narrative of grievance and martyrdom. And so this is one of the things, I think, that really is, of course, quite central to the kind of contemporary Trumpian version of White Christian national, is a sense of grievance, which as quite rightly pointed out, it’s not based on nothing. But I mean, culturally, where that narrative comes from is that the experience of the defeat of the confederacy.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] Thank you. Can you hear me? Yes. One of the picture that you showed was quite interesting of the kissing of the cross, and I associated also with Pope Francis kissing the crosses of Lampedusa, which is a form of seduction into action. So I’m really asking, how can we also rethink about a narrative politics that you’re right is 60-90?

But the problem, I think, with that Turtle Island with North America here is that– first nation have been here, of course, for a very long time. But there is a loss of the medieval archives and the importance, which is obviously not evangelical Christianity, but it’s a long-time Christianity. It’s Orthodox Christianity. And so the power of the icon, the power of the relics, the power of materiality to move, to seduce into action.

So do you see any possibility– which I think it’s also the relation between the textual and the material, the sacrament, the political liturgy as a form of encompassing both the hermeneutics and the materiality effect of materiality. Do you see any possibility of– I don’t want to say the war of images and the war of icons– but any possibility for dislodging this kind of evangelical Christianity vis-a-vis secular liberal around?

Interactivity of images and materiality is that could– I don’t say resolve but move forward. Or how do you see? I don’t know. I haven’t read your book. But how do you see the place of iconicity and materiality in this kind of White extreme form of evangelical Christianity? There is any redemption of that. I’m an anthropologist, I should say.

[PHIL GORSKI] It’s a nice point since one of the hallmarks of Protestantism, in general, but evangelical variant in particular, especially the low church form, is its radical rejection of images of materiality, ritual, or liturgy, that it should all be completely free-form, and abstract, and contemporary. And yet, you’re quite right to note the injection of also a lot of medieval and especially crusading imagery. If you ever go down the rabbit hole and look at some of this more radical online stuff, you will find that it’s really a wash in crusading imagery at the moment.

I saw this amazing story, actually, about Allen West, the ultraconservative Texas Christian legislator, being inducted into one of the crusading orders. I forget which one it was, but he was wearing the full regalia. So that is there. But I have to say that what you do to counter that, I mean, that’s like way above my pay grade. I really don’t know how you manage that.

[DAVID HOLLINGER] I’m not sure that I’m anywhere near that either, but I would observe this. It’s hard to imagine that the Christian project as a world historical event that’s now been going on for 2,000 years and continue to have any identity, whatsoever, as a project, if it abandons the cross. So I think the cross is here to stay. And for those who continue to advance the Christian project, I think the quarrel is over what the cross means.

And there is a considerable no contest about that. And just because these Christian nationalists have claimed the cross and we see all these pictures of the sort that Phil has shown us, I don’t think that means that they have to continue ownership of it. I mean, I think other kinds of Christians can continue to struggle to reclaim it. I mean, if you go into something like the congregational church here in Berkeley, which I go to often for concerts, they’ve got a cross right up there in the middle of it. And these people are all very liberal.

So they have it. It’s a completely different version of Christianity than Phil is talking about. So I think that to go at this from the point of view of icons is difficult. And maybe others will figure it out some way to do that. But I think the cross is here to stay as long as the name of Jesus survives.

[CAROLYN CHEN] Well, on that note, we’re actually at time right now. But thank you, Dr. Gorski. Thank you, Dr. Hollinger, for such a lively conversation. I think you’re going to hang around a little bit so that if people have more questions, you’re welcome to ask. So thank you very much.

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Matrix On Point

Matrix on Point: Wealth and Taxes

Part of the Matrix on Point event series

How do the wealthy maintain their wealth through tax havens, and what can we learn about these opaque practices?

Recorded on April 3, 2023, this panel featured experts explaining aspects of the global ecosystem of tax avoidance, including how corporations and individuals move across multiple legal jurisdictions to maintain wealth and avoid paying taxes.

The panel included Duncan Wigan, Professor with Special Responsibilities in the Department of Organization at Copenhagen Business School; and Gabriel Zucman, Professor of Economics at the Paris School of Economics and Ecole Normale Supérieure – PSL, Associate Professor of Economics at UC Berkeley, Director of the EU Tax Observatory, and director of the James M. and Cathleen D. Stone Center on Wealth and Income Inequality at UC Berkeley.

The panel was moderated by Marion Fourcade, Professor of Sociology at UC Berkeley and Director of Social Science Matrix.

Co-sponsored by Social Science Matrix, the Network for a New Political Economy (N2PE), the Stone Center on Wealth and Income Inequality, and the Berkeley Economy and Society Initiative.

Listen to this event as a podcast below, or listen on Google Podcasts or Apple Podcasts.

Transcript

Matrix on Point: Wealth and Taxes

[MUSIC PLAYING]

[JULIA SIZEK] Hello, everyone. And welcome to our panel. I hope that you all had lovely spring breaks if you were here. My name is Julia Sizek. And I’m a postdoctoral scholar here at UC Berkeley’s Social Science Matrix. We’re delighted to welcome our panelists and you here today for our Matrix On Point session, that is entitled Wealth and Taxes, which will concern the global ecosystem of tax avoidance.

Today’s event is part of our Matrix On Point series when we address pressing contemporary issues. And this event today is co-sponsored by the Network for a New Political Economy, the Berkeley Economy and Society Initiative, and the Stone Center on Inequality.

But before we get started, I’m just going to let you know about some of our upcoming events at Matrix. On April 20, we will be having another Matrix On Point panel, entitled Border Crossing about the US-Mexico border. And on May 1, we will be having the Matrix Distinguished Lecture by Orlando Patterson. Now, I’m going to introduce our moderator who does not really need an introduction.

Marlon Fourcade is our director here at Social Science Matrix. And herself is trained in the variations of economic and political knowledge in practice across nations. She is the author of the book, Economists and Societies, which explores the distinctive character of the discipline and profession of economics in three countries. A second book, The Ordinal Society, investigates new forms of social stratification and morality in the digital economy.

So without further ado, I will turn it over to our moderator, Marion, for comment.

[MARION FOURCADE] Thank you so much. So I cannot imagine a better topic or a Matrix On Point event that is joined with the Stone Center on Wealth and Income Inequality, the new Berkeley Economy and Society Initiative, and the Network for New Political Economy, no better topic than the topic of wealth and taxes.

Today, wealthy individuals and corporations maintain and expand their wealth by lowering their tax exposure through political lobbying and also by carefully manipulating states abilities to see and tax them. The strategies for optimizing tax exposure are complex, opaque, and global. They mobilize armies of experts operating across national and subnational jurisdictions.

So today’s panel is about understanding how these strategies fit together to form coherent patterns of global wealth management. And it is also about pondering the social consequences of what Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman here have called the triumph of injustice or the social consequences of giving the wealthy a free pass as if they were outside the social contract and need not support collective institutions.

Now, the idea for this panel came together when Leonard Seabrooke, Professor of Organization at Copenhagen Business School reached out to us about his recent edited volume with Duncan on global wealth change. Leonard was supposed to be with us today. But unfortunately, time’s COVID infection forced him to stay back in Denmark. But we are very lucky to have his co-editor with us here.

So Duncan Wigan is Professor in the Department of organization at the Copenhagen Business School. His research shows how innovations in finance and multinational corporate organization change capitalist institutional forms and relations in the international political economy. He was co-author of the European Commission Horizon 2020 Framework Program Project called COFFERS– I love this name– Combating Fiscal Fraud and Empowering Regulators, COFFERS. And he was a researcher on the ERC Advanced Grant, CORPLINK, Corporate Arbitrage and CPR Maps– Hidden Structures of Control in the Global Economy.

His latest book published in 2022 with Leonard Seabrooke is Global Wealth Change– Asset Strategies in the World Economy. And in addition to these are some possibilities, he directs the master’s program public management and social development at the Sino-Danish Center in Beijing.

Berkeley is, of course, one of the greatest institutions in the world when it comes to research on taxation and income and wealth inequality. And of course, Gabriel Zucman was a very natural panelist here. Gabriel is associate professor of economics here at Berkeley and co-director of the James and Cathleen Stone Center on Wealth and Income Inequality here at Berkeley. He’s also professor of economics at the Paris School of Economics and the economa superior and director of the EU Tax Observatory.

His research focuses on the accumulation, distribution, and taxation of global wealth and has renewed the analysis of the macroeconomic and distributional implications of globalization. His book, The Hidden Wealth of Nations, develops methods to measure wealth held in tax havens. His award-winning book with Emmanuel Saez, The Triumph of Injustice, which I just mentioned, presents an analysis of the progressivity of the US tax system, taking into account all taxes at all levels of government since the creation of the income tax in 1913.

In 2021, he was named an Andrew Carnegie fellow. And he received the Excellent Award in Global Economic Affairs from the Kiel Institute for the World Economy in 2017 and the Best Young French Economist Prize awarded by Le Monde and Le Cecle des Economistes in 2018. So we are very lucky to have you both. And without further ado, maybe Duncan, you can take it away with your own presentation.

[DUNCAN WIGAN] Well, thank you very much for the invitation. And thank you for organizing this event. It’s not only sad that Leonard isn’t here because there’s COVID in his family. But it’s also sad because he’s always the one that’s got the good jokes. He did promise that he’ll text Marion a few jokes for me during the talk. But we’ll see if he manages that.

I want to talk about this added volume and the kind of project that has led up to it and the way we’ve framed this, the topology we’re trying to promote around looking at asset management strategies in the world, economy, and talk a little bit about the cases that have been developed around the concept. And then I’m going to finish by saying where are we going with world chains next or where we’re trying to go with world chains.

Next, I’ll start with a bit of framing and a bit of theory. Two old white guys relying on two old white guys. We view markets as embedded in societies. And I don’t think that’s a massive breakthrough for this audience. We’re using old institutional economics. We think that informal institutions and cultural institutions are very important for market maintenance and wealth chain maintenance looking at the social networks that replicate the structures that we identify in the world economy.

From Veblen, we take very seriously this division between industry and business or the division between the engineers and the absentee owners. And from Commons, we take very seriously this notion of reasonable value that’s negotiated in courts on the basis of consensus and expert opinion and the idea that value arises from something we’ve termed legal affordances. These are either positive provisions in the law that allow for arbitrage, allow for invisibility, or their absence is in the law that can be exploited. And given that we’re in California, we can think about whether Uber is a transport company or an information company in these regards and whether– and the consequences for sales tax collection of that distinction.

From Commons, we take this simple sort of structure, that every exchange has two lives. One is the life of the physical exchange, and it’s the journey of the commodoty or service from supplier to consumer. But every physical exchange is mirrored in law by a contract, by a set of rights and entitlements that enable the holder of that contract to position him or herself differentially in the world economy. And from this distinction, we think we need to make a distinction between value chains and what we’re calling wealth chains.

One thing you begin to see when you take that distinction seriously is the difference between a firm and a corporation. And that difference is the wellspring of our project. So number one is the vertically integrated national champion, where the wealth chain and the value chain are hardly distinguishable, except for the laws of incorporation within a particular jurisdiction.

Number two is the word of Robert Gilpin of the internationalization of the firm and the beginning of patterns of wealth management, marketing processes of internationalization. But again, we feel in this period and in this depiction, the wealth chain is secondary and chronologically after the value chain.

And following work of Neil Fligstein many years before us, I guess, the third depiction is the depiction of the multinational enterprise, not the multinational corporation, because that tempts us to conflate corporations and firms. But the multinational enterprise is about managing value chain entities and wealth chain entities through a corporate structure. And on the left, we have the dominance of the c-suite and the CFO and the CEO on that side. And on the right-hand side, we have the global professional services firms and all sorts of elite advisory firms that are guiding processes of corporate structure.

The firm is the world of the value chain. This is describing an economic activity. And the corporate structure is the world of wealth chains. This is a kind of a flippant reference to the distinction we’re trying to make. But it’s an important distinction. Because one of our purposes is to change policy language around how we understand the multinational enterprise.

For decades now, we’ve studied the multinational corporation as a value adding entity. And we’ve thought about distribution as a process that emerges out of a kind of battle between stakeholders over who gets to keep the value that is added in a globally dispersed production process. But I think it’s a problem for policy that it’s stuck in this world 30 or 40 years later.

I read a remarkable report from McKinsey Global Institute called the Global Balance Sheet. And I think it was written in 2021. And that shows that corporations and the economy or in the economy in general, broadly, asset revaluations account for as much wealth as operations. So we live in a world where assets and asset revaluations are as important to distributional outcomes as operation. So at least the wealth chain is now paralleling the value chain. And we need to take that seriously as a group of scholars interested in issues of growing inequality and fragility in the political economy.

So this is the value chain framework. It follows the commodity understood as tracing the flow of a commodity in dyadic relations between firms from production design, marketing, and distribution, relying heavily on the smile curve to understand who captures value from this process. And the GVC research paradigm has promised opportunities or to understand opportunities for development by participating in value chains. And value chains as learning systems that enable development through the capture of value added. And GVCs can be regulated and thrive on transparency.

And this is the topology from Gereffi et al, who identify five different value chains with power asymmetries and complexity, increasing as we move from the left with the market chain to the right with the hierarchy chain. And they identify these different chains on the basis of three criteria– the complexity of information needed to sustain the transaction; the ability to write down information and pass that piece of paper over to your supplier or not; and the capabilities of potential suppliers to meet the requirements of the transaction.

We’ve defined global wealth chains initially in 2017 as transacted forms of capital operating multi-jurisdictional for the purposes of wealth creation and protection. And we use these three criteria very much explicitly mirroring the value chain research. And that’s partly an analytical move but also, of course, partly a rhetorical move to kind of shift this policy language as a Steven Vogel’s Marketcraft would suggest that we need today.

So we think the complexity of information and knowledge transfer is important to the type of chain that we’ll see. The regulatory liability applied from the transfer is important to the type of chain will see, not codification, because wealth chains often rely on opacity to thrive and again, the capabilities of suppliers to create solutions to mitigate any challenges to the consensus around the transaction.

And we, again, explicitly mirroring Gereffi et al, use the same five types from market through modular to relational and captive and hierarchy to distinguish different types of chain on the market. This is a pure market transaction, where you will obtain a service or product simply by looking in the back pages of the economist to relational chains where the transaction relies on very close coordination between parties all the way over to the right to hierarchy chains where the supplier and client may be working together in-house or indeed maybe the same entity. And I’ll give some examples of this.

The other thing that we think is really important here are information asymmetries between the different actors involved in the chain. So we have suppliers and clients and regulators here. And often the job of the supplier is to stretch the information, asymmetry stretched that bottom line between the regulator and the client. I’ll try and make this a little bit more concrete now.

So we came up with this topology. And it’s important that we recognize that a topology isn’t about identifying real types out there. It’s about identifying ideal types. And it’s a methodological strategy. But we thought we’d better put some labels on our ideal types at the outset. So this is the market chain. Again, you can just go and buy these things on the back pages of your favorite business magazine.

We see here with the information asymmetry, the only way the regulator seems to be able to get information on what’s going on here is through leaks. And of course, leaks have been incredibly important in recent years, with seemingly every two years a massive leak happening in an apparently uncoordinated way. But I’m sure, the activists have been thinking about the timeliness of their leaks, and Oei and Ring have come up with something called leak-driven law. So these leaks are extremely powerful.

Then we have these strange modular chains, where the product is differentiated according is generic product, differentiated according to clients. We can think about expat banking services here, run from Guernsey and Jersey, where according to the amount of wealth, you have different service packages will be offered to you.

What’s strange here is this is happening absolutely in plain sight. The information asymmetries are very low here. But a political action doesn’t seem to be forthcoming. So there seems to be some sort of elite consensus that if you’re an expat worker, you deserve not to pay taxes in the place where you’re extracting wealth from.

Then we have relational change. This is the world of high net worth individuals or asset protection. Trusts, where in theory the regulator is closer to the client. Otherwise, the client wouldn’t be so concerned about protecting from his or her ex-husband or his ex-wife the assets that have been accrued over a lifetime. But the supplier is astute at making sure that the regulator never comes close to those assets, using such things as flee clauses written into contracts that prompt the supplier to change the form of the capital if there is any sniff of regulatory intervention.

Then we have captive chains on here. We initially thought about the big four designing highly esoteric products and smaller shops than mimicking those products and selling them broadly. I think now we know that it’s actually boutique law firms that are at the top of that chain. And the big four are really doing mass production. And then there are bottom feeders that are copying these products from the big four.

And then in the higher your hierarchy chains, we see the information asymmetries for the regulator are almost insurmountable. And we can think of renaissance capital. We can think of bar cap. We can think of the sophisticated structures used by firms, like Apple in this way. But these were ideal types. And then when we asked our friends and colleagues to work with these types, they immediately did what was right and proper and said they don’t really often exist in the real world. And we need to break them down. And we see here that we have, out of 14 chapters, I think there are only four who nominate that chain that they’re talking about as one particular chain.

I’ll tell you a little bit quickly about what the chapters are about. So from Gondwana and Burgos, we have a study on soybeans and export mispricing in order to pay lower customs duties when the soybean or process soybean leaves Argentina in this case. From our colleague at CBS, Oddny Helgadottir, who was initially going to come and join us here, she’s looking at high-value art markets, which are maintained in art three ports on the basis of close relations between the galleries and the storage centers and the artists and the clients, who are all interested in one maintaining price and maintaining opacity around that price.

And that opacity and ambiguity about price, obviously, allows room for very discretionary reporting or of wealth. But that market is becoming so generic that. It’s becoming modularized, so we can all get involved at some sort of level in the art market.

Now, Mariana Santos who looked at how wealth management firms are cultivating the children of the ultra-high net worth individuals as next generation clients through all sorts of effective techniques. We have Matti Ylonen looking at advanced pricing agreements, where governments offer a great deal of certainty to multinationals about what– about the transfer prices they are going to agree to within the multinational corporate structure.

Rasmus Christensen looking at how technology technocracy and expertise in the OECD constrain the extent of regulatory transformation. Colin Haslam, and Adam Leaver, and Nick Tsitsianis– sorry– looking at public utilities in the U and the French firm;s Veolia’s wealth chain that extracts value from public utilities in the UK, in this case, water. Dick Bryan, Mike Rafferty, and myself, we wrote a chapter– it was awful– about intangible assets. Jamie Morgan looking at a hierarchy chain of private equity firm, which are taking over Boots PLC in the UK.

Martin Hearson looking at tax efficient supply chain management, where he argues that the value chain has been turned on its head. And that the substance of the value chain is now following wealth chain priorities. Saila Stausholm, who was then one of our students but now is at Max Planck, looking at mining contracts. And Clair Quentin looking at elite barrister opinion in the UK. And that these elite barristers have been accused of selling false opinions for money and described perhaps, not politically correctly, as prostituting themselves to the highest bidder in selling these opinions that carry the utmost authority in court.

Mia Dahl, who was a master’s student of ours at the time– and I’ll show you in a second what she came up with. But she made the first effort to actually distinguish between what is a wealth chain and what is a value chain. Unfortunately, she didn’t want to do a PhD with us and went off to the Kennedy School. And now she’s working as a journalist in Chile looking at wealth chains in the mining sector there. So that’s an overview of the book.

This is what Mia came up with on the basis of all this data identifying wealth chain entities on the basis of where they are and on the basis of the subsidiary categorization, whether it’s financial or operational, and on the basis of number of employees. And now, we’re moving on to what we’ve been doing a little bit more recently with the project. And there are two extensions that I want to talk about. And these are very much work in progress. So I’m very interested in collaborating on these projects.

But the first one is about what happens when we take accounting seriously, because wealth chains aren’t only about tax, they’re about accounting and law more broadly and finance more broadly. And we look at this image from Lazonick O’Sullivan in 2000 in shareholder value. And what we see is very much a kind of value chain, value added, value capture idea about what’s going on in the multinational enterprise with a zero sum distributional conflict between different claimants on the value added that emerges from the chain.

And with Adam Leaver at Sheffield University, we’ve been doing some work on the impact of fair value accounting on wealth chain strategies. And the important thing here is we put the wealth chain first. And in this paper, which we hope will come out in The Economy and Society at some point, in this paper, we argue that firms are often treating their value chain as collateral for wealth chain activities.

So the simplest example– I took this, because I’m not an accountant– is on the right. If we treat the parent company as in the group, and we look at the subsidiaries from a kind of value chain perspective, we simply look at where the retained earnings are in those square boxes and where the losses are. And here, we would say, OK, if we look at the whole group and we add everything up, this firm has 20 something in retained earnings, which may or may not be distributed.

But when we start looking at how these accounts are actually operated, a very simple point is that subsidiaries don’t pass losses up. They only pass the retained earnings up. And once we look at the wealth chain on the left-hand side, the retained earnings are hundreds here. And those can be clearly distributed.

The more complex or more difficult for me to describe activities that are occurring here are around fair value, because fair value shifts the accounting regime from a backward-looking historic cost approach to a forward-looking estimate approach to valuation in the accounts. So you can think about a subsidiary selling an asset to another subsidiary. And because it’s an asset purchased at arm’s length, the other subsidiary can revalue it on a fair value basis. Therefore, you end up paying 10 to subsidiary 1, taking the asset into subsidiary 2, revaluing it to 100, and paying up a massive dividend again. And of course, the management is incentivized by this in terms of the payments that they will receive but so are the shareholders more broadly.

And the second extension, which we’re working on now, is called sink holes in global wealth chains. And we want to sell a project called SHOW, because, as you can tell, we like acronyms like COFFERS and SHOW, because they seem to get you some money. But one thing that we think is happening in wealth chain is that firms are organizing assets so they don’t have to report on them, or they are not responsible for reporting on them. So we start with a question is, how come overall emissions are going up when all the firms in the world are reporting lower emissions?

And then we think, well, maybe there are three ways that they’re doing this. The obvious one is sell the asset to a low-reporting entity like private equity or an entity in a country where the reporting requirements aren’t high or don’t exist at all. So locate your dirty assets in no or low-reporting jurisdictions.

But the really interesting thing that we think– and this is part of another project where we’re involved with and again work with Adam [? Leiva ?] and a soon-to-be PhD student with us, David Castro. And we’re looking at the multinational corporate structure as an accounting device. We think we discover something quite interesting here. This is all in the oil and gas industry.

Companies seem to be shifting from joint ventures which even if the participation is less than 50%, they have to report on. And they have to report on it in terms of emissions to something which under IFRS 11 is called joint operations. And BP in their latest financial statement state 94%, 94% of our enterprise are involved in joint operations.

The really interesting thing about joint operations is no one needs to report on them at all. So 94%, so BP can becoming greener and greener and greener. But 94% of its subsidiaries are involved in– and we can’t gauge the size or the proportion of the operations as yet in joint operations. But 94% of the subsidiaries are operating through these legal forms. That mean that– potentially seems to mean to us that a lot of the oil and gas industry’s operations are simply we can’t see them.

So part of this project is to try and identify the invisible corporation. But first of all, we have to work really hard to see what’s going on in here. And of course, this is the multinational enterprise. And these are levels of control. And if we took this apart, we could begin to be identified quite hierarchical chains in the financial area up at the upper at the top, where the wealth management is occurring.

But at least as some initial lead into the invisibility problem here– I’m sorry that the text is a little bit light. But on the right, unfortunately, that’s the US. And green denotes that there is limited information on the activities of this entity. And blue– and we can call blue, for shorthand, Delaware. Blue means there’s no information. And we can look at Canada on the left, no information.

The purple are the unconsolidated entities in Shell’s corporate structure. Again, we don’t know yet. But part of the thing we want to work on in the next couple of years is, where are the black holes in this corporate structure?

Unconsolidated simply means it’s not reported at the top level of the firm. No information means it’s placed in a legal environment where there was no obligation to provide information.

Limited information means you can’t– the information provided isn’t commensurable with a full set of accounts. So all of these create obstacles if we are trying to see through the corporation.

All of the characteristics of these subsidiaries seem to mean that a large part of the multinational enterprise we simply cannot see. And we don’t know anything about it. But we have to work more to see what we can see first. And that’s what we are hoping to do in a cross-disciplinary project.

So in conclusion, Len told me to only make three points. So here they are. Wealth not value makes us look not only at the firm but the corporation as distinct. The firm is the world of the value chain.

Wealth parallels value in terms of output in the world economy now. And we need to focus on corporations and corporate structures. We need to change the policy language around the multinational enterprise and start talking about wealth because wealth increasingly determines who gets what from the world economy.

And in order to do that, we need to build banks of cases on the basis of typologies, we say. Cases can tell us about what’s going on in corporate networks, and importantly, can tell us about the social systems that permit the replication of global wealth chains.

And as I’m sure– I hope Gabriel will confirm. Cases are important because the activities in wealth chains are often unobservable in standard data. So that’s all I wanted to say.

[MARION FOURCADE] Thank you very much, Duncan.

[GABRIEL ZUCMAN] Well, thank you. Thank you so much, Duncan. Thanks a lot, Marianne. And thanks to all of you. It’s really a great pleasure to be here today. I’m a big believer in interdisciplinary approaches. And so it’s wonderful to have a space here on campus where we can learn from what colleagues in other disciplines are doing. So thanks a lot for that.

My own approach, although I’m an economist, is perhaps somewhat outside of the canon of what economists do. And I’d like to describe today that approach, how I’ve tried to study wealth, wealth concealment in particular.

And I thought that one way to describe it is that it’s somewhat of a detective approach but not a detective in the sense that it’s going to look at specific case studies or individual cases.

Those are very important to raise awareness, to understand some of the processes. But a quantitative detective approach, meaning that I’m trying to put numbers on the overall magnitude of whether it’s rising wealth inequality or whether it’s the size of wealth that’s hidden in tax havens.

And why do I think that this qualitative detective approach is important is that at the end of the day, it’s really essential if you want to be able to say things about policy and, in particular, to evaluate the progress or the lack of progress that’s done at a policy level in things like the fight against tax evasion.

So what I wanted to do is to explain a little bit of the methodology involved, some of the main results, and talk a little bit about policy implications. So in terms of methodology, one thing that I’ve tried to do is to use anomalies in macroeconomic statistics to quantify things that are hard to observe or to measure otherwise.

And it’s not an easy thing to do because in macroeconomic data, you have all sorts of inconsistencies, all sorts of anomalies, all sorts of problems that have nothing to do with tax evasion or with offshore wealth or with issues like this.

So you need to really understand very well what the data mean and what it doesn’t mean. But one thing that’s very striking is that– and people have noticed that since the 1970s– is that when you look at the planet as a whole, the world as a whole, appears to be in debt to some other planets.

If you look at the total assets of all countries and the total liabilities of all countries, in principle, this should add up. There should be as much assets as debts. But that’s not the case.

And people have been noticing this. As I said, since the 1980s, the IMF has been commissioning a number of reports. It looks like each year, there are more liabilities than assets. And similarly, there’s more income that’s paid to some other foreign planet than income that’s received by planet Earth.

And looking into those anomalies with some care, you can trace some of that, not all of it, but some of that to precisely the issue of offshore wealth because what happens is that when rich households have offshore bank accounts– let’s say a French resident has a bank account in Switzerland.

What people do with their offshore accounts is that they make investments. The money in tax havens, it doesn’t sleep. It’s invested in financial markets. So typically, they would invest let’s say in US equities, in Microsoft shares or Apple shares.

Now, what’s being recorded in global economic statistics is that the US statisticians, they recorded liability. They see that there is some foreign investors, a Swiss bank that owns stakes in Apple or Microsoft.

Prior to statisticians, they record nothing because they don’t know about these offshore accounts that’s owned by a French resident in Switzerland. So no asset, no liability. And in Switzerland, the statisticians there, they see everything. But they see that, OK, this is some offshore business.

Those assets are assets that belong to French people. And there are claims in the US. And so it’s neither an asset nor liability for Switzerland, which is why at the end of the day, you got less assets that are recorded than liabilities.

And so using those anomalies and other data sources, I estimated that the equivalent of about 10% of global GDP is held in financial wealth in tax havens. So think of portfolios of bonds and equities and mutual fund shares that rich households have in bank accounts in the Cayman Islands or in Switzerland and so on.

And that 10% is a global number that masks a lot of heterogeneity at the country level. So that number ranges from just 1% or 2% in countries like Denmark, for instance, or Norway– Scandinavian countries tend to have relatively little offshore wealth– to as much as 30% in Argentina, 50%, 45% in Russia, more than 50% in a number of Middle East oil-exporting countries.

So I think with that approach, which is an indirect method, which has all sorts of limitations obviously, but we’ve been able to make a bit of progress in terms of quantifying an issue that was very hard to quantify before because of the huge opacity that exists around offshore wealth and obviously offshore tax evasion.

So another approach from a methodological perspective has consisted in using policy changes that reveal the magnitude of tax evasion exposed. And so you had a number of policy initiatives like that in recent years that have been really useful.

One example here is in the case of the US. Just after the financial crisis of 2008, 2009, at the beginning of the Obama administration, the US government took a more aggressive stance on tax havens. And it forced a number of Swiss banks to exchange information with the IRS under the threat of economic sanctions.

And so there was this pressure that was put on Swiss banks. And so what happened is that in the years immediately following that, you can see that a number of US taxpayers started to declare offshore accounts that they used to have but that they didn’t report previously.

In principle, if you’re a US taxpayer, you have to report foreign accounts that you own in a form that’s called an FBAR if the account value is more than $10,000. And before 2008, 2009, a number of people who had bank accounts in tax havens didn’t report those accounts.

But what you can see is that in 2009, 2010, 2011, all of a sudden, lots of US-owned bank accounts in tax havens start to be reporting in those FBARs. And when you look at the distribution of who discloses owning a previously reported account– in the x-axis of the graph, taxpayers are ranked by their income. They are ranking in the income distribution in the US.

So p0, 50 is the bottom 50% of earners. Unsurprisingly, low-income Americans, they don’t have bank accounts in the Cayman Islands. What is somewhat surprising, it’s the very, very steep gradient that you can observe within the very top of the income distribution.

So the graph really zooms into the top 1%, all the way up to the top 0.001%. And you see that the higher up you move all the way up to 0.01%, the higher the probability to suddenly disclose the previously undisclosed haven account, to about 5% for the top group that we consider here.

At the same time, the US also created– had a kind of tax amnesty, which is known as the Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program, so OVDP. You can see the same pattern in terms of what fraction of taxpayers in each group of the income distribution use this amnesty to voluntarily declare previously hidden assets. You see the same gradient with income.

There have been lots of studies that have followed that approach to study the distribution of offshore wealth. I see [INAUDIBLE] here in the room, has done similar work, very important work in the Netherlands, for instance.

Here is a recent work that has been done by former Berkeley graduate students, Juliana Londono-Vélez and Dario Tortarolo in Argentina, looking at another policy change to learn about the distribution of tax evasion exposed.

And here, they look at a tax amnesty that took place in Argentina in 2016. And it’s really an incredible thing. Following this amnesty, people from Argentina– in that amnesty, they disclosed owning assets worth 21% of Argentina’s GDP.

So if you remember the first graph here with my colleagues, five, six years ago, we had estimated that the amount of offshore wealth owned by Argentine people was around 35% of GDP, really high in an international comparison.

And so after that, there was a tax amnesty. And just in that amnesty, which obviously didn’t reveal everything but apparently revealed a pretty large chunk, 21% of GDP in previously hidden assets were disclosed.

And second, if you look at who disclosed owning offshore wealth, well, this is the picture that emerges. So you know that Argentina– you might know that Argentina has a wealth tax and so for the rich.

And so roughly speaking, the top 2% richest taxpayers have to report on their wealth annually. And so what the graph shows is the increase in reported wealth over time. And you can see the huge jump in reported wealth by the very wealthiest groups of the distribution, following the tax amnesty.

So for people in p98, p99, so at the bottom of the top 2%, there’s no change in how much wealth they report. Those individuals didn’t own a lot of offshore wealth or didn’t participate in the amnesty.

In the bottom half of the top 1%, there is some of an increase. But then you have really a huge increase in how much wealth all of a sudden is reported by super rich taxpayers in Argentina after 2016.

Essentially, the amount of wealth that they report is multiplied by two or three just following the amnesty. OK, so it’s like those groups were hiding at least half or 2/3 of their total wealth prior to 2016.

The consequence of these two things– that offshore financial wealth is quite large, and that it’s super concentrated towards the top of the wealth distribution– is that to varying degrees as the graph here shows, offshore wealth accounts for a large fraction of total wealth at the very top.

So this is illustrating this fact by looking at the level and the composition of the share of wealth owned by the top 0.01% richest people in a number of countries. And offshore wealth is significant everywhere.

But it’s particularly large in, for instance, Russia where, according to our estimates, more than half of the wealth of Russian oligarchs essentially is held offshore. A lot of it is in EU offshore financial centers, like Luxembourg, like Cyprus, Malta but also outside of the EU.

All right, so that’s financial wealth. And until recently, we didn’t know a lot more than that. Recently, there’s been a lot of research and some progress in estimating the size of offshore real estate, which is large and growing.

With my colleagues, we’ve been working on the case of Dubai because we got access to essentially comprehensive property registry data on who owns real estate in Dubai at the property level. So we have about 800,000 properties in Dubai, one of the United Arab Emirates.

And you might say, well, who cares? It’s just one territory. But it’s very large. We were struck to find that the total amount of foreign-owned real estate in Dubai in 2020 adds up to about $146 billion, which, to put that in perspective, there’s very good data in France on foreign ownership of real estate in France, in the entire country, so Paris, the Riviera, Normandy, the entire country.

And the number for France is $140 billion. So you have more offshore wealth in Dubai, offshore real estate, than in France, major destination for cross-border real estate investment. There’s also more offshore wealth in Dubai than in the UK, which is, in particular, in London, another very important destination for cross-border real estate investment.

So we were quite struck by that. And then when we look at who owns that wealth, we find that just this real estate in Dubai adds up to as much as 5% or 10% of GDP for a number of low-income countries, primarily neighboring countries but not only, like Jordan, Afghanistan, Syria, Lebanon, and so on, and so on.

And we’re just talking about Dubai. There’s a lot of, as I said, offshore areas in London or in Singapore or in New York or in Paris and so on. So this is really quantitatively quite significant. And this is very highly significant for inequality.

And you can see that if you look at this graph here that just compares the average property value owned in Dubai by residents of certain countries. So for instance, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Mozambique, and so on, compare this average property value to the average income in the home country of these properties’ owners.

So the average value of Dubai real estate owned by residents of Sierra Leone, elites from Sierra Leone, is equivalent to 3,740 times. That’s 3,748 times the average per capita income in Sierra Leone. OK, so that gives you a sense of the concentration of that wealth and how in any form of tax evasion this is.

OK, so let me talk a little bit about policy. And I want to say first that there’s been a number of improvements over the last decade in the fight against tax evasion and wealth concealment.

The most important, one being that there’s now an automatic exchange of bank information between offshore financial institutions and many of the world’s tax authorities. And that’s a big progress because 10 years ago, most people, experts in that area, thought that it was impossible, that it would never happen.

Now, look, if Switzerland wants to have strict bank secrecy laws, they said, how can you make them change their mind? That’s their right. And they don’t want to cooperate. There’s nothing that can be done. But that was wrong because, of course, there are things that can be done.

And we see that, in fact, indeed, today, there is this automatic exchange of bank information whereby in principle, bankers in Switzerland or in the Cayman Islands have to report automatically each year about the wealth of their customers and the income that these customers to the different tax authorities in the US, in the EU, and in a number of developing countries.

So that’s a big progress. But of course, the problem is that it’s not enough to outsource regulation to bankers. And here’s a screenshot of a headline just a few days ago, March 29.

Just a few days ago, a US Senate report found that the big Swiss bank, Credit Suisse, violated the plea deal it has with the IRS because it had continued to help US taxpayers hide assets in Switzerland.

So about 10 years ago, Credit Suisse pleaded guilty of a criminal conspiracy to defraud the IRS by helping US taxpayers to hide assets. And as part of this plea agreement, they promised essentially to, oh, we’ll stop doing it. Promise.

Trust us. We’re not– it’s something of the past. There were compliance issues, but it’s another era. And now it’s full transparency. It will never happen again. And yeah, except that sometimes it happens. It happens again.

And that’s essentially one of the key problems with policy in this area, is that everything is based on the assumption that the very providers of financial opacity and tax avoidance and sometimes tax evasion services can be trusted to thoroughly and very honestly implement the spirit of the law.

And look, some of them are honest people and do that. But also sometimes, as I said, they don’t. And so that’s why more needs to be done to address those issues. And we need new instruments, new forms of international cooperation, and new institutions.

Most importantly, it’s really important to create financial transparency that’s independent of whatever information offshore bankers are willing to provide. And I call that the global asset registry.

So the idea is just to build on the real estate and land registries that already exist in almost all countries and to expand them to include financial assets and not only real estate and land. And then ultimately, to combine those registries, either at the level like the EU level, and perhaps ultimately at the global level.

Now, you might say, oh, global asset registry. No, that seems like really an ivory tower utopian idea that will never happen. Look, it’s not going to happen tomorrow. That’s for sure.

But I think we also understand the way that such forms of international cooperation can emerge. And the way that they can emerge is with what is initially unilateral action by some countries or by small coalition of countries.

That’s what happened for the automatic exchange of bank information. Essentially, it was, at the beginning, the US threatening offshore banks with economic sanctions. And under the threat of those sanctions, banks are going to cooperate with the US. And then other countries followed suit.

And I think it’s very important to learn from that episode. And what we learn from that episode is that oftentimes, the way to get to global agreements is not to start from the notion that there should be unanimity or global agreement but have some countries be leaders, pave the way. And then others would join.

And I’ll just end by saying that for the future, what’s going to be really critical is to change the approach that has prevailed in terms of how we regulate globalization.

So the form of regulation of globalization that has existed since the 1980s has been characterized by the fact that all the treaties that exist are essentially silent about taxation, about tax cooperation, and financial transparency.

So in free trade agreements, for instance, there’s lots of things about the protection of property rights for multinational companies and trade barriers and stuff. And none of this is ever conditional to any form of minimal taxation.

And so for the future, to make real progress, it’s going to be critical to put taxes and financial transparency at the heart of free trade agreements. Thank you very much. I look forward to the conversation.

[MARION FOURCADE] Thank you so much, Gabriel. Thank you both. So we have about 20– well, a little less than 20 minutes for questions. So maybe we can begin. And [? Leon– ?]

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] I want to thank both of you for great talks. It’s really, really interesting. So one of the things that I find a little puzzling is that– so there’s a kind of war, right, and within governments. And that is on the one hand, governments would like this money to come to them.

So they have a huge interest in collecting it, the money that’s actually owed to them. But on the other hand, they have really powerful people who they’re dealing with all the time who don’t want that money to come with them and want to keep it to themselves.

And I’m wondering how that fits into what you might think is going to happen here, Gabriel. Or as corporations do the same thing, that seems to me to be the tug of war between those two forces.

[GABRIEL ZUCMAN] Yeah, I think I agree. It’s important to be clear about what are the obstacles for progress. And clearly, the fact that in tax havens, you have a lot of wealth that belongs, let’s say, to Russian oligarchs but also to US oligarchs and oligarchs from other countries, to the top 0.01% of all other countries.

It’s probably one of the key reasons why we’ve seen so little progress in recent years, and in particular, in the context of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

I think if you recall what happened one year ago, at the beginning of the war, there was briefly some discussion, and including high level discussion that seems somewhat serious about moving towards creating these registries for wealth held in tax havens as a way to measure and perhaps freeze and perhaps tax some of the wealth owned by Russian oligarchs in tax havens.

And the reality is that one year after, we see that very little has been done, almost nothing. What’s been done is really symbolic things like seizing yachts and some real estate in London, things that are very visible.

But the bulk of the wealth of super rich Russian people obviously is not yachts and real estate, it’s financial assets. It’s stakes in businesses and portfolios of equities and bonds.

And the fact that there has been essentially no progress on that, I think it’s consistent with what you say, which is there is a lack of political will even in that context to create these transparency.

[DUNCAN WIGAN] Yeah. Yeah, I think maybe we have to distinguish between evasion and avoidance when we think about what governments want to do and what they’re willing to do here. Being at least part of London, I will say that the government often represents a group within a society.

And I think Britain is subject to something called a finance curse. And the financial industry has captured government and has for a long time. And part of that, the structure, that grip rely on is what Nick Shaxson calls the spider’s web or the imperial legacy, which is more than 50%. And [INAUDIBLE] tell us it’s more than 50% of the offshore world is ex-British empire. So I’m not sure we can expect all governments to actually want to close this down in simple terms, particularly around avoidance.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] It seems to me that there’s a terrible mismatch in capacities afoot here. We have, on the one hand, professionals, lawyers, accountants, business professionals, wealth management people, who are the best educated, the most-skilled people, and who are nimble, and whose careers are built on the Whac-A-Mole of if they catch us here, go there.

And on the other side, we have, in the United States at least, a Congress that knows more about Jewish space lasers than they do about this. That’s a real problem it seems to me because you can’t expect that all of a sudden, all the lawyers and accountants coming out of law and business schools are going to stop offering the opportunity for a creative solution to your tax problems.

They may be offering only legal solutions. But there’s an endless number of permutations that they seem to discover no matter how many crude laws are passed. And on the legislative side, you have Jewish space lasers. They have no concept whatsoever of almost anything. And they surely wouldn’t understand your presentation.

And if they cared about it, they wouldn’t understand. If they were not captive, they would not understand. If they turned it over to the IRS and said, design us a program, they’re operating under DOS operating systems. They couldn’t do it.

Who’s going to do it? Who’s going to figure out ways to capture all of this wealth and catch up with the professional Whac-A-Mole experts who keep redesigning the solution? I particularly think of two things– the BP chart, the 94%, and that fantastic, unreadable chart about Shell.

They can’t trace– they can’t audit Donald Trump whose money all comes from Russian oligarchs who’ve been laundering money as long as any of us have been standing here. And they can’t even audit his tax returns.

There’s no sophistication at all to what he’s doing. He’s just got long chains and lots of lawyers who say no and lots of accountants say no. So how do we ever get into the point where we can actually grab a hold of this system and shrink the size of this escaped money, evaded and avoided? Mostly avoided, I think.

[INAUDIBLE]

[DUNCAN WIGAN] No, no, no. I think it’s really interesting. And you’re talking– the British government having said that the British government is servant of something called the finance curse. The British government has, at least on the face of it, been on the lead on some things on beneficial ownership in the EU, et cetera, and transparency around trusts in the EU.

But you can say what you want. But if you shrink your tax service systematically over 40 years– you started by saying capacity. And absolutely, you can have all the public commitments you want. But if you don’t have any people to do the work, it’s a problem.

And of course, it’s a problem in– government workers, they’re seen as an expense whereas private– these lawyers are seen as a boon to British GDP. [LAUGHS] So there’s this whole sort of attitude towards government as a regressive cost on the private sector that prevents the investment. And I think it’s really interesting that the Canadians invested massively in their tax service I think about 10 years ago.

And then I saw some analysis of this that with the marginal benefit of adding one more tax inspector, just they never got that. There’s constantly– one person was always generating more than they cost. So then there’s a real question about [? capture, ?] I think, yeah.

[GABRIEL ZUCMAN] I think that there are two views. There’s one view, a pessimistic view that says, look, in a sense– I simplify, but governments are captured. And these problems are with us forever. And there’s not much that can be done.

And I don’t subscribe to that view. I subscribe more to the other view, which is that tax avoidance and tax evasion actually changes a lot historically. And it has changed a lot. Sometimes practices that are tolerated or even encouraged were outlawed in the past.

Extreme forms of tax avoidance like for multinational companies, creating shell companies in Bermuda, and booking, like Alphabet in 2019, $20 billion in revenue in Bermuda.

This is something that’s tolerated. And that’s been even encouraged by US policymakers for many years. But in the 1950s and 1960s, when the corporate tax rate was much higher by the way, it was just deemed not in the role of a corporate executive to try to do that, to try to do this aggressive form of tax avoidance. It’s something that has become normal only since the 1980s.

And the fact that there are so much change over time that’s linked to changes in social norms about what should be the purpose of a firm, in particular, or social norms more broadly about inequality and the role of government, I think is what makes me relatively optimistic is that, in fact, those problems can have solutions in the future because also these norms and these attitudes will change in the future.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] All right, thanks. Yeah, I wanted to ask a question first to Duncan. OK, a little closer. All right, yeah. So first, to Duncan, I wanted to ask– so we talked a little bit about Credit Suisse and UBS from 15 years ago and how the US Department of Justice really changed their practices by enforcing the fraud laws.

And I was wondering– so when you were talking about climate, the Securities and Exchange Commission in the US, I think they just published the proposed rule on climate disclosures, including the so-called Scope 3 disclosures, which was like the big battleground. And this is about disclosures within the supply chain.

So at least on the side of the corporations, as opposed to the individuals, it seems like that might be promising because if you don’t disclose properly, then you’re exposed to securities law enforcement.

And could this be expanded to wealth? And then I also wanted to ask a question of Professor Zucman. One thing that you and your colleagues have written about in the past is the problem of this incentive that’s created by extreme concentrations of wealth to actually keep– or rather buy low taxation rather.

So low taxation then makes it so that actually– so if you’re going get taxed at 80%, then grabbing the next $10 million isn’t as beneficial as it would be if you get to keep almost all of it.

And so this feedback mechanism you’ve identified, now, of course, this isn’t arguments about incentives. Obviously, you have to be questioned empirically whether they actually operate that way. But I just wanted to see if you could say something about– the last thing I read from you about that was years ago.

So I wanted to see what the current research suggests to you about how operative that dynamic is and now whether we still need to be focused on breaking that. Thanks.

[DUNCAN WIGAN] Yeah. Yeah, this disclosure is– I think we have to wait and see what happens. But indeed, if we have rules like that, and we have Scope 3 in a serious, substantive way, then that is definitely a huge leap in the right direction.

But what I understand is there’s an argument going on about whether it’s based on an accounting definition of the materiality of the relationship to your financial results, and if it is– hello, lawyers– are by rule.

And it seems that within that lobbying process and part of the Time Mirror project, which this is being developed under, are looking at the different groups who are fighting about exactly that what that rule will say.

And the accountants told me that if it says materiality, well, this is just another great, big lawyer fight that will happen. But you’re right, absolutely. If we get proper Scope 3, it’s a serious intervention, yeah.

[GABRIEL ZUCMAN] Yeah, and the effect of the tax system and incentives, the best we can do is look at the historical record. And so as you know, the US from the 1930s to 1970s had very high top marginal income tax rates, above 90% in the post-World War II decades.

And so we know. We can look at what happened at that time. And what’s really striking is that in the ’50s, ’60s, you had almost no taxpayers that declared income in the top brackets subject to these quasi confiscatory top marginal income tax rates.

This is something that had disappeared. And so those tax rates applied to income above the equivalent of several millions of today’s dollars, let’s say 5 million, and you see a collapse in the number of taxpayers who declare earning more than $5 or $10 million at the time when those top marginal income tax rates of 90% are enacted.

And so it does really look like– yeah, look, if there’s no incentive to earn more than $10 million, people are going to put less effort into bargaining super high wages or into also creating all sorts of scams that might enrich them.

Look at the expense of other actors in the economy. And so you really saw a big decline in income concentration. It’s not definitive evidence. But that’s essentially the best we have to quantify these things.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] Yes, [INAUDIBLE]. Thank you for the presentation. I was really curious to hear more about the joint operations with BP. And I was wondering how far that extends to other companies. And if that also affects laws and climate goals that have been implemented.

Is this a way to avoid reducing emissions by saying that you’ve reduced them even though you’ve just covered them up somewhere? And if so, is there’s a sense about how much that’s affecting the ability of governments to regulate global climate emissions? Thank you again for the presentation.

[DUNCAN WIGAN] That’s what we want to find out. So we’ve got a bank of 20 cases like this, which we’re working through. But it takes forensic accounting work because you have to look at the notes and the accounts, and go back over years, and see how those notes have changed, and what type of form of collaborations that these companies are entering into.

And that’s not easy because different firms report, in fact, with different language. So one of the firms we’re looking at is Exxon. They report under US cap. And they don’t use the same language of joint operations, which the IFRS use.

So we can generate the maps basically using a machine and using our very clever friends. But to do the work, we have to do case studies of firms or batches of firms. And we need to navigate different accounting systems and their legal definitions of what this collaboration is.

And it seems that it can be done. When we look at Exxon, we find something that looks very like joint operations, which we see in the BP accounts. Another thing we would like to do is trace the amount of these and when they start arising. And is there a correlation between increasing reporting requirements and a shift towards these joint operations?

But honestly, we actually don’t know yet. And it’s a job we’re going to be doing I hope with over the next couple of years.

It does seem to me that what’s happening is firms faced with reporting requirements on assets, which are returning them huge amounts of profit, will seek ways of maintaining the assets and the income that arises from those assets but disavowing themselves or the obligations that would be associated with the assets according to law and regulation.

That’s what our hunch is. And we’re in a weird world where as researchers, we like to fight bad things. So– [LAUGHS]

[MARION FOURCADE] We are running out of time. I just want to thank you both for your terrific presentations and also for fighting the good fight at the edge of the tax evasion boundary. Thank you. Thank you for being here.

Thank you to the online audience. I apologize for not asking them one question. But we’ll try to– by Len. And so hello, Len. And come back to Matrix. Thank you.

[MUSIC PLAYING]

 

Social Science / Data Science

Jo Guldi: Towards a Practice of Text Mining to Understand Change Over Historical Time

Part of the Social Science / Data Science event series

Recorded on March 8, 2023, this video features a lecture by Jo Guldi, Professor of History and Practicing Data Scientist at Southern Methodist University. Professor Guldi’s lecture was entitled “Towards a Practice of Text-Mining to Understand Change Over Historical Time: The Persistence of Memory in British Parliamentary Debates in the Nineteenth Century.”

Co-sponsored by Social Science Matrix, the UC Berkeley Department of History, and D-Lab, this talk was presented as part of the Social Science / Data Science event series, a collaboration between Social Science Matrix and D-Lab.

Abstract

A world awash in text requires interpretive tools that traditional quantitative science cannot provide. Text mining is dangerous because analysts trained in quantification often lack a sense of what could go wrong when archives are biased or incomplete. Professor Guldi’s talk reviewed a brief catalogue of disasters created by data science experts who voyage into humanistic study. It finds a solution in “hybrid knowledge,” or the application of historical methods to algorithm and analysis.

Case studies engage recent work from the philosophy of history (including Koselleck, Erle, Assman, Tanaka, Chakrabarty, Jay, Sewell, and others) and investigate the “fit” of algorithms with each historical frame of reference on the past. This talk profiles recent research into the status of “memory” in British politics. It profiled the persistence of references to previous eras in British history, to historical conditions per se, and to futures hoped for and planned, using NLP analysis. It presented the promise and limits of text-mining strategies such as Named Entity Recognition and Parts of Speech Analysis for modeling temporal experience as a whole, suggesting how these methods might support students of social science and the humanities, and also revealing how traditional topics in these subjects offer a new research frontier for students of data science and informatics.

About Jo Guldi

Jo Guldi, Professor of History and Practicing Data Scientist at Southern Methodist University, is author of four books: Roads to Power: Britain Invents the Infrastructure State (Harvard 2012), The History Manifesto (Cambridge 2014), The Long Land War: The Global Struggle for Occupancy Rights (Yale 2022), and The Dangerous Art of Text Mining (Cambridge forthcoming). Her historical work ranges from archival studies in nation-building, state formation, and the use of technology by experts. She has also been a pioneer in the field of text mining for historical research, where statistical and machine-learning approaches are hybridized with historical modes of inquiry to produce new knowledge. Her publications on digital methods include “The Distinctiveness of Different Eras,” American Historical Review (August 2022) and “The Official Mind’s View of Empire, in Miniature: Quantifying World Geography in Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates,” Journal of World History 32, no. 2 (June 2021): 345–70. She is a former junior fellow at the Harvard Society of Fellows.

Listen to the lecture below, or on Google Podcasts or Apple Podcasts.

Transcript

Jo Guldi: Towards a Practice of Text Mining to Understand Change Over Historical Time

[MUSIC PLAYING]

[JAMES VERNON] Good afternoon, everyone. My name is James Vernon. And I am a teacher in the history department. And I’m delighted to be able to welcome Jo Guldi back to Berkeley today.

Before I get going, I have been told by Marion that I need to remind everyone that the event is co-sponsored by the History Department; and by the Data Lab, D-Lab; and by the Social Science Matrix. So there’s a great team of co-sponsorship that speaks to the enormous interest in Jo’s work across the campus.

I’ve known Jo for probably close to 20 years, which is a little embarrassing– 15, for sure, but not far off 20. She’s one of the most fearless and most energetic scholars that I know. And before I try and explain something about the work that she does, I should let you know that she already published more books than I have. And I’m probably almost twice her age.

She has published her first book, which is very special to me because we worked on it a little together, and was published by Harvard in 2012. And it’s called Roads to Power– Britain Invents the Infrastructure State. Jo did her graduate work here at Berkeley. But in a way that is absolutely characteristic of Jo and the types of work that she does, she came out of comp lit into urban planning and architecture to settle finally in history.

But while she was in history, she was already very much taking the digital turn and helping to build the conversations that ended up at the D-Lab here on campus. Her next book was The History Manifesto that she co-authored with– oh, this is embarrassing. I’m blanking on his name.

[JO GULDI] David Armitage.

[JAMES VERNON] David Armitage, the very distinguished professor in my field of work and a professor at Harvard. And then this year, she has– last year, she published the book that you can see on the table here that she was talking about a lunchtime today, The Long Land War– The Global Struggle for Occupancy Rights, which is published very beautifully by Yale. And because Jo is Jo, there is now another book that she is going to be talking about today called The Dangerous Art of Text Mining, which is coming out very shortly with Cambridge University Press with this very striking image as its front cover.

So what unites or what brings together the different types of writing and scholarship that Jo does? What I love about Jo’s work is that it’s constantly pushing us to think both methodologically about how we produce scholarship. But it’s also continually in that process urging us to think about questions of scale. And for historians especially, that’s a really profound question.

And it’s led Jo to a very intense engagement with the growing field of digital humanities to think about the way in which working through methods like text mining we can work on a scale both geographically and temporally that historians are usually very uncomfortable at working at. Because historians tend to generally be very grounded in an archive that gives them a very specific relationship to time and to space. And Jo had always been pushing at that boundaries in a way in which she’s traveled between archival scholarship and her work in terms of digital methods.

The other thing that I want to say about Jo’s work, which I think brings together the different projects that she’s worked on is, to me, being a continuing preoccupation with the question– with two questions. One is about the nature of power.

Often, for Jo, that’s about thinking about state formation and the set of new technologies of power that came into the world in the 19th and the 20th century. But Jo has always been deeply interested in those groups of people who mobilize against those new technologies of power and of regulation. And I think The Long Land War and The Road– and the book on The Road to Power are really great examples of that type of scholarship.

And then the other element that was there for Jo, I think even when she began in comp lit was an absolute preoccupation with what she began by talking about as landscape. And Jo was profoundly influenced by scholars in the history of architecture and urban planning around the politics of landscape. But the question of land and understandings of property and property rights have really been at the center of the types of historical questions that she’s been asking in her scholarship.

So all of which is to long windedly key up the talk that she’s going to do for us this afternoon on The Dangerous Art of Text Mining– A Methodology for Digital History, which I’m delighted to say as someone who was trained in the history of politics is going to be dealing in part with the vast amounts of text that were collected by various forms of publication, including Hansard, the official collection of the Houses of Parliament in Britain. Jo, it’s wonderful to have you here. And we’re really looking forward to your talk.

[JO GULDI] Thank you so much, James. It’s really a delight to be here. It’s a delight to be among old friends, old advisers, new friends at a time when Berkeley is initiating initiatives like The Matrix and the D-Lab and text mining and data science. I hope to hear more about those conversations at dinner, including getting the names right.

But I’m very grateful to Marion, in particular, for facilitating this in such a way that such a diverse set of audiences could come together and to the History Department to being willing to host a nonconventional history talk. We had a great discussion of the archival book. We talked about archives at noon. So if you weren’t– if you were there, hi again. And if you weren’t there, archives are real. But we’re not talking about them right now. Right now, we’re going to talk about data.

So there is no doubt that today, social science is becoming a big data subject. As part of that process, fields make new discoveries. In political science, economics, and sociology, investigations into robustness, inductive versus deductive thinking, correlation versus causality, and false positives have generated important new standards.

Because history is both a social science as well as a qualitative discipline in the humanities with an appreciation for description, our processes will look different as history starts to engage data. It will need new standards of validation. Temporal experience as a criterion of successful discovery means slightly different work than the work proposed in fields which take certainty as the standard alone.

Because we are ultimately a positivist science descended from the Enlightenment, we in history must take an interest in those specific findings about events, periodizations, and other temporal experiences contained within our textual archives. And here, I believe could be the beginning of a productive new dialogue across the social sciences about the best practices for characterizing temporal change over time and validating conclusions made on the basis of algorithms.

So in today’s talk, I’d like to tell you about what validation might look like when applying text mining to the analysis of the experience of past events. I’ll be introducing three historical concepts– memory, periodization, and archive– and telling you about applying statistics and machine learning to gain insight about these categories of temporal experience. But first, I want to tell you a little about what text mining is, how validation is traditionally performed in history, and why I recommend working with standards of meaning from the field of history when engaging in text mining.

Mining refers specifically to the extraction of valuable metallic auras from the Earth and metaphorically to any process that extracts rare and valuable content from its surrounding context. Data mining begins with counting but includes statistical transformations to test for relationships, such as correlation and significance. And text mining typically treats text as the data in question.

It begins with computational transformations that break up and classify digital strings of archival text into units representing constituent words and phrases. We’re just counting words. Next, we might apply statistical manipulations in order to study those meaningful signals and their relationships typically using the kind that trained analysts from the humanities and social sciences would like to detect in the course of reading but now carrying out that analysis on a bigger scale.

Validating the results of quantitative text mining represents a new terrain that requires thinking with the tools of multiple disciplines. In history, as with other fields in the humanities, problems of believability have been traditionally linked to forms of dense qualitative description of unique objects. So consider, for example, this surveyor’s notebook from Ireland in the 1880s, which includes notes on local farmsteads, the cost of rent, and economic investments by peasants, all of which is easy enough to translate into the numbers on a spreadsheet.

But there are also elements of the surveyor’s notebook that I would find in the archive that are more difficult to discern when abstracted into data. The shape of the book is about gay big, which means that it’s ideally organized so that it can fit into the pocket of a traveling code. And I can take it with me on the railroad as I visit the farmsteads across Ireland. It’s a traveler’s notebook.

Reading up on the imprint leads me to discover that it was created in a woman-owned paper shop in Dublin for the purposes of accommodating travelers. So there are many travelers of the era who might be taking notes with devices such as this. It’s only by reading the invisible context of the data, not just the data itself, that one might learn about the surveyor’s politics and how his beliefs in designing a participatory economy factored into his new method of surveying the landscape, therefore, collecting rents and asking how much of the local investment originated with the tenant versus the landlord.

Relevant details for answering that question are located not in the object or in the biography of the surveyor or our deck– sorry, are located in this object as an object or in the biographies of the surveyor and has other published writings, not in the words on the page that would be transcribed in the process of text mining.

So it follows that text mining only ever applies to a sliver of the available knowledge about the past. It offers no replacement for the archive as a whole or the practice of history as a whole, a field that’s potentially concerned with the life of surveyors as well as the agrarian rebellions and political movements with which they intersect.

So just to make it super clear, I’m not talking about creating a magic button that says, make history now, and outdating the entire history department. You’re still going to need them. Are we clear? Yes? OK, good.

The surveyor’s notebook also illustrates the kinds of expertise that have traditionally been necessary to manufacture a compelling interpretation of the past. The readers’ willingness to trust qualitative descriptions often hinges on forms of expertise such as paleography, rhetoric, the history of technology or the history of the book. A deep training in these specialized skills like how to read the surveyors’ handwriting supports the individual historian skills of appreciating specific details that support meaningful interpretation of the object.

So we like our details. We like knowing that there’s expertise behind these facts and interpretations. And what this means is that if practitioners from history are going to trust me when I start touching computers, they’re going to want a similar level of maniacal detail engagement from the new field of text mining.

They will want to test the bias of each data set as well as the limits and promise of every algorithm as well as the result of what happens when the algorithm is applied. It’s not going to be enough in history to treat the algorithm like a black box. It will get me jeered out of the history seminar.

Above all, historians expect some reckoning with meaning with significant stories that have not been previously heard yet, yet which harness the potential of shaking up our understanding of the past, adding fundamentally new information to our stories about nations, institutions, individuals, and human experience in general.

Discussions of accuracy and meaningfulness are vital for text mining because the tools of text mining are by their nature reductive. They produce meaning by taking a knife to the data about the past, reducing past experience to a minimized selection of experience and information. Each data-driven visualization produced by text mining is merely one of the possible representations of what Timothy Tangherlini in the front row called the vast unread behind the data analysis.

Every exercise in data mining works with a portion of possible truths housed in the totality of each historical archive, such that any given interpretation of data necessarily represents massive information loss. Yet, text mining is powerful if done right. If the analysis of text mining are visualized successfully, a tiny image offers at least potentially an outsized return on investment, distilling shelf miles of text into a valuable, pithy representation of what those words did.

So a single visualization might reduce the story of a single institution’s politics and how they’ve changed over 100 years as in this visualization of the state of the union addresses over time. Or it might give us a mirror of what stories people have told us about how COVID was transmitted or how American novelists present white characters and Black characters and how those representations in fiction have changed over time in a more diverse nation whose publishing industry has remained biased according to the standards of the 1950s.

But there are also many data-driven analysis of texts that purport to offer substantive insight and fail. Such failures of text mining occur when algorithmic distillations of text are misapplied with the result of analyses that are empty biased or simply false. So failing to account for the limits and bias of archives is the major reason for retractions of several recent articles published in science on the papers of the National Academy of Science and attacked by historians.

For example, in this representation of the history of the world associated with an article in the Journal of Science and circulated on the Nature website, which failed to represent– which claimed to represent the history of migration all over the world but failed to acknowledge any activity by non-whites, including the transportation of enslaved humans across the Atlantic as a part of world history, left out some important things.

A second problem sometimes encountered is failing to account for grammatical relationships, which creates representations of language based on bags of words that may miss something. One of the– you may have noticed that the Wordle used to be all over the front page of American newspapers. It disappeared around the time that Trump was elected, possibly because the Trump speeches and the Obama speeches create exactly the same word cloud.

They both say the American people over and over and over again. That’s because all of the grammatical relationships and the two-word phrases are left out, which means that it’s just economy America and the people in the economy. If you do what– I wrote this without thinking about you in the front audience. But I’m just– if you do what Tim Tangherlini does and you put the grammar words back in, then you have all of these other relationships, which are much more telling about the distinctiveness of populist speech on the left versus populist speech on the right.

So don’t leave out the grammar. A third problem is failing to engage with existing knowledge about the past, which results in data-driven text mining that’s simply redundant. For instance, famously, the publications by the Culturomics group which invented ngrams, their conclusions included the fact that Nazi Germany censored books. We already knew. We knew that. Not new. Not a discovery. And unimpressive to historians. Many chuckles in the history department about that one.

So in a qualitative/quantitative question like the determination of relevant historical events, validation is more than a matter of p-values and error bars. A validation practice that’s satisfying to historians as well as the theorists of information must demonstrate intimacy with algorithms and their parameters as well as the technical interest in the results of those algorithms applied to historical questions. It must model temporal experience in a way recognizable to historians with a capacity for innovation and what we already know about the past.

The former criterion requires an appreciation of statistics, the ladder of history. In metallurgy, the field that understands geography and the physiognomy of the Earth, the way you get to value to the valuable ore is geology. In human experience, the fields that understand meaning and value about what’s changing the past are the humanities and social sciences and history in particular.

We have already established that the appreciation of the bias in each archives is a matter of robust analysis. So allow me to introduce my data. I’m talking about the collection of the speeches of the UK parliament from 1806 to 1911. So these are the speeches of the House of Commons and the House of Lords.

The major speeches were recorded. More of them were recorded over time. Here are the members of the House of Commons. Gladstone is up front. The Lord Chancellor’s on the back. All of these people have papers. Often, it’s the text of the speech they intend to read.

Their speeches are going to circulate outside parliament to the rest of the nation. Because up there, in the gallery, there are journalists. Towards the end of the century, they’re taking note by shorthand. Earlier, they have more primitive methods. They’re trying to write down all of the memorable speeches to be republished the next day in the newspaper.

Those speeches are bundled by one printer, in particular Thomas Curson Hansard. And so the printed speeches are known as Hansard. Hansard is my data set. It’s now a data set. It was turned into a data set for the first time in the 1990s. It was cleaned in the early 2000s. My lab cleaned more.

It’s comprehensive, periodic, and well preserved. One of the nice things about working with Hansard is that we know what’s in and what’s out. It’s not like the Google Books data set, which is random assortment of printed text that could be novels or magazines or essays biased in all sorts of directions.

We know how parliament was biased. Do you see any women? No. People of color? Not so much. We know. We know who they are and what’s in and what’s out. So we can describe it very well. And when we’re modeling change, we know what kind of change we’re talking about.

My data is, as I said, 1806 to 1911. It’s a big data. It’s 46,000 individual speakers, 100,000 separate debates, and a million speeches, about a quarter billion words in all. It’s too much to read.

Also, we have also established that the discipline of history represents a guide to the analysis of texts in the past that are meaningful. In my forthcoming book, The Dangerous Art of Text Mining, I argue for beginning with the building blocks of historical understanding. And I show that list here– memory, period, archive event, influence, change over time, and modernization.

These are concepts from the field of history which have been heavily theorized. The philosophy of history has engaged some of these terms for a century to help us understand different elements of temporal experience. The historical past is not all one. There are multiple pasts.

So I believe that in bringing these concepts into dialogue with data science, it’s possible to advance towards a newly robust practice of digital history and also to add to the robustness, usefulness, and meaningfulness of the practice of data science itself. In this talk, I’m prepared to show approaches to the three of the categories I mentioned here– memory, periodization, and archive. If time remains, I’ll join those case studies to one of my theoretical publications on critical search about how to move from qualitative and quantitative data to meaning.

Can I put you to work? Please hand out. So first, let’s take the concept of memory. Memory was introduced by Maurice Halbwachs at the beginning of the 20th century as distinct from history, which is the study of what actually happened in the past, in its totality. Memory is collective, anchored to place and to oral tradition. It’s the source of identity.

History is institutional and expert. It’s bound up with enlightenment dialectics of argumentation about the truth of what happened. Memory studies traces the popular partial and often deeply political reception of the past in contrast to the study of history proper, which applies social science to pursue the truth of the totality of past experience.

So historians have canonically studied memory through the creation of new rituals and monuments, whether Tudor funerary monuments like this one, which was created to tell you all that Richard Boyle, Earl of Cork, was a really cool dude; or the monuments that commemorated Civil War generals, which have become more problematic in a more enlightened age; or through such instances of invented rituals like the invention of academic regalia or the Scottish kilt.

And what follows, I’m concerned with acts of memorialization in speech. What happens when a politician says, I remember the Boston Tea Party? Well, they didn’t say that a lot in the British Parliament in the 19th century. They said, I remember the Glorious Revolution. But which events did they memorialize the most?

So let me show you a first instance. And then we’ll get to the images. This is a very baby instance. And then we’ll get to the images in your handout in just a second. Let’s begin with the simplest possible search for memory.

I’m looking for numbers between 1066 and 1911 and the parliamentary debates that were mentioned more than 20 times in any given year. Now, this could misfire. It’s possible that somebody says, 1067, and they are counting bales of hay or talking about conversions from the metric system.

But the strong diagonal line suggests that the numbers are meaningful because people in the past tended to– people in parliament tend to refer to legislation in their own year, the previous year, the next year. Next year, in 2024, we’re going to pass this bill. Last year, we passed that bill of 2022.

So we refer to those mentions a lot. Occasionally, they refer to deadlines expected in the future like that 1870 is the deadline for a diplomatic convention. Spot checking the numbers annotated in this graph confirms that they are almost universally references to years.

So the visual form of the chart is itself a modest innovation. I adopted a single dot plot to represent what I call a double timeline, meaning time is on the x-axis and time is on the y-axis. And the x here on the x-axis is the year of mention.

So this is the date of the political speech when Gladstone is saying the Glorious Revolution. On the y-axis is the year mentioned. So this is the year that’s mentioned in the text, the date that appears in the number.

And it lends itself to some starter observations. Some years are being added while others are dropping off each year, producing the diagonal. But that’s not all we find. I won’t tell you about all of the conclusions. You can say a lot of interesting things.

But one of the first interesting things to look for is strong vertical lines, suggesting a moment of memorialization. So that strong vertical line is 1838. 1838 is the date of the Tamworth Manifesto, the making of the modern Conservative Party associated with Benjamin Disraeli. It’s a moment when Conservatives are reforming themselves in order to argue against Whig ideas about modernity and the Conservative claim to an aristocratic idea of Britain is grounded in the conviction that Conservatives accurately represent the ancient aristocratic past, the glory days of Britain.

And so what do the Conservatives do in parliament? They start sprinkling their speeches with really completely random associations from the Tudor and Stewart years. Like, it’s not enlightening reading if you look at the 1567 and 1592 and 1667 and you ask, why are they debating these years?

They’re talking about the status of the earldom of Mar. They’re talking about Tudor funerary vestments like what priests are supposed to wear officially on certain days to celebrate certain sacraments. It’s not really important stuff. It’s not vital to the life of the nation. What they’re doing is symbolically signaling, I am attached to the ancient Tudor and medieval past. I know about all these things that happened in the Tudor age because I, a Conservative, have this special relationship to the past.

So you can imagine– you can imagine pursuing a question of memory like this by hand. But the success of this method confirms that the computer can with great efficiency identify changing relationships to the past simply by the simplest possible way of looking for numbers. Now, we get a very different perspective on memory and relationships to the past if we start applying different text mining methods.

And part of what I’m going to argue for in terms of a validation process appropriate to history is this process of exploring the data, exploratory data analysis via iterating over separate methods. So in machine learning, it’s giving us something called named entity recognition in which the computer recognizes the parts of speech on the level of the sentence.

And it makes a guess about which of these noun phrases, noun-like phrases might be the name of a person, the name of a place, or the name of an event based on suggestions by, for example, the different parts of speech around that noun-like phrase.

So if we ask the computer to guess about the events from the sentences in Hansard and then we give each of those events a number– those numbers are added by me– then we can organize them again in a double timeline. And we can track the phrases not mentioned with numbers but the actual phrase like the phrase “the French Revolution” over time.

So, again, tracked over time, here’s the date of the speech. There’s the date of the actual event. This is not surprising at all in British history. There’s book after book about 19th century history that says the British were terrified that the French Revolution was going to happen in Britain and it would lead to the decapitation of the aristocracy and the seizure of their lands.

So they never stop talking about it. So it’s very nice that that’s confirmed. But what we didn’t know is we didn’t know that the Crimean War has that duration of sustained memory. In contrast to most of the colonial wars, you see the Boer War or the Zulu war, the Egyptian war, the Persian war which are forgotten about. There’s a tiny shadow lingering of memory.

So we can learn something about the persistence of memory. The other one that stands out is the plan of campaign. The plan of campaign is very important to me. Because in the other book, I start with Ireland in the 1880s because of Irish activism.

This is the moment when the Irish tenants who weren’t allowed to an owner inherit land rise up against the landlords and say, we want our land back. It’s called the Plan of Campaign. And they don’t stop talking about the Plan of Campaign after it happens, which tells you something about manufacturing memory maybe on behalf of the Irish lobby.

But one of the– but this is a troubling chart in another way because there aren’t that many events from social history. There’s the Great Exhibition, which isn’t remembered that long, maybe a decade after it happens. But where are the peasants? Where are the post-colonial subjects?

Britain’s a big place. We know that Parliament is mostly an aristocratic institution, not for the entire century. But there should be some other kinds of events. Why is the computer only finding the wars? Well, the answer is that it’s a matter of scale.

And so if I control the vocabulary, the max n, the maximum number of mentions per year in the previous chart was 989. Here, it’s 77. So we’re going down in terms of scale. We’re using scale. And controlling of vocabulary is a way of exploring social events.

So we’re looking just for social events. And so these events are spoken about a degree less. It’s not that the computer didn’t find them. But they’re less numerous. So they didn’t show up unless you know that social event history is something you should look for.

This chart gives us an interesting opportunity to compare the persistence of memory around the Irish famine and the Bengal famine. The Irish famine is talked about in parliament nearly every year after it happens. The Mongol famine which should be– they’re really talking about the Bengal famine of 1880. So the number is wrong there– is forgotten about virtually after it happens despite millions upon millions dead.

So you see the bias of empire, in which the Irish have representation. But the citizens of Bengal don’t have representation. It shows up immediately– parliament is incapable of memorializing what happened despite its responsibility for the famine.

There’s clear data that parliament is mainly ignoring the colonies. And this is something that I’ve published about in other studies. The exception that shows up in the data– and this tracks with the consensus in British history– is the Great Revolt also known as the Indian Mutiny. The Great Revolt of 1857 is remembered every year because the British are reminding themselves that they have to be very afraid of Indian subjects and it’s necessary to arm themselves against them.

The tool seems to work to identify and compare patterns of memory. Much of this, we already knew. But we didn’t know it with the specificity until– with the same level of specificity until it could be measured.

So let’s look, again, at a smaller subset, descending, again, by another factor. And here, the max n is lowering from 77 to 6. So we’re going down by a factor of 10. Again, we’re looking for events that match the bigram riot. So famous riots in British history. What are they talking about?

Riots are a matter of a local uprising usually involving the working class dealt with by parliament hastily– often hastily and quickly forgotten, although one of the things that springs out from this analysis is the lasting memory of the Gordon and Featherstone riots.

The Gordon riots, we know about. We know about them in 1780. We don’t know about the way in which they’re being invoked in parliament in the late 19th century. And the same with the Featherstone riots.

Here, we get into a really specific frame of a question for investigation. The most remembered early riots are the Rebecca riots and the Gordon riots. But why is it that the Hyde Park riot of 1866 seems to evoke comparisons with the Gordon riots of 1780, whereas the Wexford riot of 1883 and later riots, this comparisons utterly vanish? What does the obsolescence of memory tell us about how contemporary riots were interpreted?

So in contradistinction to the previous charts of events, here’s a fundamentally new question about the vanishing of memory when we couldn’t have asked before text mining. So a decade ago, a student of history could have asked the question about any two riots and how they were invoked together. And they might have used keyword search to plumb the riots to at a time. But they could not have begun with an archive and an entire category of temporal experience, memory, and progressed from there to identify riots as a subject where the patterns of memory are full of surprises.

OK, so next, I’d like to move on to periodization, the issue of periodization. And, again, I have a handout. In the next case study, I’ll be applying an algorithm for finding statistical distinctiveness, TF-IDF to the problem of periodization. Now, in contrast to memory, periodization is a theory about how time is divided.

Historians argue about the significance of centuries and decades, posing questions like, when did the 19th century begin? The French Revolution is an excellent candidate. In short, we’re interested in what distinguishes one decade from another or one century from another as well as the possibility that some decades are just more historically meaningful than others. Big moment of change. Sometimes you feel like everything is changing around you.

So to investigate distinctiveness, I turn to a vintage statistical algorithm. This is old data science, not new data science, TF-IDF. TF-IDF was introduced in 1973 by statistician Karen Sparck Jones. It’s useful as a tool for class. It’s used in the library– in library schools as a tool for classifying articles by ranking the likelihood of each word document pair relative to all words and all documents in a data set.

So in my article, I applied this algorithm not to articles in the library, not asking what’s the word most distinctive of each article or each author, but to time periods. So hence, TF-IDF becomes TF-IPF, Inverse Period Frequency. What are the words that are most distinctive of each time period?

And the time period can vary. I can ask, what are the words most distinctive of each decade, of each 20-year period, of each year, of each week, of each day? So I wrote a 4-year loop and iterated through those periods. And the results are interesting.

At the level of the 20-year period, we get fairly predictable results that look something like a table of contents for textbook of British history. So the concerns of the day change from the Corn Laws and their effect at a time of harvest failure to the Bank of England and cash payments to the repeal of the Corn Laws and Irish famine to cholera and the temperance movement, rent strikes, and crofters rebellions, workingmen’s compensation, and public education.

That’s a pretty good approximation for what happened in the 19th century, according to Britain’s parliament. Those are the distinctive– some of the most distinctive historical events of each time period. So that’s no new information about British history.

But what this proves is that the technique could be applied to periodize any new corpora. So, for example, if you apply it to Reddit over the last 10 years– and we don’t really have a big theory about what the turning point of the last 10 years was. You could make up some theories. But my students have done this. They take the sexuality thread from Reddit. And then they can identify the moment of a transgender suicide that changes the conversation in the language that’s being talked about.

So we can use this kind of approach to periodize archives where we don’t have a working theory, of what the major events are or the major change points. Things become much more interesting when I start looking at the words that are most distinctive of a single day. So what the computer is looking for here is a word that was said 500 times on one day in British history and then never said again in parliament or maybe mentioned once a year.

So such a word is plumbers. Plumbers get one day in the entire 19th century. This is the date when the Plumbers Union comes to parliament with some materials that they want officially approved and discussed.

And it’s notable that once we go down to the level of 1 day, the concerns change. We’re looking at longer periods of time. We’re talking about matters of states. Middles periods of times, we talk about colonization. We talk about the railways. We talk about particular factories interest.

By the time we get down to one day, you’re seeing interests in Britain who only have enough power over parliament to command the attention of parliamentary representatives for single day out of the century. So there are lots of working class concerns. There are brewers and distilleries. There’s the issue of vagrants, what should we do about vagrants. There are the silk workers, their environmental concerns like smoke.

So time turns out to operate as something like an index of parliamentary attention. We can compare how much time each interest gets. The chartists, James, only get 1 month. Slavery gets 6 months. The abolition of slavery gets 6 months. The plumbers get 1 day.

So this gives us an interesting way of measuring parliamentary attention, bringing politics back into the meaning of temporality. Another intriguing aspect of these distinctiveness measures is that they can be adjusted in order to reveal different shapes of time. So what I’m talking about right now is essentially temporal fossils.

Temporal fossils are words or phrases that come into usage for single day or 20-year period. And then you never hear about them again. After the Irish– after the Corn Laws are discussed, we don’t go back and re debate the Corn Laws. After the railways are discussed, we don’t go back and redebate the railways of this at the same level. We might mention occasional railway bills. But there’s a moment of the railways that’s several months’ long.

But we can adjust that. We might be interested in different shapes of time. For example, words that come into being, neologisms that are talked about, and then they persist for the rest of time. So we can tweak the math to look for those. That would be historical novelty. And I gave you the timeline for historical novelty. We can look at last gasps, words that were used. And then in a certain time period, they go away.

So looking for different categories reflects different shapes of time. We can see– when we think about these investigations of what’s temporally distinctive, we have the possibility of many complementary objects of study, each of which can give us an intersecting feeling for what is coming and going relative to the past.

My third category of study is the archive. In history, the archive is key. Our findings are only as good as our ability to muster a record of specific documentary instances to prove an argument.

So one of the challenges in working with big data is to talk between distant reading, the overview, typically produced by word count, and close readings of an archive. That is, to move from the aggregate visualizations, like the ones I’ve been showing, back to specific speech acts that are recorded in the archive with names, dates, and verifiable records about exactly what happened. This is one of the trickiest moves to make but also one of the most vital to the discipline of history.

So the method that I’ll be applying in this section is word embeddings. And it offers one possible approach to the study of historical processes. Word embeddings can be used to detect many kinds of historical forces. But one of their virtues is to demonstrate the changing contexts in which certain words have appeared in historical debates.

So I’m showing you the collocates, the most distinctive collocates, words that appear in the same sentence as the key word environmentalist by 5-year period. So they very likely appear in the same sentence or certainly in the same speech. And here, we’ve switched from Hansard to the US Congress. Sorry, I tricked you. Ha-ha, we’re in America now.

1970 is the first decade in which people start using the neologism environmentalist in Congress. Word endings matter. I’m using the word environmentalist rather than environmental or environment because a hostile work environment or childhood learning environment would give us a totally different picture of what the changing discourse was about.

Word embeddings give me direct access to how the context in which they were debated was changing over time. So this image and the longer chart that you have on the first page shows the change in context. And if you glance over it, you’ll see many possible directions in which the inquiry could go.

We have the names of industries like the logging industry. We have the name of species that are being debated like different kinds of owls and fish. We have geographical regions that come in and out of the debate. At some points, the debate over environmentalism is mostly about the Pacific Northwest. Other times, it’s about California. Other times, it’s about international affairs.

So any one of these objects could be the next move for an inquiry. It’s up to the analysts to decide which of these are the most salient. Now, it’s because of other historical debates that I chose the question to inspect that I did.

And the other historical debate in question is, Oreskes and Conway’s engagement with the question of why American politics didn’t solve global warming way back in the 1970s when the scientists were like, hey, we just did the measurements and global warming is real– you should really do something. Because they did take it directly to Congress.

So Oreskes and Conway went through all of the paperwork on what the scientists discovered and when that information was presented to Congress and how politics was tilted away from the scientific consensus. And for that reason, I decided to focus on the moral discourse of environmentalism. In Oreskes and Conway’s account, the discovery of the climate emergencies in the 1960s was met with urgent pleas from the scientific community for federal attention and sustained research.

By the 1980s, however, a handful of rogue scientists with ties to fossil fuels companies have begun to deliberately distort the analysis of climate change using doctored graphics and bringing defamation lawsuits against the scientists who tried to argue with them on the basis of data. Week reporting in The Wall Street Journal further undermine the cause of the truth with the result that doubt was cast upon the broadcast consensus of climate science, which was routinely denounced as a hoax.

So by naming names, Oreskes and Conway bring something like a suit of litigation against The Wall Street Journal and other interlocutors. And we might call this the litigate of mode of writing in the humanities. Historians often imagine their work as that of litigants. And so my question was how far text mining could help us to specify the suit against figures in Congress for their role in sowing distrust against environmentalism.

In table 12.2, we see a distillation of the previous table. So just to be clear, the previous table 12.1, you just have the first 25 or so rows. But really, it’s a much longer table. It’s as long as the number– as the number of unique words in the corpus.

I read the first 500 rows. Out of those first 500 rows, I hand-selected anything that looked like a moral discourse like the word kook or the word hoax or the word elitist. And there were a lot of those terms. So that’s what I’m presenting to you in 12.2.

It’s word embeddings per 5-year period hand-sorted by me. There’s a human in the box. I could have used sentiment analysis. But for reasons I’m happy to discuss, I don’t trust it. I think the results are garbage when applied not to Amazon reviews but to Congress. Happy to say more. Definitely don’t apply it to the 19th century. Big trouble.

So moral discourse in 12.2. Two moments spring out. There are more moral discourse words in some eras than others. There’s 1975. There’s 2000. Things heat up. And then they cool down in the middle, which is interesting.

Importantly, the word embeddings don’t tell us how these words are being used. We can guess. But we don’t ultimately know whether people are saying, environmentalists are elitists. Or they could be saying, it’s so elitist that your fossil fuel industry is doing x. I’m going to call an environmentalist. We don’t know. We don’t know who’s the environmentalist. So we need to look more closely.

So the next several iterations– in the next several iterations, I show how I validated the context in which the term environmentalist appeared. I used word count, simple word count of bigrams to track what was being said about environmentalists. So these are literally two words that are welded together. They’re not saying, I’m going to tell the environmentalist that your fossil fuel dude is so radical. They’re saying, radical environmentalists did x– overzealous environmentalists did x

And this chart reveals a chronology. There’s a discourse of distrust at the beginning. But it escalates after 1995 to up to 80 mentions of these phrases in 2005 to 2009. The findings suggest that rhetoric of attacking environmentalists coincided with Newt Gingrich’s campaign to win Congress for the Republican Party during the 1990s, adopting the language focused strategy associated with Republican Fred Luntz and his famous 1990 memo Language– a key mechanism of control.

I present this to Americans. They’re like, oh, I know what that is. They didn’t know which phrases. They didn’t know how it intersected with environmental history. But they were like, oh, that’s Newt. Look, it changed things.

So next, I decided to investigate which speakers use the phrases like extreme environmentalists that we saw at the previous chart. It turns out that 90% of the phrases on the previous chart were coming from only six speakers, these guys. The chart also suggests that well before Gingrich, Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska was already pioneering a rhetoric of mistrust.

So descending to the level of keywords and context, every speech in which Ted Stevens utters the phrase extreme environmentalist gives you precisely the story of what happened. Stevens coins the rhetoric of extreme environmentalists to sow mistrust against the defenders of the Alaskan Wildlife Refuge on behalf of the Trans-Alaska pipeline from 1973 to the end of the 1970s.

In the 1990s, he returns the phrase again in the context of this Luntz Gingrich political move in order to manufacture a memory of the success of labeling the extreme environmentalists. It worked for me. We were able to pass the law by just one deciding vote. Thank you, Spiro Agnew. You too can swing the Republican Party in these tough times against environmentalists if you just use phrases like mine.

He essentially tells the story in the middle of Congress. It’s a bit more coded than that. But he’s telling other Republicans how well this strategy works. He switches, again, in 2001, as you can see not on the screen but in your handout, the last page, where he swaps out the phrase extreme environmentalists for radical environmentalists in the aftermath of 9/11, making a nonexplicit but symbolic case for equating radical Islamism qua terrorism with radical environmentalism, also terrorism.

So by using computational approaches alongside conceptual questions such as the historian’s problem of explanation, the analyst can leverage the scalar power of the algorithm against questions that matter. Such an approach requires a commitment to a textual database like the US Congress to a series of methods at minimum word count and word embeddings as well as a working knowledge of debates over meaning in history and major forces in the 20th century.

The training required almost certainly places this work outside the grasp of the lone data analyst with no training in the humanities because context is that important. The most important part of this work is explanation in the sense of identifying which questions matter and how they matter. My case study leans heavily on historians like Naomi Oreskes for the relevant question, why did Congress not respond to the science of climate change who sowed the mistrust– who sowed the mistrust if you had to take them to a court of law? Would it stand up?

The project then treats word embeddings, word count, and guided reading as stops along the way towards a full argumentation, providing answers for the questions that already exist in the world. Text mining can support historical explanation but not automatically. The historical explanation that combines evidence for word embeddings will almost always have to rely on the analysts’ understanding of and appreciation for historical reasoning, historical context, and grand questions of historical change, none of which are provided in computational form.

So regarding text mining as an art, that requires a sense of what matters, engaged with the humanities and social sciences, produces a very different research process from a data science paper concerned solely with algorithmic innovation. So critical search is my theory about how moving between quantitative and qualitative analysis can be done. It requires the unpacking of the bias of each data set, of each algorithm, of each value inside each algorithm and constructively putting the results into a dialogue with primary and secondary sources.

The process here is submitted as an alternative to faddish adaptations of new tools and visualizations quickly applied or to following computer science questions about predicting the result of algorithms applied to historical topics where prediction is a problematic term. And I’m happy to say more on that. But that’s what’s in the book. I don’t like prediction because historians denounced it a long time ago. It doesn’t work for us, except in very minute cases such as military history. I’ll say more. Ask about it.

The theory of critical search departs from the fact that historians are ultimately liable to be persuaded by combining qualitative and quantitative approaches together, measuring data as an index for further reading and depth of the kind that we’ve provided in keywords and context. In the keywords– the critical search article, I outline three ideal steps that can be applied in any order iteratively while moving through this process.

Seeding refers to the discussion of the concepts, the archives, the individuals submitted as a focus of inquiry. Today, we talked about parliament, memory, periodization. So those terms come from elsewhere. The seeds come from elsewhere.

Broad winnowing means concentrating on one view of the document base and asking, what does the data say about what’s interesting here? So any of the visualizations we’ve looked at represents an opportunity for winnowing. That means moving from the overview of the 19th century as a whole to a particular why are the plumber’s talking to parliament. You can follow it up. We know everything except the plumbers. Or why is Ted Stevens the first guy winnowing down?

And then guided reading is the process of actually returning to what’s on the page to the primary source by the time we’ve got keywords in context. And it looks like what historians do anyway. They carefully read debates. They think about what matters. We’ve just had a shortcut to those texts that matters. And now, we need to think about them.

So you look at the document. You hold the book at your hand. You actually read the speech. We practice guided reading when we follow the visualization of the years mentioned in parliament back to the era of the Tamworth Manifesto in 1838.

And what this looks like in process might be way more complex. Here’s an attempt to put a flow chart around what my lab did once, not necessarily replicable. We seeded. We seeded again. We winnowed. We read. We seeded again. And then winnowed and read and then read some more.

The point is that it’s an iterative process and often guided by historians’ concerns about interpretation. We’re trying to use this process to unpack the black box of algorithmic methods to engage these three ideal processes until we understand historical change.

So where do we go from here? Well, I think digital history is at the beginning of a process, not at the end. This list of categories of temporal experience is just a starter. My experiments with mattering these categories of temporal experience to statistics, to algorithms, to machine learning is likewise just a beginning of– the beginning of a process. It’s not exhaustive.

But in order to be robust, the discipline of digital history needs to begin with some approaches to historical experience that will allow us to have concrete arguments, not over existential issues like whether text mining has a place in the academy, but over constructive approaches that can produce accuracy, specificity, and relevant meaning. Thank you very much.

[JAMES VERNON] You have plenty of time for questions both online and in the room.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER]This is fabulous. Thank you. So I have a question about the place that you see text mining fitting in with, say, the historiography of the Hansard Corpus. Because a lot of the time, when text mining or digital humanities gets brought up, it’s the story of rupture. No, we’ve got this new method that’s coming out from whole cloth. And so I appreciate the ways that you’re trying to bridge with earlier historiographical methods.

And so I want to ask the question in sort a funny way, which is like, was there something algorithmic or machinic about either the work of telling history prior to this, which you are picking up or refining in some way, and then similarly, with the parliamentarians themselves in the 19th century have thought of aspects of their work in that way?

And just, I think that Frank Luntz actually is a great figure for that because he goes out and says, why, yes, language does have arbitrary features to it. And so when you slice it out into 5-year periods and watch the words connect with other words relatively freely, it seems like there’s a neat– I don’t know– homology in method and object.

[JO GULDI] Thank you. Thank you. Yes, a fascinating question. So first, I think there are two questions embedded in the one. And one of them is about parliament and the– you started off asking about the historiography of parliament.

And in the longer discussion of validation that’s in the book, one of the things that– one of the moves that I make on behalf of Hansard is to say, it’s really interesting to work with Hansard because Hansard has been the basis for writing the history of the British nation for over 100 years. Nobody has read all of Hansard because it’s a quarter billion words. But enormous chunks of Hansard, of these speeches and debates have been read and digested in order to write the history of the abolition of the slave trade and so on.

So I bring that up because it offers a validation that I didn’t discuss. We’re talking about validating by multiple algorithmic essays into similar questions like multiple algorithms that can unpack memory. But one of the things that I’m concerned with is that then when I periodize the 19th century and I say, this looks familiar, it looks familiar because I’ve read those British history textbooks, some of which are based on histories written by people who read Hansard.

So it’s good if the machine’s model matches the model created by the humans who are doing the reading. So that’s a very rare expert mark to have for such a large corpus. And that’s one of the words that I– reasons that I fell in love with parliament, even though it’s an elite institution filled with white men and was trained as a social historian here.

I fell in love with it because it was like, we do need to test and compare the work of these machines to the work of historians. Few cases where we could do it, we could do it right here. If the machine approximates what the historian said when the historians read it, pretty good. Pretty good.

But then you have a second question, which is more like a rhetoric question about how modular speech is. And I think it’s a really good question because you’re right– Luntz knew something about speech and about rhetoric. And rhetorical manuals since Quintilian make use of the fact that we can categorize speech acts.

This one’s an extended metaphor. This one is a really compelling violent juxtaposition of two images designed to get your attention. Because they work. You can see them at work in the speeches of Julius Caesar or in Shakespeare or in Gladstone.

And I’ve contemplated research projects that would dive into that more fully. And I’ve talked to historians about this. And they’ve told me that this is profoundly uninteresting. But I think it might be interesting to people from other disciplines. So I’ll tell you what they are. And if you want them, go for it.

[INAUDIBLE]

Awesome, OK. So this is for you. So there are compilations of– there are compilations of speeches compiled as literature, as objects of study. By the end of the 19th century, William Jennings Bryan, the great populist in America, is compiling the world’s great speeches in 10 volumes. And most of it is from Hansard. Most of it’s from Hansard. There’s a lot of Disraeli. There’s a lot of Gladstone. There’s a lot of the debates over the slave trade, the debates over Warren Hastings.

So on the one hand, there’s an opportunity to look for textual reviews because we can figure out who’s quoting Shakespeare the most, who’s quoting other members of parliament, which members of parliament get quoted. We can figure out the characteristics of the speeches that get excerpted and republished in this form for rhetorical study.

And so I think there are lots of rhetorical questions about what speech is doing and what the patterns are inside the speech that are super fascinating in the literature department. Even though the history department might be left cold, it’s OK. Yeah.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] I’m a PhD student in the history department. And I have two interrelated questions. I may sound like the devil’s advocate to the historians here. One is that you mentioned sentiment analysis and that you’re very skeptical of it. As we know and what I know right now, it’s very basic and can lead to a lot of inaccurate querying.

But as we work with them, as we read more and we know more, does it relate? Right now, we’re talking about a number of softwares, the current one being ChatGPT teaching itself to be more or less vanilla more colorful. Do you think change over time will lead us to have far more self-taught systems that be more sophisticated?

And I mean, what should historians remember in terms of the epics of doing that? Just a big question there. And the second question that I had was, right now, a lot of this data is in English and largely from Euro America. A lot of this in, say, the third-world non-English archives are still just being digitized. And I’m wondering how we can– I mean, whether exclusion or inclusion of those archives in the digital world– I mean, what are the ramifications, the larger ramifications of those for an LP or any kind of data mining?

[JO GULDI] Yes, thank you. Very intelligent question. Very smart. So sentiment analysis out of the box trained on Amazon product reviews and Twitter. Twitter is a total disaster when applied to the 19th century. Spending examples include that socialist is coded as fear.

So that might be true if you’re training the algorithm on– I don’t know– bros who code and buy things from Amazon. And then when they’re afraid of the toaster, they’re like, it’s socialist toaster. I think mom is also quoted as fear as in, I guess my mom would like this toaster. I don’t know. Like, it’s coming from some set of data.

But apply this to the era of the flourishing of Fabian socialism when parliamentarians talk about how great the socialist era will be when we have flush toilets in all residences in the city. They’re not afraid. They’re really excited because it’s not the Cold War.

So those distinctions become really important. It also gets really confused with rhetorical gestures. Disraeli and Gladstone get coded as massively sad because they say things like, I beg you to consider. Or a fear that my honorable friend has a false idea of information.

So those are rhetorical gestures that don’t actually convey a sentiment. So identifying the historical sentiments is a bit more tricky. And you can come up with a lot of garbage.

But I think that you’re right, that there are issues about training sentiment identification data sets on different types of speech. It would be too expensive and not really worthwhile to mechanical [? torque ?] it through Victorian Hansard. At least for my purposes, I wasn’t interested enough in sentiment analysis to spend valuable time and money on that.

But GPT technology seems to be– this seems to be one of the promising arenas. It cannot write history from scratch. It can do data training sets, maybe, said Nicole Coleman yesterday at Stanford. So she’s in the library. She does data. She was showing me how well it categorized some reports on fish from the 1970s. Could it categorize sentiment analysis? I don’t know. But it seems really plausible. I think that’s an excellent research project.

You ask about non-English archives. I’m not a specialist. But I will say that digital history deeply cares about this question because one of the values of history departments today in every history department is the representation of the Global South, is the representation of ethnic diversity, which we represent through hires to make sure that there is a professor of the Middle East and a professor of Russia and a professor of China, professor of Africa, a professor of African-American Studies in every department.

Even a tiny department like the one I work in, we try to aim for some of that diversity because we believe that the voices in those archives and– those archives tell us things that the voices in parliament will never tell us. We have to go back to those archives. So then, the question becomes, what’s the relationship of those archives to digitalization?

And perhaps the most compelling set of answers about that comes from Alex Hill, originally a literature scholar who was at the Columbia University library and has now migrated to a faculty position at Yale. And Alex Hill is responsible for a concept called nimble tense, which is about how to send packages to the Caribbean to ask local people to document their own documents and stories and then send us back the data so we can help with analysis rather than sending the much more expensive option of a graduate student to the Caribbean for several years to write down all of the stories.

So this is an acknowledgment that there are storytellers and archivists in many parts of the world that could become our collaborators in a process of documenting and preserving knowledge from the Global South or from other civilizations. And there’s an ethics of that. And perhaps the best book on that subject, the ethics of documentation, how to work with local groups and where this has been done really well is Roopika Risam of Dartmouth New Digital Worlds.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] Hi. I’m also a history graduate student. So I understand we all have our limits and in terms of archive. And I was just wondering, since it’s a new method that some of us will probably end up working, why is it that it’s also starts with top to bottom? Like, this parliamentary archive was used to write a certain kind of history– was used to write a certain kind of history. Why is it that a new methodology also takes that as a point of beginning?

So that also leads to another question. It’s like, some of us who do like microhistory or who have a very thin soul space, how can we contribute to a digital history method or in what ways taking something which doesn’t have a lot of flex source base and use that as a found this in person kind of original history method instead of something which is already a major archive?

[JO GULDI] Yes, excellent first question. So why is it true that digital history in our enlightened age replicates the bias of the 19th century? I mean, it’s like a zombie kind of history. Like, we got over a dead white man history. And yet, all we have in the digital space is more dead white men. I think it produces an appropriate level of a shock and horror reaction in history departments when that realization is made. And so I do a lot of apologizing and pointing to Roopika Risam and Alex Hill.

But the reason that it’s true is very important to understand. Many of these digitalization projects have been funded at the national level in the European Union. So the National Library of Sweden has digitalized the Swedish newspapers, the Swedish novels, and the Swedish parliament 300 years. Lots of data.

Finland has done the same. Britain did the same starting in the 1990s. Parliament funded it. So it was one of the first digitalization projects. It’s essentially nationalism all over again coordinated through the governing bodies and through libraries without historians in the mix.

Now, there’s an institutional response also coming from historians in the EU, where the conversation is actually about 10 years in the future from North American history departments. So this is something that we can learn from. So in Finland, for example, the historians have realized that leaving the question of what gets digitalized to the Finnish parliament results in nationalism. And that doesn’t match their values.

So humanities deans from 20 different universities have converged to write a 20 million euro grant proposal for the National Research Budget of Finland. And in this, they have asked lots of historians who have no digital skills whatsoever to help them rank in importance the archives that can be found in Finland. The archives that can be found in Finland, some of them are about the Finnish people. But some of them are about immigrants.

Some of them are about minorities. Some of them are about women. Some of them are about the working class. And they’re from all different periods. So we would probably want some diversity of time period like some medieval texts, some modern texts, some representation of immigrants, some representation of the geographical diversity of the country. And historians can have a really interesting conversation about that.

Now, what coordinating it on a national level means is that they can present– the humanities’ budget of Finland is like 0.5% of the National Research budget of the nation. A lot more goes to civil engineering. A lot more goes to public health. No offense. Public health is trying to cure cancer. Way to go.

But if history is able to, using 20 [INAUDIBLE] at a time, shift the conversation from 0.5% of the research budget to 2% of the research budget because we have a plan, then that’s a massive windfall for history. And you can start imagining capturing those archives and providing for future generations of historians and the public to understand the diversity of the nation’s past in a new way. So then, the digital history projects can be aligned with the values of the history department, which is very interesting.

And then, you ask about, what is it that a microhistorian can do where the microhistorians innovating in terms of method? Right now, the NIH is making a lot of grants to microhistorians. So I was just at Stanford. And I was meeting with a historian of the Middle East who was telling me about digitalizing one really big book of records of debt relationships. I was hearing from another historian of Latino experience in the United States, who came across one really cool archive that’s yellow pages of Latino New York. He’s mapping them all.

So those techniques look very different than mine. The microhistorical project that I would love to do to capture the voices of the working class in Britain– I know you’re standing right there. I would love to do to capture the voices of the working class in Britain is a text matching, a text similarity exercise, where we find a collection of working class pamphlets.

There aren’t that many of them relative to the speech is in parliament. But wouldn’t it be nice to know who in parliament sounds like the working class speeches, which ideas from the working class pamphlets get taken up into parliament, which ones persist for the longest time? So we can just as generations of post-colonial historians read the imperial archive against the grain in order to understand the politics of the Great Revolt and the permanent settlement.

So digital historians can also use microarchives to read the macroarchives of parliament against the grain. So that’s technically possible. And that’s actually, I think, one of the next most important hurdles for the discipline of digital history. And I’m very happy to pursue that with anybody who feels inclined to. Yes. Yes, please. Oh, sorry, there’s another–

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] Yeah, so I’m glad you started with the critique that a lot of times, findings from text mining aren’t very surprising. I do computational stuff. And I haven’t really been impressed with most text mining findings for that reason.

And I was just hoping– like, I’m not a historian. So I was hoping that you could highlight in your results where that didn’t happen. Because I was looking at your findings here. And a lot of times, it was like, the parliament cared about the French Revolution as we already knew or these sorts of things.

And so I would just love for you to highlight– because I don’t really know history– where these sorts of methods surprised historians or where historians push back on your findings because they go against the grain and how– partly because I do think that a lot of text mining. You can just read it and come to the same conclusions. And I think that’s why it’s a lot of times very repetitive of stuff that’s been done decades previous. So if you could highlight that for us in terms of your own discipline, that’d be really interesting.

[JO GULDI] Yeah, thanks. So I showed one such moment here in 1838. We really couldn’t have found that with traditional methods. Is it Earth shattering to the process of 19th century British history to know that people were signaling– the new Conservative Party was signaling with these references to memory? It’s not Earth shattering. But it’s definitely a finding of a kind that we couldn’t find otherwise.

In one presentation, an American historian leapt out of their chair at this one. The first mention of the American Constitution in Hansard is in 1832. 1832 is the debate over the British Reform Act. So it’s whether the middle class gets the vote.

And that’s really interesting because Britain is heartbroken at losing its North American colonies and doesn’t know whether the American Constitution is a declaration of war or we should totally dismiss it. So the first time they acknowledge its existence in parliament is in 1832 is they’re deciding, should we also give more people to vote like they do in America? And some people in the House of Lords say some very nice things about the American Constitution and how it’s given America political stability.

So that moment of reflection also reaffirms that there’s this moment of America almost acting as a beacon to the world quite early, shocking the British discourse, and that we didn’t know. I gave the example of my students– I mean, The plumbers are a real finding. I passed by it quickly because I’m interested in the method, not the finding. But the plumbers could be a dissertation. It could absolutely be dissertation-length material in British history as could half a dozen of the other terms that I mentioned on this visualization.

So part of it is about the level of what constitutes shocking. Interesting versus shocking. Most of our findings when text mining the British Parliament shouldn’t be shocking because there have been literally hundreds of British historians reading Hansard over the last 100 years to understand the 19th century. So if aliens invaded and constructed the pyramids in the middle of the Victorian era, that would be shocking and would probably be wrong. We probably know about those things. But we can find interesting patterns that we didn’t previously know about.

But what is shocking that could get public interest is my students’ work that I was telling you about, where we don’t know what the last 12 years of transgender intellectual history are until you model it on Reddit, using some of these techniques. And then it jumps out. It’s like one particular transgender suicide. You could theorize that the transgender suicides are really important.

But there’s one that tilts the discourse. And you model the before. And you model the after. And they’re nothing like each other. So that, you couldn’t guess. And it’s newsworthy. So yeah, it’s an excellent question because I opened with the standard of meaning. The standard meaning is one of the things that history holds up. That’s why we examine historiography and what other people have– how other people have written the history before us. It is the standard to which we hold ourselves. And most of my articles engage that question in some way.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] First, I wanted to just mention about that 1830s American Constitution point. So I think that’s when the US gave the right to vote to white males regardless of income and property. And so that was like a major expansion. So maybe that could be when they started talking about the issue. I’m not sure. But that could be.

So my question– so I’m a Berkeley history alumnus from the ’90s. And I have a question about source. And when I was at Berkeley, I worked for almost 2 years at a group called the Pacific Institute for Research and Evaluation. It’s now at the SkyDeck building. We were there, PIRE. It’s called P-I-R-E.

So it’s an NGO. And my job was newspaper coding, going through old newspapers in regions and looking for keywords related to substance abuse like alcohol use and trauma. And so I learned then that relying on newspapers was actually a powerful way to affect policy because that was the idea. You rely on newspapers to tell people, to tell lawmakers, hey, we should ban certain things here and there.

So my question is more about war, the Iraq war. My cousin’s been sent to Fallujah for Phantom storm too. He has PTSD. A lot of bad things happen. But I remember when the war started, the military demanded that the news reporters, the news agencies had to be embedded within military units.

Now, Reuters and Al-Jazeera refused the reporters by acci– they say by accident, got blown up. And then after that, the news basically would report what the military wanted them to say. So my concern is that how historians go around these kinds of limits? Because I know that newspapers, they are very important. Of course, parliament, that’s– parliamentary discussions are much more efficient. But newspapers are constituted a major source of information to affect policy.

And then when I was at Berkeley, I remember one of my English professor saying that there was a military guy who said during the Vietnam War, there was overwhelming support. There was very little disaffection with the war or dissension. People were all behind it.

And then the professor was like, I don’t remember that to the young person. So this is– so I feel like a lot of stuff in the news is now coming up. And, of course, a few days ago, New York Times published an article about rectal feeding in Iraq against Iraqi civilians or people or suspects. And these things just coming out now.

Because when I– I remember when the Iraq war came out, the news kept saying, this is good. The Iraqi children, look, they’re all rushing out to greet us. They love us. And if you reported some independent news, you might end up gone. So yeah, what ways would historians use to circumvent these kinds of state-led blockages?

[JO GULDI] Yeah, thanks, really interesting question. So in the case of the experience of people in a war confrontation, a historian of the 20th century using traditional methods would consult the newspaper and then pursue oral history, diaries, newsletters, other written documents in order to account for and triangulate against the suppression of the official record that you’re describing.

And so what you’re essentially describing is the dangers of relying solely on an official corpus, whether parliament or the newspaper, and looking for those other records and the stories that they tell. So I take on board absolutely vital. And that’s why the discipline of history is not about to surrender its sword and shield to the data science department.

It’s going to continue teaching all of these techniques of engaging with archives. Or all of the archives going to get digitalized while there are oral history projects that are recording the testimony of people, activists in the anti-Apartheid movement of the 1980s, of Vietnam War. And these days, that testimony is often digitalized and digital in nature.

So there’s a possibility of putting the newspaper account of the Vietnam War into conversation, dialogue with the account of veterans themselves. And that could be really informative because there are algorithms for finding what’s in bucket A but not in bucket B. That’s really important, really important issue for the public.

Hasn’t been done yet. Hasn’t been done yet even for the low-hanging fruit. The low-hanging fruit is we have parliament. We have the British newspapers any day now from the living with machines project. We have the British novel.

The low-hanging fruit is what’s in the British novel that’s not in parliament, what’s in parliament that’s not in the novel. There are novelists who are in parliament like Benjamin Disraeli. There are novelists who were read by parliament who inspired reforms like Charles Dickens.

So there should be a lot of transference what’s the lag. And that’s a data-intensive project that some of us are dying to see, dying to see somebody go after it a really data-driven way.

You highlight another category that I would love to add to that list of historical concepts. And that’s corrections of memory after the fact– corrections of memory after the fact. So this happens in Congress itself. It happens in the newspaper. They say, whoops, we missed this 10 years ago. This was happening now. There’s an investigation. Oh, we did use torture in Guantanamo. We did use– torture was permitted, oops.

So in my methods, my methods would miss that because the investigation would track as the discussion. So in terms of memory, would show up because Guantanamo is over. And the memory section would show up. Now, we’re talking about Guantanamo after the fact.

So yeah, it’s interesting to play with corrections of memory as a particular genre. Is there a way just based on data of examining that? I think the memory discussions aren’t really thick enough enhancer defined up. The newspapers will offer more material. It’s a really interesting question. yeah, Thank you.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] I have a quick question. You mentioned prediction is a problem. Could you elaborate on that? Because I believe a lot of these algorithms as well work in terms of prediction. And with success of things like GPT– so just predicting the next war type of stuff. So I’m just– are you saying it in general historical sense? Or are you saying it with regards to the algorithm? Just curious.

[JO GULDI] So prediction, the take in the book, I talk about prediction a lot. And I work it through many philosophers of history. I take prediction to Jill Lepore. And Jill Lepore says, you want to predict the future. Prediction is an inherently risky proposition.

I take prediction to Karl Popper. Karl Popper says, the field of history does not do prediction. We don’t believe that there are laws of history because human beings are inherently creative and come up with new responses, new forms of governance. So therefore, the search for historical laws is in its nature doomed.

I take prediction to Reinhart Koselleck. And Koselleck says with Arthur Danto’s ideal chronicler, if we had an ideal archive of every thought or mood or wish that every human had ever had, we could measure all of the repeated events against all of the singular events. And we could develop a total predictive mechanism. But we don’t have that because our archives are imperfect.

And then I take prediction to the military historians. And the military historians say, I have no problem with prediction. A military field, if there’s a hill and you can hide an army behind it, that predicts the fact that if there’s another military field, I can also hide an army there. It’s predictive. No problem.

So what that tells me is that there are limited– my discipline is hostile to the word prediction. But when I go over to the data science department or the computer science department, they’re like, what are you trying to predict? What is the most surprising discovery we can help you make? We have test sets and training sets. And they predict things. And the prediction is the measure of accuracy.

And so I say, oh. Oh, you’re using the word prediction in three different ways. You’re going to annoy four out of five historians just by using the word. Test and training data sets can be useful for teaching an algorithm about 19th century sentiment analysis. I’m not going to say, don’t do that. That’s great.

But maybe predicting the future, which some data scientists ala Peter Turchin are trying to do with historical data sets in a way that would be offensive to many historians, relies too much on a concept of laws of human behavior that can be predicted on the past, the basis of past conflict. And most of the history department thinks that that is not going to work– not going to work.

And yet, there is a conversation with mathematicians like Chris Noble, who we love. Kris Neilbo says, if you look at smaller data sets like Reddit threads– there’s some Reddit threads where they’re introducing new terminology every month. They’re using new words. There are other Reddit data sets where they’re always using the same vocabulary over and over. Again, which means maybe they’re refining their use of a couple of keywords– you can predict that these two communities are going to continue to operate in the same direction.

This is a really interesting investigation of prediction. I don’t know if it’s history. But it probably applies to the future. And you can predict some things about the future without annoying Karl Popper.

[JAMES VERNON] I have a really nerdy question about Hansard. And the Hansard, as you know, was created from an extra parliamentary campaign to try and ensure that the business of parliament was available to the British population. It was what we would now call an exercise in the transparency of governance. And yet, we also know that the way in which parliament worked changed really dramatically in the 19th century.

So I’m wondering whether– I mean, this seems a lot more basic than the forms of analysis that you’re doing. But I’m wondering whether one thing that seems that would be able to do with your techniques would be to understand how the performance of parliamentary debates change, whether there’s more space or less space given to parliamentary debate, whether more or less politicians are speaking or not.

And I’m wondering whether that’s just a level that you feel is not interesting. But it seems to me it could actually tell you something that historians working in paper archives find very hard to track. Whereas when you look at the size of your data set, you would be able to deliver that type of analysis.

[JO GULDI] Yes, absolutely. So I’m thinking of a book you put me on by Ryan Vieira, which suggests that after 1867, when the working class gets the vote, parliament stays longer later hours in parliament debating what the parliamentary representative can do for the silverware industry. Because they know that the next day in the newspaper, their speech is going to be reprinted. And they’re going to be held accountable by working men who can vote.

So Vieira’s book has no data. It has lots of evidence not in the form of data and not in the form of quantitative accounts. And it’s a trivial exercise to count the words and investigate 1867 and who’s spending more time.

So one of the reasons that we hold off on that is that the data, it seemed to me that as soon as we got into issues of representation, the speaker metadata was really important because it’s important to track the individuals who were introduced in 1867 but weren’t there before 1867. And the speaker metadata inherited from multiple past Hansard projects is unbelievably bad.

The digging into data project of 2010 spent a million dollars cleaning Hansard. So they– said and their data set was terrible. And their political scientist publishing data right now with that data set and its speakers, they have about 10% of accuracy. 1 in 10 cases is accurate, can be matched.

We worked with chemistry PhD who was used to working with genomic information to reconcile the speaker’s names. And we think we’re at 90% accuracy now. But I have not worked with that data because I’m waiting for my team to finish the cleaning process.

So that can absolutely be next up in terms of priority. It will probably– I think you’re right, that it promises great results. I would love to work with Ryan. Yeah.

[JAMES VERNON] It might be my nerdy question [INAUDIBLE].

Thank you, everyone, for coming and for your fantastic questions for Jo about her work. Can we give her round of applause? And thank you so much.

[MUSIC PLAYING]

 

Lecture

Jo Guldi, “The Long Land War: The Global Struggle for Occupancy Rights”

Most nations in Asia, Latin America, and Africa experienced some form of “land reform” in the 20th century. But what is land reform? In her book, The Long Land War: The Global Struggle for Occupancy Rights, Professor Jo Guldi approaches the problem from the point of view of Britain’s disintegrating empire. She makes the case that land reform movements originated as an argument about reparations for the experience of colonization, and that they were championed by a set of leading administrators within British empire and in UN agencies at the beginning of the postwar period.

Using methods from the history of technology, she sets out to explain how international governments, national governments, market evangelists, and grassroots movements advanced their own solutions for realizing the redistribution of land. Her conclusions lead her to revisit the question of how states were changing in the twentieth century — and to extend our history of property ownership over the longue durée.

Recorded on March 8, 2023, this talk was co-sponsored by Social Science Matrix, the Berkeley Economy and Society Initiative (BESI), and the Network for a New Political Economy (N2PE).

About the Speaker

Jo Guldi, professor of history and practicing data scientist at Southern Methodist University, is author of four books: Roads to Power: Britain Invents the Infrastructure State (Harvard 2012), The History Manifesto (Cambridge 2014), The Long Land War: The Global Struggle for Occupancy Rights (Yale 2022), and The Dangerous Art of Text Mining (Cambridge forthcoming). Her historical work ranges from archival studies in nation-building, state formation, and the use of technology by experts. She has also been a pioneer in the field of text mining for historical research, where statistical and machine-learning approaches are hybridized with historical modes of inquiry to produce new knowledge. Her publications on digital methods include “The Distinctiveness of Different Eras,” American Historical Review (August 2022) and “The Official Mind’s View of Empire, in Miniature: Quantifying World Geography in Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates,” Journal of World History 32, no. 2 (June 2021): 345–70. She is a former junior fellow at the Harvard Society of Fellows.

Transcript

“The Long Land War,” Jo Guldi, Southern Methodist University

[MUSIC PLAYING]

[MARION FOURCADE] All right. Hello, everybody. Welcome to Social Science Matrix And to actually this is the first event, formally public event, organized by the Berkeley Economy and Society Initiative directed by Paul Pearson right here. So we’re very excited about that.

So today we are delighted to welcome Professor Jo Guldi from Southern Methodist University. She [INAUDIBLE] focus of history and practicing data scientist. She will discuss her book, The Long Land War– The Global Struggle for Occupancy Rights, which approaches the question of land reform from the point of view of Britain’s disintegrating empire.

Professor Guldi is the author of four books. The first one published, by Harvard in 2012, is Roads to Power– Britain Invents the Infrastructure State. In 2014, published by Cambridge, The History Manifesto. And then The Long Land War, published just last year by Yale University Press. And forthcoming is The Dangerous Art of Text Mining.

So you can see that the historical work, her historical work, ranges from archival studies by nation building, state formation, and the use of technology by experts and by historians. So she’s been a real pioneer also in the field of text mining for historical research.

So I’ll just mention a few upcoming events at Matrix. And the first one is actually the one at 4:00 PM today also by Professor Guldi, so where she will present a talk cosponsored by the Department of History and the Berkeley D-Lab and, of course, Social Science Matrix. And that talk is titled, Towards the Practice of Text Mining to Understand Change over Historical Time. So join us today at 4:00 PM.

And then next week on March 15, we will be having a Matrix on point panel entitled Myths and Misinformation, which brings together perspective from across the social sciences on the question of the spread of untruths and misinformation. And finally I’ll just mention, on March 23, we’ll have Phil Gorski from Yale University to present his recent book, The Flag and the Cross– White Christian Nationalism and the Threat to American Democracy.

So without further ado, welcome, Jo, and–

Thank you so much.

[INTERPOSING VOICES]

[JO GULDI] Thank you so much, Marion. I’m going to switch the slides. OK, thank you so much, Marianne. Thank you to the center, to Paul Pearson, for inviting me. It’s such a privilege to be with you in Berkeley and such a joy. This is where I did my PhD with the gentleman in the back. It’s an honor to be back.

This is my traveling copy. So I’m going to pass it around in case you would like to see. I am a funny kind of historian. I spend half of my time in archives doing normal historian archival things. And then I spend half of my time with computers, thinking about how the new techniques of artificial intelligence, machine learning, and statistics can help historians to read more books than they would have read and make conclusions on a different scale or a different sort of conclusion.

In general, times being what they are, the latter kind of talk fills up the room every time because there’s so many data science majors and so many data science faculty. This work is not irrelevant to the present, land climate change or not, irrelevant issues. So I’m really grateful to everyone who’s made time to show up for this conversation.

The two I’ve been– so just to add on to Marion’s advertisement for the afternoon event, there will be no data in there. There’s a really simple table at one point. It wasn’t generated with a computer. It’s simple edition. [LAUGHS]

If you want to see computers, come back at 4:00. This is actual history. You can leave now if you want, but I’m really glad to those of you who aren’t leaving. Thank you. OK.

So I’d like to talk to you today about the historiographical questions that I wanted to engage in this book, The Long Land War, which came out in May. It’s a monograph on global land redistribution and occupancy rights, the right not to be displaced. The book represents the first attempt by a historian in something like half a century to reckon with the narrative of the episode sometimes referred to as land reform or agrarian reform along with a larger set of land use, land governance issues that include freedom from eviction, rent control, everything that looks like a right to housing, which I classify as a land issue, which is a sort of retro thing because in the United States we have departments of urban studies.

And then we have urban planning and rural land use. And those are understood as fundamentally different kinds of issues. Housing issues are not land issues to the views of many people in North America. I’m going to erase that difference in order to get us back in sync with an earlier time in the evolution of modern land use history.

Land reform, as I understand it, originated as an anticolonial movement for reparations. It was the first modern reparations movement– reparations in land. And the first ideas about a postcolonial reparations appeared in the 19th century in the course of anticolonial movement associated with the British Empire, specifically in Ireland. And I’ll returned to Ireland in a moment.

The rationale was that only by reversing the sins of empire, the confiscations associated with race-based exclusions on owning or inheriting property, was it possible to create an inclusive and therefore viable economy in the former colonies of Britain. In the 20th century, independent colonial movements across Latin America, Africa, and Asia took this British model, a land court reallocating who owns the property, usually with compensation, in new directions. Those movements effectively redistributed millions of acres across the face of the globe from the hands of hacienda and landlord systems where property was in the hands of the few, the rich, the money, the elite, and everyone else is a tenant paying rent, to systems of broadcast ownership by small farmers and householders.

It is hard to overstate the economic and political consequences of land reform for the 20th century. The World Bank offered– authored a report in 2008 maybe that argued that across all national and ideological traditions in nations where land reform had appeared, the Gini coefficient went down, meaning that it was– that however rich the nation might be, more people were able to participate in economic growth when that occurred. Revolutions and land reform touched almost every nation in the Global South, and those nations were all– but those movements were also intertwined with housing movements, anti-eviction movements, and intellectual currents about land use governance across the Global North.

Now land reform is a massively-challenging subject for a historian to take on. This will not be the final book on land reform by any stretch of the imagination. The global span is intractable. Temporal scale adds the advantage of being able to watch institutions rise, converge, and vanish. But it also amplifies the nature of the undertaking.

So I’d love to tell you about that work, about how I hoped that the digital would support longer time spans and more global comparisons, how the digital failed, and what I’d love to do with the digital. Bracket that. There’s a blog coming out on the Royal Historical Society website later this month. I’m not going to talk to you about it. I’m not going to tell you about the archives in Rome, New Delhi, Sussex, and Wisconsin that helped me get a handle on international currents, comparisons, and social movements.

I’d like to tell you about social theory. I’d like to tell you about what it’s like to reckon with the kind of theoretical orientation that allows a historian to engage Charles Tilly’s call for vast comparisons.

So the theoretical questions that allowed me to wrangle with an era of land reform were these. First, a history of the state told in terms of practices, borrowing techniques from the history of science, and crucially about the role of information in institutional infrastructures that reinforce certain ideas of collective and private ownership. Secondly, an approach to global history that is transnational, global, and transtemporal, which is based on excavating connections between land reform movements and intellectual traditions in different places. And finally, an investigation into the legal status of property and how it changed in the 20th century, which challenges received definitions of property, which was conceived as a universal law, an unchanging good that was discovered alongside the law of gravity in the 17th century and never changed again.

My argument is going to be big changes happen. I’m going to tell you what I think they are. So let’s dive in with the question of what is the state in the 20th century.

I wanted to ask questions about new forms of governance that came into being in this era, which ranged across several categories, including international initiatives, including attempts from the United Nations to plan a global extension service modeled on the American New Deal to support farmers, wherever they might be, and extending to concomitant attempts to map global land use around the world with the thinking that maps like the one in the upper right hand corner would provide member nations like India with the rationale to make sure that if I gave every seat in this room your own acre of land, I wouldn’t give Professor Pearson the loam and Marianne the rock and say, well, they’re equal because they’re one acre. And then Marianne wouldn’t be able to farm anything because all she has is rock, not viable soil. So we need a land use map.

Some historians like Stephen Masike have seen this map as a tool of imperialism just because it’s a big, international map at scale. I see it as a request coming from the postcolonial nations themselves for support, for information infrastructure, that allows them to make their own decisions and to affect postcolonial reforms. So the international actors are a new part of the story, not something that we see in the 19th century domain of European colonization.

What’s new in the 20th century includes new theoretical approaches to the problem of postcoloniality from the social sciences, as social scientists, some of them from nations like India, applied themselves to developing a theory of economic growth suited to nations composed primarily of peasants and small farmers. Their logic included often reversing Malthusian theories that cast population density as an impediment to growth, and arguing, as with this chart in the lower right-hand corner, that the density of farm population could be a resource up to a certain point for allowing more growth, more economic production overall as small farmers became small entrepreneurs, producing bucket factories and hoe factories on their former farm with the multitude of children that they had.

The actors include national initiatives, of course, including contemporary conversations in the US and the UK about extending state welfare to public housing, but also national initiatives in Tanzania, India, and elsewhere about disseminating land to the people, land to the tiller. And these initiatives– national, theoretical, international– are joined by nonprofits, activist nonprofits, like the Ford and Rockefeller Foundation and libertarian think tanks, which I’ll reference in a moment. And finally, there are social movements– social movements that include peasant protest movements, communist and worker movements, student protests, identity movements, pushing for housing and reparation and land. We’ll hear more about them in a second.

One thread that stands out about these actors is the degree to which land and housing movements were interrelated. Theories from Georgist economics, theories about self-built housing movements from anarchists like Colin Ward trickled across the borders of the urban and the rural, the Global North and the Global South. So I’m going to be trying to make some of those connections with you. It’s a long book. There are a lot of those connections. I’m just going to show you a smattering of splinters right now.

The competition of ideas and interests resulted in numerous showdowns. This was, as my title proclaimed, an era of war, a struggle to disseminate the land sometimes punctuated by bloody coups and famines, sometimes by less violent protests, which by the end of my period, 1974, had serious consequences that included the collapse of movements for the national redistribution of land and the replacement of that ideology on a national– international level by free market mechanisms coordinated at the World Bank. And I’ll give you my explanation for when and how that happened.

I came to argue for the emergence of land use governance alongside unions and inflation as one of the paradigmatic sites of ungovernability in the 1970s. Land use policies failed to provide enough housing, but the land use bureaucracies that had been established in the developed and developing world, once abolished, were replaced by free market laws that replaced state bureaucracy but likewise also failed to provide sufficient housing, resulting in new challenges to social equity.

If we ask about what’s historically new about this moment, another feature that stands out as this, a diversifying cast of actors. Unlike in the 19th and 20th century stories about the rise of bureaucracies in the imperial context, when we look at this 20th century story, we’re talking about national initiatives regulating housing access, operating in a world where those national actors have to interface with international actors and sometimes compete against nonprofits that assume state-like powers. All of these entities are using the techniques of gathering information and disseminating information that had been forged in the crucible of 19th century empire.

So let’s descend into a little bit more detail. Let’s take one of the international units that consumed my research– international actors at the level of the United Nations. When the UN was founded, it coordinated an international movement to protect rights of occupancy in the developed and underdeveloped world.

This was nowhere more clear and more relevant to land and housing issues than at the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations with its motto, fiat pannus– let there be bread. The FAO, rhymes with cow or now. That’s how the Italians say it. So it’s how the FAO employees say it. So it’s how I say it. The FAO was the UN’s first independent agency, founded in Quebec City in 1945 and later headquartered in Rome.

In the 1940s and ’50s the FAO housed many individuals working with an undisguised anticolonial agenda to advocate for restoring land rights to farmers in the developing world. In 1945, many of the founding designers of programs look to postcolonial struggles in Ireland, Mexico, and India as an omen of things to come. Peasants around the world are organizing, demanding their land rights back. New institutions are coming into being, like land courts which are charged with compensating landlords, buying out their land, and redistributing the land to the peasants to create a nation of owner occupiers.

One of the believers, firm believers, in this agenda is a former nutrition expert, John Boyd Orr, recipient of the Nobel Prize, the Nobel Prize in peace, founder of the FAO. In 1953, he published his manifesto for what this movement was about, The White man’s Dilemma, in which he made strong a strong argument that Europe had incurred a moral debt to its former colonies.

He explained the FAO’s mission in part by arguing that developed nations would have to fund the development of their former colonies, and that only through the creation of broad economic opportunities could the past be repaired. The redistribution of colonized land around the world was necessary to avert an era of endless cycles of violence.

Now the collective bibliographies, the group bibliographies, by which I sketch out what’s happening at the FAO in my first– in chapters two and three underscored that Orr’s beliefs about this were not unique. Reviewing the founders and the first ranks of leaders and consultants associated with the FAO, I found the granddaughter of a Fenian radical exiled from Britain for his involvement with dynamite plots to get the land back to the Irish peasant. She was committed to postcolonial rebellion everywhere and was an architect of the Kindertransport, literally seizing Jewish children from the mouth of the Holocaust and transporting them to Canada, to safety, the best kind of settler colonialism. Best kind? Yeah.

I found other activists that included the son of a suffragette hunger striker committed to food for colonized subjects through control of their own territory. I found the economist husband of novelist, Pearl S. Buck who himself had attempted to orchestrate a New Deal for China, which forms a large part of the plot of the prize-winning novel, The Good Earth. I found early director generals touring India and explicitly meeting with postcolonial economists, committed to the idea of economic growth at the bottom of the economic pyramid through the principle of land redistribution.

The FAO is unlike many of the other branches of the United Nations that have been associated with a new cultural imperialism. The FAO then today, as when it was founded, was essentially a postcolonial institution typified by south-south advising. Today, economists from Lebanon are sent to advise Algeria about what its water and agricultural problems.

And that was a matrix of south-south, intentional south-south, advising, using the expertise of India to advise around South Asia, using Indigenous PhDs, Indigenous economic knowledge, native economic knowledge, to create a postcolonial well of expertise to push back against other kinds of expertise coming from American universities. Recovering the radicalism of the FAO’s founding, plumbing the FAO archives for their tortured correspondence with peasants and landowners on both sides of the business of land redistribution allowed me a shortcut through a multitude of highly diverse, very differentiated national disputes and, to a sense, about how international governance was intervening in a world of former empires, trying to create a new era where participatory economics might have a chance to come into play.

Let’s examine a different part of this new range of actors involved in land governance. Let’s look at one of the nonprofits that took an active role in urban land issues in the Global North.

In the UK, a think tank called the Institute of Economic Affairs was formed by Arthur Seldon. Envious of the fervor of left-leaning youth for Fabian socialism, he dreamed of making a similar movement to take– to back the market and the small state inspired by the philosophy of F.A. Hayek. The IEA rushed into action in 1965, compiling pamphlets, imagining a free market world where even public libraries would charge for their services.

After 1968, as a housing crisis began to rock London accompanied by massive student protests advocating a universal right to housing, the IEA switched its pamphlet campaign to information about what the market could do for housing. And they had an information-collecting kind of census of land use problems as part of their strategy. IEA leaders began to write letters to executives in the construction and real estate industries, asking those executives to help them compile a compendium of evidence that state restrictions on building were choking the building of housing with red tape, that NIMBYism was at the root of limiting housing.

If that was true, then they could call for the deregulation of land use, the abolition of the land use in public housing, bureaucracy. So they compiled evidence, case by case. And they began to compile this in new pamphlets about the coming regime of free market housing.

Then the IEA leaders began to reach out to recruit and groom promising new political candidates, among them a young Margaret Thatcher. Elected as prime minister in 1979, Thatcher’s– one of Thatcher’s first acts would be to sell off public housing to the highest bidder.

Now one of the ways that international actors like the FAO and nonprofits like the IEA could compete with nation states and traditional parties was through their use and orchestration of information. The FAO collected and distributed bibliographies and soil maps of the world, like this one, tools that allowed postcolonial nation states to enact relatively efficient land redistribution programs backed by international studies in soil science, agriculture, and economics. The IAEA staged letter-writing, information-collection, and pamphlet-dissemination programs to create a groundswell contesting normative ideas of land use bureaucracy as the solution for a housing crisis.

Both essentially copied the activity of nations and empires in the 19th century, instrumenting the collection and dissemination of information to promote a homogeneous space united by information flows. I theorize the term information infrastructure to investigate the many information-organization schemes launched in parallel with land-redistribution initiatives and to think about the consequences of information in the service of multiple ideologies.

But one of the features of these information infrastructures was that they served a variety of different ideologies. The ideology of information had– it had an international face with the FAO. It had a libertarian face with the IEA. It even had a more radical face among social movements at the same time as these other initiatives were being pressed forward, and this radical phase pushed in a very different direction from those visible at the level of international government or the UK nonprofits.

So we’re looking at what are known as participatory maps– maps drawn by hand– by taking into account the testimony of maybe 500 individuals. In the 1970s, British Marxist geographers had begun to experiment with new kinds of surveying suited to documenting local property rights in their diversity. Participatory maps first emerged as many-to-many maps to document the so-called hunting lines of the Beaver and Cree tribes in Canada.

And we’re seeing the hunting lines map from Hugh Brody’s Maps and Dreams, the publication in 1977. Each of these loops corresponds to one family. The idea is that these are hunting lines that constitute a nonoverlapping property right.

This is where our family hunts. Your family hunts over there in the next ridge. You can do other things with the land, but only we are allowed our hunting line. By drawing them and showing that the hunting lines were mostly nonoverlapping, the Beaver and Cree people were able to argue in court that they had an occupancy right to their territory and therefore defeat mineral and lumber interest claims to use the land as part of a public domain.

The Beaver and Cree map launches an era of participatory mapmaking in global development which is still ongoing, nowadays through GIS and handheld devices. But this is still something that we would learn about in a global development program like the ones at Cornell and Sussex.

By the 1980s, these maps had begun to spread across the developing world, creating copycat movements. For example, in the 1980s, participatory map movements occur in– are appearing in India, being used to document the occupancy rights of so-called pavement dwellers– we would call them the homeless– on the streets of Bombay. Alongside the techniques of many-to-many mapping spread the possibility of a more diverse set of property claims adjudicated not by colonial courts but by independent and decolonized national court systems on the basis of data collected by the people themselves.

Looking at information infrastructures suggests a fundamentally new model of how 20th century states differ from earlier ones. Information infrastructures, I want to suggest, differed in scale, point of organization, and ambition from those information infrastructures of 19th century empire, whether the state inspection of factories and slaughterhouses or the colonial census. It was only in the 20th century that information infrastructures, such as alternative mapping programs, could be launched outside of the nation state with participatory maps as a symbol of the power of village by village across the south, localities village by village across the south, to make their own intervention into property law.

So we get a very different picture of what maps mean in the 20th century. If we start with the abundance of different kinds of maps and actors on an international scale being used to adjudicate these land use issues, and then ask, what is the ideological meaning, how many people are involved with these maps, how is this different from the 19th century, than if we start with a theory of the map, expertise, and scale a la Foucault. In short, this is a very– this is the inverse of the picture of 20th century authority that has been given to us by writers like Timothy Mitchell.

Neither the FAO maps nor the Cree maps were imperial homogenizing forces. They were countervailing information structures leveraged in the context of a struggle for control over land by the people in the future reversing the sense of colonialism. The era of modern information infrastructure meant a new field of war over political economy where ideologues of the free market and Indian villagers actively contested the decisions of state bureaucrats by assembling their own data.

So much for conclusions about the state, theorizing the state. Let’s move on to global history. The new actors that I’ve been describing set to work to map land and lobby for a particular political approach to land management in the context of a global movement to redistribute land loosely connected by social movements and intellectual crosscurrents, which was my task to reconstruct, as a global movement initiated by peasants and workers, accompanied by intellectual and political movements that theorized alternative economic projects.

This movement dates from the late 19th century when simultaneous struggles over land ownership in Ireland and India rocked British empire and introduced drastic new measures, for example, the introduction of rent control and the state-sponsored buyout of landlords in Ireland. So the long land war began with the revolt of colonized populations. In Ireland, the National Land League staged mass marches, counted evictions, and invented the boycott.

In Mexico, peasants hid their property titles under floorboards and swarmed to form armies, revolting against the hacienda system. Their rights would be enshrined in a new system of Iquitos, protecting Indigenous rights and common village lands. In India, Gandhi and his followers led rent strikes and staged a 10-year pilgrimage in the name of voluntary land turnover from landlords to peasants.

Interconnections between local movements suggest the advantage of viewing these interconnected movements as global, recognizing a variety of commonalities between global land struggles associated with each other. In Britain, India, Mexico, the United States, across Asia, Africa, and Latin America, movements for occupancy rights struggled to define land not as a private commodity to be bought and sold but as a special kind of property– a property whose value was defined by inhabitation. Many of these movements won.

They passed legislation in Bengal, Kerala, and Mexico that defined land as a collective resource for food and housing. And these movements had in common their postcolonial origins. In each case, as in the cases of land reform movements in other parts of the world, in each of the cases listed here, postcolonial experience was informed by a series of common struggles– protesting for land redistribution, the broadening of access to housing, for control over rent, and for security against eviction and displacement.

And the movement wasn’t as limited to the Global South as this list would proclaim. Even in New York City and London, rent-control measures endorse the rights of working-class citizens to live and thrive, free from fear of eviction and displacement.

So as I’m laying it out, lumping together diverse movements, rural and urban, Global North and South, communist and capitalist disrupts, many received histories which provide the turning points for the 20th century. The reason that I’m doing this is that I believe that studying British empire provides a thread running through each of these confrontations. 1881 in Ireland was the world’s first modern land law that constituted for rent control and land reform.

India was promised land reform in 1886. And the failure of Britain to provide land reform for Bengal precipitates the fight for land reform and the struggle up to independence in 1945 when it takes a different form. The British inexperience in Ireland with consciously looked to as the pattern for land reform in Egypt.

Conversations about Indigenous land rights and reparations marked ongoing, longer struggles in Tanzania, Kenya, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia. So the Commonwealth countries are deeply rooted in a 20th century struggle about the nature of land and its governance. Britain itself was promised land reform in 1911, including a rent control during the first World War, and promised homes fit for heroes, returning veterans. A housing crisis marked British policy from 1945, through the Thatcher years, and persists to this day.

Meanwhile, British intellectuals were deeply embedded in conversations about international land reform, especially through the FAO and the United Nations where, as we’ve seen, many of the stories of the original founders and administrators, their architecture, was composed with the expectation of a decomposing British empire in which Indian postcolonial economics was newly relevant. So we would expect that tracing British connections across this disintegrating empire would explain global patterns that might be otherwise overlooked when the emphasis is on Bretton Woods and American empire, and the narrative is about Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines.

We can tell that story, too. It shows up from time to time in the book. But I’m not going to take time to examine those cases here because the organizational principle that casts new light is thinking about British empire disintegrating.

To investigate the connections between these conversations, let’s look at a few cases of global interconnectivity. And let’s start with India and the US via the Indian mystic and social reformer, Vinoba Bhave. When we first encounter him, Vinoba is burning his proof of graduation, his high school diploma, in the family stove, having explained to his mother that he was going to dedicate his life to the service of humanity. He had just heard about Gandhi, and he would dedicate his life to becoming Gandhi’s major apostle and successor.

In the American context, we often think of Gandhi as the author of the Salt March in 1930, the author of nonviolent political tactics. But in India, he’s equally remembered for events a decade previous to the Salt March when he was leading rent strikes patterned off of the Irish example in the Champaran district alongside future prime ministers and presidents of India.

Land reform had been promised to Bengal in 1885, 1886, just ahead of Ireland. And it was expected with independence as one of the first fruits of the Indian Resistance Movement. At that point, in 1945, land reform was passed, but a Brahmanical supreme court struck down Indian land reform measures, referring land reform to the individual states.

At that moment of regrouping, many Indians believed that land reform was essential to a path out of poverty that would raise the many alongside the few. After Gandhi’s assassination in 1948, Vinoba Bhave became the individual who personally symbolized this hope of an egalitarian, charitable, and nonviolent reversal of the land thefts associated with British empire. Walking hundreds of miles across the continent, Vinoba asked landowners in India to consider pledging a proportion of their land to the landless families of the district.

Believing that spontaneous community self-organization was more important than any infrastructure he himself could provide, Vinoba refused to provide any accounting whatsoever of these land pledges. And one result was that 10 times as many acres were pledged as were actually turned over. His followers included a large number of European and American youth who recorded and published their experiences for Western audience.

And some of these attempt– returned home and attempted to instantiate a similar ethic around land use and land management back at home. So a primary example is the civil rights activist, Robert Swan, who joined Vinoba’s ashram, and then brought the idea of land-banking back to North America, to the American South, in an attempt to set up African-American communities in Georgia free from the threat of rising rent. And so this is an argument about the origins of the modern land trust which is of relevance to conservation movements, social movements, and movements today. This is how the land trust movement gets planted in North America.

Ideas about an economy where housing was valued above the commodification of land was re-echoed in the squatters movements of New York and London in the 1960s and 1970s. And Vinoba’s case remained a frequent referent, circulating in these communities as proof that anarchist principles of land as a human right could be enacted, anchoring the possibility of a noncapitalist relationship to land persisting within a dominant ethos of capitalism.

Some of the most compelling cases of international connections happened around the edges of Britain’s former empire, as in this case. But consider some further afield cases, as in events in New Mexico in the United States. Consider the story of Tierra Amarilla.

Here, the property rates of Indigenous and Latino majority were sacrosanct, in theory, since the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo which had validated Spanish crown grants to Native peoples and Indig– and Latino peoples alike. By the 20th century, an Anglo sheriff and county administration were turning a blind eye as Anglo ranchers started moving their barbed wire fences, trespassing into Indigenous and Latino territory. The Latino community complained. The Indigenous community complained. The sheriff did nothing.

In 1963, local Indigenous and Latino leaders began to form a resistance movement, the Alianza Federal de Mercedes, led by Reies Lopez Tijerina pictured here. They started by erecting placards bearing the face of Emilio Zapata and the slogan, tierra o muerte, which many American historians have wrongly suggested was the slogan of the Mexican Liberal Party. The slogan of the Mexican Liberal Party associated with the Mexican Civil War, the Mexican Revolution, is tierra y libertad, land and liberty.

Land or death is really important. The slogan in New Mexico, in fact, echoed a contemporary Latino land movement elsewhere, the one in Peru represented by the Marxist leader, Hugo Blanco. After 1961, Blanco had orchestrated one of the most consequential Indigenous protest movements in Latin America for land rights.

He led the Quechua people to occupy the fields of local haciendas, putting up one-night houses, putting up tents, literally occupying the land and refusing to leave. They occupied the streets of Cusco in protests, claiming their ancestral rights to land. In 1963, Blanco was sentenced to death.

In the proceedings in the courtroom, he led the packed ranks of Quechua people who had showed up in his defense in the chant, tierra o muerte, tierra o muerte, land or death, until the courtroom had to be shut down in the chaos. The death penalty was dropped. The sentence was changed to 25 years in prison.

Back in Tierra Amarilla, Latinos began resisting land theft through armed confrontation. In 1967, Tijerina led one group, kidnapping the local sheriff, departing for the hills before exchanging gunfire with local troops. The events in New Mexico ran in parallel to other contemporary US identity movements that claimed land rights, including James Forman’s Black Manifesto of 1969, which called for 200 million in federal payments to reverse the loss of farmland by Blacks.

Also contemporary was the Indigenous occupation of Alcatraz and [INAUDIBLE] in upstate New York in 1969 into ’71. I think what we learn from the contemporaneity of these movements and the ties to international movements is that these are not one-off ethnic studies movements in the United States. They are deeply aware that there are Indigenous land reformations being enacted in other parts of the globe, and they want in. They just want what other people are getting.

These events kick off a counter-reaction in the US enshrined by a number of bestselling books that warned about growing population overwhelming the economy and the Earth’s carrying capacity. Of these the most consequential was William and Elizabeth Paddock’s bestselling We Don’t Know How in 1973, which explicitly denounced land reform as a fool’s errand driven by the growing demands of ethnic groups at home and abroad, dooming any economic improvement schemes whatsoever. These theories would converge in a new report at the World Bank in 1974 that essentially eradicated the FAO’s control over its own budget, denouncing land reform, and proclaiming a new era of free market politics.

Henceforth, there would be no more land ceilings, no limits on how big farms were, only land floors. This is the policy instrument that inaugurates the era of the Green Revolution and therefore reverses the successes of land reform in most of /

Meanwhile, Hugo Blanco had become a celebrity in London. His testimony and manifesto, Land or Death, was republished by activist committees. There were protests outside the Peruvian embassy. And the story of the Quechua occupations sparked the revival of student-led squats to protest the crisis of housing, demanding that the UK government take action to create a world where housing was regarded as a human right for all.

I’m going to skip the international– the transtemporal and intellectual connections because in the interest of time and head straight to what this tells us about property Traditional narratives of property have been dominated by a history of single ownership– owner proprietorship as if property were a law of nature, like gravity, that was promoted around the world by British colonialism, thus giving birth to the era of capitalism.

Thanks to decades of historical scholarship, we now know that this picture is incomplete. Scholars such as Sujit Sivasundaram and Alan Grier among many others have persuaded us that none of the spaces to which Europeans applied property law were empty, and indeed that most people had highly specific and differentiated notions of nonexclusive, overlapping property rights, sometimes holding territory in common for specific purposes. A literature on the history of Commonwealth nations has emphasized the story of land grabs, seizure, and homogenization where the European map is the instrument of dominance.

Now, despite this research for the era of European empire, histories of property rights in the 20th century have remained largely governed by the earlier model. Modernization, expertise, and commodification remain the themes of many accounts of global development. So we can read Daniel Immerwahr, Ethan Kapstein treating US land reform in Taiwan, the Philippines, and Korea as an instance of pacification through individual proprietorship, or Tori Olson and Amy Offner on Mexican land reform under American influence, where peasants are turned into proprietors who conceive of citizenship in terms of single owner proprietorship. The logic is usually that single owner proprietorship is an instrument of pacification and American empire of homogenization and capitalization.

And this is– there’s something to this account. But I think when we look at the larger picture of the disintegration of British empire, we get a very different portrait of the meaning of land reform. And it’s also possible that American policies were noticeably lagging behind UN policies and policies promoted in other parts of the world, a global trend. So any account focusing on American empire therefore risks losing track of the wider and longer picture.

So it’s worth considering looking at this chart of land reform movements as a whole and charting the longer– and asking what it means to chart the longer arc of time. This timeline of land reform begins with 1881, the date of the first rent control and land reform in Ireland. And it persists through the 1970s when land reform is effectively dismantled by the World Bank.

The long part of the land long land war is therefore a distinctive era of the 20th century. It extends across two world wars and the Bretton Woods conference which are standard landmarks of periodization for the American empire story.

A major feature of land reform viewed as a period, I would argue, is that it was marked by an expanding array of repertoires for understanding what property is and for conceiving of property in common. These are driven largely by postcolonial debates. But the evidence is most visible in shifts across the social sciences, including in my own field of history.

Across the social sciences, reacting to postcolonial land movements, researchers began responding to social movements by investigating the validity of traditional claims to land in ways that challenged European conventions of single owner, masculine proprietorship as the unique model for property over time. So social historians like EP Thompson argued for the significance of customs in common and peasant access to land in centuries past in Europe. Meanwhile, the economist and agricultural scientist, Esther Boserup contributed research into women’s property rights in traditional cultures in Africa, showing how those had been dismantled and challenged under European empire.

Elsewhere, at the University of Indiana, Elinor and Vincent Ostrom began a workshop on political economy that began to compile case studies from around the world, documenting the diversity of property systems, starting with the Swiss Grazing Commons and going on to document Spanish and Arabic irrigation systems that treated water like a common good, as well as fishing and timber commons around the world. Ostrom’s findings about common property systems would earn her a Nobel Prize in economics in 2009.

The work of these social scientists highlights the plausibility of multiple systems of property rights, not just of land but also of water, not merely for men but also for women. They highlight that property could be tended, maintained, even improved when had held as a collective good, administered on behalf of the many. Now, by conceiving of property as constituted by a broadening diversity of actors, we have the opportunity to compare ideological approaches in a new light.

The long 20th century can be conceived of as a moment when new social movements were galvanized around land use. And that includes single owner proprietorship versions like those in Ireland as well as certain kinds of communist policies both in Ireland and in the Chinese model of the family farm, early Chinese land reform, early Russian land reform, before forced collectivization.

Reforms center on the figure of the rent-paying peasant and their exploitation. In this sense, a longer story around British empire upends the Cold War narrative in which Russia and China are conceived of as a distinctive, fundamental break with European liberalism. In this case, they completely continuous.

The communist land redistributions then show up as having much more in common with other revolutions than previously thought. They also show up as being– I’m sorry the arrow should be pointing to Russia and China because we’re talking about that right now. The Russia and China models then show up in this account as the most effective– the most effective in terms of land redistributed until the forced collectivization and redistributions which result in massive famines. But these are not primarily linked to the initial single owner land reforms.

So it’s useful to notice what historians of China and Russia have long understood, that the communist land reforms are not singular in kind and nature but are composed of multiple stages of intervention, including the family farm movement which was extremely productive, minimally violent, and which looks very much in conception like the mirror image of Ireland. Comparing the movements in aggregate also underwrites some surprising conclusions, including the fact that the purely voluntary redistribution movements merit more notice than they have been given in political science texts that foreground aggregate comparisons between capitalist and communist models.

So what throws a wrench in that categorical, binary structure is the voluntary movement in India associated with Vinoba Bhave and the derivative campaigns like Operation Bargain in Bahar in the 1970s. Totally voluntary land reform. The state is barely involved. Landowners are just gifting land to landless peoples for the sake of a more inclusive economy.

They stand out as among the most successful of land reform movements. Voluntary land reform with two million acres distributed redistributes more than the first phase of the Mexican Revolution. It’s serious land reform.

Vinoba’s entirely voluntary land reform thus presents a corrective to histories of property rights that foreground a struggle between command and control redistribution on the model of Mao or Stalin against private property on the model of Anglo-American law. Its far more diverse. The spectrum is really important.

So where I think this drives us is this. The categories of 20th century land reform were fissile, not fixed. The moment of land reform was an era of expansive experimentation with the means of persuading individuals to part with their property or to recategorize property in the name of a wider spirit of egalitarianism. Broad, new redefinitions of property, including the possibility of legal recognition for reparations for Indigenous or collective tenure, for housing and agriculture as human rights, appear in the 20th century and expand, motivated, in part, by social science’s ongoing engagement with social movements.

These expansive definitions of property are constituted via new technologies and social practices. And these, together, constitute a major movement within government and beyond government on the international playing field.

So let me wrap up and ask, why does this matter for history? What is the big takeaway for histories of the 20th century? I believe that what emerges from an aggregate view of the struggles over property in the 20th century across various forms of governance is an inter– is a portrait of an age of land redistribution, much as we speak of an age of revolutions.

This is a very different perspective from the one in political science where there’s been a comparative approach centered around Cold War categories, the numbers of acres, and beneficiaries. It’s also very different than accounts that focus on American empire as a zone of expertise exploitation and single owner proprietorship, which characterizes the expansion of American empire as totally unprecedented but also simultaneously just repeating what British empire did in the 19th century.

What I find is that this age is generally marked by an evolving debate over what property is, about the multiplicity of types of ownership that can constitute property, and the possibility of ownership of land and water as commons. It’s marked by an expanding set of nonstate actors, including international actors, nonprofits, and social movements, many of them competing with the state and against– competing against each other through their implementation of information infrastructures. Who wins the pamphlet war wins. Who collects the– who disseminates the most maps wins in court. Who wins is not going to be determined fundamentally by the nation state but by these information infrastructures and their reach on a global level.

So these are my conclusions about the era of land reform. Thank you so much for your time. Thank you for staying through the conversation. I very much look forward to your questions. So shall we proceed to the Q&A? OK, thank you.

[PAUL PIERSON] That was really great. Thanks. I guess the question I want to start with is about the decision to think of housing and housing rights as a sort of subcategory of land reform, and I– because I tend to think of them as different. And so I was trying to think, as we were going along, about what the advantages and disadvantages of grouping them together are.

So I was just thinking, so I think of the conflicts over housing as being very closely connected to urbanization, as being a much more urban issue and much more about consumption– that housing is a consumption good, whereas land is a for production. And so I thought it was really interesting to group them together. I’d just be interested to hear a little more of you’re thinking about that.

[JO GULDI] Yeah, thanks for that question. It’s a really good question. So it’s absolutely true. If you read Matt Desmond’s, Evicted, he’s not talking about the eviction of rural families. If you take an urban studies course, you’re going to be talking about housing movements, and you’ll never mention housing– rural housing problems. It’s assumed today that rent is a nonissue in rural places.

But in order to understand the three months during which the protesting farmers shut down New Delhi last year, they were protesting laws which extended the reach of corporations into protected rural lands, resulting in rising taxes and rent. So around the Global South, these eviction land ownership and housing questions are tightly bound up with agricultural land use. I think our division of categories dates from the moment of the so-called urban crisis of America and the postwar world which, is when the first American studies programs of urban studies were constituted.

But. Interestingly, the first rent controls emerge in a rural context. So I’ve been talking about the land law of Ireland, 1881. Land law of Ireland, 1881, is the first rent control in history, and it’s a rural action. It’s a rural action because the practice of rent-racking, of raising the rent every year, has resulted in an eviction regime which is way less– there’s way less eviction than what was happening during the Irish famine when there’s a mass exodus. But it’s raised the Specter of a new famine, a new regime of evictions.

And so Irish peasants began literally counting the evictions as part of the activities of the National Land League, and then they take that to court. And then, ultimately, this new court is set into place, and the new court has the power to fix your rent. You have to apply to the courts, show up with documents, saying what you’ve done with the piece of property. And it’s very much bound up with the question of Gaelic Indigenous law against British single owner proprietorship.

And there’s been enough of a social science conversation in 19th century Britain that that becomes the issue. So the rent control is about keeping Irish peasants in their houses in the countryside. Also agricultural production. They’re also all happen to be farmers. But it’s the status of the homestead that launches these movements.

Copycat movements begin to emerge in Edinburgh and London in the decades that follow. And Ireland becomes the site for a new theory of an egalitarian politics of housing coined by Californian, Henry George, who was married to an Irish-American immigrant who we met over there in San Francisco. So that’s the in a nutshell version of the longer rural background to housing as an urban right.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] I had the same question. I write about council housing. So I’m so curious. My question, then, to follow on from that is, you talk about different kinds of tenure. There’s own your own occupation. There’s collective rights of various kinds. There’s security of tenure for just one person. I mean, there’s a lot of different forms of land use, including versus land for housing, an apartment, a farm. All of those are very different.

And I think– I also think about, say, the Australian case, the Native Title that was handed down by the Australian high court in 1991 or the judgment that spawned Native Title. That kind of land reform and redistribution is very different from the New Zealand version of the Treaty of Waitangi, for example. And so I’m wondering how you sort of deal– obviously, I’ll have to read the book– how you deal with [LAUGHS] all of these different forms because I can see the movements being the same. But it feels like the goals and the forms of tenure are quite different. And how do they all work together?

[JO GULDI] Yes, yes, how the whole thing works. Well, I tried to do this in– tried to sketch out the variety of land regimes in the really big picture in the introduction. The introduction starts off with the most ancient regulations that we have on governing land use which are Daoist documents. And then very quickly it runs through Marx and picks up the recent literature on British empire and Treaty of Waitangi and settler colonialism.

But settler colonialism isn’t the only version of property seizure in British empire. There are also high taxation regimes typical of most parts of India, and the Zamindari System where we’re just going to fix the property settlements, in 1793. And so they’re extractive regimes which have the effect of eviction and limiting opportunities for growth, but they’re based in property law. They’re based in the matrix of how the land is managed.

And then there’s outright expropriation, like White people coming in and saying, now, I own this. And that’s behind the Mau Mau rebellion and many other parts of British empire. So we have these conflicts, and they’re seen as equivalent by anticolonial movements starting in the 1880s because the Irish example and the war in Bengal push to such a degree that even Americans like Henry George can’t ignore it. They’re starting to see that there’s a global connection and that theorizing the land might be the basis for some understanding of the harm done by empire.

So that’s the contemporary conclusion, that the commodification of land has constituted a kind of harm. And the plausibility of that is what encourages Aurobindo to meet with Irish rent strike leaders in London in the 1880s and 1890s which is how we think the rent strike makes it to India and how these copycat types of social movements get started moving around the world. And this story allows for alternative traditions because obviously I’m telling the story of the disintegration of British empire. But many of the events that I trace are happening in former Spanish empire, former French empire.

There are land struggles that are particular, and I stage a very particular types of landownership which are complex in all of those regions. And that’s exactly what the challenge is of telling a global transtemporal story about land reform. So for individual cases, I try to be very exact about what’s happening.

And then this is why the conclusion’s about what happens to property is essentially a diversification. And the social science literature is incredibly helpful because you can see anthropologists, sociologists starting to reckon with historians, starting to reckon with describing the multiplicity of land ownership patterns and institutions like this one starting in the 1960s and 1970s, where if you look at the dissertation title catalog, it’s literally like every single dissertation coming out of Wisconsin, Berkeley, Cornell has land somewhere in the title. It’s land in the property ownership system of the Iquitos or land in the European peasant commons, but it’s all land, all the time until about 1982.

Yeah, and then it collapses. It changes. It’s a fascinating portrait of global development as a market driver of a certain kind of theory, which is then perceived as being rural and not related to the market in an era of neoliberalism.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] This is really fascinating. So if I’m understanding this correctly, you are arguing that these anticolonial movements are not just challenging the distribution of land. But they’re also challenging the very concept of property in the colonial regime.

But at the same time, they are sometimes working through the institutions of the colonial regime. They;re using their maps or the legacy courts or whatever. So I just wanted to ask if you could kind of give us your thoughts on the tension between those two, and maybe whether different strategies have different outcomes in terms of working with the system and working against it?

[JO GULDI] Thanks. I love that question. So one of the things, fun things, about STS approaches is that the same tool can mean different things to different people. So when I was writing about the road system in 18th century Britain, the roads serve one purpose for the friends of Adam Smith who want to unite a nation and opportunities for trade. And then they’re used for very different purposes by working class members of the early trade unions, the Methodists and other radical groups, who start to organize over the roads, starting with the Wesleyan Methodists and the circuit riders. So they’re starting their own national purposes.

So I started thinking about maps in the same way. Maps showed up in my first book as just the instrument of the state for [INAUDIBLE], right? They’re used by this– [LAUGHS] the civil engineers’ maps mean taxation. And this is the story of the cadastral map as told by Roger Kain, and it’s probably mostly accurate until at least 1880.

The map, wherever you see it, the stories are all a map-maker is sent by the king into the remote hills of the Ardeche. And then he’s killed by the local peasants because they mean– they know that the surveyor’s instrument means that their tax taxes are about to go up. Yeah, so the surveyor has to die.

And that’s what resistance looks like. Resistance [LAUGHS] means literally killing the surveyor and taking away his instruments. No possibility of the map. And that’s the story of the blank spaces on the map. That’s the James C. Scott story. It’s true. It’s true until– the historian’s question is when? When is it true until?

So what’s not in this book is the prequel. The prequel. [LAUGHS] Originally The Long Land War was going to be much longer. It hit 1,000 pages. My readers were like, for god’s sake, Jo. So it got cut in half.

So forthcoming is the first half of The Long Land War in which I tell the story of Irish peasants in the 1880s, and their– what they start doing with maps and counting eviction. They start counter-mapping. They start counter-mapping in a fairly primitive way, but there are radical anticolonial surveyors associated with the movement in Ireland.

And that’s one of the reasons that this fundamentally new institution, the Land Court, can do its work, is that somebody has thought through all of the technicalities of what it needs to record. And essentially they do a labor theory of value in space. That’s what they figure out how to do.

So you can’t read that in the book now, but it’s coming. I promise. It’s really juicy. That was the motivation to start looking in the 20th century for the evolution of mapping from below.

There was a thin literature in this already. Denis Cosgrove, the great UCLA geographer, was already writing about this in the 1990s. He was thinking about participatory mapping movements in land use, in early socialism in the 1930s, where they’re going to map all– ask all of the children of Britain to map all of the best places for playgrounds. They’re going to ask unemployed people to map all of the best places to go to look for a job. And they’re going to disseminate– they’re going to re-engineer the welfare state, so it can be by the many, in the service of the money.

That was how I found my way to the archives of Sussex and the archives of participatory research in Asia, which are mind-blowing. Because from the 1970s– 1960s and 1970s, the followers of Paolo Freire, in all of these postcolonial countries, start taking airplanes to hang out with each other in the Caribbean and Yugoslavia and in India. And they start exchanging techniques for how to organi– first it’s how to organize literacy.

And then it goes through these stages– how to organize a participatory meeting, how to organize participatory research. And then they figure out the map. They figure out participatory mapping. And that’s when they perfected and turned it into a model where they can describe it in a flyer, and other people can do that.

That happens between 1972 and 1982. There are some conferences at the University of Sussex where they’re flying in postcolonial organizers. It then shows up in the Appalachians. It shows up in Thailand. It shows up in India. And John Gaventa from– who’s now running the University of Sussex, but is then at the Highlander Center in the Appalachias, conducting a rent survey of miners gets invited to Tamil Nadu to meet with Chania factory workers.

It’s so intensively global and so social, urban, rural, whatever. But it’s about this method, the counter-mapping, the potential of using technology against itself. My article version goes into this in much more detail and talks about the possibility of cooptation of the many-to-many map, which I think happened via the World Bank, again, in the 1990s.

Despite some good intentions by some people, the World Bank, they just didn’t understand the nature of participatory politics. They threw a lot of money at it. It didn’t work. Participatory mapping is now alive and well in a technological format in Silicon Valley promoted by Google’s social arms.

How to read counter-mapping strategies when they’re actually participatory in counter-mapping and when they’re not appropriated is a really interesting, knotty question. But reading those early organizers, they have a lot to say about it, so worthy of study.

[JULIA SIZEK] There’s a question from online. So I’m going to give anonymous attendee an opportunity to say some words. So this person says, thank you for this talk. Your work makes a point about the international discourse of land redistribution as part of a postcolonial movement and as a call for reparations.

I think that the agrarian underpinnings of reparations for formerly enslaved Black folks in the US and calls for 40 acres and a mule in Sherman’s Field, order number 15. Can you speak towards how Black land redistributive reparations relates to your work? And then there’s another follow-up question, which is concerning reparations. How do we deal with conflicts between the US’s theft of Indigenous lands and Black reparative calls for land redistribution when the land itself was transformed into property and stolen not from Black subjectivity but from indigeneity?

[JO GULDI] So two really good questions sort of about different things. One of them is a historical question about the chronology, as I take it, the chronology of activism for reparations for African-Americans. So the 40 acres and the mule story is really fascinating to follow through these international debates because it becomes abundantly clear that everyone else in the 1960s and 1970s has heard about this. They’ve heard about the claims for African-American reparations, and it makes sense to them.

They’re doing their own reparations to repair the sins of enslavement and land seizure and punitive taxation under colonization. Why shouldn’t the descendants of American slaves also get some form of reparations? So even in textbooks on land use published in the 1970s and 1980s by faculty at the University of Wisconsin, they are lobbying for African-American land reparations and describing this as the natural fulfillment of the land to the tiller movement that started, in their view, with Taiwan, the Philippines, Japan with an American vision of peaceful transitions to home ownership for all, instantiated by the American GI Bill and mortgages and middle class home ownership. Obviously, African-American reparations would be part of that.

So it’s so clear that the people who were part of this conversation, even in America but also overseas, see this as inevitable, just totally inevitable. The only way I– so then that raises the question, how do you make sense of it not happening and going away? James Forman writes his manifesto. If I’m right, and all the social scientists think that this makes sense– not all of them but significant social scientists are saying, this makes sense– how does it go away?

And so my explanation I gave in miniature, but it’s– the Paddocks are symptomatic of a response from a certain kind of natural scientist who believes that overpopulation and what is called then the crisis of rising expectations is at the root of ungovernability, at the root of a climate crisis, at the root of a food crisis, at the root of a housing crisis, that essentially these other people are asking for too much stuff. And they have to be stopped, or the planet itself is not going to be able to sustain this.

You hear echoes of this all the time in climate debates. And so I think it’s useful to say, ah, I have seen that before. They have data. There is other data to support family farming being a sustainable economics, being able to imagine a future. That debate has happened on this campus over the future of development as well.

There was a second part of that question. Julia, I might need you to help me.

[INAUDIBLE]

About indigeneity. OK, so this is a fascinating question. So in a settler colonial country like North America in which you had Indigenous land, and then you had enslaved people forced to farm land that had once been Indigenous, what does land reform mean? If land reform in Ireland meant turning the clock back to before the 17th century confiscations of Irish land by Cromwell’s army, what does it mean to turn the land– turn the clock back?

So I think one of the things that’s important is that, in most of the land reform movements, at least outside of communist countries, if there’s a land reform, it takes the form of an ownership transfer. And the ownership transfer is typically of a parcel of land. But the parcel of land can be converted into cash.

Sometimes this is raised as an objection to land reform isn’t the kind of social engineering that we’d hoped. We gave all of these parcels of land to Mexican peasants. And a week later, they sold them to a real estate developer and moved to the city.

So some people think, oh, so, therefore, it doesn’t work. Well, on the other hand, that’s why the Gini coefficient moved, because you had a massive transfer of wealth. So it’s possible that reparations would take the form of land transfer when land transfer is the most meaningful, symbolic value. So for example, transferring land to local, Indigenous populations whose descendants are nearby, restoring those land rights, restoring governance and the ability to police and to own.

And it’s also possible that for– reacting to structural racism and the suffering of enslaved people, reparations project would take the form of cash payments rather than land transfer. It doesn’t all have to be the same. We don’t have to eradicate our cities or transfer all of the land.

And often in the land reform movements that follow the Irish example, we see this kind of equivalency of– what needs to happen is a movement of capital, not a total reversal. So the Irish landlords are compensated. They’re paid out. They take their cash from their manor house in the West of Ireland, and they usually move someplace, like maybe California. And they invest in another industry.

So instead of investing in farming and being a landlord, collecting rents, they’re now going to invest in real estate or in a shoe factory or in a tech factory. They go elsewhere, and they do something else with the capital. And that’s one of the nice things in land reform and in capitalist models, that it can co-exist with other kinds of investment. You don’t have to correct for– repairing the sins of the past doesn’t have to take the form of an idealized land management strategy.

That’s very narrow. We have a multiplicity of demands on land. Lots of people need housing. Lots of people need factories. You can make these adjustments, and it adjusts the shape of society as a whole.

[MAROIN FOURCADE] But unfortunately, we are already passed our time. So maybe, Jo, you can answer questions separately. But that concludes the formal part of the program. Thank you so much, Jo. [INAUDIBLE]

Thank you very much again. Thank you so much for being here.

[MUSIC PLAYING]

 

Panel

Economics and Geopolitics in US International Relations: China, Europe, and the Global South

The pandemic and the war in Ukraine have reshaped global geopolitics, trade, and security. How will these changes affect the relationship between the US and China, Europe, and the Global South? How will they impact US firms operating globally, and how might foreign leaders — and notably the Chinese leadership — respond?

Recorded on February 16, 2023, this panel discussion featured a group of distinguished scholars addressing these questions, and the possible implications for the global multilateral order established in the second half of the 20th century. The panel was held in Spieker Forum at the UC Berkeley Haas School of Business, and was co-sponsored by Social Science Matrix and the Clausen Center for International Business & Policy.

Panelists

Mariano-Florentino (Tino) Cuéllar is the tenth president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. A former justice of the Supreme Court of California, Justice Cuéllar served two U.S. presidents at the White House and in federal agencies, and was a faculty member at Stanford University for two decades. Before serving on California’s highest court, Justice Cuéllar was the Stanley Morrison Professor of Law, Professor (by courtesy) of Political Science, and director of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford. In this capacity, he oversaw programs on international security, governance and development, global health, cyber policy, migration, and climate change and food security. Previously, he co-directed the Institute’s Center for International Security and Cooperation and led its Honors Program in International Security.

James Fearon is Theodore and Frances Geballe Professor in the Stanford School of Humanities and Sciences, a professor of Political Science, and Senior Fellow in the Freeman-Spogli Institute for International Studies. He is a member of the National Academy of Sciences (elected 2012) and a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (elected 2002). Fearon’s research interests include civil and interstate war, ethnic conflict, the politics of economic development, and democratic accountability.

Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas is the Economic Counsellor and the Director of Research of the International Monetary Fund. He is on leave from UC Berkeley, where he is the S.K. and Angela Chan Professor of Global Management in the Department of Economics and at the Haas School of Business and Director, Clausen Center for International Business and Policy. Professor Gourinchas was the editor-in-chief of the IMF Economic Review from its creation in 2009 to 2016, the managing editor of the Journal of International Economics between 2017 and 2019, and a co-editor of the American Economic Review between 2019 and 2022. He is on-leave from the National Bureau of Economic Research, where he was director of the International Finance and Macroeconomics program, a Research Fellow with the Center for Economic Policy Research CEPR (London) and a Fellow of the Econometric Society.

Laura Tyson is Class of 1939 Professor of Economics and Business Administration and Distinguished Professor Emerita of Economics at UC Berkeley. She is an influential scholar of economics and public policy and an expert on trade and competitiveness who has also served as a presidential adviser. She also chairs the Board of Trustees at UC Berkeley’s Blum Center for Developing Economies, which aims to develop solutions to global poverty. She is the former Faculty Director of the Berkeley Haas Institute for Business and Social Impact, which she launched in 2013. She served as Interim Dean of the Haas School from July to December 2018, and served previously as dean from 1998 to 2001.

John Zysman (moderator) is Professor Emeritus at UC Berkeley and co-founder/co-director of the Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy. He received his B.A at Harvard and his Ph.D. at MIT. Zysman’s ongoing work covers the implications of platforms and intelligent tools for work, entrepreneurship, and international competition; and the economic challenges and opportunities of climate change and the green economy. From these positions, Zysman has made contributions to the policy and intellectual debates, building a record of thought leadership on the global economy going back five decades.

Listen to the panel as a podcast below or on Google Podcasts or Apple Podcasts.

Transcript

Economics and Geopolitics in US International Relations: China, Europe, and the Global South

[MUSIC PLAYING]

[MATILDE BOMBARDINI] Good morning, everybody, or good afternoon. Welcome, everyone. My name is Matilde Bombardini. And I am an associate professor in the Business and Public Policy Group here at Haas. And together with Professor Maurice Obstfeld, I’m co-director of the Clausen Center for International Business and Policy. I should say caretaker, co-director. The Clausen Center together with the Social Science Matrix led by Director Professor Marion Fourcade, who is here, are happy to present our distinguished panelists.

So we have John Zysman, who is the moderator. He’s a professor emeritus at UC Berkeley and co-founder, co-director of the Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy. Through his many contributions to policy and intellectual debates, John has built a record of thought leadership on the global economy going back five decades.

Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas is the Economic Counselor and the Director of Research of the International Monetary Fund. He is on leave from UC Berkeley, where he is the SK and Angela Chan professor of Global Management in the Department of Economics and at Haas, and Director of Clausen Center for International Business and Policy.

James Fearon is the Theodore and Frances Geballe professor in the Stanford School of Humanities and Sciences and a professor of political science, a senior fellow in the Freeman-Spogli Institute for International Studies. He’s a member of the National Academy of Sciences and a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Mariano-Florentino Tino Cuellar is the 10th president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a former justice of the Supreme Court of California. Justice Cuellar served two US presidents at the White House and in federal agencies and was a faculty member at Stanford University for two decades. Before serving on California’s highest court, Justice Cuellar was the Stanley Morrison professor of law, professor by courtesy of political science, and director of the Freeman-Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University.

Laura Tyson is class of 1939 professor of economics and business administration and distinguished Professor Emerita of economics at UC Berkeley. Professor Tyson is well-known for his distinguished career in both academia and government services. She is a former National Economic Council advisor and past Chair of the Council of Economic Advisors. So join me in welcoming our speakers.

[JOHN ZYSMAN] Before turning us over to Pierre for the first round of this, I’m going to do a brief overview of what we’re going to be talking about. The title of the session, in fact, suggests quite clearly the themes. These are volatile and uncertain times. And our effort is to try and get to come to grips with them in one way or another.

Each panelist will take seven or eight minutes maybe, give or take a little more, you never know, and lay out their basic views on this. Then we’ll do a second round in which they can have interchange with themselves or add to questions, or I may provoke some of them to some extent. And then we’ll open it to questions and answers to the group as a whole.

Pierre will, in fact, be addressing, as he begins, the extent of geoeconomic fragmentation in the scenarios that may emerge. Then James Fearon, who brings a security lens to these questions, will focus considerably on the China challenges that are before us. Tino Cuellar will, I’m hoping, be able to show us how we can reconcile these differing imperatives of security and economy, particularly in the context of climate. He’s saying he can’t, but we know that he can. But we’ll benefit from his insights. And Laura Tyson will, with a particular focus on climate, will, as she always does, provide an integrated and insightful interpretation of developments.

With that, I’m going to turn to Pierre and say, from your work at the IMF, I’m hoping you’ll give us a sense of the extent of trade and financial fragmentation and the scenarios, as I say, that might emerge. As we move into a discussion, we will all want to consider that if the multilateral consensus that has been in the past is no longer possible, what approaches actually are in order? So Pierre.

[PIERRE OLIVIER GOURINCHAS] Thank you. Thank you, Chris. Well, thank you all very much for being here. I will use the seven minutes or so I was instructed to use in the first round to talk about geoeconomic fragmentation and the implications for the global economy. And this is, as you can imagine, a topic that we spend quite a bit of time thinking about at the Fund in the research department and also in other areas of the Fund.

So I would start by offering some comments on the extent of geoeconomic fragmentation that we can see already in the global economy. And then I will discuss some more speculative assessment of some scenarios that we have been working with to try to assess what might be happening if things really start unraveling.

So first, I will start by showing you some signs of geoeconomic fragmentation, what we are seeing already. And here, when I talk about geoeconomic fragmentation, I want to focus on a fragmentation that is policy-driven and might be policy-driven because of national security considerations. It might be having to do with sovereignty or autonomy. But I don’t want to have in mind something that would be due to some change in the environment or some global precautionary measures that countries would be taking.

For instance, you might imagine that all we’ve seen in the aftermath of the global financial crisis that there were some measures, some macro financial measures, prudential measures that were put in place that reduced some of the cross-country exposure. But they were designed to make the system more resilient. And I wouldn’t want to consider that as part of what we’re discussing today.

So I’m showing you here on this figure two different indicators that we are starting to look at, we’re following. So first, on the left, you can see mentions of national security in our annual IMF– annual report on the exchange arrangements and exchange restrictions. And you can see that after 2015, this starts picking up. This is sort of very low and not very relevant, it starts picking up in these reports in terms of some of the motivations for some of the exchange rate arrangements that countries are taking. And even net of Ukraine, this is still going up. So it’s one first indicator here.

Another indicator is the one on the right, which is coming from data from earnings calls. And you can see there a rapid increase. That starts actually before 2022, but a rapid increase in the mentions of themes like reshoring, onshoring, friendshoring, near-shoring in these earning calls. And of course, some of it starts during the COVID crisis, because, at that time, there’s already a concern about the vulnerabilities in the global supply chains. But this is exacerbated by the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Now, when we’re thinking about global economic, geoeconomic fragmentation, of course, we can think about a number of channels through which this might affect the global economy. So you might think that this will reduce trade. And to the extent, that trade has been one of the vectors through which countries have been able to grow faster. And there’s a lot of evidence of that or people have been able to be pulled out of poverty, or levels of food insecurity have been decreasing over time. Then something that would basically revert the extent of globalization we’ve seen and reduced trade might actually have adverse effects on the economy.

You might also think about technology diffusion as being affected by geoeconomic fragmentation. I have something to say about that in a minute. I mean, ultimately, technology and productivity growth is the key driver of improvements in standards of living. And so if we have geoeconomic fragmentation, we could also have a growing gap in terms of levels of technological development between different parts of the world. And that means that the parts of the world with the lower levels of technology would be suffering in terms of their improvements in standards of living. That would also affect competition. That would affect the rate of innovation. So it could affect both the gap between countries but also the level at which innovation grows overall.

But there are other channels that we can think about that might be relevant when we’re thinking about geoeconomic fragmentation. So you might think about increased barriers to migration. And that would reduce efficiency. That would hinder also innovation and technological diffusion. That would worsen adverse demographic trends that we’re seeing in different parts of the world. And that could also raise international tensions. We could have a fragmentation in capital flows. That would also have an impact by, for instance, limiting the amount of remittances streams that is very relevant for some low-income countries or limiting financing choices.

You could think that it could also increase uncertainty. A world in which you have this policy decision visions is a world in which policy uncertainty is increasing. And there’s a lot of evidence indicating that policy uncertainty is actually hurting investment. It’s leading to suboptimal decisions. It’s leading to delays. It’s increasing precautionary savings, for instance. And all of that could weigh down on economic activity, not to mention the fact that in a volatile and uncertain environment, you have more room for policy mistakes.

And finally, you could imagine that geoeconomic fragmentation would be something that makes it harder to coordinate on global public goods, make it harder for countries to agree on some of the key aspects that they need to work together on, whether it’s climate and the ability to implement measures that would allow us to stay below 1.5 Celsius in terms of temperature increases, or future work on health preparedness, pandemic mitigation, or the ability to deal with a large number of countries facing debt problems, for instance.

So what I’m going to show you is I’m going to show you some estimates where we try to work out what these scenarios would imply for the global economy and for different regions. So here, what I’m showing you on this figure here is based on some analysis we’ve done in a house at the Fund, where we’re looking at a situation where we’re splitting. And of course, we have to make some assumptions. And so we’re splitting the world into two blocks. And we’re using the March 2, 2022 United Nations General Assembly motion to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to sort the countries in the different groups– the countries that voted to condemn and the countries that didn’t vote to condemn.

And then we imagine that, as a result of this fragmentation, you would have in green, what I’m showing you is what happens if you have sanctions or if you stop trade on energy and high tech, so what we call energy and high-tech decoupling. And then in red, we add to that non-trade barriers that would basically go back to a level of trade between the different blocs that would be similar to what we had in the Cold War between the West and between the Soviet Union.

And the cost are significant for the world. There are about 1.5%. A lot of it is actually coming from the trade, the energy and high-tech decoupling. There can be much higher for some regions in the world. So the Asian countries, not surprisingly, are very, very vulnerable to a decoupling of the global economy, a fragmentation of the global economy. And you can see that for them, the estimated cost would be on the order of 3%, so about twice as large.

Not surprisingly again, but when you plot the costs or the welfare losses or GDP losses against the degree of openness, you find a very strong relationship here. Small and open economies are much more vulnerable. And that’s something that characterizes a lot of emerging market and developing economies.

Now, that’s one scenario where we have this sort of energy and high-tech decoupling. But there are a bunch of other scenarios we’ve run or other researchers have been working on the WTO or elsewhere. And so here, in a recent staff discussion note that we published in mid-January, we surveyed the landscape, if you want, and we put together this figure that shows the range of estimates.

So this is a pretty large range. And it goes from something like 1.5% of GDP, as I’ve already mentioned, to something that is on the order of 7% to, for some individual countries, up to 10%, 12%. And it really depends on how deep the fragmentation scenario is if you assume that there is really no trade at all between the different regions here. Whether you have a technological decoupling or not, that matters a lot for the long-term losses. Whether you have any substitution in the short term, so that depends on what the elasticity of substitution in this modeling exercise.

And in the sense, you have in a U-shape relationship. In the short run, it’s very hard to substitute a way, so it might be very costly. Or let me restate, if it is very hard to substitute a way, it could be very costly. In the long run, you may have substituted a way, but then the technological decoupling might kick in. And so you may have high losses because you’re sort of on this different productivity growth path. And so you might have also long and elevated costs.

We find that overall emerging markets and low-income countries are the most vulnerable. And in part, because they are behind the technological frontier. And any fragmentation would make it much, much harder for them to catch up. And they’re also quite open to start with.

Now, what does this imply for policy challenges? And this is my next to last slide. So there’s been a lot of– as I’ve mentioned, there’s been a lot of discussion about reshoring. Some of the measures that have been implemented by some countries, in particular in the US, have made it a condition for being eligible for subsidies and things like that.

And one of the point that we make is that we have to be careful is if the risk is the concentration risk that, your supply chain may be very concentrated, for instance, in semiconductors that are made in Taiwan in only one plant or one factory in Taiwan, then reshoring does not necessarily reduce concentration risk. In fact, the way that trade matrix is organized already, we have a fair amount of what you might call want-to-go-home bias. And this is what this figure on the left is showing.

If you look at the domestic share of intermediates, that’s the blue bars, it’s much higher than the domestic share in production. So in other words, this is an extent to which countries are already producing a lot of their domestic intermediates as opposed to procuring them from somewhere else in the world. And so reshoring would actually aggravate this pattern.

And in a little experiment we run, that’s the figure on the right, we ask, well, what would happen if you have a shock that is similar to about a 25% contraction in labor supply in a major intermediate goods supplier comparable to China? So think of this as a pandemic that would hit a country like China. And because of the centrality of China in the number of trade relations, it, of course, has a large impact on the world economy. So we estimate, on left bar, we estimate that the cost is about 0.65% or actually the world is a little bit more than that. It’s 0.8. It’s not it’s not on this figure.

But then if you diversify your supply chains, not concentrate them, diversify THEM then you get the black squares there. So you can reduce the impact and the dependency on any one single large supplier by a lot. So the point here is that diversification of global supply chains is much more important in terms of building resilience and then reconcentration.

Now, I will end with this final slide here that is coming back to what I started with, which is evidence of geoeconomic fragmentation, but looking at it from a different perspective by looking at it from the current account balances. So the difference between savings and investment or domestic absorption and production.

And here, what you have on the left is what we call a global imbalances graph. So you have the different countries or regions of the world above zero or surplus countries or regions below 0 or deficit countries or regions, starting in 1990 to 2022. And something interesting is happening when you’re looking at this imbalances. First, you see that they are sort of growing again of late. And that, meaning that the dispersion, the surpluses, and the deficits are increasing again. And this is in large part reflecting the energy shock that the global economy suffered last year.

And so what that tells you also is that a lot of these surpluses are located in countries that are actually on the other side of the countries running the deficits. You have an increase in the deficits of the US, for instance. And you have an increase in the surplus of countries like China or Russia, Saudi Arabia, which are not necessarily countries that you would associate with countries being in the same geopolitical camp. So for all the evidence of geoeconomic fragmentation and the trade fragmentation, et cetera, the financial flows are telling you there is still a lot going on. There’s a lot of interdependence there. And it’s a point that you want to keep in mind.

But what has changed perhaps already, and we’re seeing that on the right, is the composition of this flows. So what this here I’m showing you on the right is the outflows and inflows for three countries together– China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia. And notice that in the past, the black component was quite irrelevant. And that’s the effects reserves. And so there was quite a bit of reserve accumulation when these countries were running surpluses.

And this has disappeared in recent years. And what you see instead is an increase in other types of flows or errors and omissions, which means things that we can’t quite categorize. And we don’t really know where they’re going or what’s happening to them. So what this is suggesting is that there is an increased opacity in financial flows in recent years.

Now, you can imagine that this is an increased opacity, because the number of countries that are running surpluses may not want to accumulate reserves in the form of US treasuries in an environment where US treasuries might be frozen for instance as has been the case with central bank of Russia. So here, we have a displacement in terms of the composition of these flows, not necessarily a change in terms of the magnitudes of the overall balances, but certainly a lot less transparency and a lot more opacity going forward.

And I will end with this final point, which is that in the world we’re in, we used to think about the need for countries to maybe run current account surpluses, maybe for mercantilist reasons, that’s an argument that’s sometimes advanced, or maybe for the cautionary reasons precisely to build these reserves that they can then use to buffer against shocks. And in a sense, this second motive may be strengthened by the environment in which we live. The experience of what happened to Russia in 2022 illustrates how it’s difficult for sanctions to bring a surplus countries to a standstill. And so that might actually give an additional impetus to countries trying to be in a current account surplus position. I will stop here. [APPLAUSE]

[JOHN ZYSMAN] James– while they’re moving the chairs around, we can get organized. James spent a year at the Department of Defense, where he contributed to the National Defense Strategy document that came out in October. So part of the question that he’s going to address is, how if the priorities then the defense priorities actually changed in recent years, to what do we attribute those changes? And I would add, to what extent does that become entangled with economics? But that we will set aside unless he wants to address it himself. So when we’re all set, I suggest the rest of us ascend. And James–

[JAMES FEARON] Should I go up here?

[JOHN ZYSMAN]Yeah. Why not?

We have some sort of order. I think you’re–

[INDITINCT CHATTER]

 

I’m going to come here until somebody moves me. It’s good.

[JOHN ZYSMAN] It’s good. We’ll get that now. Before James gets started, I would say Laura and I have back problems. So occasionally, we may stand up. That’s not because we’re going to walk out on everybody else but just try to stretch a little bit. So forgive us in advance.

[JAMES FEARON] Thanks very much. And thanks for the opportunity to talk here. I should start out. Yes, John mentioned I worked last year. I was leave from Stanford and spent it fascinating year in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, working with the group that worked on the 2022 National Defense Strategy. That said, this should go without saying, but just to be 100% clear, I’m talking as in absolutely no representation or on behalf of I’m talking DOD or the US government, but as a person from Stanford.

So also, I should say, I’m not an economist. And I can really– I’m better positioned to address defense and security challenges. I look forward to trying to do some integration in the conversation we have and in answering questions.

In terms of the broad questions John raised, what’s, I think, really striking is that the US National Security community, the defense policy world has been, for a couple of years now and very much in the last year or two, preoccupied with the possibility that the PRC will, at some point, in some unclear timeline, could be next few years, next decade, could be longer than that, use force to try to change the status quo on Taiwan.

You may or may not have tracked that there’s just in every couple of weeks, there are some new set of speculation, an argument someone says something about when they think this might happen. There’s a lot of focus on timelines. And I’d be happy to address that more specifically. But I mean, no one really knows, of course, as US senior leaders generally say or pretty much always say.

But you can also say that this preoccupation, I’d say, it’s based on a quite plausible view that there is a non-trivial risk that you could see military action of some form, by the PRC, to try to reincorporate Taiwan to change the status quo using force. And that there is a non-trivial risk that could lead to a quite major war, really major war, between the US and the PRC, or US allies and partners and the PRC.

That would be a disaster. It would be terribly costly in many ways, including it would be economically or it could be economically catastrophic, both in the region and globally. So I mean, I think this would be an interesting thing to discuss. But the degree of global economic fragmentation that might follow, I think, Pierre would almost surely agree, that the degree of fragmentation that could follow from such a conflict would make the kind of changes that we’re seeing in the absence of that look pretty marginal, I suspect, quite marginal.

Yeah. I’d be interested in– I mean, I think in some of your just thinking about some of the slides you presented, I’ll throw this out as something that would be interesting to discuss. I don’t think it’s really that plausible that we’d see decoupling or fragmentation on the order of what we saw in the Cold War. I think we’ll far more likely to see a much more marginal than that the current international economic system. Even in the absence of the use and smooth functioning of the multilateral trade institutions as occurred in the past, even without that, the built-in forces in global value chains and FDI and multinationals and lobbies in many countries for maintaining trade relations are pretty strong. But not my area.

So, of course, we hope that a major conflict, military conflict is a very– I think, it is a low probability event. A lot of the stuff that the 2022 NDS is focused on, and a lot of US Defense policy thinking these days is focused on what needs to happen to keep it this a very low probability. In a slightly longer term, a slightly longer run perspective, the US Defense policy is in the process of attempting to make a hard turn away from what had been core focus for much of the last 20 years, which was counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. And In the last 10 years– well, and more than that– the war in Afghanistan.

You see this concerted effort to try to shift towards a set of challenges related to the very large scale and very focused military modernisation of the PRC and a set of plausibly interpreted policy changes in foreign policy of the PRC that are raising concerns about, for example, the independence of– well, or the continued status quo on Taiwan.

So the focus of the 2022 NDS was– kind of a top line objective was this need to, as it says, sustain and strengthen deterrence on a set of vital national interests. And these are not exclusively but mainly major concerns related to major power conflicts. Taiwan being one such scenario but not the only one. Russia was characterized in the document as an acute challenge. And as we’re seeing, that’s also another major power issue very much, very obviously in play.

So how do economic considerations play into these defense priorities and objectives? My impression is that by the Biden administration and also previous administrations are– the general worry, like the motivation for these security policies or defense policies and orientation is a worry about an economic threats in the long run, medium and long-run threats to the political and economic autonomy of major trading partners in the Pacific Rim.

So the long-run concern would be, in the sense, that PRC policies may threaten US or could threaten US ability to trade and interact with major Pacific Rim economies, that PRC economic and military leverage may be increasingly used to influence their domestic politics, for example, essentially, to make the world safe for the CCP, as they see things.

So the response to this as well having been focused on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency since at least since 9/11, a whole bunch of things have kind of– there’s a lot of catching up to do in terms of reinforcing, enhancing deterrence for a different set of security or military problems, particularly in the Pacific. Doing so is in itself risky and tricky. I think there’s a good deal of attention to the risk of what in the field of international relations, we talk about, is called spiral dynamics. That the US in attempting to do things to enhance deterrence would actually increase the likelihood of conflict by increasing, say, PRC perception of threat or changing military balance or things like that. So it’s a tricky thing.

I think at the same time, coming back to economics a little bit, my sense is that, at least the Biden administration leadership understands that the situation is very, very different from the Cold War conflict with the USSR. And it’s different in many ways, but it’s particularly different in terms of the economic situation or the economic relationships.

And I think that, I guess, I get the impression reading the news and public discussions that a number of the administration’s actions have been interpreted– have been are sometimes interpreted as, oh, this is a kind of Cold War kind of response. And we’re talking about decoupling and fragmentation. And I can understand why those– why one might think that.

But I think if you look closely at Biden administration foreign economic policy documents and leadership statements, or, for example, the National Security Strategy, the overarching security document that comes out of the National Security Council is not specifically or exclusively defense-related, you see, I think, a quite clear understanding that countries in the region do not want to be made to choose between the US and the PRC. And that at the same time, it’s also inevitable and not even necessarily a bad thing that countries in the region and the US will be trading a great deal with China.

Just two days ago, I listened to a Deputy Secretary Wendy Sherman gave a talk at Brookings, where she made– asked these kind of questions, made these kind of points. And noting in addition that it’s not just countries in the region, but there’s a huge amount of Chinese investment in the US economy. She flagged that a prosperous Chinese middle class is in fact a good thing for US workers and for the US economy overall. So I don’t get the sense that there is a concerted– any concerted policy of economic decoupling or a notion of like, it would be a good thing to try to create economic blocs along the lines of the Cold War.

Some of the actions, I think, really should be like, say, with chips and so on, should be really interpreted as related to the defense policy challenges and the concern about Chinese military modernization and how that plays into the deterrence challenges in the Western Pacific. So I think the broad question is, how do you– for the US Defense policy as they see it is, how do you get to a situation– maybe this is more my take, how do you get to a situation of stable long-run deterrence on the security side of things as an assurance or a support for backing what the administration is always talking about or likes to call a free and open regional order, which really refers back to this kind of political and economic autonomy of countries in the region that they maintain an ability to trade with who they please, according to something like commonly observed rules of the road?

The administration released something called the Indo-Pacific economic framework. And they started talking about it in late 2021 and released the documents, I think, in early 2022. This is a set of talks oriented to, as I understand it, I don’t have deep insight into this at all, but talks on digital, on trade, including digital economy, tax policies, a set of other pillars that they are talking about with 13 countries comprising in the region, comprising something like 40% of global trade.

It’s a little unclear. I mean, the discussions are ongoing. And they say they want to have a set of results by November this year. It’ll be interesting to see. I don’t know if there are other panelists who are following this and could say something about it. It’s a different approach. And the administration’s too kind of traditional US trade policy, which traditionally, there was talk about and focused on trade agreements.

This administration, like the last one– and I’d say one of the big changes is neither the Republican nor the Democratic Party seems to want to talk about trade agreements at all. And they don’t even like to use the words. The National Security Strategy has a sentence, which I should have written down, but it’s something like we need to modernize or move past the free trade agreement approach. And they talk about fair trade and so on.

Whether this can deliver, we’ll see. I really don’t know. But it could be– well, it probably is to some degree just an acknowledgment of changes that make the institutional– set the inherited multilateral institutional trade setup which was already pretty sclerotic arguably, not that functional. But I’d be very interested to hear what other people on the panel then say. I’d stop there. [APPLAUSE]

[JOHN ZYSMAN] Thank you very much, James. Now, I turn to Tino. And I say as president of the Carnegie Endowment on international Peace, you’re going to save us.

[MARIANO-FLORENTINO CUÉLLAR] No.

[JOHN ZYSMAN] And in fact, if these multilateral arrangements and agreements are sort of not so possible anymore, how do we go about moving forward? Or any other folk you choose.

[MARIANO FLORENTINO CUÉLLAR] Thank you, John. And thank you, everybody, for being here. It’s just a treat after so much pandemic isolation to be in any event where I see real people. I should tell you, one challenging thing about being on this stage right now is the view is distractingly beautiful.

[LAURA TYSON] The view is very nice.

[MARIANO FLORENTINO CUÉLLAR] With one exception, and that’s that Art and Architecture Building over there, our environmental building. You have to get rid of that. But aside from that, I’m very happy to be here.

[JOHN ZYSMAN] It’s an award-winning building, which says what architects really want.

[MARIANO FLORENTINO CUÉLLAR] It’s insane. That’s the one thing more insane than the state of the world we’re talking about. How many of you are students? OK, well, let me begin with an apology, because, in some sense, our generation is in the process of getting ready to give you the keys to the world. And we’re not giving you a vehicle that is in great shape. But really, what I want to do in part to eventually get to John’s request, and I don’t have a formula to solve things, but to just put things in context a little and get the conversation moving towards what will help us get through this tumultuous era of economic fragmentation and tensions between the US and China is to zoom out and look at the very big picture.

So let me start by acknowledging some things that I take as a fact. It is a fact that the US and China are in the process of a massive fragmentation. Now, there’s some subtlety and nuance here that’s important. So trade between the US and China, bilateral trade, has never been higher at this very moment. So it’s not a complete break. But the technological side is an indicator to my mind of where things are going.

If you had asked me five years ago, whether I thought it was possible that the leadership of the US government would say on the record, not privately, not in a little dinner with Chatham House Rules, but on the record that their goal was to limit China’s economic rise five or six years ago, I would have said, I doubt that level of candor or directness. And that is what’s being attempted now. Now, that’s not lost on China.

And one of the interesting intellectual and policy questions that your generation will have to deal with for the students is what the elasticity is of technological innovation to policy change that comes from knowing that a major geopolitical power is trying to stop you from developing technology. Like, how quickly do you develop your own TSMC, your own lithograph machines, your own AI algorithms like leapfrog all of that? Or conversely, is there something– I mean, do we have the courage of our convictions, something in the secret sauce of a California, a place of immigrants, a place of openness, that creates a different kind of technological innovation story? So that’s one thing I’ll just put out there.

Second, I think it’s worth recognizing that much of what is driving any policymaker at the highest levels in the US– probably in China to some extent, but I’m more familiar with the US– is a little overdetermined. So if any of you traded places with Jake Sullivan or Gina Raimondo, you might do things a little bit differently. But I doubt that you would have complete freedom to totally rewrite the story. That’s to say that even if you’ve buried the party, even if you’ve buried the personality, there’s some degree of geopolitical pressure, economic reality, domestic political reality that hems in these policymakers.

That’s the part of the news. But the other piece of context that I think is crucial here is to think about what moment we’re at in human history. Everything you see around you, including the ugly environment award-winning building over there, is created and made possible only because of the Industrial Revolution. And that has been the tiniest fraction of human history. So if I zoom out a bit, the world does look depressing, difficult, painful, certainly if you’re in Europe and think about Ukraine if you’re Ukrainian.

But let’s remember that in 1950, literacy was about 50%. Now, it’s about 90%. In 1950, life expectancy was about 46 years. Now, it’s about 76 years. That’s the trend we’re on. So my frame to you is if I zoom out a bit, to me, the questions of economic fragmentation, the war in Ukraine, the frostiness of US-China relations, the economic dislocation and fragility people feel are all about disruptions on a path that humanity can and should stay on ideally to enormous progress enormous possibility. The fragility of the planet, climate change, it’s all the question of, like, how do we back ourselves into this corner? How do we get back on this path of innovation prosperity that we can share with the world?

Now, to be clear, there are some real impediments. Let me just go into that for two minutes, and then I’ll tell you what I think might be helpful going forward. The brutal realities of the war in Ukraine are not just about the Ukrainian people, obviously, not even just about Europe. They’re about the fact that we wrote a check as a world in 1945, 1947 roughly, around the time the UN was created, negotiated right around across the bay, that there would be a system to stop. Aggressive war from happening. That was never perfectly achieved.

But the scandalous reality of having a UN Security Council member be the party engaged in aggressive war is a particularly poignant indication that we have not– we don’t have sufficient funds to catch that check to channel Martin Luther King. So that’s on all of us. And it does highlight that the problems here are not just about Ukraine, they’re really going to affect potentially billions of people. Like, what does the world do when aggressive war occurs?

That has to be counterbalanced with a really brutal political reality if your taxpayer in Western Europe or the US, which is you’re shelling out $5 to $6 billion a month collectively to keep the economy of Ukraine afloat. And that’s not even counting the amount of money for the missiles, for the drones, for the millions of rounds of ammunition. So there is a question about how long this war can continue. But I don’t think it would be wrong to conclude that on the other side of this discussion, sitting in the Kremlin, are people or is a person thinking that time is on his side. So how does that look when you’re trying to limit aggressive war?

Second, the frostiness of US-China relations are not just a problem with respect to potential decline in growth rates. They also are on the minds of people like me, because there’s just an aggregate increase in the risk of an off the equilibrium path, dramatic, staggering conflict. And even a pretty minor one between the US and China, it’s going to go way beyond what the predictions indicate about just sort of a moderate loss and growth.

And I think it’s just important for us to recognize that even though the US and China have serious and important differences, and as a former US policymaker, I look askance and with concern that a lot of things happening in China, as I’m sure China does with respect to US. I just note that question of what is the risk of that off the equilibrium path event, particularly around Taiwan, but not exclusively. That’s got to be on our minds.

Third, every institution that involves thoughtful people trying to make choices about budgets and about the use of legal authority is facing a loss of confidence around the public. So people lose some confidence in the University of California or the California Supreme Court or the IMF or all of the above. And to me, this generalizes by saying, to a first approximation, no country with a very large population knows how to govern in this era very, very effectively.

We’re all trying. We all have ideas. We all have some things that go better than others. But if we’re not talking about Denmark or Singapore, I think governing at scale is really, really difficult. And so in the US, that means we take our chances with democracy. We do our best. In places like China that have a more authoritarian tradition, that means leaning into that tradition to some extent. But I think on both sides, what you see is a real question about how with this level of technological change and social media and just disruption and loss of trust you govern.

So where do we go from here? I would say five things I’d put on the table for discussion, all of them worth plenty of back and forth. The first is I would say, the war in Ukraine, the frostiness of US-China relations and the underlying causes behind them are important. But I would not want the world to stop thinking about the big picture questions involving how to keep technological innovation going, how to keep the Global South and the people who are poorer and more economically insecure in the developed world from feeling like they just have no stake in the system, how to deal with climate, biodiversity, water, et cetera. That deserves a ton of attention of the agenda despite all the other things happening.

Second, I would advocate for somewhat greater experimentation in domestic economic policies in different countries. This is my pitch for saying that you can be a little bit more flexible with the rules of trade and not necessarily get just autarky everywhere. I’m not in favor of big tariffs, to be clear. I think that global trade has been a big boon for human progress.

But we are a lot in each other’s businesses now. And I felt that a lot as a domestic policy White House official. Back in the day, when working on public health, transnational crime, tobacco policy, food safety, civil and criminal justice, almost nothing that I did that didn’t have a meeting with USTR attached to it. And I thought that was really telling and interesting. And I just wonder if the system might be sort of made more viable if we ask a little bit less of it to some degree. And I can say more about what that means.

Three, I think the multilateral development banks should have about twice as much capital to spend on infrastructure change in the developing world for climate and energy reasons. Fourth, I think the stuff happening around the eye is really interesting and exciting but requires careful attention. And I’m not sure that any one actor has all the right incentives, certainly not the private sector that’s developing most of the technology, even though they are potentially in a position to do some good things with it. And I suspect, by the way, that getting the governance and regulatory framework right, there would be a potential boon for billions of people who can benefit from the technology to deal with medical, educational needs.

Last but not least, I think all the geopolitical problems we’re talking about should be leveraged in some way. So on the domestic US side, concerns about geopolitics or driving interest in domestic investments in technological innovation, maybe starting to percolate into discussions about how to rethink our immigration policy. I think maybe a US-China degree of competition might also develop greater interest in both countries about how to appeal to the developing world and help them through the energy transition. I’ll stop there. [APPLAUSE]

[JOHN ZYSMAN] Thank you for really actually providing real insight on some possible directions. Laura.

[LAURA TYSON] So I think I’ll just throw a few things out there. I have been working with John. We did do a paper for Omidyar thinking about looking forward, thinking about the big structural drivers and uncertainties of the global system. And I will play off of my comments with John there.

But let me just start with something that occurred to me as I was listening to my other panelists. And that is the past dependency of where we are with China today in the United States. I don’t think people recognize, but I clearly recognize it, because I was involved in this part of the transition to the Bush administration in 2000. If you had talked to Condoleezza Rice at that time, what she would have said is that the major foreign policy challenge for the United States was China, was China.

And because we weren’t yet thinking about what was going to happen in the Middle East and insurgency and how we were going to totally flip, and we were simply going to focus on that, there is a growing– and it does grow over time, it was there in 2000, and it’s bigger now– a growing group of maybe different interest groups that really would like to reduce as much as possible US-China interdependence or would like to put as much pressure as possible on China to be like us.

There are religious groups. There are human rights groups. There are ethnic groups. For a long time, the business community was in the United States the major, I would say, voice for the importance of growing economic interdependence with China. But think about that, the incorporation of the United States, which made billions of dollars by labor arbitrage in China, by essentially producing their products at very low cost in China, using low-cost labor, selling it around the world, collecting the surplus, and giving it to their shareholders, giving it to their owners, not giving it too much to their workers.

So from over the course of, say 2000 to ’22, today, much of middle America and certainly the medical American workforce have seen the growing interconnectedness with China as a negative. It has hurt their wages. It has hurt their jobs it has hurt their communities. It has taken products that could have been produced in the United States and move them abroad. Those removed by the way by the companies, by the companies, not by nation states. The US didn’t move this stuff. China made it attractive place to do things, and US companies went there.

US companies started to get less supportive of the regime with China somewhere around the mid-2000s, really– I would say, no, more like around 2015, 2016. It was like, OK, they’re stealing our intellectual property. We knew that. They were always stealing our intellectual property. We used to get a better deal we used to get higher returns from the trade-off for us, the company I’m speaking now is that will let them steal the intellectual property. But boy, do we make a ton of money through our interdependence with China. We love it.

They became less and less convinced that the balance of returns worked for them. So a major, perhaps the major voice for easing US-China tensions, the business community in the United States, that voice has been lowered. That voice is no longer dominant in those discussions. And indeed, some of the companies are actually now on the other side. The national security companies are certainly on the other side. There’s this saying, OK, yeah, we can’t really depend upon having so much of the supply chain of semiconductors in Asia.

We put it there, by the way. The companies put it there. The companies put it there and say, probably, not a good idea anymore. Let’s bring some back. And the US government says, here’s a whole bunch of subsidies. Here’s a whole bunch of tax credits. Here’s a whole bunch of things that will help you bring it back, will help you bring it back.

So I just wanted to start there, because I think the history of all this matters. And I also will say what has been mentioned here is that the increasing frictions between the US and China, you cannot underplay the sort of change in the policy environment that President Xi himself has introduced. There is a change on the Chinese side as well. And I think you cannot and whenever I hear about Hong Kong, I’m reminded of that a lot of people look at what happened in Hong Kong and say, see, China’s got to do this. It’s just a matter of when they’re going to do it and how they’re going to do it. They did it in Hong Kong, and we let them do it. We let them do it. I thought I wanted to start with that view.

Let me talk a little bit about a phrase I’d like to be defined by this panel. How do you measure technological decoupling? What does that even mean? If everybody is working on the same AI technologies, the same digital technologies, the same nuclear fusion technologies, how are we– are we just going to do the same thing, but we’re not going to talk to each other about it? I really want to know what technological decoupling means.

That brings me to climate, where there at least is a recognition throughout this entire period of time of deteriorating US-China relations. There has been a sense that one area where we can work with them, and we should work with them, is on climate, because it’s a shared interest, completely shared interest, because we have moved from the biggest emitter in the United States to China being the biggest emitter in the world. So basically, we have the same problem. If we’re worried about the world carbon situation, we the big emitters have to figure out what to do about it. So shared interest, shared challenge because of the size of the emissions.

China has been doing some really, really interesting domestic policy, including its own carbon trading market on carbon. But here’s an area where it would seem to me that technological cooperation to deal with a shared challenge would make the most sense. And at the meetings, the last COP meetings, there was– the former Secretary of State John Kerry is now the special envoy on basically global relations on climate change, trying to work with other countries on common strategies and common technologies.

And he was very pleased that in his meetings with his counterparts in China leading up to the COP meeting, the Chinese were willing to be there with him, were willing to talk with him about it, were willing to be a presence in that meeting. So I think that we might look to the possibility of climate collaboration.

The National Security Council document mentioned at the beginning, a climate change is one of the recognized by the NSA as one of the major national security risks in the United States. So it’s not as if this is separate from national security consideration. This is a national security consideration. So that seems to me is another reason why we might be able to bring together the agencies on some kind of collaboration with China on this issue.

However, and now I’m going to go to the competition part of climate and green and talk about technologies. So part of the US switch in policy to attract production back to the United States, and employment back to the United States, and investment back to the United States through subsidies and tax credits, a motivation for that is basically job creation in the United States. It’s production in the United States. It’s investment in the United States. It’s not climate change per se. It’s not relations with China and national security risks of trading with China. No. If we want to have more good jobs here. And you hear President Biden saying that all the time. That is the way he couches a lot of these policies.

Well, if you do that, if you do that, you set off some kind of, I would say, tit for tat. Let’s say the positive side would be a tit-for-tat subsidy raise. We throw it a bunch of subsidies, and we are, if you look at the IRA. The Europeans who are talking about this throughout the Davos meetings look at the size and go, oh, my god, we’ve got to do that, too. We’ve got to throw a whole bunch of subsidies, because we need the green technology produced here. We need the technological breakthroughs in green produced here. We need the production of the green technologies produced here. We need the employment of deploying the green technologies produced here.

And so the countries, I think, the perspectives of the US, of China certainly, of Europe in the area of cooperation on a shared challenge of climate change, that cooperation is going to be hinged by or not hindered by but interface with competitive concerns. We want the technology produced here. So the competitive nature of the Industrial policies that regions of the world are putting together in a good cause to promote the production and services that lead to addressing climate change, that’s a good, good cause.

But there can be conflict in this. There can be trade conflict. There can be foreign direct investment conflict. The IRA, that piece of legislation that we are so proud of here, is discriminatory. It is absolutely discriminatory. It says if you produce it here, come on, welcome. We won’t discriminate in terms of ownership of production if you’re a German farmer, who wants to do it or a Taiwanese farmer, who wants to do it, Korean farmer, anybody, except Chinese. We do say except Chinese right now because of the national security risk. But it is discriminatory in the sense of location. And some of the IRA is actually in violation of the current WTO rules.

So the question then becomes, do we need a new set of international rules on trade and on investment? Maybe the simplest way to do it is to think about trying to divide rules for a particular kind of trade and investment. So let’s say, green. So there was a sector– there is a sectoral trade agreement in IT. It goes back to I think 1996, 1997. About 87% of the World Trade in IT is covered by that agreement. Maybe we need a write an agreement, which is not a whole new WTO, but an agreement on in the green space. That might be a possibility.

Some other places where I think there’s a possibility of collaboration or of international rulemaking in the green space, one would be disclosure, disclosure of carbon emissions. So now, there is a new international standard setting body that has been set up by COP, set up by the UN. And at the end of the day, what this is supposed to do is to insist on standardized credible information about carbon emissions at every point in the planet, at every point in the planet. So that basically then an investor or a company, investor in a company, who says I’m on net-zero, can say, yeah, well, you’re not really on net-zero. You say you are, but your emissions are nowhere near it.

So an international agreement and standards possibility, I mean, the standard body does exist. And it is putting together these standards. Right now, it’s totally voluntary. So the question is, could that become regulatory at some point and a global agreement? Another area where one might have at least a global agreement possibility or at least among some countries would be out a carbon tariff, a carbon import price protection. That is a possibility. So I will stop there.

[JOHN ZYSMAN] You don’t have to stop abruptly, but–

[LAURA TYSON] No, no, no. But that’s good. I think that’s pretty much where I was going to stop anyway.

[JOHN ZYSMAN] Wonderful. [APPLAUSE] And Laura raises a very direct question, which is, if you will, that the coalitions and arrangements about technology in a technological autonomy and what we often call sovereignty in Europe, in fact, conflict with the kinds of coalitions that are needed to try and deal with the problems of climate.

And part of the question, are there ways around it? Obviously, you raised the issue of doubling the investment in multilateral investment institutions has one strand of that. So I’d love to get the reactions from the rest of you to some of the issues that are out on the table. Maybe we do a very quick go around, Pierre, James, Tino, and then try and open this up to conversation.

[PIERRE OLIVIER GOURINCHAS] Well, thank you. I thought this was absolutely enlightening and fascinating. Let me just offer a few reactions to some of the things the other panelists have mentioned. So James was asked– was making the point, which I fully agree with that if we were to get in a situation of military conflict between the US and China would be in a very different environment than the kind of economic decoupling of fragmentation scenarios that I showed you. And of course, this is absolutely true.

And while there might not be a concerted effort at economic decoupling, I think a number of the panelists have pointed out whether– Tino talks about of equilibrium, and Laura talks about path dependency. I mean, the danger here is what we at the Fund call runaway fragmentation that you do something because you have some narrow objective in mind, maybe it’s about targeting some advanced semiconductors and trying to curtail progress that one country is doing in that direction. And this is on the grounds of national security.

But the world doesn’t stop there. It’s very unlikely that other countries would just not respond at some point or another. And then you get into another round. And then shocks happen. And then things can take a turn for the worse. So I think this notion that we are in a more fragile world is important to keep in mind.

Related to that, the question I’d like to ask James is when we’re thinking about the China-US rivalry, I mean, I think we have to– I mean, Laura talks about dependency. But really, this is the emergence of this multipolar world. It’s the rise of a major power on the economic and global scene that we’re seeing. And it proceeds in fits and starts a little bit like plate tectonics, that nothing moves for a while and then you get one of the plates moving as we’ve been reminded in a horrific way recently with Turkey and Syria.

So I think this is the dynamics that we’re seeing here. And if we’re thinking about that emergence of this multipolar world, it’s a challenge. It’s a challenge, because, I mean, if I channel or if I think about my colleagues who are more international political economist than myself, does the world need a hegemon or not? That’s sort of the question that is in the background.

And you could make the world more stable by having blocs. You could have blocs within which there is a local hegemon. And that’s a stable world in a sense in some dimensions. Or you can try to have a more integrated world in which you don’t. And that means that the rules need to be defined, and so the engagement needs to be defined. And so that’s I guess the question is what kind of world do we want to build?

And here, at the Fund, we’re sort of facing this reality. We’re seeing that there is this push away from multilateral rules, whether we’re looking at the WTO and trade issues or whether we’re saying, the very fact that there is in a major war on the European continent right now. And we have to think about, how do we engage? How do we try to maintain and make progress on the multilateral agenda?

And our approach is to try to be very pragmatic. It’s try to realize that in the current environment where the wind is– we’re facing significant headwinds, we can’t really push on all these things at the same time. So we have to maybe be nimble and adjust. And I think that goes in the direction of what Laura was highlighting in terms of maybe sectoral agreements, where you try to push on something that is about green technology, or maybe try to have multilateral agreements on common goods where everyone agrees. And you might put climate in that bucket. You might put some other things.

On some other issues where some countries might agree but not everyone, you can go to your lateral way. You could try to have some agreement that are open and non-discriminatory where countries can join, and you try to build a coalition that way. And then the hardest part is on situations where you are head-to-head and countries don’t are really on very different paths and are not willing to make progress.

And here, of course, countries will motivate what they’re doing by national security and sovereignty. But I think we can still have a conversation about at least doing a spillover analysis, trying to think about what decisions individually might– how they might impact the rest of the world. What was quite striking I think in the context of the IRA is the extent to which these were a number of measures that were taken, in part, as Laura described, to try to satisfy some domestic objectives but without really necessarily taking into account the way it would impact some of the US allies, the European firms, et cetera, that came later.

And so doing this kind of analysis upfront, being cognizant about the spillovers is something that maybe can help put some guardrails. You might think that, for instance, for things like food exports or access to medicine, if you think about a pandemic, those are things where we want to have safety corridors. Even for national security reasons, maybe we wouldn’t want to put restrictions on this. Let me stop here.

[JOHN ZYSMAN] Thank you. Before we turn to James and to Tino, I want to remark that we are holding the conversation as Americans in California. If we were holding this conversation in Berlin or in Paris or in Copenhagen or in Finland, the concern about technological risk and technological domination would only partly be about China. It would be about American big tech companies. And part of the question would be, how do we in fact establish our own autonomy and sovereignty in the face of this? And how do we handle this conflict going on between the United States and China without getting squeezed in between?

Now, I don’t think today we’re going to be able to really engage with that issue, because we have a whole range of other topics on the floor. But I think it’s absolutely a critical one that in a different context, perhaps all of the four of us and others can, in fact, take up. I see one of my friends from Denmark nodding away at that very, very assertively. But I don’t want to distract you from what you might have wanted to say, James, but I did want to make that point on my behalf.

[JAMES FEARON] Thanks. Well, I’m interested by the idea, Pierre-Olivier, of this runaway fragmentation. And I’d be curious to hear and read more about that, not to dismiss it at all. I mean, I’m obviously in zero place to do that. I guess, I do wonder about it. I mean, what I know from the IR, IPE side is a lot of our thinking is really driven by kind of the Specter of the 1930s and the fear of a collapse, a real shutdown of trade.

And you guys are expert on this kind of thing. But I wonder the nature of– many things have changed from the 1930s in the trade sector and the depth and global value chains and the effects of these. I wonder– it’s kind of a question, have you thought through how would we see runaway fragmentation currently? Do you have evidence from the– I’m sure you guys have been studying the economic impacts of the war in Ukraine.

I mean, I think a big conflict in the Western Pacific would be an entirely different thing. But nonetheless, it would be– I’d be very interested to know, I mean, how– obviously, the word Ukraine has been– the costs are stunning at the level of human life, injury, refugees, dislocation in both Russia and Ukraine. But on the economic side of things, how big are the kind of hits to GDP that we’re looking at there? And how is it affecting trade patterns in terms of some of the issues, you’re talking about resilience and substitution?

The other thing I’d say is ignorant to speak to Laura’s– or what Laura particularly but others raised in terms of the climate issue, this is a real– you definitely see– I think if you look at their documents and how they’re talking, the Biden administration understands that this is a tough circle to square or square the circle. How does it go? I don’t know, but on the one hand, I want to say, this is not– climate is not something we can make progress on without high levels of international cooperation. And they say– which I think just is the right thing to do– we are ready and want to talk about cooperating, and the door is open.

But at the same time, they’re saying, we also– the phrases go like, the PRC is the only country with the means and intent to revise the global rules based order and want to mobilize and focus on competition. And a not uncommon response by Chinese diplomats is, you can’t do both. They want to say, OK, you want help on climate, and I don’t know. I’m not quoting here. But effectively, it would be adopt our position on Taiwan.

[JOHN ZYSMAN] So with that, I’m going to ask a question. Are we absolutely obliged to stop at 1:30? Or can we take 10 extra minutes? We can. We have– so–

Can’t we straight to the questions–

Yeah. I think–

Go ahead. Do you want to make–

No. Just go straight–

So let’s open this to question. You can go to the mic–

[LAURA TYSON] There’s a microphone on either side.

Hey, Henry. It’s Henry.

There’s a microphone on your side.

[JOHN ZYSMAN] Please also say who you are, where you’re from even if I already know.

Yes.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] I’m Henry Farrell. I’m at Johns Hopkins University. I’ve got a question for Jim, which picks up on something that Tino said. So Tino said that it was incredible to see the United States effectively announcing that it wanted to close China down or something. I understood what you were saying, it seemed actually a little bit different from that. You seem to be arguing that from the US perspective, this is not about trying to keep China down. But these are technologies with specific military applications, which the US is trying to sort of prevent China having similar access to.

But I guess the question I have is, to what extent is Tino’s comment controlling here. In other words, if you’re China, and you read Jake Sullivan’s speech back in September, where he more or less said that the US wants to keep China as far back on what he called foundational technologies as it could, China is going to read this obviously in very different ways.

And are there ways in which the United States, if what you’re saying is correct, can credibly communicate and can create some kind of a modus vivendi with China that China is prepared to accept? Or alternatively, do we face the kinds of dangers of spiraling that you talked about briefly in the presentation because of fears of a more general desire to just keep China from achieving what it wants and believes that it is entitled to achieve?

Now, as chair, I’m going to say we did not use a timekeeper. We didn’t cut people off, but I’m going to insist that we keep responses at this point short and direct, so that we can get as many questions in as possible.

[JAMES FEARON] Thanks, Henry. It’s a great set of questions. My impression– I think, Laura said something which resonated in either this or related context. It’s not like– I think if you could look into the views of high level Biden administration foreign policy officials, you’d get a spectrum. And I think that the Jake Sullivan thing you’re referring to and some of that language on technology, it’s not so much like– well, I’d like to think, and I think some people would say, it’s not about keeping China down.

It’s that we have come to the realization that this was a one way street. And that they were admitted to the WTO and then exploited the rules of the game and haven’t played by the rules. And so we’re looking for reciprocity, not maintaining hegemony. That might be a take there.

[JOHN ZYSMAN] Laura and I’ve held some conversations with some of these people. Do you want to comment on it at the–

[LAURA TYSON] There’s a spectrum of views and there’s a very, very serious split. I mean, it’s not just a spectrum of views. But I mean, if you talk to people from the National Security Council about the semiconductor policy, it is essentially war with China on semiconductors. Period. What Jake said exactly reflects that view.

If you talk to people in the Commerce Department, they’re talking about the need to build, rebuild the semiconductor fabrication capabilities in the United States, because we need to have a more competitive supply chain. And I think that’s a valid goal. So I think there’s just loggerheads right now in terms of the administration’s views on this. And I don’t think the National Security Council is weighing the economic consequences. That’s not their thing. OK. National Security is their thing. We’re not worried about the economic consequences.

Tino.

[MARIANO FLORENTINO CUÉLLAR] Just super briefly, I cut my teeth as an assistant professor working quite a bit on how the legal system struggled and generally did not do a really good job of ring fencing the concept of national security. And if that’s true in the legal system, its way true in technology. I think, we’re in a world where with advanced semiconductors and AI, at least, maybe even on the bio side, I think everything pretty much is dual use, and I think it’s the core of the problem you’re raising.

[LAURA TYSON] Yeah. Great.

[JOHN ZYSMAN] Do you want to add anything to that? Let’s turn to another question while we still have time for that. Sir, your name and where you’re from.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] Thank you very much. This has been a very tremendous panel. My name is Haikun. I’m currently a senior studying economics.

I just wanted to I guess question the rhetoric of the panel a little bit. I’m wondering why is there almost a sense of inherent antagonistic perspective when it comes to talking about the role of China. Like, why is it a perspective of competition rather than collaboration? And then also the same sense of antagonism when it comes to the private sector. Because isn’t the goal about global integration, like your talk yesterday?

[JOHN ZYSMAN] What I’m going to do is take all three of these questions very briefly so that we get one round of responses. We get an extra five minutes, but we still need to do it that way.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] Great. Thanks. My name is Ping. I’m a first year MBA student. My question might be a little long, so I wrote it down. So I thank these panelists. You guys mentioned the importance of technology, innovation, as well as like climate cooperation. But I’ve never seen a higher rate of progress other than the Cold War. So like a controlling environment of competition can be helpful in this situation.

But, as we can see, the war in Ukraine, there has been a tremendous amount of humanitarian crisis, environmental crisis, as well as economic disruption. So how does the both parties in this situation– China and the US– in a such volatile environment, both politically and socially, how do the policymakers keep the tension under the boiling point? And if there’s anything the policymakers can do to control the tension.

All right.

Thank you.

Sir.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] Hi. My name is Anchu Jin. I’m originally from India, but I’m an MBA student here at Berkeley Haas. And my question is sort of opposite of the previous question.

So I wanted to ask, basically, there’s this theory which was popularized by Professor Graham Allison of Harvard. It speaks of the Thucydides’s Trap, which is that there’s a dominant power, which is the US, and that there’s an emerging power, which is China. There’s always sort of a position of conflict between the two. And that conflict, there might be a flashpoint, which is maybe Taiwan or Hong Kong, but there is a natural tendency for conflict.

So how much do you ascribe to that view? And if you ascribe to that view, do you think that the US should take actions early and be more aggressive in combating China?

[JOHN ZYSMAN] If I understood– and there’s one last question behind you, so let’s take the question. But I was going to say, if I understood, you’re asking about basically Graham Allison’s view of the matter. And the answer is carefully. Carefully. I mean, that’s what the basic position he takes. Ma’am, to the microphone so we can hear you, please.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] Hi. My name is Charlotte. I study economics here. I’m wondering if the United States and China might– how we might be able to navigate the conflicting needs for collaboration over climate and tech decoupling at the same time in terms of developing fusion technology.

[JOHN ZYSMAN] I’m going to give a quick answer to a couple of these and then turn it– the fusion technology issue is really an open-ended one, where the question is it’s basic research– how do we structure collaborative basic research. And it’s quite a different problem from the semiconductor or other kinds of things. There may be some hope in that.

But a number of us, in fact, were involved in one way or another in the WTO– entry of China into the WTO. And I can assure you that the conversations held at the time and the outcomes were quite radically different, which is I think part of what has sparked some of the concerns. But with that, let’s– we have– we’re being granted a 5-minute access here.

[MARIANO-FLORENTINO CUÉLLAR] So I’ll jump in really quickly.

I can’t answer all of them. But just very briefly on the Thucydides’s Trap, I think Professor Allison has some neat ideas there. I would read Thucydides’s work actually a little differently and suggest that there are ways to avoid certainly the worst conflicts. But I think he’s right to note that this is a period of remarkable peril potentially and concern, which leads me to answering the first question.

And I would just note, look, the kind of world that I think we all want to live in is one where there’s plenty of room for the US to prosper, for China to prosper, while we recognize that they disagree about some basic things. My own view is that I try to take the world as it is, not as I’d like it to be. So if you look at that first meeting between Jake Sullivan, Antony Blinken, and their counterparts at the very beginning of the Biden administration, there’s no way to describe it other than it’s contentious.

[LAURA TYSON] Yes, contentious.

[MARIANO-FLORENTINO CUÉLLAR] And then briefly on the private sector, I think the private sector helps the world thrive, but I think there need to be some rules of the road. And what they should be and how to get them to the right place without squelching innovation is really the key question.

Well, I–

[PIERRE-OLIVIER GOURINCHAS] Very briefly.

Very, very briefly. I mean, I think obviously on the first question, I think a place like the fund is, of course, trying to foster engagement and multilateralism, and we’re trying to be a place where exchanges can take place. And that helps to address the second question as well, which is how to avoid getting to the boiling point. I think you keep working together. You try to engage and gauge where you can rebuild trust.

Since I have– I’m also going to use my 30 seconds to get back to James and Laura on two questions that we’re asking and were directed to me. So Laura was asking, well, technological decoupling, how should we think about this? Well, I think technological diffusion doesn’t happen in a vacuum. It requires institutions. It requires researchers, universities. It requires funding.

And if you start starving some of these things, making them harder, then you can see over time some of this decoupling happening. If you go back to the Cold War, there was very clearly technological decoupling between the Soviet Union and the West even if you had some technologies that could go through that membrane.

And James was asking, well, what kind of evidence for fragmentation do we have from the Russia-Ukraine War? I mean, there are multiple dimensions. But one I would point out is in the energy sector. If you look at the energy flows, they have been massively and more or less permanently rerouted by the war. And I think this is one area where you can very clearly see that things can happen– sometimes things can happen quickly.

[JOHN ZYSMAN] Tino, do you want to add anything else before I turn it to– Laura.

[LAURA TYSON] On the view that this panel focused or had an antagonistic tone, I just want to make it clear that actually I am very concerned about the antagonistic tone about the US in its relations with China. And I don’t think that we were describing something here. I don’t think we were taking a position. Actually, if you asked each of us, we probably take maybe different positions. But mine certainly would not be antagonistic. I questioned the United States on that.

On the issue of business, so one of the things we didn’t talk about here is the notion of all of the– globalization, deglobalization, technological decoupling, all this stuff, there are winners and there are losers. There are winners and losers.

And so part of what the movement against trade agreements in the United States and four more antagonistic relations with China was because the losers in the United States were able to have their voices heard. They were real losers. Communities were destroyed. Plants were destroyed. Jobs were lost. Companies made profits. This was something that worked for them.

So I just want to say that, in all of this, we have to think about winners and losers. And that brings me I guess to the last point of a little bit of optimism here. When Biden met with Xi, the meeting took much longer than anybody anticipated. There were a number of breaks. I think in the breaks there were sort of jockeying for the hard line versus the soft line.

And out of that meeting, there was a real sense that the Biden administration was going to try to strengthen areas of cooperation and collaboration. And then, unfortunately, the balloon. And what I don’t know– and this is just a question for all of you people who are foreign policy or defense policy experts– did the president of China know about that balloon? I don’t know. I don’t know.

There’s national security there. But, apparently, their balloons’ all over the place on all– everybody’s doing this. But the only point I want to raise there is there was a moment, and I think it will not go away. I think today– I think that we will see a Blinken visit to China. And I think that meeting between Xi and Biden was very important. Because Biden has worked with Xi for many years and he knows him personally. So that’s a point of optimism on US-Chine relations going forward.

[JOHN ZYSMAN] I would simply conclude this one more remark on the fusion question. We’ve established now that fusion is logically possible as a source of energy. We are God knows how far away from even being able to identify the pathway that would lead to a practical implementation, let alone a commercializable version of it. So, at this point, collaboration may be possible, whether that will then quickly break down once the possibility becomes– if it does become real is another question.

But I want to thank all of you. It’s been great, and thank you very much.

[LAURA TYSON] Thank you. Great moderating.

Yes. Thank you for moderating.

Matrix On Point

Matrix on Point: Myths and Misinformation

Part of the Matrix on Point event series

Misinformation and conspiracy theories have become a central feature of modern life, but they have a long history that have served to justify surveillance and prosecution of marginalized groups. In this Matrix on Point panel, recorded on March 15, 2023, a group of scholars who study these histories discussed how misinformation circulates, and the effects of such myths and stories on society.

The panel was co-sponsored by UC Berkeley’s Center for Race and Gender (CRG), the Berkeley Center for the Study of Religion, and the Othering and Belonging Institute.

The panel featured Timothy R. Tangherlini, Professor in the Scandinavian Department and Director of the Graduate Program in Folklore at UC Berkeley; Robert Braun, Assistant Professor of Sociology at UC Berkeley; and Poulomi Saha, Associate Professor of English at UC Berkeley and affiliated faculty in the Programs for Critical Theory and for Gender and Women’s Studies, the Center for Race and Gender, the Institute for South Asia Studies, the LGBTQ Citizenship Cluster, and the Department of Department of South and South East Asian Studies. The panel was moderated by Elena Conis, Professor in the UC Berkeley School of Journalism.

Listen to the presentation as a podcast below or on Google Podcasts or Apple Podcasts.

Transcript

Matrix on Point: Myths and Misinformation

[JULIA SIZEK] Hello, everyone. I’m Julia Sizek. I’m a postdoctoral scholar here at the Social Science Matrix. And I will be introducing our event today in lieu of Marion Fourcade who is our director who is unfortunately out of town, but I understand online watching all of us right now, which is perhaps fitting because today our topic is on– is myths and misinformation, which critically addresses contemporary challenges of myths and misinformation through a historical and humanistic lens and is ever more present in our online lives.

Today’s event is part of our matrix on point series, which addresses hot button issues in our world. this particular event, we’d also like to thank our co-sponsors, which are the Center for Race and Gender, the Othering and Belonging Institute, and the Berkeley Center for the Study of Religion. Before we get started for actual event, I just have a couple of brief announcements. So this includes our upcoming events at Matrix.

Next week, we will be having Phil Gorski presenting on his book, The Flag and the Cross: White Christian Nationalism and the Threat to American Democracy. On April 3rd, we will be having another Matrix on point panel on wealth and taxes about how the wealthy evade taxes and tax havens around the world. On April 20th, we will be having a Matrix on point panel featuring work from graduate students across the social sciences about borders and migration. And then finally on May 1st to wrap up our semester, we will be having Orlando Patterson giving a Matrix distinguished lecture on his work.

So we have a lot of exciting upcoming events happening. We hope to see you either in person or online at these upcoming events. And now onto the most boring part, which is how to join if you are online and having challenges. So if you want to ask questions online through the Q&A feature, put your questions in the Q&A box. Do not put them in the chat. The chat is for if you are having AB problems.

And then finally, if something sort of like goes wrong and either someone in the room urgently needs to leave or if you need to urgently leave the Zoom room, we are recording this event, and it will be posted online as well. So yeah, that’s all of our housekeeping. And then the run of show of our event today is after our brief introductions. Then each of our speakers will be presenting. After that, there will be an open Q&A for everyone.

So now as we get started, I’m going to introduce Elena Connis who is our moderator and a professor in the UC Berkeley School of Journalism. She is a writer historian of Medicine Public Health in the Environment, the author of How to sell a Poison: The Rise, Fall, and Toxic Return of DDT, Vaccine Nation: America’s Changing Relationship with Immunization, and with Aimee Medeiros and Sandra Eder, Pink and Blue: Gender, Culture, and the Health of Children.

Conis’s research focuses on scientific controversies, science denial in the public understanding of science and has been supported by the National Endowment for the Humanities, the National Institutes of Health, and the Science History institute. She is an affiliate of Berkeley’s history department in the Center for Science Technology, Medicine, and Society and the Department of Anthropology, History, and Social Medicine at the University of California, San Francisco. Previously, she was a professor of History and a Mellon fellow in Health and Humanities at Emory University and an award winning health columnist for The Los Angeles Times. So Thank you so much Elena for moderating.

[ELENA CONIS] Thank you, Julia, for that introduction. And I thank all of you for being here on what feels like the first sunny day in a century. So thank you again for being inside on this lunch hour. And thanks to all of those who are attending online. We’re looking forward to a rich conversation after the comments from our panelists among all of you, whether you’re here in person or watching virtually. It’s my real pleasure to be moderating today’s event on myths and misinformation.

Something that has become deeply woven into the fabric of our everyday existence in the 2020s that seems to be not just buzzwords anymore, although they certainly have become common buzzwords, but real political, deeply challenging problems that we confront across so many sectors. Today’s panelists represent views of these issues from the humanities. And humanists, in my view, don’t generally have as much opportunity as others to chime in on these particular challenges. So I’m delighted to be able to introduce our three panelists. And before I invite them, I’m going to tell you a little bit about who all of them are.

I’m going to start with Tim Tangherlini in the middle there, who is a folklorist and ethnographer, and professor in the Department of Scandinavian where he focuses on computational approaches to problems in the study of folklore, literature, and culture. He’s the author of Danish folktales, legends, and other stories talking trauma and interpreting legend. And his papers have been published in journals ranging from Western folklore and the Journal of American Folklore to PLOS One and Computer. He’s a Co-Pi on a project called ISEBEL, and I hope I’m pronouncing that one right, the intelligent search engine for belief legends.

And he has also been co-directing a three-year long program at the NSF’s Institute for Pure and Applied Mathematics to advance the field of cultural analytics. He has also led the NEH’s Institute for Advanced Topics in Digital Humanities on Network Analysis for the Humanities. And in collaboration with colleagues at UCLA and Stanford respectively, he is developing automated methods for detecting conspiracy theories on social media and a search engine for dance movement in k-pop using deep learning methods, and maybe we’ll have a chance to learn a little bit more about that.

Robert Braun to Tim’s right is assistant professor in the Department of Sociology. His research focuses on civil society and intergroup relationships in times of social upheaval. And he is the author of Protectors of Pluralism: Christian Protection of Jews in the Low Countries During the Holocaust, which is an examination of communities who stepped up to protect victims of mass persecution, while others refrained from doing so. It was published by Cambridge University Press in 2019, receive the Gregory Liebert best Book Award from the American Political Science Association and, I believe, a total of six different best book awards from the American Sociology Association, which might set some sort of record. I’m not sure if it’s for the association or for you.

His similarly well recognized articles have been published in the American Journal of Sociology, American Political Science Review Social Forces and the Journal of Conflict Resolution among others. And he came to Berkeley in 2018 after teaching in the Departments of Sociology and Political Science at Northwestern. Fascinatingly, his next book project, Boogeymen, will trace the evolution of fear in Central Europe throughout the 19th and 20th century by studying the spread of frightful figures in children’s stories.

And finally, Poulomi Saha at the end of our table here is associate professor in the Department of English and affiliated faculty in the program on critical theory and the Departments of Gender and Women’s Studies in South and Southeast Asian– Southeast studies. Their book An Empire of Touch: Women’s Political Labor and the Fabrication of East Bengal was published by Columbia University Press in 2019 and awarded the Harry Levin prize for outstanding first book by the American Comparative Literature Association in 2020, as well as the Helen Carter first book subvention prize.

They’re currently at work on two new projects, Fascination: America’s Hindu which considers the allure and scandal of so-called Hindu cults in America from the transcendentalists to the countercultural 1960s, and Bengal to Berkeley, which looks at conspiracy as a legal philosophical and political concept to understand the rise of surveillance of racial and sexual subjects in World War I America.

Saha teaches and writes at the intersections of psychoanalytic critique feminist and queer theory, postcolonial studies, and ethnic American literature, and is broadly interested in shared histories of racialization, governance, and regulation of gender, sexuality, and politics of resistance. So please join me in welcoming our panelists. And I’d like to invite Tim to come on up and join us here.

[TIM TANGHERLINI] Thank you so much for that introduction. So I work in folklore. I’m going to blast through these slides at an alarming rate because I have– what is it five minutes? Is that what we’re thinking? 10 minutes? 10 minutes, 10 to 15 minutes and something like 40 slides. So my students are used to this.

I work with rumor legend storytelling at internet scale. And I look at how these stories, and these partial stories are part of this negotiation of belief and how that feeds into the formation of a cultural ideology, which is the consists of norms, beliefs, and values, where we have some expectations of how we want people to behave and how we want the outcomes to align with our hopes.

So stories on social media are noisy. They’re partial, and they’re– which means they’re incomplete. And they’re based on knowledge of the ongoing conversation. So the implication there is that if you just sort jump into a conversation on social media, you might not actually know what’s going on.

And so one of our goals is to estimate the parameters driving any of these conversations on social media so that we can understand the boundaries of the discussion, so what can you say within this discussion area, the structure of the conversation and its elements, and then the role of narrative and storytelling in these conversations, so to what extent do people rely often on personal experience narrative as a way– as a kind of a rhetorical device to convince others to be aligned with their perspectives.

And this leads to the emergence of what we see as narrative communities in which there is an alignment of beliefs within the community based on the storytelling that circulates there. And then we’re very interested in the robustness or the resilience of these narrative frameworks, which we model as graphs.

So how do you do this? This is part of this whole project of computational folkloristics where folklore is seen as vernacular or informal culture circulating on and across social networks. So we’re interested in the social networks. We’re also interested in this vernacular expressive forms and how they’re negotiated dynamically in these networks.

And you can see, this becomes a perfect opportunity for this question of misinformation, because in times where you don’t have access to trustworthy information sources or where you don’t trust your information sources, we turn to each other. And this is part of that process of negotiating belief in the group. And so this becomes an opportunity for the rise of misinformation and/or disinformation as well.

So if we look at what we’re looking at and why we can build this theoretical framework, we have a tradition context. This is where people recognize that you can have these types of conversations. And the structure of a genre is embedded at that very low level. At the mesoscale, we have an information knowledge area in which the framework is anchored. So if we’re discussing, for example, vaccination, we’re in a vaccination domain. If we’re discussing politics, we might be in a politics, but we would be in a politics domain by definition. And if we’re talking about witchcraft and we’re Danish farmers from the 19th century, we’re in that witchcraft domain.

So this is the information knowledge area in which a framework is anchored, and the narrative framework is based on the underlying structure. We relax Algirdas Greimas’s ideas of acting to interact– well, act and then interaction model to allow us to find in this very noisy data that I mentioned before, the different accents and the relationships that they have to each other.

And of course, performance, which is what we’re very interested in folklore on social media really exists at those things that we can observe. So that’s the post-level. And so we can observe the posts. Everything else is part of this hidden latent model. So stories we see as instantiation of some underlying framework, which in whole or in part, and it includes evaluation.

I can’t believe he said that. It would be an evaluation of something. And it also includes some sort of framing. Let me tell you what happened to Robert the last time I saw him. And so that’s kind part of this whole framing project. We use NLP methods to extract these act interaction networks from the noisy social media. And then we turn it to different domains where we’re trying to understand what is structuring these conversations.

So our first interventions were with a conspiracy theory Pizzagate, which was circulating broadly on the internet. And we were very fortunate. Although the people of New Jersey were not fortunate that at the same time, there was an actual conspiracy where people had conspired to shut down the George Washington Bridge, which caused a week long traffic chaos.

So we have on the, one hand, data telling us about an actual conspiracy. And on the other hand, we have a conspiracy theory that’s circulating broadly on the internet. And so the question is, can we discern some fundamental differences in the narrative frameworks between a conspiracy theory, which has a wall of crazy? You’re all familiar with walls of crazy. We were all in the pandemic binge watching every single detective show and every single detective show out there as a wall of crazy.

And so this is what we were able to extract for Pizzagate. This is the wall of crazy for Pizzagate. And we thought, Oh my God, that’s a real mess. And then we did the same type of extraction for news sources reporting on the George Washington Bridge. And we got that as our wall of crazy. And so it made us wonder if real life is perhaps messier than fiction.

And so this drove some of our work where we were trying to understand the relationships in all of the discussions of Pizzagate that really was boosted by the release of Wikileaks. And we found that there were these different types of things that you could have discussions about. And with the release of Wikileaks, the interpretation of Wikileaks, people were able to find connections between things that we generally might be loosely connected, weakly connected, or perhaps not connected at all.

So we found that there was Democratic politics, which is weakly connected to the Podesta brothers who also enjoyed pizza and casual dining. So you get this sort of weak link to casual dining. And then you get this whole other area called satanism where you traffic in children in underground tunnels that we usually don’t associate with casual dining. But through Wikileaks, we can make that association. And you see in the aggregate when we project all of these connections, we get what’s called a single giant connected component.

When we take out Wikileaks, you can see here at the bottom all of those domains fall apart into of independent connected components. So one of the problems, of course, then we realize is that, well, the conspiracy theory really exists only a narrative where it’s very easy to bring these links back in. So this becomes a structural feature of the conspiracy theory. While it’s not robust to deletion, we can make it fall apart very easily. It’s also incredibly resilient.

So conspiracy theories seem to be fragile. They’re not robust, and there’s a small separating set that allows one to attack the conspiracies theories narrative framework graph. Unfortunately, it’s like Terminator 2. It’s very easy to make it fall apart. But then again, it’s very easy because it exists in narrative to put those deleted edges and nodes back into the narrative at the next retelling. And so that’s an interesting phenomena that we see borne out again and again in that narrative space of social media forms.

One of the interesting things we find in these narratives spaces is that it’s often a threat narrative that really relies heavily on the construction of an inside group you or us. And then there’s always some form of threat or disruption coming from the outside. And so it’s very interesting to be able to map which group considers itself as an us and what they see as threatening outsiders– disruptive outsider, and then also being able to understand what those threats and disruptions might be.

Because the next thing that you do in narrative is you come up with strategies. It’s Ghostbusters all over again. You come up with strategies for dealing with that threat. When ghosts appear in the neighborhood, who are you going to call? The answer to that question is ideological. And it tells us an awful lot about the insiders.

Of course, we had a lot of time on our hands during the pandemic. And so we started harvesting all of the discussions about the pandemic. Our earliest work had been on vaccine hesitation looking at mommy blogs. So we use some of the same methods to look at the Reddit’s. And we discovered early on there were many different narrative communities coming into play, and they created highly separated narrative communities. So we could estimate what the actions and relationships are in each of those discussions.

As the pandemic went on and QAnon became more and more of a factor, it started bringing these separated communities together. So by a year and a half into COVID, we had one giant connected component that was redolent of the Pizzagate conspiracy theory. It’s almost like Pizzagate was a dress rehearsal for QAnon, which is a very greedy conspiracy theory.

So then we also wanted to know how this works in something like where the insiders see themselves as the true Patriots, the outsiders would be then the Dems and the deep state. The threat is a stolen election. The strategy is take over the Capitol. Can we discover this in the noisy forums in places like Parler? And so that’s current research we’re doing right now.

We also have some other challenges that are highly contextualized. Who does the author of a social media post side with? Who do they oppose? That gives us the insider outsider and it’s highly contextually-based. So here’s something about vaccines. I think tech will kill me with vaccines. People like Bill Gates are developing this for the money. And you can see my friend Sarah, who’s a doctor, told me not to get the vaccine because, of course, weirdly in this case, it causes smallpox.

And so we’re trying to understand who’s the insider, here coded in blue, who are the outsiders. It can change very quickly, depending on some very small shifts in language. And so we’re able now to do this automatically understand the stance of a person in a post based on some linguistic, very small linguistic cues. And so the shifts– inside outsider can shift.

A lot of future projects and challenges. How is the debate shaped? Fake news, polarizing debates, feedback between news and social media. Do virtual communities influence real life decisions? Yes, they do. We were told early on in our vaccine work that no, they don’t. And that is not– clearly, it’s highly correlated at least.

And then our current work is actually integrating some of these decomposition of very noisy data with something like ChatGPT 3.5. So we find these highly ranked nodes in one part of the decomposition of these very complex networks. And we just give ChatGPT 3.5 machine ballot case fraud. That’s the prompt. And this is what it tells us, which is kind of alarming and goes to the heart of today’s matter misinformation. So thank you so much.

[ROBERT BRAUN] Thanks, Tim. So I am going to– since I’ve only have 10 minutes, I’m going to jump straight into the question. And the question is a question that I hope all of you are interested in. And that is, how do xenophobic myths spread throughout space? Now obviously, xenophobic myths are of interest to lots of people because they’ve led to the destruction of groups, they’ve led to the destruction of countries, and they have resulted in the mass murder of many people. They’ve been voting. They’re highly important.

So it’s not surprising that many people have tried to formulate an answer to this question. These questions generally come in two flavors. The first flavor focuses on political dynamics and suggests that xenophobic myths are often instigated by political elites who can somehow benefit from creating an ethnic outsider.

On the economic side of the spectrum, the second flavor, it’s often argued that xenophobic myths tend to spread to places that somehow suffer from socio-economic problems. Ethnic outsiders in that case are scapegoats for the problems that people face in their local communities. Specific subform of this type of explanation formulated a long time ago in this very building argues that xenophobic myths, particularly spreads to groups and places where people are losing social status.

Now, what these approaches often do is that they use space as little containers with variables and try to analyze the spreads throughout different spaces. I’m going to do that today as well, but I’m also going to do something else. I’m also going to argue that space in and of itself shapes the spread of xenophobic myths. In particular, I’m going to argue that’s– and I’m just going to show the central argument.

I’m going to argue that National Border crossings act a spatial focal points for xenophobic myths. And that this is particularly true when the nation state comes under pressure. And this is particularly true for communities that are losing social status. I’m going to make this argument, I’m going to develop this argument by looking at National Border crossings, the lower middle classes and anti-Semitism in the Weimar Republic.

There are two mechanisms that in my view link border crossings, xenophobia and anti-Semitism. The first is what I call a perception mechanism. Border crossings often make international influences visible. They provide a lens through which local vulnerable groups look at the social problems that they are face. And subsequently, these vulnerable groups then are more likely to link their social problems to international forces.

The second mechanism is what I call the attraction mechanism. Not only do border crossings shape the view of people who are there, they also shape who actually goes there. Border crossings often become symbols for international threats, and therefore attract mobilization by sometimes aggressive nationalist groups who want to defend the nation from outside influence. And these nationalists often frame outsiders as a problem that needs to be addressed. And it’s the conversion of these two mechanisms that produces xenophobia in border regions.

So first of all, there’s a group that’s losing social status. This group, because it’s closer to a border crossing, is more likely to link its problems to international influences. Subsequently, radical nationalists come in who frame ethnic outsiders as the problem. And this frame resonates because there’s already groups on the ground who link their problems to the internet issue. As I said, I’m going to do this by talking a little bit about Weimar Germany. Let me give you a very brief background of the historical case.

So with the end of World War I and the establishment of the Weimar Republic, one era gave way to another. Whereas the establishment of the Weimar Republic finally formalized the end of the empire and the establishment of the German nation state. The end of the war unleashed three destabilizing mechanisms and forces that would undermine the newly established nation state for decades to come. The Weimar Republic suffered in a geopolitical domain. It suffered in the economic domain. And it also faced a lot of internal turmoil.

Now the differences of these three domains, the economic, the geopolitical, and the internal domestic politics. The differences between these domains notwithstanding, Jews are blamed for all three. Because of their prominent role in international finance, the financial crisis were often associated with Jews. Because of the fact that some prominent leaders of the Communist movement were Jews, internal left wing radicalisation was also often associated with Jews. And these two misperceptions to a certain extent culminated in something that was called the stab in the back myth or Jews were blamed for losing the war.

Now I could give you an institutional history of how borders changed in Weimar Germany, but instead, I’m just going to show you three pictures. These are the pictures of the border crossing at the Dutch-German border called Bad Nieuweschans. This is what the border looked like before the outbreak of World War I, a common street. During World War I, heavily militarized, even though the Netherlands was not a war Germany. And then after World War I, the border crossing became a clear demarcated entry point, where you could see that you were passing from one nation state to the other.

Now it might be tempting to conclude that temporarily border crossings and anti-Semitism are somehow related, but it’s also important to analyze this at a subnational level. And in order to do this, you need good subnational data on anti-Semitic myths. Existing scholars often look at pogroms or votes to analyze this problem. And each of these has serious shortcomings because they both assume that mobilization and anti-Semitism are somehow inherently intertwined.

On top of that, often when you would look at pogroms, you would also assume that a Jew needs to be there in order for anti-Semitism to be there. And we know from research that is not always the case. So instead, I make use of a different source. Instead, I will call it boogeymen in children’s stories. And in particular, I will make use of a folkloristic tradition called Kinderschreck. What’s Kinderschreck? Allow me to briefly illustrate this based on an example from my own life.

When I was a little Robert, I used to run too far away from the house. And my parents wanted me back in time for dinner. And they didn’t want me to stray too far from the house. So they would tell me the story about the guy with the bow tie. If I would pass a certain street, the guy with the bow tie would pick me up and throw me in a well.

Now you should not underestimate the incredible impact that this story has had on my life. Not so much here. But sometimes I have to visit East Coast Universities or conferences at the American Political Science Association, especially the political scientists, and people there wear bow ties. And although I’ve at this point acquired the abstract reasoning skills to know that bow ties don’t make people bad, there’s always this little primitive response inside me that’s like, yikes, I need to watch out.

When I looked around in the audience, the first thing I did is I scanned for bow ties. And rest assured, we are safe today. For those of you who know this sociology department, they also know that I avoid the area around the restrooms because of the presence of a certain bow tie person. Now all joking aside, the guy with the bow tie in these stories isn’t always the guy with the bow tie. Sometimes it’s the dirty gypsy. Sometimes it’s the big Black men. And sometimes it’s the wandering Jew.

So what I’ve done for this project is I use the work of folklorists. The most famous folklorist is sitting over there. But apart from Tim, other famous folklorists would be the Grimm brothers. And they trained many students to collect data on both material and oral traditions in Germany. One of these gentlemen was Wilhelm Monfort. And he was the first person who would conduct expert surveys with local community leaders to figure out which boogeymen showed up in children’s stories.

This culminated in– this approach culminated in something that’s called the Atlas Der Deutschen Volkskunde, a gigantic project which tended to collect information on folkloristic traditions in tons of German localities. According to their own claims, they tried to cover every geographical area in Germany. And this project, this gigantic research project was interrupted because of the rise of the Nazis and World War II, at least the serious part of this project. However, they are housed still. The questionnaires are still available and analyzable hard copy in the archives of the University of Bonn.

So basically, I spend a couple of Summers collecting the data from these questionnaires, which lots of them have been left unanalyzed. And I looked up at the questions about Kinderschreck, boogeymen. And based on this, I was able to figure out where Jewish boogeymen showed up in children’s stories. And for the approximately 20,000 localities, I found that in 5% of them, they were located– they actually had bogeymen that were of Jewish nature, so the Wandering Jew.

The spread of these boogeyman looks as follows. So this is how it’s spread out over Germany, where each light gray dot denotes a village for which we have an answer. And it’s green dot denotes a Jewish boogeyman. As you can see, we see clustering near the border with Denmark, border with the Netherlands, Belgium, France, then here, Switzerland. Surprisingly, it skips all– not so surprisingly, it skips Austria, picks up again at the border with the Czech Republic– at Czechoslovakia, sorry, and Poland over there at least. So at first, there seems to be something going on there.

Now you might wonder this might just be the places where Jews were living. So that’s why there were Jewish boogeymen. It doesn’t really seem to be the case because lots of Jews in Germany were living inland. So in order to analyze this more systematically, I link this data with road networks in Germany to demarcate where border crossings are, and I correlate the proximity to border crossings to the presence of Jewish bogeymen while controlling for lots of factors and statistical signals.

And this is what the results look like. This is the relationship between proximity to the border crossing and the prevalence of Jewish bogeymen in children’s stories. So when you’re really close to the border, about 9% of the towns have a Jewish bogeyman. But this declines when you move further away from the border crossing, and this negative effect levels off around 60 kilometers. So I’m going to probably have to conclude right now. How much time do I have? Two more minutes.

So one more thing that I’m just– then I’m just going to conclude. I have some other data as well that I wanted to show you. But for the sake of time, I will skip that and we’ll just go to the conclusion. So existing approaches that look at the spread of xenophobic myths as I said, have looked at political threats, economic problems, elite instigation, social class. And my argument in essence is that whether these things activate the spread of anti-Semitism is conditional on the space within the nation. Thanks for your time.

[ELENA CONIS] Thank you, Robert.

[POULOMI SAHA] I was a little worried as I was thinking about what to present that I would be off topic, as I tend to be. But the lovely thing about Tim inaugurating us into a kind of conspiratorial thinking is in conspiracy, anything can be connected. So I’m going to try and make good on Tim’s theory. So at the core of the question of misinformation is, of course, the question of belief. That is not just what one believes, but what are the ways in which something comes to be believable? What are the social, psychic, , philosophical, and political forces that say– oh gosh, sorry. See, disaster.

What are the technological forces also that might shape and govern the terms of believability? And how does a set of narratives or an idea come to move between the designation of the believable and the unbelievable? How do we go from the fabulous to the factual, from the given to the gimmick? My current book project Fascination: America’s Indian Cults takes up the question of belief and faith through an examination of America’s captivation with communities and philosophies that claim Indian origins. Fascination is the condition of a kind of rapt unbelief.

Common narratives of the abiding interest in foreign spirituality often begin with things like the great guru boom coincidental to the wave of South Asian immigration posts the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1965, or from the 1893, World Parliament of Religions in which Monk Swami Vivekananda claimed to introduce Hinduism to America, or even from Henry David Thoreau who in 1844 swam at Walden Pond and quote, “bathed his intellect in the stupendous and cosmogonal philosophy of the Bhagvat Geeta.” But the seeds of contact actually go much further back still.

And one of the things that I want to argue is that the obsession with Indic concepts and ideas and forms of epic actually lie at the heart of the founding of the American Republic. This idea of a foreign spirituality in particularly Indian spirituality is a long experiment in American self-invention. The concept of Indian spirituality is the foil against which the dramas of a modern secular American self are continually played out and the proving ground of the problem of too much belief.

That is that the American idea of Indian spirituality is designed to test the limits of what an American can be if she seeks transcendence, a form of spiritual belief in which you wish to lose yourself as a singular contained individual. Losing yourself in this kind of enthronement as both anathema, to the idea of individualism and rationalism that claim to govern America, and at the same time, a tantalizing possibility. This is why so many communities and philosophies that cite Indian origins and espouse Vedic transcendentalism so often come to bear the ignominious designation of cult.

Cults as we know from pop culture, which are everywhere now, are groups that threaten to disappear the individual, to brainwash them, to kidnap them, to remove them from their families, to turn them into something else. Within a cult, people act and want what appears to be fundamentally incompatible with mainstream society. This is their draw. Maybe one of the most famous examples of the cult is the horror Christianist who in the 1970s and ’80s were infamous for their public singing and chanting on street corners, distributing pamphlets and flowers in airports.

Largely young, White, middle class and college educated, the people who joined the International Society for Krishna Consciousness expressed a particular American spiritual hunger, the desire to be fully immersed in the experience of ecstasy to lose oneself in devotion and in turn to be found as part of a limitless Union. So ISKCON actually develops techniques of collective enthronement, which in their public performance and in their cultural reception disrupt a social compact in which we are expected to perform containment.

This is what actually invites the claims of cultishness. And it’s true that the horror Christianist get tied up in all kinds of scandals, claims of kidnapping, brainwashing, sexual abuse, murder, financial impropriety. All of these would warrant the term cult. But I actually think that cult is a kind of sheath of meaning that we give to forms of public shared enchantment that only contingently relate to the abuses of power and violence that follow. Cult is the kind of useful connection. The danger and draw of this collective enchantment though, is originary to what makes America.

In 1814 before Henry David Thoreau and Ralph Waldo Emerson turned to Hindu scripture to write the poetry of transcendentalism, John Adams wrote to Thomas Jefferson that he had become fixated on oriental history and the Hindu religion. These letters, the first that broke their 12 year silence following the 1,800 election, range a various– a variety of topics, but have a special investment in philosophy and spirituality. Themselves deists and therefore unbound from more Orthodox Christian beliefs, Adams and Jefferson were voraciously curious about faith, about what people could believe in.

But because these men who’d never actually traveled to India had to rely on the text available to them, they were reading the works of American scholars of religion who themselves also never traveled to India and themselves could not read Sanskrit. So Adams and Jefferson are actually reading third-hand accounts in American translations of books that circulated through the British empire and through orientalist traditions.

It is the circulation across the British empire that I think partly produces this idea of kinship for Jefferson and Adams, that there’s a relationship fundamentally between the American colonies and Indian philosophy. It’s an interesting thing to have happen in this moment in which the American ideal of the individual is being established as the building block of the state. So the sovereign individual fully contained identifiable and self-governing.

This is what gives us that old familiar motto of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Happiness, which in the 18th century term means property, is inextricable from the person who can acquire that property, the White free male individual who vows the whims of no other being, who acts only through his own will. So at the same time that the American ideal of the individual is taking root as a part of political and social life, we also have some of the most prominent figures of political America entranced by a philosophical vision of a self that is completely opposite.

What is it that makes John Adams write to Thomas Jefferson that he had read the voyages and travels and everything he could collect? It’s not interest in India the place. It’s not even an interest in Hinduism, the religion. It’s actually a fascination with this concept that underpins Vedic philosophy. A truth that is one, it is the idea of a self that is pure consciousness, that is utterly one with the universal Brahman. It is a self that is uncontainable and infinite. In this philosophical vision, any conception of being an individual is an illusion. It’s a misapprehension of your true being. So the singular figure of American political life is impossible to actually reconcile with the goal of Vedic imagination.

So here’s the dilemma, the philosophical ideal is totally alluring and the material reality is totally destabilizing, especially to these men who helped to shape laws and institutions designed to individuate and segregate, free, sovereign, landowning White men on one side, slaves, free Blacks, women, native people on the other, private religion on one side, public secularism on the other. So then maybe it’s not surprising that when they discuss the place of religion in law or what we now call the separation of church and state, this is what they come to, a look eastward.

And this is what Adams writes to Jefferson, “I dare not look beyond my nose into futurity. Our money, our commerce, our religion, our national and state constitutions, even our arts and sciences, are so many seed plots of division, faction, sedition and rebellion. Everything is transmuted into an instrument of electioneering. Election is the grand Brahma, the immortal Lama, I had almost said, the juggernaut, for wives are almost ready to burn upon the pile and children to be thrown under the wheel.”

Two former presidents drafters of the Declaration of Independence. Now both old men fretting about the future of the country they helped to come see into being. And the terms of their fear, they articulate in the language of the rituals and rites of a Vedic imagination. Its promise of liberation supplies the terms of their vision of tyranny. These days, we can see how American elections continue to play out Adams’s prophecy of sowing division, faction, sedition, and rebellion. The sedition borne out of elections that Adams fears isn’t quite what we saw on January 6, but it’s actually not that far off.

So here we’ve arrived at the problem of too much belief for the American political subject. Elections, the living practice of democracy, are for Adams the all powerful like Brahma, and potentially catastrophic. The rolling juggernaut seen here is in fact, the anglicization of the word juggernaut, meaning the lord of the universe, the name given to Brahma. Colonial administrators were obsessed and horrified by the annual Ratha Yatra, which involves the pulling of a chariot of juggernaut through towns. That bodies might be crushed under those wheels while the masses that are pulling and watching are too lost in a kind of religious fervor, to loss an all encompassing moment was proof for the British of the savagery of Indian religion.

So when Adams describes a potential threat of electoral politics as a rolling juggernaut or the widow burning upon the pyre with her dead husband, he’s recognizing that there’s an enormous danger to a self that can be disappeared, whether in a group, another person, or that limitless Brahma. The same Vedic imagination that produces transcendence also appears to produce in India through the eyes of British colonialism the crushing uncontrollable force of mass psychosis.

This paradox of enthronement with a philosophical ideal and disavowal of a material expression becomes a repeating narrative for a long encounter between American society and its awesome fantasy of transcendental Vedic philosophy. The Indian ascension that America seeks is always a self-construction. American culture has produced from within itself a racialized foreign other on whom to hang a variety of desires, whether it be for transcendence or collectivization, a variety of terrors, and a variety of radical possibilities.

Of course, today, when we think about cultish belief or over belief in the realm of politics, we think about things like QAnon and MAGA. But the terms of the anxiety that they evoke that this idea of a collective hypnosis that will leave the purportedly private realm of spirituality and enter into the public space of governance is not new. I’m going to offer one other tangential link that I think actually might help us understand it, which is that the racialized other that Adams and Jefferson fear has also moved into the mainstream.

Practice by 40 million Americans, yoga and its industry of studios, clothing, and equipment is valued at over $110 billion this year. Central to its marketability as a health and lifestyle practice is that while its roots lie in Vedic philosophy, it can be practiced and consumed entirely desacralized. Yoga has been made a kind of mass market of a practice for the individual tailor made for an American public, but it has to do so by cauterizing the influence of it from the sphere of the public. Thanks.

[ELENA CONIS] Thank you, Poulomi. And I’ll invite Tim and Robert back up to the front. You’ve given us some really, widely varied and rich examples to start thinking about our topic for today myth and misinformation. Poulomi, I loved your introductory comment that in conspiracy, anything can be connected. And I think that your three presentations really have shown that. We’ve investigated the questions of how something becomes believable, how certain kinds of myths, especially xenophobic ones can spread across space, and how to pull many things from Tim’s presentation, we can identify the fragile points and conspiracy.

So I want to invite all of you to share any questions that you might have at this point. I know that we also have folks who are online as well. But I’ll turn to our in-person audience first. Any questions for our panelists or the panel as a whole? Yeah, let me first find out if there are questions online from our online viewers.

[JULIA SIZEK] We have two quick questions from online or one is very quick, which is someone was just curious about this ISEBEL project that Tim runs. So you can briefly answer that.

[TIM TANGHERLINI] To answer that you can just go to search ISEBEL.EU. And that gives you access to belief legends from Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, Iceland, and hopefully very soon Norway and Sweden.

[JULIA SIZEK] And then the other question that we have from online is, who judges conspiracy theories? And is there an assumption or bias that certain theories are fake and why? And how do we determine that something is a conspiracy theory or could be dismissed?

[ELENA CONIS] It’s a great question. How do we define conspiracy to begin with or maybe even more broadly myth to begin with?

[TIM TANGHERLINI] If you take a stab at conspiracy and conspiracy theory, both have that feature that there is some group of malign actors who are sort of outsiders working against your best interest. In conspiracy theory, we often find that your strategies for dealing with malign actor group one is blocked because the people that you hope to help or who you’re going to call turns out to actually also be linked to malign actor group one through group. And so everywhere you turn your potential strategies are blocked.

We weren’t so much saying this is a conspiracy theory, this is a conspiracy, but rather here are two groups of text. And do we see any kind of topological differences in the narrative frameworks? And so we found both topological differences and aspects of development. So with Pizzagate and other narratives like that, we found that there was a separating set, very small that if we delete it, all of these different domains of discourse are contained and coherent. And the linking was a narrative, an element of narrative.

When we looked at a conspiracy theory, not only did it not stabilize as quickly as conspiracy theory did. So conspiracy doesn’t stabilize. It takes many years, actually, for the actors and the actants and the interactions to come out. It comes out in drips and drabs. And it’s robust to deletion. In fact, we could delete all of the actants from Bridgegate and all of their relationships. And New Jersey politics seemed to just continue without a hiccup.

So in some ways, conspiracy tends to hide within the thicket of a single domain. Conspiracy theory tends to at least topologically jump between domains. And it relies on these links that the theorist is able to discover linking domains. Now there are certainly cases where the conspiracy turns out to– conspiracy theory actually turns out to have uncovered conspiracy. And that’s I think is a difficult area.

[ELENA CONIS] Yeah. Poulomi?

[POULOMI SAHA] I mean, the thing about conspiracy that is so interesting, the very basis of it, the word co-inspired is about its shared breath. It is about a gathering of people. One that is both intimate to share a breath, but also that it is necessarily somewhere hidden. It is the breath that you’re interested in, the thing that actually you cannot give form to. So on the one hand, you have this idea that you have to be looking for it everywhere. Hence, the inauguration of conspiratorial thinking.

A conspiracy theorist, I think, is a person who thinks in a particular kind of way. And they are able to think in that way because they have– there’s this, I think, a kind of sense of a cipher. Everything is out there. There are things that are connected. And in order to see the connections, you have to have some sort of cipher that unlocks a way of seeing the world. And the minute that happens, it’s like the diagram you had for us. Suddenly, what appears to be just scatter plots had these lines between them, but not everyone can see them.

There’s something about conspiracy theory for us to not invite everyone into it. If everyone believed it, it would lose some of its power it has to remain a kind of a gift or a thing that actually binds people together. And I think I’ve been thinking a lot about how it allows– it offers a kind of structure of compensation for paranoia. There’s that amazing moment of Nixon saying, just because you’re paranoid doesn’t mean they’re not out to get you. And I think about it.

Because a lot of conspiracy theory is like you may think that I am crazy, and I think that I see these connections, and I know the Illuminati. The reality is if that person’s life is impacted by material forces that they believe are related to the Illuminati, it doesn’t matter whether or not they’re crazy. There’s a kind of relation of psychic compensation where their way of seeing the world is made sense of, and the bad things that happen to them actually have a logic, rather than the general logic of life.

That’s what we’ve also been looking at is how conspiracy theory emerges in narrative. And it is about belief and not necessarily some external truth. And so it’s– I can partly create this community that you’re talking about. We have a community then of belief where this could be a community that feels threatened. And this is one of the ways that we can structure the worldview and negotiate this cultural ideology where these things make sense.

[ELENA CONIS] I see we have a question from the audience. And then I imagine, Robert, you may have some thoughts to add to that ongoing conversation. But let’s turn to the audience for a moment.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] I was very interested in all of your presentations, but the economic factor and conspiracy is very interesting. I wanted to ask you, why does Wikileaks join all these– the Pizzagate conspiracy to remove Wikileaks? What is Wikileaks? I don’t actually know.

[TIM TANGHERLINI] It was a dump– we just use that as shorthand. It was a dump of hacked emails and communications in the Democratic National Committee. So it actually had weird resonances with the Watergate burglary. And then this dump of emails was sort of put out there and people started to piece through them. And this is where you got the narrative material for those hidden connections where people then could share these hidden connections, which could then reinforce this idea of, aha, that’s what we thought was going on. And that brings you into the tunnels underneath Washington, DC, which are being used to traffic children for cannibalistic pedophilia in this model. And it spills over into real world action.

Edgar Wells jumps into his pickup truck one night in North Carolina, drives through the night to Washington D.C. and barges into Comet Ping Pong and asks to be led into the tunnels. And it’s built on concrete slab. There are no tunnels under Comet Ping Pong. But there are all sorts of things with that event that relate to this idea of these– they’re hidden, they’re hidden in tunnels. All of this idea of hidden connections couldn’t have been articulated more in a better way than the idea of hidden tunnels underneath casual dining establishments in Washington D.C. controlled by Democrats. Yeah, perfect.

[ELENA CONIS] I know we have another audience question. Go ahead, sir.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] Thanks. I cannot say that I’m here in this room, we’re used to having a lot of Pol SCI related talks. And I wanted to connect the atmosphere of this room to something you were saying about ciphers and versions of habits of mind. I’m saying that what given– we’d like to hear from– I’d like to hear from all of you about, what are the implications for a proactive or pedagogical ways in which we might counter issues of misinformation or the spread of myths given the nature of the conclusions that you’re coming to from your work?

Again, I’m over on the same side of campus. And we have a lot to talk about from data science. And we have a lot to talk about here from Pol Sci. But I wanted to hear if I have an opportunity to have these sort of sociology and humanities takes on what are good ways to counter the spread of misinformation, and what are bad ways to counter the spread of information given what you’ve been doing.

[ELENA CONIS] You’ve all been invited to answer. I wonder, Robert, would you like to start?

[ROBERT BRAUN] I like to start, but the thing is that my approach probably doesn’t differ in any shape, or form from those of political scientists. So if the idea is to forge a connection between the humanities and social sciences, I’m perhaps the least qualified to speak to this.

[POULOMI SAHA] I may have an unpopular opinion, which is I’m not that interested in training my students in how to be skeptical about misinformation. The reason I say this is because of narrative. So part of being in the humanities– I teach these very large classes. I’m teaching a class on cults this semester. And we have to start sort of by talking about empiricism and the way in which empiricist reason structured particular kinds of ways of understanding the world, religion, belief, communities. And the thing that over the course of the semester becomes very clear to them I think, is that there’s nothing more real than belief.

So somewhere, misinformation and when someone believes it so powerfully that it materially structures and sometimes all parts of their reality. Not the way that– actually, if we think about it, reason doesn’t structure all parts of our reality. But somebody who is fully say committed to a belief in the Illuminati, that’s like one of those strong conspiracy theories, it structures every single part of their life.

So the narrative that gets produced out of that, I want my students to be able to understand the logic of it, the effects of it, why it is so compelling, how it translates, how someone makes sense of it. But I guess, I leave the question of teaching them how to counter it to other people. Partly because I’m interested in how belief becomes reality making, which I don’t know that I’m the best person to help think through misinformation. I think all information is incredibly real and productive. And often, the things that are factually untrue are the ones that have the richest life.

[ELENA CONIS] Tim, did you want to chime in on this question?

[TIM TANGHERLINI] As a folklorist, I’m really interested in the storytelling and the negotiation of belief and also recognize. And our work has shown that, look, once a group starts holding beliefs, that’s very hard to– and there’s a great questions about whether or not ethically, this is something that you want to quote and intervene in. That said, there are some features of social media that are both based on amplification and speed or velocity. So I can target groups– if I’m a malign actor, I can target groups very easily, and I can amplify the signal. And then I’ve primed a group to a certain type of belief.

And Robert was kind of gesturing at that with this idea of extreme nationalists taking advantage of these border areas as a place where people are primed for certain types of belief. And so one can with the affordances of social media do this kind of amplification and targeting much better than we can do in low level, face-to-face interaction, which is what I study in the 19th century because there were weirdly no iPhones back then. And so there were social breaks.

So if I went to the pub and started talking about the Illuminati, my friends wouldn’t invite me to the pub anymore. But on social media, I have these opportunities to amplify and target. I don’t actually have a great deal of optimism. I mean, my darkest moments, I just think we’re all doomed. But are there interventions? I’m more interested right now in understanding the dynamics of these systems.

[ELENA CONIS] I think, Robert’s going to chime on this too. And then we’ll come to the next audience question.

[ROBERT BRAUN] Sorry about that. So I’m going to give you, I guess, the more boring social sciency answer that you’ve already heard from. But if I would look at my project and if I would have to formulate ways to counter the spread of these myths, I think there’s– this perhaps didn’t come out as much in this particular talk, but there’s two things I’ve done that might help us out. So the first thing that I’ve done is I didn’t only look at border crossings activating xenophobia, I also looked at which border crossings are more likely to activate xenophobia than others.

And if you compare among border crossings, you find that it’s border crossings that are symbolic threats. And it’s places where there is contentions or contention between the two groups, where the two groups meet. And what is where this doesn’t happen is actually where there are strong interconnections across the border and there’s cooperation across the border that actually lowers the emergence of these symbolic markers.

So the fact of– so one of the things I showed you is that the borders with Austria don’t seem to have these myths. And this is because– this is the case because there you have cross national, cultural, economic cooperation efforts that produce contacts across these borders that don’t activate this fault line and this tension, which in turn makes the likelihood that such a myth resonates with these people a much less likely.

Now there’s other thing– so that would suggest that we need to figure out what are the places where two opposite groups meet, and how at those places can we facilitate coordination and cooperation. That would be a way to deal with this. And this goes beyond space. The story I told here is purely about physical space, two nations meet at a border crossing and where they meet thinks there’s these symbols that emerge which makes xenophobic myths resonates. But I think it’s a little bit more than that.

So in other work, I’ve also looked at different types of myths, myths about giant killer animals that attack people, or myths about witches that basically don’t wish you well and do harm to the community. And here you see that these myths don’t tend to cluster near physical borders. They actually cluster near spaces where different types of communities meet. So the killer animals, that myth tends to emerge in places where the forest meets the urban, so the intersection of the forest and the urban.

With witches, witches tend to emerge in places where progressive communities with high female employment rates are adjacent to places where there are more– have more conservative values about the family. So here it’s not only a physical border, it’s also a social border. And social borders– the intersections of social borders, those are the places where, according to my research, you would see these damaging myths emerging, and those are the areas that you need to focus your attention on and you need to somehow create coordination that transcends those borders, which is a defense of pluralism message but another way, it’s defense.

[ELENA CONIS] Thank you for that. I know you’ve been waiting. Go ahead.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] First of all, thank you for coming here. I have a question for you, professor. You mentioned that some conspiracy theories do uncover conspiracies, real conspiracies. So I want to ask about how past incidences can exacerbate conspiracy theories or denial of real factual past conspiracies can inflame the conspiracy theorists. So I think there are two things mentioned, elections and vaccine hesitancy.

So we know that before groups, especially from Berkeley went to the South, my family’s from the South, in the ’60s, the Democratic State party has had one party state. The Blacks decided one day, hey, we’re going to go vote there, or riot, or the house would get burnt down, especially in places like Florida and [INAUDIBLE], the North, these cities. These political machines did have election irregularities to say the least.

And so now when– of course, that was some decades ago. But when people say, hey, there might be election fraud, of course, I don’t believe in most of those things personally. It’s the sham. But what I feel is that a lot of people downplay fear of election fraud. When this whole– for much of the history of the United States, there has been nothing but election fraud against Blacks, who are denied the constitutional right to vote for 100 years. And so I’m wondering if kind of denying that the possibility of election fraud can also inflame these fake conspiracy theories.

And the part about vaccine hesitancy. So I work for the Discovery– [INAUDIBLE] Discovery Grant 26 years ago. We got funding from biotech chip industry to fund this PIs. And we know what happened with opioids. The Sackler family pumping money into universities, top universities to Tel Aviv University even. Now it’s almost as if to say, hey, don’t do research on us, or don’t be the ally of the oppressed people. So anyways, they are cases. And so for people now– and then the FDA, they have been thoroughly infiltrated by this.

[ELENA CONIS] So yeah, it takes us back to our first question in some ways.

[TIM TANGHERLINI] Yeah. So I think one of the elements of the interrelationship between conspiracy, the way we’re using it, and conspiracy theory is one that’s a feedback loop. And so they’re interdependent. The fact that there have been conspiracies in the past gives you a good strong narrative basis to work on your conspiracy theory. The conspiracy theories that we’re mostly looking at are ones that cross domains and cross multiple domains.

It’s often that– the Ali genre of legend is really the type of story where you’ve got some outside threat, and then your insight group, the us, comes up with a strategy to deal with that outside threat, whether it’s a witch in Denmark, it was either you would turn to the minister, you would turn to the folk healer, and particularly in cases where we had a great deal of debate over the direction of the Danish Lutheran Church, in those areas would get a lot of these stories because it was an ideological decision.

With conspiracy theory, we often find that they’re sort of monolithic in their worldview. And so you start to add in more groups and you do these sort of narrative kind of network paths. So you get this maximal spanning tree of this remarkably broad network. And that helps you understand the world as it is. The threat of election fraud is absolutely real. And you can have different types of stories about that.

What we’ve discovered in our research is that in the case of conspiracies, they come out in drips and drabs because they’re deliberately hidden and they tend to remain within a single domain. So election fraud is within the domain of politics. Conspiracy theory might link that also to big pharmaceutical, which might be involved in some other kind of conspiracy and also link it to international banking. And with international banking were immediately in the realm of the Illuminati. And it’s only one step to Satan. And so that’s how this narrative of world develops.

And I’m fascinated by that because it reflects belief in ideology and that negotiation. I’m also really interested in actual conspiracies that usually come out through historical work, investigative journalism, and a lot of digging into the relationships within a single domain. So that whole idea of do your research, well, yes, but are you able to actually do research? So I mean, as an investigative journalist, you might really have a focus on politics, and you can actually do that type of research. But the type of do your research that’s being referenced, for example, in the chem trails, no, contrails conspiracy theory is not really what we would recognize, I think, as actual research.

[ELENA CONIS] Thank you for that. We have literally 30 seconds left. And I’m wondering Poulomi or Robert if you had one final thought you wanted to share.

Yeah, I’m– go ahead.

OK, we will take one more question from the audience. Thank you.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] Thank you. Just very quick, but to import two important question. I would like to have Timothy. Do you have any suggestion for responding to the problems of misinformation based on your research? I know it’s a very large question, but just few ideas. I don’t know. Are you also working about the question of the solution or just–

[TIM TANGHERLINI] I think we have to understand stories and context, understand the groups and understand their worldviews. And at that point, we can start to build ideas about how we can address the circulation of misinformation, how that impacts people’s worldviews.

[ELENA CONIS] Thank you for that. Any final comments or thoughts?

[POULOMI SAHA] I was just going to say that I think that we would be wrong to think of conspiracy theory and misinformation as a site of pure falsehood. It is never a pure falsehood. That’s what makes it so compelling and so rich. There’s always something that is true there. If there wasn’t, we would be talking about mass delusion. That’s not really what we’re talking about.

We’re talking about enough truth that leads to confirmation bias that allows further the kinds of grand narratives that you’re tracking. And I think that we have a kind of desire to always look at what seems outlandish or extreme and think of it as just like pure falsehood. And I think that’s part of what creates these impossibilities of understanding what’s actually driving and causing these narratives to flourish.

[ELENA CONIS] Yeah. Final thought, Robert? No pressure. If not, that’s OK. We can leave on that thought of the element of truth in all myths and misinformation. So thank you to the panelists for their comments today. Thank you all for being here and for your questions. And to those of you who are online, thank you for participating as well. Have a good afternoon.

Authors Meet Critics

To Defend This Sunrise: Black Women’s Activism and the Authoritarian Turn in Nicaragua

Presented as part of the Authors Meet Critics event series

Recorded on March 7, 2023, this Authors Meet Critics panel focused on To Defend This Sunrise: Black Women’s Activism and the Authoritarian Turn in Nicaragua, by Courtney Desiree Morris, Assistant Professor and Vice Chair of Research in Gender and Women’s Studies at UC Berkeley. Morris was joined in conversation by Tianna Paschel, Associate Professor in the UC Berkeley Department of African American Studies. The panel was moderated by Lok Siu, Chair of the Asian American Research Center and Professor of Ethnic Studies and Asian American/Asian Diaspora Studies at UC Berkeley.

The panel was co-sponsored by the UC Berkeley Department of African American StudiesCenter for Latin American Studies, and Department of Gender & Women’s Studies.

Listen to this panel as a podcast below or on on Google Podcasts or Apple Podcasts.

About the Book

To Defend this Sunrise examines how Black women on the Caribbean coast of Nicaragua engage in regional, national, and transnational modes of activism to remap the nation’s racial order under conditions of increasing economic precarity and autocracy. The book considers how, since the 19th century, Black women activists have resisted historical and contemporary patterns of racialized state violence, economic exclusion, territorial dispossession, and political repression. Specifically, it explores how the new Sandinista state under Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo has utilized multicultural rhetoric as a mode of political, economic, and territorial dispossession. In the face of the Sandinista state’s co-optation of multicultural discourse and growing authoritarianism, Black communities have had to recalibrate their activist strategies and modes of critique to resist these new forms of “multicultural dispossession.” This concept describes the ways that state actors and institutions drain multiculturalism of its radical, transformative potential by espousing the rhetoric of democratic recognition while simultaneously supporting illiberal practices and policies that undermine Black political demands and weaken the legal frameworks that provide the basis for the claims of these activists against the state.

About the Panelists

Courtney MorrisCourtney Desiree Morris is a visual/conceptual artist and an assistant professor of Gender and Women’s Studies at UC Berkeley. She teaches courses on critical race theory, feminist theory, black social movements in the Americas, women’s social movements in Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as race and environmental politics in the African Diaspora. She is a social anthropologist and is currently developing a new project on the racial politics of energy production and dispossession in the US Gulf South and South Africa. Her work has been published in American Anthropologist, the Bulletin of Latin American Research, the Journal of Women, Gender, and Families of Colormake/shift: feminisms in motion, and Asterix. To see her art work, visit www.courtneydesireemorris.com.

Tianna PaschelTianna Paschel is an Associate Professor in the Department of African American Studies at UC Berkeley. She is interested in the intersection of racial ideology, politics, and globalization in Latin America. Her work can be found in the American Journal of Sociology, the Du Bois ReviewSOULS: A Critical Journal of Black Politics, Culture and Society, and Ethnic and Racial Studies and various edited volumes. She is also the author of Becoming Black Political Subjects, which draws on ethnographic and archival methods to explore the shift in the 1990s from ideas of unmarked universal citizenship to multicultural citizenship regimes and the recognition of specific rights for black populations by Latin American states. It is the winner of numerous awards including the Herbert Jacob Book Award of the Law and Society Association and the Barrington Moore Book Award of the American Sociological Association (ASA). Professor Paschel is also the co-editor – along with Petra Rivera-Rideau and Jennifer Jones – of Afro-Latin@s in Movement, an interdisciplinary volume that explores transnationalism and blackness in the Americas. Professor Paschel is a Ford Fellow, member of the American Political Science Association Task Force on Race and Class Inequality, the Council of the Law Section of ASA, and the Steering Committee of the Network of Anti-Racist Action and Research (RAIAR).

Lok SiuLok Siu (moderator) is Chair of the Asian American Research Center and Professor of Ethnic Studies and Asian American/Asian Diaspora Studies at UC Berkeley. She is also an affiliated faculty in Anthropology, the Center for Race and Gender, the Center for Chinese Studies, the Center for Latin American Studies, and the Berkeley Food Institute. Her books include Memories of a Future Home: Diasporic Citizenship of Chinese in Panama (2005) and co-edited volumes Asian Diasporas: New Formations, New Conceptions (2007), Gendered Citizenships: Transnational Perspectives on knowledge Production, Political Activism, and Culture (2009), and Chinese Diaspora: Its Development in Global Perspective (2021).  Her latest manuscript, Worlding Chino Latino: Cultural Intimacies in Food, Art, and Politics, is forthcoming with Duke University Press.

 

Transcript

To Defend This Sunrise: Black Women’s Activism and the Authoritarian Turn in Nicaragua

[MARION FOURCADE] Hello, everybody. My name is Marion Fourcade. I am the director of Social Science Matrix. And it’s a great pleasure to welcome you today in our space for this wonderful event about Courtney Morris’s new book To Defend This Sunrise.

This is a book that was published by Rutgers University Press. And it’s a book that considers how Black women activists in Nicaragua have resisted historical and contemporary racialized state violence, economic exclusion, territorial dispossession, and political repression.

In the book, Morris also examines how multiculturalism rhetoric under the Sandinista state has been used to continue practices of dispossession. And of course, also how Black communities have pushed against these critics.

Now, today’s event is part of matrix’s Author Meet Critics series, which features critically engaged discussions about recent books by faculty and alumni at UC Berkeley’s Social Science Division. And the event is also co-sponsored by the Department of African-American Studies, the Center for Latin American Studies, and the Department of Gender and Women’s Studies.

Without further ado, I will now introduce our moderator, Lok Siu. Lok Siu is the chair of the Asian-American Research Center and professor of Ethnic Studies and Asian-American/Asian Diaspora Studies at UC Berkeley. She’s also an affiliated faculty in anthropology, the Center for Race and Gender, the Center for Chinese Studies, the Center for Latin American Studies, and the Berkeley Food Institute. That’s a lot of affiliation. And I commend you for them.

Her books include Memories of a Future Home– Diasporic Citizenship of Chinese in Panama and three co-edited volumes on the topics of Asian diasporas, Chinese diaspora, and gender and citizenship.

Her latest manuscript Worlding Chino Latino– Cultural Intimacies in Food, Art, and Politics is forthcoming with Duke University Press. So now, I leave it up to Lok to introduce the rest of the panel. Thank you.

It doesn’t matter. I’ll just turn up the mic.

[LOK SIU] Just want to make sure. OK. There you go. Well, welcome everyone. It’s a pleasure for me to moderate this panel and to hear Courtney speak a little bit about her book and also Tianna’s comments. I’m going to go ahead and introduce each of the presenters. And then we will go ahead and begin the discussion with Courtney introducing her book.

Courtney Desiree Morris is a visual and conceptual artist and assistant professor of Gender and Women’s Studies here at Berkeley. She’s also the vice chair of research in the Department of Women and Gender Studies as well. She teaches courses on critical race study, feminist theory, Black social movements in the Americas, women’s social movements in Latin America and Caribbean, as well as race and environmental politics in the African diaspora.

She is a social anthropologist and the author of the book we’ll be discussing today In Defense Of This Sunrise– Black women’s activism and the geography of race in Nicaragua, which examines how Black women activists have resisted historical and contemporary patterns of racialized state violence, economic exclusion, historical dispossession, and political repression from the 19th century to the present.

And I’ll just say that I had the immense honor to have sat on the dissertation when Courtney was at UT Austin. And I will say that her book is just as stunning as her dissertation then. But it is incredibly– I mean, the update of what she brought in is just incredible. And I so appreciate this work.

I think this is one of the few books, if not the only book, on looking at the intersections of race and gender and focusing on Black women feminist struggles in Nicaragua. So thank you for this important work. And we’ll look forward to hearing more in just a bit.

I’m just going to turn around– turn ahead, turn to Tianna Paschel and introduce her as well. She is the commentator for this panel. And she is the associate professor in the Department of African-American Studies at the University of Berkeley here. She is interested in the intersection of racial ideology, politics, and globalization in Latin America.

She’s also the author of Becoming Black Political Subjects, which draws on ethnographic and archival methods to explore the shift in the 1990s from the ideas of unmarked universal citizenship to multicultural citizenship regimes and the recognition of specific rights for Black populations by Latin American states.

It is the winner of numerous awards, including the Herbert Jacob Book Award, excuse me, of the Law and Society Association and the Barrington Moore Book Award of the American Sociological Association.

Professor Pachel is also the co-editor along with Petra Rivera-Rideau and Jennifer Jones of Afro-Latin@s– I’m not quite how to pronounce that. But it’s written the at sign– in Movement, an interdisciplinary volume that explores transnationalism and blackness in the Americas. It is so rare to have a panel of specialists on Latin America and Caribbean looking at race. So this is such an incredible opportunity for us to turn our attention to this.

So with no further ado, let me go ahead and have Courtney discuss her book.

[COURTNEY DESIREE MORRIS] Wow! Thank you all for being here. It feels very surreal that the book is done. It’s taken up the better part of my adult life, 20 years working on it. I think I went to Nicaragua for the first time when I was 20. And I’ll be 40 in June. So it’s been a very long relationship with this field site and with this particular political struggle.

And it feels really great to be able to share the work with you, to share with the people that I worked with in Bluefields, many of whom are no longer living there. Because as political conditions in Nicaragua continue to deteriorate, many of the folks that really taught me everything that I know about Nicaraguan politics have had to flee the country because conditions there are untenable.

So this book, there are a lot of people that I would like to thank. And if you’ve had a chance to look at the book or when you look at it later, you’ll notice in the acknowledgments that I’m not really able to name people by name who have been my greatest teachers, which was really heartbreaking. But that was a choice that I had to make to protect them.

And so I’ve tried really with this book to offer something that would be analytically useful for those of us who are interested in thinking about the complexities of anti-Black racism and Latin American statecraft. But that would also be politically useful for people who are trying to make sense of what’s happening there now.

And that maybe this can be something that can offer blueprints for people for trying to think about the nature of struggle as people continue to try to figure out how to survive under this authoritarian turn in Nicaragua.

So before I get started, I just want to thank all the folks in the Social Sciences Matrix for hosting this gathering. It’s been a really long journey to get here. I’m really glad to be able to share it with my community here at Cal who were the last folks to help like midwife this book into the world. So thank you.

I especially want to thank Julia for your work organizing this event. And give extra special thanks to my whole department, Gender and Women’s Studies. And to Af-Am which is very quickly I’ll write out there. And give thanks to Af-Am who co-sponsored the event and has also become a home away from home on the sixth floor.

So honored to have Lok moderating today. It just feels so right that you were here at the beginning of the journey. And now, you’re here at the end. So thank you so much for being here.

And extra special shouts to Tianna for being here. I think you only graduated maybe like a year or two ahead of me. But I always felt like when I was in grad school, you were already like a star. And we all really like Tianna is amazing! And this was like together.

Yeah. But you were already such a formidable scholar of Afro-Latin American politics. And so I’m just really delighted to have you serve as the discussant today. So thank you for being here.

And unfortunately, our colleague, Jovan Scott Lewis, could not be here because he’s in Sacramento trying to get reparations for Black people. So I think it’s totally allowed. He’s fighting the good fight and doing the work. So he is greatly missed, but very apologetic that he could not be here.

And then I also wanted to, before I start this talk, I want to thank my partner who’s here in the room. And I’d like to acknowledge him. You can clap for him. It’s very rad. You can clap for him.

But I just want to thank you for supporting me through this process. You met me right at the beginning of it. And it really never would have been– I don’t think this book would be in the world without you supporting me through this. So thank you so much for being here. I love you.

So with that, I’ll go ahead and get started. And this is the cover of the book. The artwork is by an Afro-Nicaraguan painter named Karen Spencer who when I saw this painting, I knew immediately that I wanted it to be the cover of the book. But I was really afraid to ask her to let me do it because I was afraid of political retaliation.

And she was insistent that this had to be the cover of the book. And that was going to be her small contribution to resisting state violence aesthetically. And so I’m very grateful to her for allowing me to use this image.

And so, what I wanted to do today is instead of just reading directly from the book, I’ve pieced together sections of the book to provide a general overview of what the work is doing and the conceptual offerings that I’m making with the work. And trying to think a little bit more about the work that I see Black women activists doing in response to these conditions of deepening political repression in Nicaragua.

And so, To Defend this Sunrise is really at its core, a historically grounded ethnography of Black women’s political activism against the authoritarian turn under the administration of Daniel Ortega. In this work, I map a genealogy of Black women’s struggles against the Nicaraguan state from the 19th century to the present.

And examining this genealogy reveals the forms of authoritarian violence that are currently operating in Nicaraguan politics that they’re not an aberration from model of liberal democracy. But rather, they are and have historically been a keystone of mestizo nationalisms in all of its ideological iterations that both requires and reproduces Black and Indigenous exclusion.

And so, these forms of violence have underwritten the project of mestizo nationalism in foundational ways that are reflected across the political spectrum from the right to what I term in the book the nominal left. And if you want to ask me about that in the Q&A what I mean by that, I’m happy to talk about it

In a deeper sense, I’ve come to think of the work as an indictment on the broader logics of liberalism in both its conservative and revolutionary iterations and the ways that particular modes of insurgent Black politics expose the racist underpinnings of these fraternal ideologies. And of course, I came to this realization like after I finished writing the book.

But I think it’s true. And so based on my time working in Nicaragua over the past two decades, I’ve come to argue that Black women activists have historically been at the forefront of these insurgent social movements against the state that reject the empty promises of liberal inclusion and instead identify it as a project of political containment executed under the guise of multicultural recognition.

Now, this was really not the book that I set out to write as Lok will tell you because she was there. My dissertation was a sprawling 300-page meditation on Creole women’s cultural politics with a vague but largely unstructured spatial analysis of Black women’s practices of placemaking and communal land activism.

But I realized very quickly, when I got my first postdoc and when I sat down to begin revising the dissertation into the book manuscript, that a radical shift was unfolding in Nicaraguan politics that I needed to pay close attention to.

In 2017, after years of struggling with how to narrate the authoritarian turn and its impact on Black and Indigenous communities, I returned to Bluefields to understand how regional activists were responding to these developments. What I learned led me to rethink my entire project.

Residents shared their anxieties about the administration’s anti-democratic tendencies and their fears about the erosion of communal property rights as Daniel Ortega and his party, the Sandinista National Liberation Front or the FSLN in Spanish, have intervened in regional and communal governments to advance its own centralized development agenda.

They pointed with alarm to the wave of mestizo settler colonial violence against Indigenous Miskito communities in the neighboring North Coast Autonomous Region. The place where I worked was the South Coast Autonomous Region, which are two separate political entities. And I’ll describe that, I’ll explain that more further along.

People also shared their concerns about this placement after the administration approved the use of eminent domain under the auspices of an interoceanic canal mega development project. And as I listened to them, I knew that I needed to write a different book. One that would help people both inside and outside of Nicaragua to understand the slow process of authoritarian drift that has led to the current political crisis.

And so let’s talk a little bit about that crisis now. In April 2018, Nicaragua was shaken by a wave of popular protest against the administration of President Daniel Ortega and his wife and Vice President, Rosario Murillo. Yes, you heard that right.

In the weeks and months that followed, hundreds of thousands of Nicaraguans from university students, retirees, environmentalists, feminists, religious leaders, Black and Indigenous communities, journalists, and left wing and right wing opposition groups flooded the nation’s streets calling for Ortega’s resignation and early elections.

The unfolding crisis took many, including the government by surprise. Yet the conditions for the uprising had been in the making for more than a decade and revealed a deepening crisis of legitimacy for the Ortega administration.

In April– and the crisis was precipitated when Ortega issued an executive order instituting a series of reforms to the Nicaraguan Social Security Institute. The reforms would increase the amount that employees and employers would have to pay into the system while cutting benefits to elderly retirees by 5%. And it’s worth noting that this was actually an austerity measure that was recommended by the IMF in the negotiations with Nicaragua to provide aid to the country in the form of loans aid.

The public outcry to this shift was swift and furious. Retirees began protesting outside the offices of the INSS. They were quickly joined by university students from the Central American University or the UCA and the Polytechnic University of Nicaragua, UPOLI.

The government’s reaction rapidly escalated into violent repression. It shut down television stations broadcasting live coverage of the protests, ordered anti-riot police forces to disperse the demonstrations by firing live rounds into crowds of protesters, engineered the mass arrests of student activists, and attacked universities where students were mobilized.

Pro-Sandinista gangs known in Nicaragua as turbas and members of the Sandinista youth organization also attacked demonstrators with mortars and other arms as the national police stood by and refused to intervene.

By the end of the first week of protest, the Nicaraguan Center for Human Rights, CENIDH, confirmed 43 deaths. Among the dead– I’m sorry. I got pictures of all that I totally forgot about. But these are some images from the protests in 2018. Ortega is a murderer. Ortega is [SPEAKING SPANISH] There we go. And so that’s Angel Gahona.

So among the dead in that first week of protest was Angel Gahona, a journalist who was shot and killed while live streaming coverage of the protests in the Caribbean coastal city of Bluefields where most of my research was conducted.

During this time, the Ortega administration went on the offensive claiming that the protests were being infiltrated and manipulated by narco traffickers, gang members, and juvenile delinquents committed to promoting quote “destruction and destabilization” unquote.

In a televised speech on April 21st, Ortega claimed that the protesters were receiving arms, funding, and tactical support from domestic right wing elites in collusion with the United States to stage a coup and overthrow the government.

And of course, given Nicaragua’s particularly fraught relationship with the United States, it’s not unreasonable that that kind of narrative would have a lot of political resonance for people on the ground, even though it turned out to be largely untrue.

So protesters retaliated by shutting the country down with weekly marches, building tranques or roadblocks to keep police and paramilitary forces out of communities sympathetic to the protesters and using social media to counter the administration’s narrative.

As the protests continued to escalate, calls for peace and calm came from the powerful Superior Council of Private Enterprise or COSEP and the Catholic Church. The National Conference of Catholic Bishops convened a national dialogue and served as a mediator between the protest movement and the administration.

Representatives of various sectors of Nicaraguan civil society, including labor unions, the feminist and women’s movements, national human rights organizations, student activists, the Campesino Movement, and costeño representatives or people from the coast, as well as religious leaders agreed to participate. But the talks collapsed within days when the government refused to enter into negotiations and demanded that the removal of the tranques was basically a precondition for negotiations.

Following the collapse of the talks, in July, the Ortega administration launched quote “the cleanup operation” to forcibly remove the tranques and crack down on its political opponents. FSLN lawmakers then passed sweeping anti-terrorism legislation that expanded the definition of terrorism to include a broad range of activities that resulted in death, injury, or property damage when the intent was quote “to intimidate a population, alter the constitutional order, or compel a government or an international organization to perform an act or abstain from doing so.” So basically, so vague as to be meaningless. I’m sorry. I feel like there’s a little bit of reverb in my face.

From July to December, some 500 people in the country were arrested under charges of terrorism. The government quickly declared the cleanup operation a success. And that effort came at a very high cost. The United Nations, the Organization of American States, and Amnesty International reported that the protests of more than 300 confirmed dead.

National human rights organizations placed that number closer to 500. Approximately 2,000 people wounded and more than 400 political prisoners. By the year’s end, an estimated 40,000 Nicaraguans had fled to Costa Rica, fear of reprisal for their participation in the protest. I think at this point now we’re looking at about 100,000 people who’ve already fled the country since 2018.

And after the cleanup operation, the government then escalated its repression of civil society, stripping away the legal status of dissident NGOs, harassing journalists, and arbitrarily detaining human rights defenders across the country.

So as I said, a number of people I know have left the country. And all of the people that I know who were running NGOs on the coast or in Managua have had their NGOs stripped off their legal status and shut down in the last five years.

So now, let’s take a look at the view of the protest from Bluefields. The civic rebellion, however, came as little surprise to Black and Indigenous activists on the Caribbean coast who took a radically different view of the origins and implications of the protest movement.

Bluefields is the capital city. There’s the map. You can see Bluefields right there on the Caribbean coast, on the east side, on the East Coast of the country. Bluefields is the capital city of the South Caribbean Coast Autonomous Region of Nicaragua, and is home to a multiracial population of Afro descendant Creoles, Afro Indigenous Garifuna, mestizos, and Indigenous Miskito, Rama, and Mayangna peoples.

In 1987, Nicaragua formally approved the creation of the autonomous regions as part of a cluster of multicultural citizenship reforms that formally redefine Nicaragua as a polyethnic, multicultural nation state. These reforms– as kind of will speak to in her own work.

These reforms recognized the collective rights of Indigenous and Afro-descendant peoples to govern themselves under their own traditional forms of customary law, granted them access to bilingual education, communal land title, and gave them the rights to manage the use and exploitation of the region’s natural resources.

The law also established the formation of two autonomous regions with their own political institutions. The transition from the state’s historical embrace of mestizo nationalism, which defined Nicaraguan national identity as the product of racial mixing between Spanish colonizers and Indigenous Native peoples was a watershed moment in the struggle for Black and Indigenous rights in Nicaragua and Latin America more broadly.

The approval of these reforms marked the beginning of the multicultural turn in Latin America and signaled a radical shift in the relationship between the multiracial Caribbean coast and the mestizo Nicaraguan nation state.

Despite these reforms, in the years following the approval of regional autonomy, the Nicaraguan state under multiple administrations whose ideological orientations ranged from revolutionary to reactionary continue to undermine the political claims of Black and Indigenous people for territory, resources, and political autonomy.

Black and Indigenous communities have resisted the state’s effort to grant concessions to national and multinational corporations to the region’s fishing, mining, and lumber resources and to construct an interoceanic canal that will cut their communal land claims in half.

These communities have also condemned the state for failing to address the mass migration of landless mestizo settlers into the region occupying and trafficking in Black and Indigenous communal lands.

Although these reforms did not transform the unequal relationship between Black and Indigenous communities and the state, they did facilitate the emergence of new forms of political subjectivity and new modalities of political mobilization that have transformed racial justice movements throughout Latin America and the Caribbean.

Black women in Nicaragua, as in other Latin American countries, have emerged as key leaders in these political formations leading struggles against police abuse, gentrification, mega development schemes, a regional land grab, and territorial displacement.

When the protests erupted in April of 2018, Black women quickly mobilized to organize demonstrations in Bluefields. Costeño participation in the uprising increased dramatically after the national police arrested two young Black men, Glen Slate and Brandon Lovo, for the murder of Angel Gahona, the journalist that I showed you earlier, despite eyewitness accounts from Gahona’s friends and family members that the journalist was murdered by local police.

In addition to hosting marches, activists discussed the case on local radio which they livestream to be on Facebook for costeños living outside the country and circulated memes in social media posts in which they identified these two young men as political prisoners countering official government narratives of them as juvenile delinquents.

Lovo’s and Slate’s arrests and subsequent convictions that were later overturned under appeal powerfully demonstrate the racialized dimensions of Nicaraguan state violence under the authoritarian turn, which were largely overlooked by the civic movement.

This exclusion was made evident, for example, when the hastily formed civic alliance initially neglected to invite Black and Indigenous community leaders to participate in the national dialogue with the government in May of 2018.

Dolene Miller who is a colleague that I worked with for the last 20 years. Dolene Miller, a longtime Creole land activist and representative in the Bluefields Black Creole Indigenous government, argued that the civic movement has tended to ignore the specific political demands of Black and Indigenous communities on the coast, even though these communities were among the earliest and most vocal critics of the authoritarian turn. And by early, I mean people were telling me in 2009 that Daniel Ortega is a dictator. And I was like, no. And they were right.

The failure of the civic movement to engage with the political concerns of Afro-descendant and Indigenous populations reveals as Shakira Simmons, a Bluefields based Black feminist activist argues, quote “the geocentric vision” end quote of mestizo nationalisms which has historically minimized the place of the coast and broader struggles for state power, nationalist modernization projects, and official development schemes.

Costeño activists argue that the state of Nicaragua under a series of ideologically divergent political regimes has historically treated the Caribbean coast as an internal colony quote, “an annex territory open to exploitation” end quote.

Addressing this historical legacy of regional exploitation will mean going far beyond replacing an individual political figure, even one as enduring and powerful as Daniel Ortega, to envision a different kind of political future for the country.

So To Defend This Sunrise– Black Women’s Activism and the Authoritarian Turn in Nicaragua intervenes in this debate by examining the genealogy of Black women’s activism in Bluefields and these women’s historic and contemporary struggles against authoritarian state violence.

I demonstrate how Black women have engaged in regional, national, and transnational modes of activism to reimagine the nation’s racial order. And the book is based on fieldwork conducted from my first time going to Nicaragua in 2004.

I basically went every year between 2004 and 2009 for a couple of months. And then conducted fieldwork from 2009 to 2010. And then went back for subsequent trips from 2012 until 2017. And I have not been back since 2017 because I’ve been told by friends and loved ones who live there that I shouldn’t because it’s not safe for me to go back. So I haven’t.

And so, I conducted this fieldwork primarily in Bluefields. But I also conducted research in rural Black communities in the Pearl Lagoon basin. I can show you the map. So there’s Bluefields. And just above that, you see this kind of body of water. I don’t know if there’s a pointer here.

You can see a kind of bay there. That’s the Pearl Lagoon basin. And I also conducted research in the capital city of Managua and Puerto Cabezas in the north, which is a largely Indigenous urban community with large settlements of Miskito folks who have also been involved in extensive struggles for communal land rights and multicultural recognition.

And then I also conducted research in the US with Creole women who have left Nicaragua and who are now living with varying citizenship status in the United States. And so the study combines ethnography, archival research, oral history, and discursive analysis.

And through using this kind of interdisciplinary methodology, I argue that Black women’s contemporary activism is rooted in a genealogy of struggle against racialized state violence, economic exclusion, territorial dispossession, and political repression.

And so rather than reading the contemporary authoritarian turn as a state of exception, Black women activists highlight quote, “the tragic continuities following Saidiya Hartman between different racialized regimes of governance whose collective results have been the ongoing dispossession, displacement, and disappearance of Black communities.”

And so, despite its seemingly inclusive rather exclusive tenor, the rhetoric of multiculturalism has largely failed to unsettle mestizo hegemony and Nicaraguan nationalist discourse. As the political scientist, Juliet Hooker, argues multicultural discourse has been absorbed into the historical project of mestizo nationalism in ways that reproduce the idea of quote “Nicaraguan national identity as pre-eminently mestizo” end quote.

Under this logic, multiculturalism is reconstituted as an extension of earlier mestizo nationalist political projects. Hooker argues that mestizo multiculturalism is thus a disciplinary discourse that polices and inhibits the assertion of critical racial subjectivities that challenge the ideological and material bases of mestizo nationalism and the project of centralized state development that requires Black and Indigenous resources and territory.

Those political subjects who fail modernity’s tests and refuse the imposition of neoliberal development projects have become the targets of state led efforts to discredit disparage and delegitimize Black and Indigenous social movements.

Since I began working in Nicaragua in 2004, I’ve seen the phenomenon of repression and state violence intensify in the region and witness the growing assault on Black and Indigenous human rights activists throughout the hemisphere.

Yet these spectacular forms of state violence, however, can also eclipse the more mundane systemic and structural forms of violence that the masses of Black people encounter in their everyday negotiations with and struggles against the state.

These structurally violent conditions are as well, Vargas argues, a normalized feature of Black social life throughout the Americas. He argues that official multicultural discourse throughout Latin America tends to quote “obscure the economies of Black suffering that sustain it” end quote.

In Nicaragua, Black activists have responded to this erasure by declaring that the Nicaraguan state is and has historically been engaged in a campaign of everyday genocide against Black communities on the coast. They argue that rather than disrupting this genocidal campaign, multiculturalism as a discursive project in public policy has provided new cover for the violence that Latin American states enact against Black communities.

The United Nations defines genocide as any intent to– as quote “any intent to destroy in whole or in part a national racial or religious group.” Excuse me. It can include, but is not limited to quote, “killing members of the group, causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group, deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part, imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group, and forcibly transferring children of the group to another group” end quote.

Since the approval of the UN Convention on genocide in 1948, Black activists and scholars throughout the Americas have used the term to describe the various legal, economic, social, and cultural means by which the modern state produces premature Black death in whole or in part.

In 1951, the Civil Rights Congress led a delegation to the United Nations charging the United States with genocide. William Patterson, then the organization’s national executive secretary, compiled and edited the group’s findings in a collection titled, We Charge Genocide, the historic petition to the United Nations for relief from a crime of the United States government against the Negro people.

In the 1970s and 1980s, the Afro-Brazilian scholar and activist, Abdias do Nascimento, argued that the myth of racial democracy obscured a systematic regime of genocidal anti-black racism that was reflected in the lack of access to housing, employment, and education and to disproportionate levels of police abuse and violence against Black people.

Yet scholars of genocide studies have largely been reluctant to classify Afro-descendant people’s historical experiences in state violence as a form of genocide. This stems in part from the tendency to define genocide as a historically specific term rooted in the Holocaust of European Jews during World War II.

Genocide scholars have expressed concern that the term might be inappropriately applied to social groups who– although they may have experienced brutal forms of discrimination– have not by definition undergone genocide.

Yet, as far as my reading can tell, the definition provided by the UN suggests a much more capacious understanding of the phenomenon than the scholarship suggests. As well, Vargas argues the concern over vandalisation quote “prevents the possibility that the definition of genocide may be applicable especially to specific, quantifiable, and recurring social processes in the African diaspora whose results are the disproportionate victimization of Black people” end quote.

Christine Smith extends this argument and suggests that scholars of anti-black state violence should theorize genocide not as quote “an historically determined, location specific occurrence” end quote, but as an assemblage.

In so doing, we can quote, “not only take into account it’s gendered, racialized, sexualized, and class contours but also how it is tied to other similar iterations of violence across space and time” unquote. As always, it’s controversial to some to suggest that the Nicaraguan state is engaged in a campaign of anti-Black genocide.

Such claims fly in the face of long established discourses of Latin American racial exceptionalism and newer narratives of harmonious multiculturalism that states have historically deployed to buffer themselves from such critiques.

Yet, this is precisely what Black activists have argued, that the Nicaraguan state in both its democratic and authoritarian iterations has and continues to enact genocide against Black communities through a structure campaign of dispossession and exclusion.

So in this book, following the insights of Black activists, I make two conceptual offerings. First, I argue that since the end of the Revolutionary Period in 1990, the Nicaraguan state– and this includes both the neo conservative free market liberal administrations that followed the revolution and the return of the nominally leftist Sandinista administration– have enacted a longstanding historical project of Black death through what I term multicultural dispossession.

Multicultural dispossession describes the many ways in which state actors and institutions drain multiculturalism of its radical transformative potential by espousing the rhetoric of democratic recognition while simultaneously supporting illiberal practices and policies that undermine Black political demands and weaken the legal frameworks that support their claims against the state.

These forms of dispossession comprise the very heart of the state’s genocidal assault on Afro-descendant communities. And this is violence that was not produced solely by the Ortega administration. And this is something that activists are very clear on.

Rather, it is the product of the violent economic effects of multiple conservative administrations of the 1990s and early 2000s that initially adopted the kinds of neoliberal economic reforms that left Black and Indigenous communities increasingly impoverished. And that has hollowed out regional autonomy as a tool for Black political self-determination.

I further argue that these political formations have produced new political subjectivities and modes of activist engagement among Black women activists that can be instructive for all of us, I think, doing this work in the hemisphere.

In response to the racialized underpinnings of the authoritarian turn, they’ve developed a global analysis of anti-Black racism that directly informs their critics of local and national racial formations. These new modes of activists engagement in the transnational public sphere also reveal how Black women are responding to contemporary state violence by cultivating a politics of what I term diasporic locality.

And so the term for me really describes how Black women engage in multi scalar forms of activism and advocacy that link local struggles to broader racial justice movements unfolding throughout the Americas. These activists offer a radical critique of the excesses and abuses of the authoritarian turn and link them to a hemispheric legacy of anti-Black racism and discrimination.

Now, I’ll conclude with this part. Now, given the growing visibility of Black women activists as transnational political actors, it’s tempting to read this shift as a new phenomenon. But given the kind of historically grounded nature of the research that I’ve done, I would argue that this is actually to borrow from Audre Lorde, a difference only of scale rather than of kind.

My research on Black women’s activism on the Caribbean coast suggests that these modes of political engagement are not new, but rather have been expanded by Black women’s increased access to digital communication technologies, the development of transnational political networks and organizations, and the development of international political institutions, including philanthropic organizations, human rights governing agencies, and the international human rights legal system that they have made extensive use of, that have allowed Black women to advocate for the rights of their communities to a much larger public audience.

But if we look to Black women’s engagement with earlier diasporic political currents, including organizations like the Universal Negro Improvement Association or Rastafari civil rights movement, and Black feminists of the late 20th and early 21st centuries, the degree to which transnational diasporic discourses of race, nation, and resistance shape and are mutually informed by these local struggles for racial justice becomes apparent.

Through a careful review of the limited archive of Creole women’s historic activism, I offer a genealogy of these women’s struggles against the mestizo nation state, which forms the foundation for their contemporary struggles against authoritarian state violence.

Yet, even as Black women activists sharpen their critique of the state’s historic and ongoing project of Black genocide, they also narrate their activism as a reproductive politics through which they fight to create the social, political, and economic conditions to sustain Black life. Thank you.

[TIANNA PASCHEL] OK. I’ll jump right in. That was beautiful and amazing.

Thank you.

I first wanted to thank, Julia, for all of your work in making this happen, the millions of emails, the wrangling of people. And to Marion for so beautifully heading the matrix and really helping us come together across disciplines. Thank you to Lok for moderating this. And thank you to Courtney for your work.

We run in the same circles. If people are at all familiar with my work, we’ve just been like together but not ever in a formal engagement. And so this– I’m really thankful for this conversation because it is the first time that I get to deeply engage with her work and not just hear about you as I made my circuit through Central America and South America around the same time that you were doing your work.

I want to just say apologies to you because I have a neck injury. And so I’m going to be looking like really stilted and formal. But it’s all love and all warmth in your direction.

I feel it.

And then one just caveat because probably I didn’t send Julia my bio or anything. You have to get it from the internet. I am a professor in African-American Studies and in the Department of Sociology. I want to say that in part because my colleague is here too. And I didn’t want anyone to feel like I wasn’t claiming both of my departments.

So there is so much that I can say about this book. I think one of the amazing things is that if I close my eyes, at times, so much of what you’re describing in the context of Nicaragua sounds like the context of Colombia. Right? The dispossession, the co-optation, the state violence, the ways that activists are engaging in all kinds of trickery in order to confront this.

But I will say that the analysis itself is so much richer, so much sharper, so much more layered, and so much more feminist than anything that has been written on multiculturalism in this region and focus on blackness especially, right?

So I just wanted to say you wrote the book that you needed to write. It came at the time it needed to come.

Yeah.

So the first gem I want to talk about– there are many gems in this book– is the way that you talk about and develop your practice of Black feminist activist anthropology, and the way that you center your body, the body and your body, and as it’s interpolated through your many experiences in Nicaragua.

Your body is crucial to developing your understanding of what’s going on there, socially and politically. And it’s also central to how Black women come to their own political praxis. There’s a line in the, I think, intro of the book where you say, being a Black woman in Nicaragua is hard. And it’s italicized and full stop. Like that already is saying so much.

And then you say, I came to learn that that fact in and through my body and my embodied experiences navigating the complex social terrain of Nicaragua’s multiple racial geographies in an era of authoritarianism.

The racial topography and the containment of blackness as over there on the Caribbean coast as not quite Nicaragua is so clear from the minute you arrive, your first time there, when everyone already knows where you’re going, and where you belong, and where you don’t belong.

I’ve had these similar experiences when I lived in Costa Rica for a year. Also when I went to Nicaragua as a 20-year-old tourist and everyone always already assumed that I was from Bluefields. And in Colombia, a place that I visit often and work in often.

But your book made me– gave me a new language for understanding how I was navigating these spatial political terrains and new ways of thinking about how my body and how people engage with my body make visible these racial geographies. So I really appreciated that.

Another gem is your idea of diasporic locality. It’s very helpful because, of course, it cuts up against this idea that when Black folks in Latin America, the Caribbean, or in the Spanish Caribbean articulate a racial politics, they are actually responding to US impositions of racialized understandings, right?

This idea that gets reproduced in the English literature and the Spanish literature, but also a charge that activists often face as a sort of silencing tool. We don’t have race here. That’s some US stuff you’re importing. You’re importing concepts of race and racism from elsewhere.

So your concept of diasporic locality puts that to bed in a really skillful way. But it also couches and puts into context these more contemporary regional activisms and transnational activisms in this kind of long deray. And it complicates in many ways taken for granted politics and geographies.

So in To Defend The Sunrise, we see that from the vantage point of Managua, the Atlantic coast is this place. It’s a place of some contradictions. It’s marginal and yet strategic. It’s outside of the nation but also a place that must be recolonized, reintegrated, and controlled. A place that is undervalued and also extremely valuable in economic and geopolitical terms.

And in this way, the Atlantic comes to embody all the discourses associated with Black people, and all of those kind of contradictions about the Black body actually within the national politic– assimilation and integration, needing to be managed, needing to be surveilled.

But what I think is so powerful about this book is that it refuses to see Bluefields and the Atlantic coast from that vantage point, from that centralist, colonial, mestizo national, Spanish-speaking vantage point.

Instead, what you do is give us a view of Nicaragua and really of the world from the vantage point of Black women in Bluefields and, of course, other parts of the Southern Atlantic coast.

Rather than a provincial outpost, we see a cosmopolitan place that is made through these constant circulations of people and products, and also through complex layers of coloniality, and also through this rich creation circulation and taking up of political ideology from Garveyism to feminism to liberation theology.

It is from this vantage point one centers the– you center the lives, practices, and relationalities of Black women, their political philosophies. And from there, we see Nicaraguan state formation and nation building in all of its failings.

It is from this vantage point this place– so it’s from this place both in terms of the positionality of Black and Creole women vis a vis this masculinist, centralist state project, and the positionality in place of the Atlantic that those contradictions come to be seen.

And you’ve talked so much already about the Hispanicized cultural project in your opening remarks. I want to talk a little bit also about the authoritarian and autocratic one that you also talked about.

So the view from Bluefields shows quite clearly that these authoritarian underpinnings and strongmen compulsions of the Nicaraguan state even as the country goes through all these different political formations and upheavals. It’s one of a story of continuity and not discontinuity.

You, like the women at the center of this book, forced us to put Ortega in his proper historical context as one of many men from the Pacific of a country from the seat of Hispanic-owned colonial power to edge towards authoritarianism and more and more dispossession despite promises, despite revolutionary ideals, and despite treaties.

Thus, rather than see him as this drift as this aberration you show very powerfully that he’s part of this longer legacy of state formation in Nicaragua. In this way, the Atlantic coast becomes this kind of miner’s canary to use critical race theory as Lani Guinier’s term, not just a siren that feels and sees and lives the racial underpinnings of Nicaragua’s social and political order, but also a region of people who see the first signs of the authoritarian creep.

We see time and time again how the coast plays this role because of the anti-blackness that underwrite state policy over time. But also because the coast is this place where the central state tries and attempts to perfect its authoritarian practices precisely because the place that it holds within the national project.

So your book reminded me a lot of the colloquial expression that goes something like, “we are all Blacks now.” This idea that the kinds of dispossession, the kinds of austerity that we experience at the point at which they become more fully democratizing universal is when people start to notice that there’s a problem. But there are things that we live before.

So where Black and Indigenous activists here were the first one in the context of– we see this in the context of other countries. And I’ll just speak a little bit about Colombia and Brazil, the countries I’m most familiar with.

So where we see Black and Indigenous activists, for example, being the first ones attacked by Alvaro Uribe’s policies, and that specific idea of constructing human rights activists as terrorists. That becomes universalized, starts out with attacks of both Black and Indigenous activists. And in a way, you can think about Uribe actually practiced perfecting his brand of parapolítica through those engagements with those communities.

Or even the way that the contemporary Bolsonaro right movement in Brazil with all of its idiosyncrasies and all of its incoherences tried out its discourse and actually its political sort of repertoires when it came together first against affirmative action and against land rights for quilombola communities.

Ultimately, it’s from these margins that we’re able to see the center of these politics in these places that we’re able to understand also the nature of power, even though mainstream political accounts in and outside of the academia hardly ever mention Black people.

And I was struck by I think it’s in the preface where you talk about there being this important edited volume on authoritarian turn in Nicaragua with not one mention of the coast. And that happens in the context of Brazil to like no mention of race at all, even though it’s hard to see how that’s possible.

In addition to revealing the contradictions and desires of the Nicaraguan state project, the view from the coast also gives us so much to think about and to theorize around the nature of racial spatial orders, the meanings of autonomy, sovereignty, and freedom, and the relationship between the politics of sovereignty and sexual politics.

I found this last point to be one of the most unmistakable contributions of this book. I thought your chapter on chamba and the cruise ships was fascinating, especially because you read these experiences of Black women within this broader context of neoliberal state policies and development projects that never quite materialize.

Chamba emerges in the space between the promise and the reality of hegemonic development projects and in the promise and reality of multicultural rights that end up dispossessing more than they allow for the guarantee of rights.

This actually reminded me a lot of Jovan’s work on Jamaica. The ways that people carve out some kind of life. They strive. They make sense of their realities in that gap.

In your account, though, it’s mostly women and not men who are engaging in these practices. That despite their structural origins become yet another site of a culture of poverty kind of ideas of moral panic and of the policing of Black women around motherhood and sex.

Beyond the theoretical contributions this book makes, there are some key contributions to historiography. I was struck by two things here. First is that you tell these life stories of Black women who are involved in the taking down of Somoza and the early years of the Sandinista revolution.

I found it really interesting as someone who in my previous life working at international institutions around multicultural rights, I guess, have met Dorothea Wilson actually, and always in these super professionalized international women’s NGO spaces. And I did not know her history, like going to the mountain and all the things related to being involved in the Sandinista struggle, very interesting.

So your book really reminded me of the importance of telling these stories, of approaching it from an oral history, long deray kind of perspective. Another gem in terms of the historiography is kind of embarrassing. But I’m going to tell the story because I have this opportunity to. And it has to do with setting the record straight about Maymie de Mena, like her origins.

So I co-edited a book which you referred to that’s called Afro-Latin@s in Movement. And we have a chapter that’s all about Maymie de Mena, who was like a right-hand woman to Marcus Garvey, and a person in her own right, who really shaped the way that the UNIA actually functioned in that whole pan-African movement like the Spanish, like pages of the Negro world, and all of that.

So we have a chapter that’s about her and the symbolic politics of her, what it meant for her to be writing on a horse in Harlem down in these parades and representing Garvey when he was traveling.

And all of it was in the context of this book, Afro-Latin@s in Movement, thinking about this Afro-Nicaraguan woman– you know what I mean– was so important to the United Negro Improvement Association.

And I remember, right when we were going to press, Juliet Hooker, she was going to–

[INAUDIBLE]

Yes, exactly. She wrote like a foreword. And she said, I know it’s already going to press. It’s fine. But I just want to let you know that Courtney Morris has uncovered that Maymie de Mena is not Afro-Nicaraguan.

She claims that identity for herself. But she actually was born in Louisiana. And I was like, oh no! And it will forever be in print with my name on it, this chapter that’s just about this Afro-Nicaraguan woman, right?

So thank you for setting the record straight and finding all of those archives to say that. So I’m just going to close with some questions. I actually think we– because of time– should open it up more broadly. But I’ll say my questions. And then maybe you can take them together. I don’t know. I’ll leave that to the discretion of Lok, of course.

So my first question has to do with the racial order or orders in Bluefields. So I found a depiction of racial formation in the Atlantic Coast starting in the 19th century and through the 20th as super interesting and depicted as very opposed to or different from the way that we might think about racial formation in the rest of the country.

On the one hand, we see on the Pacific this mestizo dominated hispanophone place with this discourse of mestizaje and then later multiculturalism. But one where there’s deep seated anti-blackness and even anti-indigeneity in different ways.

On the other, we see in your book this place on the Atlantic where Black Creole people are integral to the political, economic, and social life of the place where there seems to be a lot of race mixture and conviviality. I couldn’t help but think that maybe Bluefields sounded a little more like what mestizaje was supposed to be but wasn’t.

Even so, there are these little peeks where there’s little cracks in the veneer that I wanted you to maybe talk more about. We see them when you talk about class and color cleavages that happen when the UNIA has two chapters and not one. We see that with the resectability politics that emerge and re-emerge with different Black women political figures that you talk about.

I’m curious about what, if anything, that has to do with questions of not just class and color, but even like origin and what generation folks are there– Creoles, migrants from Jamaica, how to think about that.

But more generally, I’m interested in if you could say more about what racial formation in Mosquitia was like historically and in the present. My second question has to do with this idea of diasporic locality and how you make senses of change over time.

So you actually set the quote that I was going to say, which is the quote around these being practices that have a long history, these transnational practices that Black women have, and this idea that you use Audre Lorde to say, which is that “it’s a difference of scale and not kind.”

And I guess actually, I’m curious if it’s not a difference of kind and scale. Because in these more contemporary moments, we see Black women throughout your book making appeals to institutions like the United Nation, who don’t have completely clean hands in terms of putting forward these more symbolic versions of multiculturalism and not the more deep versions of actual rights that have all these performative things like the decade of Afro-descendants but are sort of constantly developing these things alongside the Inter-American Development Bank, the IMF, and all of them.

And so I was curious what we are to make about these trans nationalisms over time? And if we might think about them as not just a difference of scale? That the UNIA and the UN are not the same, and so how are we to make sense of that?

Related to this last question, I was really fascinated by the encounter between the Junes in your book. It was a really sweet moment where Courtney narrates this encounter between June Beer, a Black Nicaraguan painter and poet, and our June Jordan, also a poet and philosopher and somebody I feel indebted to as a Black woman professor on this campus but in the Department also of African-American Studies.

At first, I thought you were curating a conversation. We all are like I’m going to put June Jordan in every– I’m going to put her in conversation with this person or this person. And then I realized that you meant there was an actual encounter between these two Junes. And it made me–

[COURTNEY DESIREE MORRIS] That really happened.

[TIANNA PASCHEL] It really happened. It wasn’t just like I’m going to think about how June talks to this June. It was really– it was sweet to see that they actually met. And it made me wonder more about how you think about these encounters between people who are so differentially situated within the African diaspora. It comes up so much within your book.

You show beautifully how Central America informs how Marcus Garvey thinks about his political project. It informs Maymie de Mena so much that she takes on the identity of a Black Nicaraguan. And then we have June Jordan going. And I can imagine many, many other kinds of exchanges.

And at the same time, because of US centrism, because of neocolonial relationships, because of differences in resources, and also just the ubiquity of US Black struggles, there’s often a presumption about the directionality of those exchanges.

And so, my question for you is, what do we learn? What did June Jordan, what did Maymie de Mena, what did Marcus Garvey learn from the struggles in Nicaragua and Bluefields in particular? What might those struggles tell us about freedom, about autonomy, about power? And I’ll end there. Thank you so much.

[COURTNEY DESIREE MORRIS] Oh my gosh! That was incredible. Thank you.

Thank you so much.

[LOK SIU] So, Courtney, you should do some– so, Courtney, why don’t you take a few minutes to respond. And then we’ll open it up. It would be a missed opportunity if we didn’t do that.

[COURTNEY DESIREE MORRIS] Yeah. I mean, there’s so much to speak to in your comments. I mean, I think this question’s around kind of thinking about this overlapping, sort of specialized racial formations, and how race is constructed and developed on the coast versus how it’s constructed and sort of imagined in the Pacific.

So I do think one thing that’s sort of worth talking about for people who haven’t had a chance to read the book yet is that one of the things that is the kind of history of Afro Central America, the Caribbean coast in all of these countries has always had a kind of fraught relationship to the state.

And so, in the case of Nicaragua specifically, one of the things that makes working there so interesting is that for many years, that whole part of the country was basically its own semi-autonomous, semi-sovereign state. It existed in the interstices of the colonial scramble and the sort of bids for land and territory and resources.

And so while the kind of Western half, the Western central half of the country was governed by the Spanish and operated under Spanish colonial rule until the 1820s when Nicaragua became an independent republic in 1823, the Caribbean coast had a kind of quasi colonial relationship with the British Empire and was considered a quote unquote “protectorate of the British Empire” and had its own kind of formal governing structure that interacted directly with representatives of the British crown.

So that whole part of the country was referred to historically as the Mosquitia. So that was the term that Tianna was using in reference to the Indigenous Miskito peoples who historically have lived in that region. And the Mosquitia had its own king.

A Mosquitia king that was educated in Jamaica, answer to the governor of Jamaica, was considered a sovereign, was the head of state, essentially. And they could enter into treaties. They entered into multiple treaties with different European nations.

They entered into treaties with the Nicaraguan government to determine what the nature of the relationship would be with the central government. And also in an attempt to kind of contain and mitigate Spanish efforts to colonize that part of the country and claim sovereignty over the entirety of the territory.

And they were able to maintain that semi-sovereign status until 1893 when Jose Santos Zelaya, who was then President at the time, launched a campaign to reincorporate, so you’re talking about this sort of symbolytic projects, but to reincorporate the region into Nicaragua, even though it had never actually formally been a part– you can’t reincorporate what you didn’t ever actually own. But that was the language.

And so it’s like that kind of historical cleavage between these two geographies has always structured the relationship between these two spaces and the ways that people think about their relationship to Nicaraguan national identity, culture, politics, citizenship, all of it.

And it’s really interesting because even now, there was a study that I cite in the book that was carried out by one of the UN offices that was housed in Nicaragua where they asked costeños, people living on the coast, like do you feel as Nicaraguan as you feel costeño? Do you feel more Nicaraguan? Or do you feel less?

And overwhelmingly, people were like, at best maybe I feel as Nicaraguan as I do costeño or Black or Indigenous. But just as often people would say, I feel less Nicaraguan than I feel costeño, than I feel Creole, than I feel Miskito.

So there’s a way in which how people identify and where they imagine their political loyalties to lie in spatial as well as racial and cultural terms. It’s not with the Nicaraguan state at all. And then, for their part, mestizos in the Pacific are wildly uneducated about the coast.

So I talked about in the book where one of the things that Black people would often say is yeah, I leave Bluefields and I go to Managua to study. And I’m in school. And people are asking me like, do I need to take out my passport so I can travel to Bluefields to go visit the coast? Or is it true you all live in trees? I mean, does everybody there practice witchcraft?

There are sort of narratives about the kind of radical space of racial difference that the coast represents. It’s still a very salient part of just like everyday racial common sense in ways that have not been mitigated at all by advent of these multicultural citizenship reforms.

So I wanted to talk about it in a way that would treat that phenomenon as a kind of like transhistorical phenomenon. But that would lay out the continuities and discourse and how even as new ways of thinking about Nicaraguan national identity emerge.

These older patterns and the palimpsest, I guess, of Nicaraguan anti-blackness and anti-indigeneity is constantly being rearticulated and reconstituted even in the face of these gestures towards a more inclusive way of thinking or imagining the nation. It’s really pernicious.

So anyway, that’s something that I think is in terms of the question of Mosquitian racial formations. I think that’s how I would think about that. And then yeah. I mean, I will say really briefly, and then I’ll kick it to the audience that it was really sweet writing that piece about the two Junes meeting.

Because I also have this idea– I think when I started this project initially as an undergrad. I was like, I guess I was like 20 when I went down there. And I was like, I’m going to go find the Black feminist.

I think I really struggled at that point because the literature was so limited on Black women’s political engagement in Latin America, as you know. We basically had to write it and work with other people in the region who were also writing and translating and trying to make the work available.

But it was for me this kind of watershed moment like realizing that that encounter had actually happened, and then thinking about having the evidence of how that encounter really expanded to Jordan’s political imagination.

She goes to Nicaragua. And then she comes back. And she publishes in 1984 an essay at Essence magazine back when Essence was still about it about why she had to go to Nicaragua and why Black people should support the Sandinista revolution. That was the argument. And I was like, wow, this is so incredible.

And this is the same time that June Jordan is going to Palestine. She’s going to Lebanon. That she’s really engaged in these sort of modes of Black internationalism that have a long enriched tradition. And that Black women have really been key protagonists in that project of Black internationalism, even though we’re largely or often written out of that history in favor of the great man narrative.

But I think that for me really demonstrated how or maybe in a way I appreciated it because I also felt like– and I didn’t have space to talk about it in the book. But my own political imagination has been radically refashioned by my encounters with Afro Latin American women who have really helped me to rethink what I imagine constitutes a feminist politics or who is the ideal subject of feminist politics or what do we imagine in terms of what is politically possible, like thinking about how in the space of the United States, our demands for political recognition or repair are very limited in some ways.

And you go to Latin America, and they’re like claiming territories. And it happens. It’s not an easy or an uncomplicated process. But the demand is there and it’s viable. And people believe in it.

And so I just think that there’s something about the way that Black activists use these infrastructures that are not created for our own political dreams, our freedom dreams. Whether it’s the infrastructure of American empire or the infrastructure of international human right spaces or spaces of cultural exchange, and then take that infrastructure to make connections that then enable the development of more expansive modes of political imagination, and what we think we have a right to as Black people.

And I think that it’s important to really dissenter the US and say oh Black people in the US don’t have the monopoly on offering those kind of insights. But that we can look to the Global South, I think, to maybe free ourselves from the limitations that we have imposed on us in Global North context.

So anyway, that feels like a very rambling, meandering answer.

[TIANNA PASCHEL] It’s beautiful.

[INTERPOSING VOICES]

[LOK SIU] Anyway, comments? Questions?

[JULIA SIZEK] OK. Well, we do have two questions from online. So I will start with those while people in the room are thinking about your questions. And we’ll get over to you. So a question from Garrett Brown is, do people on the coast view the 1987 autonomy agreement as something that could work if there was the political will in Managua? Or are there changes that need to be made in the approach or content of the autonomy agreement itself?

And then, I think actually this next question is potentially related, so I’m just going to tack it on. From Laura Enriquez who says that she would like to hear more about any ways in which exploitation and repression of the Atlantic coast may have differed between the conservative and left governments in the post-1990 period.

[COURTNEY DESIREE MORRIS] Yeah. Absolutely. So I think, when I was working, I remember the first time going to Bluefields and people talking about regional autonomy and the 1987 autonomy law. I think at that point, the levels of disillusionment were so deep. Because it had become so apparent that the state actually had no interest at all in activating its own policies to provide the forms of repair that the law was created to address.

And so the feeling always that I got from people was that they were like yeah, autonomy could work. But the reason why it won’t work is because of the depth of political corruption in the country, the lack of political will, and the fact that there’s– as I talk a lot about in the book– that the state across these different political administrations has used these tools of political co-optation, tokenization to separate Black leaders from their communities, and to keep them from advocating for their communities in the ways that might make the law meaningful and real.

But ultimately, the biggest single factor is that the state doesn’t want to do this. They pass the law, but they never actually had any intention of realizing it. And I think that it’s such a profound source of bitterness and disappointment and heartbreak. That’s kind of hard to communicate in words, but I tried.

And then in terms of the second question, what are the differences between this sort of– one of the arguments I make is that multicultural dispossession isn’t something that just emerges under the Sandinistas, but it is a defining feature of Nicaraguan governance in the post-revolutionary period.

So all of the administrations do it. So Violeta Chamorro in chapter 3, I talked a lot about how she has no concept of what regional autonomy is. She thinks it’s– she doesn’t know what it is. And her son-in-law who’s her chief of staff like wild nepotism. That’s how government works down there. He just thought it was a ridiculous idea. He says it. And he wrote a memoir in 2006 where he was like yeah, we didn’t really get it. We just thought it was kind of a crazy idea.

A project that took years and years, like people spent years developing regional autonomy, hosting gatherings all over the Caribbean coast, going to every single Black and Indigenous community like rural communities on the middle of nowhere, to ask people what they wanted. And then to consolidate all of that into a coherent government policy that could be instituted, that could be enacted through the law.

And the next administration just comes in and is like yeah. We think that’s a pipe dream. We’re not going to do that. So those forms of dispossession happen immediately. It’s like the ink is barely dry. And the state immediately starts going about hollowing it out and whittling it out.

So I don’t know that there are– I would say that the major difference is I think under Ortega has been the return of explicit forms of political repression. I think the intensification of government intervention into the spaces of everyday life. And Black and Indigenous sites of political mobilization is really unique.

But I also think that the Sandinistas are really clever. Their use of multicultural rhetoric is really different than– the neo cons have no use for multiculturalism. They don’t care. The Sandinistas actually say, well, we created multiculturalism. It happened on our watch. And not only did we create it, but we’re the only ones who can execute it effectively.

And so the repression or the forms of authoritarianism that are being enacted can be justified by saying, but we’re the only government that actually has ever cared about Black and Indigenous people. Look, we passed this law. So they have really, I think, been very strategic in their mobilization of multicultural rhetoric in a way that is fascinating.

And in some ways, I think also articulates with these sort of similar modes of neoliberal multicultural discourse in the United States that are really problematic. And that I think we can learn from. So I would say those are the biggest differences.

It’s working?

Hi, Andres.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] Thank you so much for this wonderful talk. My question is, I mean, first you mention an anti-Black historical violence encompassing both the reactionary and revolutionary governments has been produced like they caused as a space of dispossession and repression, as you already mentioned.

And my question is, what other like [INAUDIBLE] of practices like about the land, the coast, from their life, knowledge, and political practices of Black women emerge? Or what kind of– if there is another notion of coastal geographies or coastal ecologies from these political coalitions of Black women in Nicaragua?

[COURTNEY DESIREE MORRIS] Yeah. I mean, I remember while writing the dissertation like Katherine McKittrick’s Demonic Grounds. It just came out. And that book was just like a bomb in my world. And I was like, oh, what are these Black women’s geographies that I should be paying closer attention to? And I think they showed up in a lot of places in the book.

I talked a lot about the fact that regional struggles for land rights have been led almost entirely by Black women. They are the ones who– so the autonomy law when it was passed, one of the holes in the legislation was that it gave Black people the right to communal land rights. But it didn’t actually establish a process for delivering on that.

So then another law was passed in 2003 called the Law 445 that provides a step-by-step process for demarcating and titling Black communal land claims like in blocks. And Black women were the first people. There were a lot of folks when that law passed they’re like that’s never going to happen.

And Black women were like, it is going to happen because we’re going to make it happen. We’re going to take that law. And we’re going to run with it. And one of the activists that I worked with is a woman named Nora Newball.

That’s Nora talking at the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights with Dolene next to her. But Nora had an encounter with the president of Nicaragua at that time, Enrique Bolaños. And she was like, well, what are you going to do? We got this law and what are you going to do for us?

And he said to her [SPEAKING SPANISH] And she was like, I will. That’s exactly what I’m going to do. He’s like, yeah, take up the law. You got it. Now, do something with the law. She’s like, I am going to do something with that law. And she did.

I mean, they ended up doing this massive project to demarcate the land, doing ethnographic research, mapping out the territory, meeting with all the residents, passing and voting on it, coming up with a proposal, pushing that through to the state. And that was the proposal that they ultimately presented to the state for the land claim.

But then there are– so that’s one of the formal ways that I see Black women’s geographies or Black women attempting to reshape space through practice. But there’s also these more informal strategies like the stories that people tell about places.

Like the state will come in and change the names of places. And Black folks are like, no, that’s not Punta Fria. The name of that neighborhood is cotton tree. That’s where we live. And that’s some stuff that somebody made up.

So there’s a chapter in the book where I talked about walking through the neighborhoods, these traditional Black neighborhoods in Bluefields. And my friends, homegirls, who would be like, that was a Garvey house. That was where the UNIAs used to meet. And over there, that was a Black church. And that was the Crowdell Hotel where Anna Crowdell used to organize people and led all these rebellions against the state.

So even though the landscape of the city had changed radically, people’s memories of what had happened there was really strong. And they kept it alive through these narrative practices that I’m like, oh, you wouldn’t know that unless you talk to people.

But the memory of the land lives in their bodies in a way. And that you could experience it through walking through the space. And I was always really struck by that. So that’s just like some examples of the ways that I saw it playing out in the space of daily life and political practice.

I just want to call attention to the time. It’s 2:00. I think we can have a conversation for so much longer. I just want to– and we would love to have an informal conversation afterwards. But I need to, I think, formally close this panel.

[LOK SIU] I just want to say thank you so much, Courtney, for this amazing book. So necessary at this moment as well in terms of what’s going on in Latin America, what’s happening in the US as well. I think there are lessons to be learned.

And thank you, Tianna, for your amazing comments. They were so incredibly rich and generative making us think at different directions as well. And thank you to Marion and Julia for hosting this, for sponsoring it, and bringing this on campus, and to sharing it with everyone. So thank you very much. And thanks to our audience.

[COURTNEY DESIREE MORRIS] Thank you.

[MUSIC PLAYING]

 

Authors Meet Critics

Cooperating with the Colossus: A Social and Political History of US Military Bases in World War II Latin America

Part of the Authors Meet Critics event series

Recorded on March 6, 2023, this Authors Meet Critics book panel focused on Cooperating with the Colossus: A Social and Political History of US Military Bases in World War II Latin America, by Rebecca Herman, Assistant Professor of History at UC Berkeley.

Professor Herman was joined in conversation by Julio Moreno, Professor of History at the University of San Francisco, and José Juan Pérez Meléndez, Assistant Professor in Latin American and Caribbean History at UC Davis, and a Bridging the Divides Fellow at the Center for Puerto Rican Studies in Hunter College. Elena Schneider, Associate Professor in the UC Berkeley Department of History, moderated. (Please note that Professor Meléndez is not included in the video, per his request.)

This panel was co-sponsored by the UC Berkeley Department of History.

Listen to this panel as a podcast below or on on Google Podcasts or Apple Podcasts.

About the Book

During the Second World War, the United States built over two hundred defense installations on sovereign soil in Latin America in the name of cooperation in hemisphere defense. Predictably, it proved to be a fraught affair. Despite widespread acclaim for Pan-American unity with the Allied cause, defense construction incited local conflicts that belied the wartime rhetoric of fraternity and equality.

Cooperating with the Colossus reconstructs the history of US basing in World War II Latin America, from the elegant chambers of the American foreign ministries to the cantinas, courtrooms, plazas, and brothels surrounding US defense sites. Foregrounding the wartime experiences of Brazil, Cuba, and Panama, the book considers how Latin American leaders and diplomats used basing rights as bargaining chips to advance their nation-building agendas with US resources, while limiting overreach by the “Colossus of the North” as best they could.

Yet conflicts on the ground over labor rights, discrimination, sex, and criminal jurisdiction routinely threatened the peace. Steeped in conflict, the story of wartime basing certainly departs from the celebratory triumphalism commonly associated with this period in US-Latin American relations, but this book does not wholly upend the conventional account of wartime cooperation. Rather, the history of basing distills a central tension that has infused regional affairs since a wave of independence movements first transformed the Americas into a society of nations: national sovereignty and international cooperation may seem like harmonious concepts in principle, but they are difficult to reconcile in practice.

Drawing on archival research in five countries, Cooperating with the Colossus is a revealing history told at the local, national, and international levels of how World War II transformed power and politics in the Americas in enduring ways.

About the Panelists

Rebecca HermanRebecca Herman is an Assistant Professor in UC Berkeley’s Department of History. Her work explores twentieth-century Latin American social and political history in a global context, probing the intersections between grand narratives and local history. Her book, Cooperating with the Colossus, reconstructs a contentious U.S. military basing project advanced in Latin America during World War II under the banner of inter-American cooperation in hemisphere defense.

Julio MorenoJulio Moreno is a Professor of History at the University of San Francisco. He is the author of Yankee Don’t go Home! Mexican Nationalism, American Business Culture, and the Shaping of Modern Mexico, 1920-1950. His other publications are on U.S.-Latin American relations during the Cold War. His research and publications center on the intersection of U.S. business and diplomacy through the subfields of diplomatic, business, and cultural history. He is currently writing a book on the history of Coca-Cola in Latin America.

JJosé Juan Pérez Meléndezosé Juan Pérez Meléndez is an Assistant Professor in Latin American and Caribbean history at the University of California, Davis, and a Bridging the Divides Fellow at the Center for Puerto Rican Studies in Hunter College. His work is concerned with nineteenth-century colonization dynamics in Brazil in global perspective, and with the international dilemmas of decolonization in the twentieth-century Caribbean. His forthcoming book, Peopling for Profit, charts the co-production of migrations and regulatory powers in the Brazilian Empire with a special focus on the driving force of oligarchic business dynamics.

Elena SchneiderElena Schneider (moderator) is Associate Professor of History at UC Berkeley. She is a a historian of Latin America, the Caribbean, and the Atlantic World. Her research focuses on Cuba and the Caribbean, comparative colonialism and slavery, and the Black Atlantic. Methodologically, she seeks to write history that moves across regional, imperial, and national boundaries, integrating diverse stories normally told separately. She is also committed to the practice of writing history “from below” and the challenging archival work that makes reconstructing the experiences of historically marginalized peoples possible. Her book, The Occupation of Havana, is a longue durée history of the causes, central dynamics, and enduring consequences of a crucial incident of imperial warfare, the British invasion, occupation, and return of Havana (1762-3) during the final stages of the Seven Years’ War.

 

Transcript

Authors Meet Critics: “Cooperating with the Colossus,” by Rebecca Herman

[MUSIC PLAYING]

[JULIA SIZEK] Hello, everyone. Hi. My name is Julia Sizek. And I am a postdoc here at Social Science Matrix. And I am here to welcome you to our exciting book panel here today.

Today, we’re going to be discussing Rebecca Herman’s new book Cooperating with the Colossus, which is an examination of US military bases built in Latin America during World War II. She examines the tensions of United States empire in the project of cooperating for hemispheric defense. And she does this not only through looking at diplomatic projects but through conflicts over discrimination, labor rights, and criminal jurisdiction on the ground.

Today’s event is part of our Author Meets Critic series which features critically engaged discussions about recent books by faculty and alumni in the UC Berkeley Social Sciences division. We would like to thank UC Berkeley’s Department of History for co-sponsoring this event.

I will be introducing our moderator Elena Schneider. Elena Schneider is a historian of Latin America, the Caribbean, and the Atlantic world and an associate professor in the UC Berkeley History Department. Her research focuses on Cuba and the Caribbean, comparative colonialism and slavery in the Black Atlantic.

Methodologically, she seeks to write history that moves across regional, imperial, and national boundaries, integrating diverse stories that are normally told separately. She is also committed to the practice of writing history from below and challenging archival work that makes reconstructing the experiences of historically marginalized peoples possible. Her book, The Occupation of Havana, is a longue durée history of the causes, central dynamics, and enduring consequences of a crucial incident of imperial warfare– the British invasion, occupation, and return to Havana during the final stages of the Seven Years’ War.

[ELENA SCHNEIDER] Sure. Thank you, Julia. We’re going to do a little AV Stand up. Hi. Thanks so much for coming to those of you who are here in person. And thank you also to those of us who are here on Zoom. We really appreciate you all joining us today. This is a real pleasure, a chance to talk about my colleague, Rebecca Herman’s book.

So as was mentioned, I’m an associate professor in the history department working in the Latin American and Caribbean field along with Rebecca Herman. And so my job is just to introduce our panelists individually. And then, I’ll be moderating and fielding questions. We also have a microphone. And Julia will circulate to gather your questions during the Q&A period. We’ll also be fielding questions from Zoom.

So Rebecca Herman is an assistant professor in UC Berkeley’s Department of History. Her work explores 20th century Latin American social and political history in a global context, probing the intersections between grand narratives and local history. Her book, Cooperating with the Colossus, reconstructs a contentious US military basing project, advancing Latin America during World War II under the banner of inter-American cooperation and hemispheric defense. And also, would you like to say a word, maybe mention your next project when you get a chance?

Mhm.

Your bio was too short.

[LAUGHTER]

Our next panelist, critic number one, is Julio Moreno. He is a professor of history at the University of San Francisco. He is the author of Yankee Don’t Go Home!– Mexican Nationalism American, Business Culture, and the Shaping of Modern Mexico from 1920 to 1950. His other publications are on US-Latin American relations during the Cold War.

His research and publications center on the intersection of US business and diplomacy through the subfields of diplomatic, business, and cultural history. He’s currently writing a book on the history of Coca-Cola in Latin America.

[INAUDIBLE]

So thank you. I’ll turn the microphone over first to Rebecca.

[REBECCA HERMAN] All right. Thanks, everyone, for being here. And, Julia, thanks so much for all of your work organizing this chuck for the technical support and my critics, my wonderful critics. Thank you for joining. We’ll see if I’m still smiling at the end of the session.

[LAUGHTER]

So I think my role on the panel is really just to orient those of you. Probably the majority of you have not read this book. And so I want to help to contextualize a little bit so that the comments from José Juan and Julio do make sense and tell you a little bit about it. And then I’m going to turn the mic over so we can hear some of the comments and questions from our guests.

So you may not have read the book. But you’ve read the title, which really gives a lot of way. It’s a book about US military bases in World War II Latin America. The focus is most heavily and is really anchored in the experiences of communities in three countries– Brazil, Cuba, and Panama. And I can talk more about that during the Q&A if you want to geek out around methodology and that sort of thing. But I wanted to mention that now in case that proves relevant in the comments.

And the book examines both the high politics of basing and also the social histories of the bases themselves. So it moves between different registers. It moves between the international, national, and local spheres in which this history of wartime basing unfolded.

Through the history of these bases, it tries to contemplate the nature of cooperation between unequal partners. So for those of you who aren’t that familiar with the region’s history, Colossus of the North is a nickname that the United States has had in Latin America that really speaks to the kind of preponderance of US power and the US tendency towards interventionism in the region. So cooperating with the Colossus is intended to highlight the fact that this book is really thinking about how folks in Latin America have tried to engage US power while grappling with the consequences of these asymmetries in their relationships.

Because of the overwhelming history of US interventionism in the region, cooperation is really not the first word that comes to mind when you think about the history of US-Latin American relations. But I think that actually, Latin Americans’ frustrated efforts to find ways to effectively cooperate with the Colossus has been a constant and really underscrutinized through line in the history of the region. And the scholarship on US-Latin American relations in recent years has really moved in a direction that I think sets us up well to examine those efforts in a nuanced and responsible way.

There’s been a push in recent years led by Julio Moreno and others to take more seriously Latin American agency in histories of US-Latin American relations without diminishing the asymmetries of power that structure relationships in the hemisphere. So that’s a balancing act that I try to engage in this book.

To give you some context about the bases and explain how I use those bases as a vehicle for thinking about these broader themes, here’s a map that we had drawn up for the book. During the Second World War, the US established over 200 defense sites on sovereign soil in Latin America. So they made me break it into two maps because I really wanted one map. But they said it was too cluttered. [INAUDIBLE] on a single book page. It just doesn’t turn out to be very legible.

The US at this point already occupied the naval base in Guantanamo Bay and already had established the Panama Canal Zone. But most of the other defense sites on this map were new to the war period. And World War II is really a key moment in the growth of the United States global basing empire.

So today, it’s sort taken for granted, that the United States has this global military footprint that’s an important part of its national defense and thinking about national security. But before World War II, the US only had around 14 bases outside of US continental borders. Today, that count is somewhere around 750. So over the intervening years, that number has expanded and contracted. But World War II was really an important moment in the outward push of US national defense.

What makes it interesting in terms of thinking about the history of these bases is they were created. And how these stories played out on the ground is that there’s really not much by way of precedent at this moment. So there’s this real make it up as you go along part of the story that I found in the archives as I was trying to understand the history of these places.

So why did the United States want bases in Latin America during World War II? Because you don’t think of Latin America typically when you think of the Second World War unless you’re a Latin American [INAUDIBLE]. Elena, do you mind passing me the water? Thanks so much.

So well before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, there was an overwhelming concern among US defense strategists that German forces could cross the South Atlantic from West Africa to the Northeast of Brazil. So I put this generic world map up here so that you can just get a sense spatially of how close that proximity really is. So it’s only about 1,600 miles to cross the South Atlantic.

This is a moment when thinking about defense strategy is changing because of advances in aviation technology. So airplanes really shrink the distance between places and make US defense planners feel the nation is much more vulnerable than it’s ever been before. And so there was this scenario that was envisioned where German forces might cross the South Atlantic. There might be this fifth column of Nazi sympathizers already living throughout the region who would then receive them and help them in their pursuit, either of an attack on the Panama Canal, which is really important strategic asset for the US, or invade the United States.

And so defense planners called for the development of strategic airfields at really close intervals because aviation has advanced but still not that far. Planes still can’t fly that far. So that means you need a lot of airfields. And the objective was to be in a position to unilaterally defend the Americas from any kind of extra hemispheric aggression.

Now, the usual story about the US and Latin America in World War II is that it was this atypical moment of harmony in the Americas, this real high point. This is a poster from the war period produced by a US government agency that was circulated throughout the region. It’s the image that’s on my book cover. I believe I have the Spanish version on the book cover. This one’s in Portuguese. It was circulated throughout the region.

The first three decades of the 20th century had been a period marked by repeated US military intervention in the region. And these military interventions had fomented all kinds of anti-US sentiment. It well beyond the places in the Americas that experienced that intervention firsthand.

And during the early 1930s, for reasons that maybe I can’t fit into 15-minute spiel, but the US government pulls back from that interventionist tendency and reinvents US policy towards Latin America under the banner of the Good Neighbor Policy. The name of the policy is felt self-explanatory. But the basic premise is we’re not going to intervene in Latin American affairs anymore.

This was a development that Latin American jurists and diplomats had been seeking for decades through various different strategies. And so when the United States finally conceded to a principle of non-intervention in the region, it was seen as this huge boost to inter-American affairs. And that boost and the goodwill that it generated became really important in the late 1930s because there was this concern about Axis’ sympathies in the Americas. There was a sense that goodwill was now a national security imperative. They needed to push back against the anti-US imperialism that had become really baked into nationalism in different parts of the region during this era.

So ultimately, this– so this is all to contextualize why this moment of Pan American unity during World War II was seen as a departure. And ultimately, the American republics do band together in support of the Allied cause. Even the holdouts that wait until later in the war end up breaking ties with the Axis powers. Brazil and Mexico, both send soldiers to fight in the war. Many of the American republics that don’t send soldiers do declare war.

And so Pan American unity in the war is often described as a crowning achievement of the Good Neighbor Policy and one that is fatefully discarded when the Cold War brings new security concerns to the United States and then the US returns to interventionism. So that’s the typical narrative.

And so World War II with the exception of some key aspects of that story doesn’t get tons and tons of attention in the literature on US-Latin American relations, in part maybe because it’s atypical in a broader story that’s more organized around intervention. But in my book, I suggest that we’ve aired in taking more time cooperation at face value and also in dismissing postwar cooperation as a charade and that we might instead think about cooperation critically as a vital and dynamic field of contest in the Americas.

So I use basic to do that. And it works pretty well in my opinion because it was the most contentious form of cooperation. So there’s this whole menu of ways that the American Republics cooperate during the war. Hosting US bases is by far the most politically unpalatable.

And so the way that I found when I got into the archives, folks in the diplomatic sphere trying to navigate this difficult proposition, and then people on the ground who encounter US soldiers in their communities where US bases are hosted presented a lot of opportunities for thinking about the inherent tensions between national sovereignty and international cooperation between unequal partners.

So let me just tell you quickly about the book’s structure. I think I mentioned in the beginning that the book moves between scales. And this is in part because when I was in the archives and I was beginning to reconstruct these stories about the different spheres in which I saw conflicts over sovereignty playing out, it wasn’t just in diplomatic negotiations over basic. It was also in navigating newly won labor rights on defense construction sites.

It was in the nature of race relations in places where workforces were segregated. It was in how US-based authorities took it upon themselves to regulate prostitution in the communities surrounding basing sometimes in violation of local law and in fights over criminal jurisdiction and this question of, do Latin American authorities have retained the right to police the behavior of US personnel on their own soil? And if not, is that an infringement on sovereignty that’s unacceptable that’s at odds with the Good Neighbor Policy?

So the chapters in the book take an hourglass shape in terms of the scale that they’re operating at. I begin at the regional level, where I talk about the history of basing in the Americas and the problem of basing from the perspective of its various constituents. In chapter 2, I move into the bilateral realm, consider how Latin American heads of state and their foreign ministers negotiated the terms of US basing. Typically, they managed those appeals for basing rights by leveraging them, using them as bargaining chips to solicit all kinds of quid pro quo, economic and military aid that would help them to advance some of their own nation-building objectives during this period.

Latin American leaders were especially reluctant to accept any terms around basing that would openly diminish their nation’s territorial integrity or the principle of territorial sovereignty. So questions around jurisdiction were especially complicated. And remember, this is the beginning of the US basing establishing bases on sovereign peer nations.

So previously, the US had bases typically in colonial territories or places where the United States didn’t profess to respect the territorial sovereignty of that place. So the fact of the Good Neighbor rhetoric surrounding territorial sovereignty created a host of issues around how do we actually operate these bases and who’s in charge.

So what that meant in effect, particularly in the context of war, things are moving quickly. They’re trying to advance this defense construction without creating all kinds of backlash. The terms around governance were usually really vague in formal agreements and were often worked out on the ground.

So that’s where the subsequent four chapters go. They go to the ground. And they look at how these ad hoc governance systems were improvised at different places and built in the context that would best be most effective in each space.

For me, these middle chapters are really the heart of the book. While US and Latin American leaders managed to strike mutually beneficial agreements in the high political realm, problems on the ground, noise from below really routinely threaten that peace.

I’ve already described some of those conflicts– US defense contractors failing to observe newly won labor laws; race and nation-based segregation at defense sites; US soldiers violating local social norms or upsetting existing social practices, particularly in their engagements with local women; US-based authorities regulating prostitution; and then police and courts lacking the authority to police the behavior of US personnel.

So sometimes these conflicts were settled locally. But often, they required some kind of state intervention. A lot of times, you see people on the ground appealing to their own national leaders or directly to Franklin Roosevelt saying, this is really at odds with the Good Neighbor Policy, and using that language of the war to advocate for the ends that they sought.

The various resolutions that US and Latin American allies devise to resolve these conflicts tell us something about a problematic relationship between international and domestic politics that cooperation wrought. And this consequence for domestic politics that these international relationships precipitates is something that I’m really interested in.

You start to see a little bit of a pattern emerge over these chapters. With labor law, prostitution policy, and criminal jurisdiction, you see Latin American leaders who profess a nationalist defense of territorial sovereignty surrender jurisdiction in practice, even if they refuse to do it in principle. And so you see typically covert means by which, for example, labor laws can be suspended or imperfectly applied in ways that benefit US interests.

So then finally, in chapter 7, I zoom back out. I consider the fate of these wartime bases. Popular protests at the war’s end ultimately forced the evacuation of most of them. And I think a little bit about the legacy of wartime cooperation in the postwar era and moving into the Cold War.

I had a few notes about how this fits in the scholarship. But I think I might be pushing it on time. So I might save that for our discussion–

[INAUDIBLE]

Oh, great. All right, well, maybe I’ll just say this a few words about where this fits in the scholarship. So I think I hinted at this when I first began speaking.

But with this book, I’m really building on a broader intellectual project that’s been underway for some time to restore Latin American agency to histories of US-Latin American relations, to push back against the idea that the United States is this all-powerful puppet master in the region that’s pulling the strings of dictators and the like but doing so in a way that doesn’t diminish the really great power asymmetries that shape relations in the region.

This is manifested in the scholarship in a number of ways that I think really lend themselves to a more nuanced consideration of cooperation as an analytic theme in the region’s past. One trend has been scholarship that recognizes Latin American dictators and other powerful elites as complex historical figures with their own agendas and interests and motivations in enlisting US power.

Another has been to look at the work of Latin American diplomats and jurists and intellectuals as architects of international governance. And then, there’s other scholarship that’s more focused on social and cultural histories and tends to be grounded in more of a bottom-up framework. Folks who have found that close encounters is one of the phrases from a leading book in this field with US power on the ground in Latin America to be an effective means for understanding the agency of less powerful people. So not just looking at diplomats and dictators but also folks who might disappear if you zoom out too much.

Resistance remains a popular analytic theme in those ground level accounts. But even that portrait of resistance often includes the ingenuity of ordinary people at channeling foreign resources to advance their own ends. So you see both with elites or people on the high political stage and folks on the ground these efforts to cooperate with the Colossus. So that’s why I have that kind of hokey title because this is something that I really am seeing in the work of others as well.

So in all of these distinct narratives, there’s this common pattern– Latin American actors trying to make the most of a partnership with powerful and well-resourced counterparts from the United States while also confronting and trying to mitigate the inequality that structures their relationships. So in regards to how my project fits, how the Good Neighbor era fits into this broader story, I believe that rather than mark a brief era bookended by periods of interventionism, World War II is better understood as an important pivot point in this longer story.

There’s a certain political economy of security cooperation that’s forged during the war that lives on as a really important legacy of the war in inter-American relations during the Cold War period and beyond. For US officials, security cooperation remains a more discreet mode of intervention, one that’s really born in this period that’s conventionally known for its non-interventionism.

So in other words, the book endeavors to rethink how the Good Neighbor era fits into the longer history of US-Latin American relations, not merely by demonstrating as others have that the period itself was riddled with intervention after all, though it was, or that the US simply innovated new tools for sustaining hegemony during this period, though it did, but by taking a wider angle lens to the history of the region that views intervention as one feature of this broader dynamic contest over US power and resources in the Americas.

Considering cooperation allows us to see how cooperation, which was envisioned by some in Latin America as this avenue for collapsing international hierarchy, also helps in practice to preserve that hierarchy. All right, I’ll stop there. Thank you. [APPLAUSE]

[JULIO MORENO] Well, first and foremost, thank you for the invitation. And it’s truly an honor to have the opportunity to comment on your book. I don’t like to think of myself as a critic because I really, really enjoy reading the book. And it’s one of those books that you read consciously read slowly. And you really don’t want it to end. Because the way the different stories unfold throughout the book, it’s just amazing, very engaging.

So I had a hard time thinking about what can I say that would really highlight where the field is, how Rebecca really contributes to that field, and what are some of the questions, some long-term questions that I think we should consider as we look at this type of accounts that you provide for us. So I want to do that by highlighting the structure of the book, the way in which, Becca, you contribute at different points as literally in each chapter make significant contributions to the book.

And then I’m going to highlight at least three areas where I feel are– well, I have some questions that I would love to have you elaborate on, but also some questions that I think will be important for us in the audience to grapple with as we think about where the field of US-Latin American relations is and what we make of those encounters between Latin Americans and the United States.

So what you see here, it’s basically my way to sketch out what the book does. So if you could picture yourself to a two-parallel process, on the one hand, you have World War II and the Good Neighbor Policy and the US interests to make things work and get Latin Americans to cooperate mainly because of the urgency that World War II represents.

So if that’s on my right hand, that’s one parallel process that Becca brings in from literally the early 20th century to the 1940s. But on the other hand is the Latin American process, which is embedded within these calls for social reform, which is often expressed in popular protest and in pressure for social reform and this nationalist rhetoric and those domestic politics as well as the Good Neighbor Policy.

Those are the two pillars that are shaping how US diplomats, how Latin American political leaders behave, but most importantly, how people on the ground behave. And the contribution that you make has really engaged the way in which people at the very high level as well as on the ground, how they engage. They begin to use this language that is embedded within Latin America. But it’s also very keenly aware that the US government and different US government agencies have an interest in getting the cooperation of Latin Americans.

So stay with me for a minute because we have this parallel process that we bring all the way up to the 1940s. And that is what you see at the high level, if you look at the chart– at the top chart there. And then, you look at the two middle bubbles, so to speak.

You have the way in which Becca really engages the reader on how labor tensions on the ground are mitigated. And she does an amazing job looking at the way in which those conflicts often are resolved just in a variety of ways. But if you look at the way in which Latin American, especially Cuban workers engage, you have the display of that nationalist rhetoric, that display of labor reform without pressure to comply with labor policies that benefit the Cuban workers.

She knows there’s a disconnect between a progressive Cuban labor law, for example, in the late 1937, 1940s and the US labor policies that are applied at the basis. As workers navigate through that, they end up not only using just the Cuban judicial system, but even the US judicial system as well. So it’s an excellent contribution to the way we do transnational history. And she does an excellent job dissecting the different layers of that transnational system, including those judicial processes across countries, which is, again, very, very impressive.

But it’s not just progressive labor reform or the pressure to adopt progressive labor reform that is pushing for addressing these labor conditions at the military bases, the construction of military bases in Cuba in different parts of Latin America. It’s also race or better yet racism that in the case of Panama really is the driving force of labor tensions. She does an excellent job looking at the way– explaining the way in which people on the ground in Panama are really beginning to use US racist attitudes as a leverage to push for reforms at various levels.

So, again, stay with me for a minute. We have, again, the pressures in Latin America driven by calls for social reform, nationalism. We have the rhetoric of the Good Neighbor Policy and the urgency of the Cold War as those two pillars. Then you have labor tensions driven by social conditions, by labor legislation in Cuba. And in Brazil, for example, you have labor tensions driven by racial tensions, of racial issues in Panama.

So I’d like you to just stay with me here and go to the second two bubbles here. Because then, what Becca does is she looks at the way in which in the context of those two pillars that I just mentioned, what are the tensions that surface on the ground. And she looks at the way in which prostitution and the behavior of US servicemen in those military bases, why it serves as a source of conflict and how those conflicts are mediated.

And it’s a fascinating, fascinating story that really gets at those conflicts. On the other hand, the– and I lost [INAUDIBLE]. On this section here, she also looks at the way in which the jurisdiction over the crimes committed by those servicemen on the ground, how that gets worked out within Latin American systems.

Let me keep track of my time here. And as these conflicts unfold, one thing becomes clear. And that is that people on the ground resort to this notion that when it comes to the behavior or this, quote unquote, “disrespectful behavior” of your servicemen towards local culture, local traditions that often gets used and gets appropriate and then used by people on the ground to push for policies or very specific demands that they have.

Same thing when it comes to issues over jurisdiction over who should have– questions of who should have jurisdiction over the crimes that US servicemen commit on the ground.

I do want to move on– I’m keeping track of my time here. So I’m going to have to move on to the second part. The last bubble here is dealing with after World War II, what are the limits to both US and Latin Americans, what the limits in terms of pushing their agendas. And she highlights that there are a number of limits on both ends.

But I want to move on to– I was a critic. So some of the issues that I think I would love to hear more about or what I think is important for us to discuss. And one is that as scholars, when we want to bring out the agency of local people on the ground, it does require an incredible amount of pressure to balance, what happens on a number of factors.

And at least in my judgment, I felt that the book strikes for that balance, in most cases reaches a balance. But in some cases, it leaves some questions open. And I divided this into different sections.

The first one is the question of dealing with the weight we give to different actors on the ground. Becca does an outstanding job looking at how people on the ground in Latin America exercise that agency as they negotiate with the United States. I would have loved to hear a bit more on the German side.

We know that during World War II, there’s no doubt that Germany is scolding Latin Americans. And I think at different points, those questions become pretty relevant. For example, in the book, one of the issues that raised that question for me at least is that these arms agreement or sales that is happening between Brazil and Germany from 1938 to 1942.

And at different points, you note in the book that the United States held back in signing an arms agreement with the United States. And it begs that question. If the urgency that the US feels on the ground but the fear of German influence on the ground is so big, why would the US hold back in moving forward with an arms agreement with Brazil during this period? And I would love to hear more, Becca, on that section.

So balancing the role that different actors play on the ground, I think that is important. And to Becca’s credit, this is an extremely, extremely, extremely challenging task for those of us doing US-Latin American relations and looking at the nature of that encounter between people on the ground, people in high politics and how they negotiate with the United States.

The second item that I think when I comment the need to strike for that balance, it’s really that intersection, that intersection between what happens in the sociopolitical sphere within that broader cultural context. And there is– you do an amazing job highlighting the type of sources you use. Just fascinating. Very, very well researched.

You make an extremely compelling argument at the diplomatic side. By the sociopolitical– you make no secret this is a sociopolitical history. Yet, the question that surfaced as I was reading this account is the following– what about those stories?

What about if Latin Americans are using nationalism and this call for social reform to mobilize and pressure the US government as they are at the negotiating table, what about those Latin Americans who buy into the US our way of life, the American way of life in consumer culture? How much pressure do they provide? Or how much do politicians who are negotiating with the United States, how much attention do they put to those sectors of Latin American society that buy into the American way of life?

Again, it’s a question of balance and how much of that balance we bring into the narratives that we build as we focus specifically, as we zero in on the sociopolitical sphere. In other words, what is the intersection of the sociopolitical sphere with the cultural sphere As we write the history of those encounters? And for me, I think, at least this question– and I have to be honest– is partly driven by some of the very own research issues that surface for me. And let me just very quickly put this in perspective for you.

So you have this picture– and I know this is a few years later– a picture of Fidel Castro in 1959 delightfully sipping on Coca-Cola as he’s pushing for this revolutionary movement. And you can– these nationalist chants in the background. Do I focus in sociopolitical sphere? If so, what do I make of Castro buying into, again, the seductive nature of the American way of life in consumer culture?

So I do think for us as scholars looking at US-Latin American relations, that intersection, dissecting that intersection between the social and the political sphere and the broader cultural context, I think, is important. And I would love to, again, to center part of the conversation on that.

And last but not least, as I wrapping this up here, is the question of balance or how much agency we give to Latin Americans and US diplomats before or the period up to 1945 and the period after 1945. And, Becca, you do an excellent job at different parts of the book leaving an open-ended, which I think is critical.

I think it is important for those of us who are focused on looking at agency. And the extent to which Latin Americans are attempting to shape conditions, it is important to keep it open-ended. And you make no secret that the different points of the book we leave it open-ended.

Here are some of the conclusions or some of the questions that surface as we’re going through the book with the following– if Latin Americans and US diplomats were so clever, a play in the diplomatic game up to 1945, and if we have this urgency by 1947, especially when some of the US military bases up close, if they’re so clever negotiating and making things work, even using national political leaders– as you go through the book, you’ll see the Latin American political leaders, they use popular protests and nationalism as a tool to get the US to gain more from the United States.

So they were so clever in negotiating. Why did they lose that diplomatic mojo that they had before 1945? What changed? And I think this is a fascinating question. And it really opening a new lines of– new lines of research inquiries as we look at the 1940s.

And I do think it is important. Because when we come full circle, if we look at the nature of US-Latin American relations from the late 1900s to the 1940s, the questions of Pan Americanism and the creation of the OAS, I think there’s a lot there that we could uncover. But I did have some of those questions. And I’m going to stop there because I believe my time is up. But thank you for the invitation. And I look forward to the conversation. [APPLAUSE]

[REBECCA HERMAN] –for so long. And you think all along the way, will anyone read this [INAUDIBLE]? So it’s really good to have you to come to this book fresh, not having read them before and really connect with it. And–

Yeah. So I mean, I just– what a moment. I’m so thrilled to have had you both read so carefully and to really connect with the work. I’m very grateful. And really grateful for all of those really provocative questions. I hope we can continue the conversation after because I only want to take a couple of minutes so that folks have time to ask questions.

But gosh. So where do you even begin? I mean, you both picked up on this question of the transition to the postwar period. So maybe I’ll just say something about that, which is, Julio, to your question about, well, if they were so savvy, what changed? Or why didn’t they carry that clever use of these techniques into the postwar period?

And a big thing is what changed was the context they were operating in. And so you do see these strategies persist into the postwar period. They’re just not as effective because of a couple of things. One, the US doesn’t care as much about Latin America for a period of time as it did during the war.

So this belief that actively cultivating goodwill in the region is important to the United States’ best interest, that context goes away. And so a lot of the leverage goes away. But you still see folks using the same language of US security concerns to advance their requests and to try to say, no, you should really invest in these development projects. Or you should really invest in this or that thing because it’s going to be good for your interests.

It’s just not as compelling when the United States is now focused on Europe and Asia and Latin America doesn’t regain that super important place in US strategic thinking until really the Cuban Revolution. And the other thing that changes the nature of the threat that defense strategists are obsessed with, it’s no longer an extra hemispheric invasion that would require this kind of infrastructural investment when the shift is really more about counterinsurgency and the fear of Communist infiltration.

The nature of military aid changes the nature of that particular threat changes what US resources are available. So I think one of the three lines that I see when I look at other periods and I’m thinking about this idea of cooperation with the United States is something worth taking seriously is people playing the best hand that they can with the cards they’ve been dealt. And those cards change.

So I think that’s part of the story. This question about sovereignty, I think, is so important. When I was thinking about where to focus my attention is also thinking about the meaningful differences between how Cuba and Panama experience this or people there did compared to Brazil, which didn’t have that experience of US occupation and intervention.

You’re right that– so Guantanamo, Puerto Rico, the Canal Zone are always a little bit present. And for US defense strategists, the British colonies in the Caribbean, all these places are super important because the way that they can advance their interests there are different because of this question of sovereignty. So I tried to– I mean, Guantanamo is this kind of like shadow cast over the entire undertaking.

So much of what has to happen is for people to show this isn’t just the proliferation of Guantanamos across the region. And so it’s present in that way. But I wonder if I had said, OK, I’m going to take Roosevelt Roads as one of my case studies if that could have been a really interesting opportunity for thinking even more about what sovereignty really means and what international hierarchy looks like in this period.

And I think that’s certainly something worth thinking about. There was a summer where a handful of folks working on US basing in different parts of the world were being convened by Paul Kramer to have these Zoom seminars where we would swap work. And it was really interesting because there are people who are working on US basing in Okinawa, in Japan, in Germany. Totally different context.

And seeing how these sets of challenges around governance manifested in different places was really rewarding. But I think probably certainly would have pushed my own limits and pushed me beyond the limits of my capabilities. I’ll sit down, and I invite questions.

[ELENA SCHNEIDER] Thank you for those fantastic comments and a great response and [INAUDIBLE], Rebecca. Do we have any questions in the room? And also, on Zoom, if you have a question. I’m seeing [INAUDIBLE].

Zoom, if you have a question.

Oh, was it that thing?

Yeah.

People on Zoom, if you have a question, please feel free to submit it.

[INDISTINCT CONVERSATION]

–for the Q&A.

[INAUDIBLE]

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] Go ahead. Thank you. Thank you so much for this wonderful presentation of the book. I haven’t read it. So the question has to do with the negotiations by the political elite. So on the upper level but how did they use their negotiations with you as Americans for their national politics? So it’s in between the local level and the high–

Yeah, yeah.

[INDISTINCT CONVERSATION]

[REBECCA HERMAN] Yeah, thank you. How’s that? Is that good? Yeah, so I think the chapter titles like high politics and horse trading– and there is a lot of really quid pro quo, not as cynical as that sounds like legitimately, for example, the Brazilian government saying, well, if you really want us to be equal partners in defense, we need modern weapons. And modernization of security forces is a really important nation building objective at this moment.

And so this question about– there’s some really great scholarship. Brazil is one area in Latin America that has had a really sizable amount written on this period in part because Julio Vargas did this really amazing job of playing the global context to his advantage. So he negotiated arms deals with Germany that really alarmed folks in the US.

So then, the US government stepped forward and said, no, no, no, maybe we can help you get the things that you need. But part of the problem wasn’t the will. It was the practical ability to do it, figuring out how to do it legally, where the weapons would come from. Eventually, the Lend-Lease Act enables a lot more movement of those kinds of materials.

But at one point, I think the best they could do was prevent German shipments from being stopped. So military aid was one of the examples. Then the investment in various parts of industry. So Volta Redonda, which was this really important symbol of economic nationalism in Brazil, a steel mill, was built with financing from the US investment in the revitalization of the rubber industry in Brazil because this is valuable to the United States’ strategic interest rate– the need for rubber during World War II.

And then there were all kinds of ways that were coming from the United States but then could be channeled towards areas of interest. So, for example, the US invested in public health infrastructure and thought of this as advantageous on a couple of levels. One was to protect the health of US servicemen. Another was to protect the health of rubber workers so that they didn’t get sick and stop being productive. And then another was on this goodwill level. If the United States is contributing to aid Brazil in the development of public health capabilities, then that was a positive thing.

So I mean, I have a three-year-old and a six-year-old. And we’re still trying to brainwash them to the idea that cooperation is just a family value and a social good. But I think cooperation is really an effective way to get what you want. And so you see that on both sides of these negotiations, trying to find places where security interests dovetail with nation-building objectives.

And if I may– I mean, the evidence you provide for that quid pro quo is just very impressive. You definitely dive into providing that evidence for those type of– that type of interaction.

Thanks, yeah. And in the Brazilian case, I really relied on the work of Frank McCann. I mean, there are some great folks who are really interested in military history who have done a lot of the heavy lifting there. But then in some cases, it was really digging into those diplomatic archives and that sort of thing. Yeah.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] Becca, thank you– is this on? OK, I’m wondering if you could talk a little bit more about your chapter on prostitution regulation and policy. Because when I think about– when I teach on US imperial policy in Puerto Rico and I’m thinking about Laura Briggs’s work and that kind of adaptation of British, I guess, prostitution regulation policies and then how that changes in 1917, I’m wondering how your chapter might help me speak to that and also reframe it and bring it towards World War II. Like, how would you connect those histories for an undergraduate audience?

[REBECCA HERMAN] Thanks, that’s a great question, Bernadette. So that chapter became a broad umbrella sex chapter, where the second half is really devoted to prostitution and the first half is looking more at gender relations and changing social customs and the establishment of USO clubs, which were new, and conflicts that those created particularly in Brazil where US officials were eager to encourage US servicemen to have wholesome recreation options where they could engage with women from elite families who were perceived to be less likely to carry disease and keep them away from red light districts. And that created all kinds of tensions.

The section on prostitution thinks about– well, this overwhelming concern about military readiness and venereal disease led to, on the one hand, creation of wholesome recreation options, on the other hand, efforts to sanitize prostitution. And the way that this connects back to this threat of sovereignty is that this is a period where Latin American nations– well, nations around the world are still trying to think like, what is the most effective, most modern way to deal with sex work?

Do you try to have a policy of suppression and abolition? Do you criminalize it? Do you not prohibit it but decriminalize it? And so all of those questions are ongoing in each of the places that I’m looking at. And the war department’s official policy is suppression– keep US soldiers away from prostitutes. But ultimately, at each place, there’s these really tailored to the local contacts based on what the red light districts look like, policies for managing sex work and US soldiers access to sex workers.

And so I think it intersects a little bit with that earlier scholarship and that it’s not an imperial context. But it is grappling with how US officials do or don’t respond to the reality of local jurisdictions. I don’t know.

I’d be curious to talk to you about this after. Maybe I can send you the chapter and just that section. We can think about how they connect. Yeah, that’s a good question. And it goes back to this question of when you’re the sovereign versus non-sovereign space and how the story looks different.

Yeah. No, that’s a great question. I mean, I think there’s more on this, the environmental history of US military bases during the Cold War period. And it’s possible that my next book will have a chapter that thinks about this. Well, we’ll talk after. But [INAUDIBLE] is one of the places that would be an obvious place to think through these problems.

But in terms of the environmental consequences of this moment, I didn’t dedicate any space in the book to it. There’s some about in terms of the afterlives of the bases of what happens to these airfields. Most of them become national airports or national military bases. One of them was one of the airfields that the aerial support for the Bay of Pigs Invasion was supposed to bomb. It was supposed to be one of their aerial targets.

But I guess the short answer is not with this project. Maybe the future project. John Lindsay-Poland has a book about it in Panama specifically. Also, when it comes to testing weapons and the environmental fallout of that. But just in terms of paving the airfields, I didn’t see a lot of discussion of the environmental harm that that would cause. That’s a good question.

[ELENA SCHNEIDER] Well, thank you, everyone. This has been a really fascinating conversation. Thank you, Rebecca, for writing this fantastic book. Thank you, Julio and José Juan for those wonderful comments and all of you for being present and engaging. Thank you. Thank you.

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