Matrix Lecture

Alexis Madrigal: “To Know A Place”

The 2025 Matrix Distinguished Lecture

Recorded on December 4, 2025, this video features a Social Science Matrix Distinguished Lecture, “To Know a Place,” presented by journalist and author Alexis Madrigal.

Madrigal has long explored how technology, culture, and environment shape our lives; from his work co-founding The COVID Tracking Project to his books Powering the Dream and The Pacific Circuit. In this talk, Madrigal turns his attention to the question of how we come to know a place. Drawing on his background as a reporter, writer, and thinker of cities, landscapes, and histories, he explores different ways of writing about and understanding place, revealing how perspective, memory, and narrative inform the stories we tell about the world around us. 

About the Speaker

Alexis Madrigal is a journalist in Oakland, California. He is the co-host of KQED’s current affairs show, Forum, and a contributing writer at The Atlantic, where he co-founded The COVID Tracking Project. Previously, he was the editor-in-chief of Fusion and a staff writer at Wired. His latest book, The Pacific Circuit, came out in March 2025 from MCD x FSG. He is the proprietor of the Oakland Garden Club, a newsletter for people who like to think about plants. Madrigal authored the book Powering the Dream: The History and Promise of Green Technology.He has been a visiting scholar at UC Berkeley’s Information School and UC Berkeley’s Center for the Study of Technology, Science, and Medicine as well as an affiliate with Harvard’s Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society.He was born in Mexico City, grew up in rural Washington State, and went to Harvard.

Podcast and Transcript

Watch the panel above or on YouTube. Or listen to the audio recording via the Matrix Podcast below (or on Apple Podcasts).

(upbeat electronic music)

[WOMAN’S VOICE] The Matrix Podcast is a production of Social Science Matrix, an interdisciplinary research center at the University of California, Berkeley.

[MARION FOURCADE]

Thank you for joining us today. Uh, my name is Marion Fourcade. I’m the Director of Social Science Matrix.

Our Distinguished Lecture is a once-a-year opportunity to highlight an outstanding public thinker whose work sparks important conversations in the wider public sphere, and sometimes across the disciplines as well. So today, we are delighted to welcome Alexis Madrigal, a journalist based here in Oakland and co-host of KQED’s show, Forum. His wide-ranging work including his two big books, Powering the Dream, on green technology, and the more recent Pacific Circuit, reflect a deep curiosity about how technology and society intertwine, and are really always, always through a very original perspective.

Uh, so we are very honored to ask him for this year’s distinguished lecture, and I want here to acknowledge my predecessor, Cori Hayden, who had the brilliant idea, actually, of reaching out to Madrigal last spring. This is our last event of this semester, so let me just give you a quick preview of our coming activities in the spring. Very, very, very shortly, I just want to draw your attention to two, you know, two Matrix — first coming, Matrix on Point on corruption in America, and our California Spotlight in February on higher education under attack, and there are a lot more, but we also have several, you know, quite a few Author Meets Critics that are going to be that are either already scheduled or are going to be scheduled.

So let me now introduce our speaker. So Alexis Madrigal is a journalist based in Oakland. So as I said, he’s the co-host of KQED’s leading talk show in the Bay Area, Forum, and a contributing writer at The Atlantic, where he co-founded the COVID Tracking Project.

I want to honor this project because it get, really got me through Covid. It was an incredible public service that kept me hooked at the time, at a time of great upheaval and uncertainty. And, of course, I, along with Cori, have been a huge fan of his writings at The Atlantic, and they are indeed the reason why I became a subscriber a few years ago, and why you should.

Previously, Madrigal was the Editor-in-Chief of Fusion and a staff writer at Wired. His latest book, I think part of the talk will rely on it — The Pacific Circuit came out in March from MCD x FSG. Right?

It is an ambitious gripping, and very human history of Oakland as a key node in the Pacific supply chain. Madrigal is also the proprietor of the Oakland Garden Club, a newsletter for people who like to think about plants. He’s been a visiting scholar at UC Berkeley’s School of Information, and also at the Center for the Study of Technology, Science, and Medicine in Society, as well as an affiliate with Harvard’s Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society.

He was born in Mexico City, grew up in rural Washington State, and went to Harvard. So without further ado, I will turn it over to you. Thank you very much.

[ALEXIS MADRIGAL]

Thanks so much.

(audience applauding)

This is also my last big talk of the year, too. What a lovely place to do it too. I’ve spent several stints at Berkeley as a visiting scholar ’cause I never went to grad school.

Ugh. And I love it here so much. I’ll try not to get distracted by the view that’s behind you that you don’t get to see.

But it’s, this is like my favorite light of the year. You know, there was a time in my career when I was largely writing about technology. And I wrote about startups, and I wrote about big companies, though it was really nothing like today, where startups are worth billions of dollars, and big companies are worth trillions, where the weight of the technology industry has taken over the stock market, and also maybe sent the Earth off its axis too.

But back then, there was a debate about whether social media created new social conditions or merely reflected what was going on. And in this debate, there was this fierce sub-debate, some of you might remember, about whether people should refer to the world outside the screen as real life. That’s because people, I think, studying technology wanted to argue that what was happening there on Twitter or Facebook or anywhere else was also real life, and there was even a magazine, a great little magazine called ‘Real Life Mag.’

Which was about, quote, ‘Living With Technology.’ And in Real Life Mag, you know, one author described, quote, “The cultural concept, debunked over and over again, and yet somehow emotionally convenient of a real world,” scare quoted, “beyond the screen.” “To sustain these fantasies,” this author wrote, “one needs to bracket the understanding that,” quote, “Our lived reality is the result of the constant interpenetration of the online and the offline,” as Nathan Jorgenson has put it.

I wanna reverse this idea and note that there was an incredible allure to the idea that there was nothing special beyond the screen. Then whatever you were doing on your phone, whatever was happening on your feeds, whatever you could access through this piece of glass, it was as relevant a thing to study, as complex a topic, as important a subject as anything that was happening out there in what many folks, including myself, began to call the physical world, or the three-dimensional world, or, and I only rarely committed this sin, meet space. And perhaps this idea that there was nothing special about the reality outside our screens or that the interpenetration of the digital and physical made them one and the same was one that we needed to begin to take the study of social media seriously.

Twitter had to be put on a level with other weighty topics like climate change, and I would still argue it should be there. The mapping of the relationship from a social media app to the real world is important, and as all these folks would note, it was also bidirectional. Academics and journalists and just regular people had to understand the sort of cyber skin that had grown on the world, shaping all that it draped over, and I really do think it was a significant achievement putting the cybernetic nature of our current physical world front and center.

But I really think it was only a temporary maneuver, and it should be rolled back. This is really a talk in honor of real life of the real world. Because no matter what theorists said, people kept using those terms.

Was it emotional convenience, or was it something more important, a kind of deep truth that kept rising to the surface? Here’s the first part of what I think it was, the real world is alive, and the phone world is not. And what makes it real is that there are other living beings with their own goals who you meet on whatever terms, not the terms of service inside a screen.

Bodies are real and alive. Trees are real and alive. Mosquitoes are real and alive.

Perhaps the term shouldn’t be in real life but with real life, because that’s how we live outside the screen. The other part is that place really matters, and place matters because of the inescapable history of every spot on Earth. I tend to describe what came before and my recognition of it as a kind of haunting, and I mean this mostly, playfully mostly.

Places are, to borrow Jorgenson’s language, the result of the constant interpenetration not just of digital and physical, but of the past and present. Couple of my favorite artists, Helen and Newton Harrison, like to ask these two questions: How big is here? And how long is now?

And you could, like, apply that to Instagram posts, I suppose, and you’d draw a network of data centers, and you’d keep going backwards maybe, and you’d get to the sand that got made into the silicon that went into the chips and the other sand that went into the glass. Like, you could do that, and it’d probably be interesting, but it wouldn’t tell you much about the here and now of Instagram. And this is so different for real places, for the real world.

Out here, we find a superposition of so many places and systems. My wife and I have a little shop on College Avenue now called Local Economy, kind of all part of this thinking about place, and if I ask of that place, like, “How big is here? And how long is now?”

I can find so much. Because here is Claremont Creek, where our water comes from, running in pipes past the shop down College to the river where our water also comes from, eventually running to the Pacific Ocean, where our water also comes from, to the wall we had to cut open in the back room to install a sink, where our water also comes from. Here’s really a node in a logistics network.

It’s a community space. Here is an old building on a ghost streetcar line. Here to your microbiome is you, and all these heres are not stacked like dolls, but they’re connected together by complex and often mysterious piping.

There’s just so much to learn about here. Now is the rushing narrows that contains all of our histories and ancestries and genealogies. It’s the point at which we can nudge the trajectory of the world.

So now is an X-millisecond slice of perception, as a neuroscientist might say, and now is also the product of 3.8 billion years of life reproducing itself in an unbroken chain. The astrobiologist Sara Amari Walker says, “You’re actually just an object that’s very large in time.” So perhaps we could also ask, how big is now, and how long is here?

You can probably see why I’m interested in place, in knowing this particular place, a bioregion of this Earth, because I’m a technophile who quit in kind of the ways that matter, and like an ex-smoker, I bring the convert’s zeal, you know? Every tree, an opportunity to atone. Every blade of grass worth touching.

I feel like concentrating on the big here and the long now have rescued me from a world of technology that’s more alienating in its current form than I could have ever imagined when I was a kid connecting to a BBS while living at the end of a long country road in Washington. I’m obviously not the first person around here to become fixated on knowing place. You know, there’s a really proud history that I associate with the term bioregionalism, popularized by Bay Area legends like Peter Berg and his Planet Drum work and also by the poet Gary Snyder.

And Snyder’s book of essays, The Practice of the Wild, is amazing, been very influential for me. And of course, he was deeply influenced by indigenous traditions both here and across the world, and what he was invested in was that people really learn to live where they live. And he meant, of course, the flora and the watersheds and the animals, but he also meant the culture, which for him grew directly out of the place.

And he believed that a more ecologically sane world would fit our political jurisdictions to our bioregions, especially to the watersheds. Importantly for our purposes here, that required taking the time and doing the work to know and understand all kinds of things about a place. This is Snyder writing, “Bioregional awareness teaches us in specific ways.

It is not enough just to love nature or to want to be in harmony with Gaia. Our relation to the natural world takes place in a place, and it must be grounded in information and experience.” That’s ecological and hydrological knowledge.

It’s deep familiarity with our specific Bay Area social history. It’s understanding the projections that inform our local future, and it’s an intimate kind of knowing, both intellectual and embodied. You know, for good reason, Robin Wall Kimmerer has become the most influential carrier of this message in recent years.

This is Kimmerer, “America has been called the home of second chances. For the sake of the peoples and the land, the urgent work of the second man may be to set aside the ways of the colonists and become indigenous to place.” This is from Braiding Sweetgrass.

But can Americans, as a nature of immigrants, learn to live here as if we were staying? With both feet on the shore. Can’t really presume to give you what Americans might do.

I mean, look around, kind of a wild and unpredictable people, you know. But with my preamble done, I do want to give you my version of knowing this place with my mind and with my body, and let this be an offering then to the place, to the real world, to real life to life. We call this place the East Bay, but for me, it is the center of my own personal geography, and Oakland is the center of the center.

So, let’s begin then with a little talk of Oakland, a crossroads city, backlot of the future, a place destined in some ways to provide the infrastructure for the gleaming automatic city of San Francisco. A city by the water, but not of the water. In fact, turned away from the water.

Really a place where the water was more of a front in the battle with global forces. Oakland, a place that’s always been working. Maybe it’s a city that’s really a borough.

Definitely a city that’s infused with Berkeley and the American South and several countries in Asia. Oakland’s polyglot, multiethnic, multiracial, and I suggested that living in Oakland actually infuses people with a certain Oaklandish sensibility of politics almost. Oaklandish people are highly conscious of the ways that institutional discrimination has structured every aspect of American society and also of the tremendous cultural ferment that those circumstances have produced.

The pain and pleasure of belonging and not belonging, of longing for some other home and making a new one, of forgetting and of remembering. While San Francisco and Silicon Valley have dedicated themselves to the new, to the future, Oakland’s not so sure, and that’s because we’ve learned the hard way. Much of my work has taken place on the waterfront itself over the last decade, and we’re gonna get there.

But as I look ahead, my work is actually shifting geographies a little bit. The Oakland waterfront has been the center of the center of the center, but what do I even call that geography? It’s not really the San Francisco Bay Area.

It’s not really Northern California. It’s more specific and stranger like a gerrymandered district or maybe more hopefully an estuary. One way I can explain it is that one day a message arrived in my mind that I actually recognized two gods, the mountains that delineate my life, Mount Diablo that way, Mount Tamalpais, which we could see this way.

And between those two mountains, that’s where my real life was, has been, and will be. When I say this message arrived, I wouldn’t even really call it a thought. I can’t find its roots or other networks of neural firings it could be attached to.

And when I looked in for, in my mind for a why I might believe in these particular gods, it was just a single image, kind of more dream than memory, a ridgeline and a kind of luminescent wind, not actually glowing but somehow kinda sensible like I imagine a dog might see smell. And there was this realization that everything around here must bend to the will of the mountain, and in that trace, in that wisp, I think the ridge belonged to Diablo out there looming dominant and lonely. I didn’t ask for the message either.

I’m, like, not a religious person in any way, and I once said that to an eco-feminist liberation theologist, and she replied, ‘But you are a spiritual person.’ I didn’t know I was. Diablo’s obviously not my only god.

On the other side, my daily life looks to and upon Tam. I mean, Tam has so many faces, and in my mind, the mountain’s aslope from the Golden Gate to its very peak, an elongated eccentric mountain. But I know that’s just one view, and if you look from the city or from the north or from Angel Island, there’s a different mountain.

So, everywhere I look for Tam, and I track her comings and goings into the fog, into light and shadow. If you were to plot all the tracks of my life, something like Mega, Strava, or maybe there’s just some data place out there that actually has this, nearly everything I do and the vast majority of the people I love and care about are located between these two mountains. Diablo 20 miles to the east, Tam 20 miles to the west, and in between, the city, the East Bay, what humans have built here in these desperate and frenzied decades.

I live actually almost exactly on the line between the two highest peaks, like within a couple hundred yards. And my friend Robin Sloan, novelist, jokes it must be like a lay line out there somewhere. I think I might be drawn myself to what Gary Snyder called the visible fact of the mountain, that the mountain just is.

And for all humans before us, the mountain is, and for us, it will always be, is. To look upon these mountains is to see beyond our own time, beyond the biological, beyond the technological, because the mountains exist in a temporality we can ourselves only imagine. Like, we can fake an understanding of deep time, but there’s no million-year module in our brains.

We can only simulate that kind of thinking about not quite endlessness. Yet here we are, these strange beings coursing with loops and longing, contemplating the mountains with neurons working on that millisecond animal scale. Nothing actually makes me feel more biological than running up a mountain.

Inside every cell of my body has to be recruited to the challenge of ascent, and that multicellular cooperation is old enough to be forgotten and automatic. But it really is what the self is, a version of the self that predated neurons, that’s hunkered down deep in our cells. And yet that self can only exist in relation to this world and the place and the places that I run.

I should confess now that I actually spent the summertime training for and executing a solo ultra-marathon from the summit of Diablo to the base of Mount Tam, 57 miles. I delivered a little tiny stone from the top of Diablo to, to Tam. And I still, even though I’ve already done it, I can’t tell you why I did it.

Just like I don’t understand the messages that I received. But I can tell you some things that I learned running between the two mountains, training on the hills and valleys, and the Bayshore Trails. I mean, for one, I have run everywhere.

Across the San Rafael Bridge, across the Bay Bridge to Treasure Island and looping back past the IKEA and across Emeryville. I’ve run up and down the Bayshore to Richmond and the Rosie the Riveter Museum, the old Craneway Pavilion. I’ve run Mandela Parkway and into the port and looped it while it stood there empty on a Sunday, sideshow loops covering the road, cranes at rest.

All the detritus of logistics grinding into dust in the gutter of Middle Harbor, Shoreline Road. I’ve run hundreds of times up Strawberry Creek Canyon behind the university, building a kind of internal time-lapse as the seasons change but I remain, my memories getting embedded in this landscape and the landscape embedding in my own memory. One time, actually, I ran through the valley at night, it was part of my training to figure out how to run at night.

And halfway down, a single coyote began to howl. As I kept running, soon the entire valley revealed itself to be lousy with coyotes. Their cries were all around me, echoing off the canyon, and for the first time, I understood what it meant to have your blood run cold.

I run up Diablo with sweat pouring from my body in buckets, circled by flies like Linus from Charlie Brown. I run through Briones through clouds of black flies, just holding my arms in front of my face like a boxer and screaming from the sheer nastiness of their bodies on mine, picking them squirming out of my beard. I’ve run through the Ashby BART station, past the glorious Mildred Howard sculpture that finally got put in just as Howard herself was being pushed out by gentrification.

I’ve run every glorious trail in Redwood, trees high above me, ruddy dust coating my shoes in a sweaty paste, the quiet, all-encompassing. I’ve run three miles in blistering heat to visit a patch of special Oakland Calochortus, mariposa lilies, which are my favorite. I’ve run the mudflats of San Leandro in pouring rain, my fingers fumbling with energy bars, clothes soaked.

A miserable counterpoint to the happily skittering water birds dancing where the water meets the land. I’ve run in the Southern Oakland hills near the gun range, where every now and again, I’m reminded we’re in America. I could go on, I really could go on, but I will stop.

(laughter)

My point is, running has pulled bioregional knowledge inside me. I mean that in a really quite literal way, that running pulls the environment into you, because it’s not your body alone that trains. You need the ground and the air and the trails and the gravel paths, all of the places you’ve moved your body through.

Training merges the body into Bay Farm Island or the Tamalpa Trail or Marina Bay, or the Embarcadero. These places have literally gone inside my legs and heart, all those strides, the bottoms of my feet pushing against earth, the filling of my lungs with air, the blood rushing to where it’s desperately needed. And these moments of emplacement on the earth are now encoded in my body.

The trails are in the fibers of my heart and in the muscles of my legs and the patterns of my brain. My body is inseparable, really, from the landscape. And wasn’t that, in a kinda more general form, one of the key realizations of ecology?

You know, there was another 1960s era, a San Francisco publication called Man Not Apart, that we’re not people living in a diorama, we’re part of a living world and that living world is a part of us, not just in this moment but reaching back through time. I’ve been a bit haunted by Andrew Alden’s book on the geology of Oakland called Deep Oakland. It’s a good haunted, I would say, but he describes our Bay’s long-term oscillation between Bay and the river valley that it’s actually often been in the fullness of deep time.

Like, our shorelines, that our shorelines would not be fixed is something that I think we all kinda understand, but to truly imagine sand blowing over from a San Francisco not on the water, and that that sand piling up over the eons created the material on which downtown Oakland now sits, gives me this chills, and it also helps me prepare, maybe a little, for sea level rise, to think of the place that I love as that dynamic. And also to know that this sand is what lets the buildings of downtown Oakland rise, so that one day I can walk beneath them with a million people celebrating the idea of Oakland, the warriors on floats and people shouting, “My town!” People long since vanished, many no longer in Oakland, Team Gone too, along with many of the businesses once there, and yet that city still exists inside me too.

How long is now? It’s not enough to me to understand just the physical and biological elements of a place, you know, Humans Not Apart. Another astrobiologist, you can tell I’m interested in astrobiology, Adam Webb, says, you know, “We are what the biosphere is doing now.”

So let us talk of what we’ve done to Oakland, to the parts of Oakland that used to be the shoreline and those that are the shoreline now. So a lot of my work down there has really focused on the global forces I call the Pacific Circuit and how they’ve transformed Oakland and the people who live closest to the port and how they’ve dealt with those changes. For me, the Pacific Circuit’s core is the network of container ports connecting Asian manufacturing with American consumers and corporate know-how, a system that’s generated at the most valuable companies the world has ever known.

You could mark the beginning of it as containerization, which enabled the integrated supply chains that Silicon Valley has specialized in. You know, we often focus on the kind of physical parts of that, stuffing things into boxes, which can be loaded on ships, trains, or trucks, and all the systems around that, which vastly reduced the amount of labor needed on the waterfront and expanded how much land a port needed to take up. You know, that’s kind of the port part.

But just as important were the information and communication technologies that were necessary to make the system run, the Silicon Valley part. And it’s important to say that Silicon Valley chipmakers were building assembly plants and factories in Asia literally at the dawn of the industry, and those same products were making the control of those places from Northern California easier. It was, to a certain way of thinking, a virtuous circle.

Logistics offered an incredible new opportunity to build new production systems. Almost always left out of that story is that there was another component to the system that was also required, and that was a vast shoreline in close proximity to San Francisco that could be turned into an environmental sacrifice zone, and that’s the West Oakland part. West Oakland had long been the most diverse and also the most working class of Oakland’s neighborhoods.

Black people had built a thriving commercial corridor along 7th Street that still resounds in the hearts and minds of people today. A new form of blues emerged there. It was a place where you could go not only to get soul food, but also to visit the dentist or find a union, go to a political meeting.

It was really kind of a town square for Black life in the East Bay. Can kind of sound nice when you describe the sanctuary that black people built amidst depression, but we can’t forget another truth right alongside that one, which was that black people were segregated in the Bay Area, especially in the years after the New Deal. The political trade for an America with socialistic tendencies was an America in which segregation reigned from sea to shining sea.

West Oakland was, in addition, red-lined. That is to say, marked for disinvestment by the federal government alongside a variety of private entities and other levels of government. And it was really worse than red-lining.

In 1937, the federal government engaged in a massive data collection effort to analyze every block of every urban area in the country, and it was this data that actually fed into the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation and FHA’s different efforts at risk rating, mapping and red-lining neighborhoods within cities. They drew on the Chicago School of Sociology’s beliefs that cities grew from the inside out, that racial invasion was a primary, maybe the primary factor in driving urban change, and that black people specifically were a detriment to property values. Hence, the inner city became a metonymy for black America because the inner city was where segregated black populations were left to their own devices, right as the government funded suburban developments for white people.

Just to put a fine point on it, there were 350,000 suburban homes backed by the FHA built in the Bay Area from the ward in 1959, and only 100 non-whites were living in them at the end of that period, but we’re at Berkeley and you can all read Richard Rothstein to get the full story on that. Here, let me add a little different element that I think gets short shrift in most histories. In Oakland, that data-gathering effort that I mentioned, it was led by a guy named I.F. Shattuck.

You probably recognize the name from Shattuck, and he wrote a report based on all the data for the City of Oakland. He suggested two key things. One, that a freeway be rammed through the area of West Oakland to segregate the blacker west end from the whiter east.

And two, that industrial facilities should be sited near the dense residential neighborhoods of West Oakland to, quote, “crowd out” residents by reducing their quality of life. To Shattuck and his ilk, crowding out would solve the problem of assembling properties for industrial concerns who would support Oakland’s tax base and also what he saw as the problem of black people living in the city. And of all the injuries visited upon black people in this country, red-lining, predatory lending, racial steering, unjust policing, segregation, many more you can probably name, I think using pollution as public policy might be the most underrated.

Citing heavy industry near black families’ homes was direct, not just financial violence, and it took place at an almost unbelievable scale in community after community and continued unabated for decades. As it was in Oakland, so it was all over the Bay Area. Look at the archipelago of black communities here.

East Palo Alto up to Bayview-Hunters Point, Marin City, Richmond, Oakland, down to Russell City. All of them were near the water, most of them directly attached to waterfront work, and all of them subject to terrible injurious living conditions, and it was all intentional. This was the world in which the main character in my book, Miss Margaret Gordon, was born.

Miss Margaret, many of you probably know, an environmental justice leader in West Oakland, works here at Berkeley now too and she was my guide to not just the place of West Oakland, but also how Oakland worked. So when I go back and listen to some of my earliest recordings of her from now 10 years ago, she was really giving me the whole game, putting me onto everything that would later become the book. And honestly, I was not yet deep enough in West Oakland, the lore of it, at that point to understand how rich those early conversations were.

It actually took me half a decade of work interviewing people, learning the place, digging in archives to even really begin to approach what Miss Margaret was trying to tell me about the place, what she already knew in her mind and her bones and her heart and her lungs. There’s really one thing I’ve come to believe with a really fierce conviction that the story of West Oakland is known by the culture-keepers of West Oakland. People there don’t need historians and journalists to tell them the truth of what happened.

They were there, their ancestors were there, and we can fill in details we can pull receipts from predominantly white institutions, and I think that’s a useful role for us, but those third-generation Oaklanders, the people whose parents came on the railroad for the war work, who passed down the stories of the Jim Crow South and the North’s separate but equally nasty depredations, they don’t need me to tell them about how the scale of the federal government’s interventions in the area were enormous, how thousands of housing units were destroyed, how the American state encircled the neighborhood with freeways and rammed BART through its thriving cultural district and maintained a heavy industrial zoning designation in the densest residential neighborhood in Oakland. And built an enormous container port for global shipping directly attached to the neighborhood, and bulldozed whole city blocks to build a postal logistics facility, calling in a cut-rate demolition man who did the job in front of neighborhood children and downtown elites with a literal World War II tank. They know the story, if not the details.

Truly the story of the country of sacrificing black lives for economic growth, while white business owners prospered. Or as Miss Margaret would put it, “One was down, and one was up.” Some people have made a ton of money from the port’s operations, that’s for sure.

But to the residents of West Oakland, all the economic growth meant was thousands of trucks going through and idling in their neighborhood, belching diesel particulate matter into the lungs of their children. Over time, asthma rates climbed up, people got sick, and researchers called the combined effect on the health of residents of places like this weathering, except the weather was racism, environmental racism, institutional racism, can’t go for a walk outside racism, have no grocery store racism, been up all night with sick kids racism. This was a hard place to live for a lot of years.

Some people loved it despite its flaws. Some people hated it. Art came out of it.

Many people died unnecessary deaths. But no one could say that the west part of West Oakland was being done justice by our country, despite the struggles and contributions of its people. And then in 1989, the earthquake hit.

The freeway that had cut off the west part of West Oakland, as envisioned by racist planners since 1937, collapsed. A new range of community efforts began, and Miss Margaret, who moved to the neighborhood shortly after, found herself in the middle of many of them. One of the things that was sprouting up in the neighborhood during those years of intense crosswinds was a program called the West Oakland Environmental Indicators Project.

Miss Margaret actually started volunteering through their community planning process. And the idea behind that organization was that the residents of West Oakland knew what the problems in the neighborhoods were, but their voices had been ignored. They knew they needed to take what everyone knew and turn it into data that could be processed by regulators, politicians, and citizens alike, and that’s what they set out to do.

They brought together dozens of community members to list the problems where they lived, and the list that they developed really could be summed into two buckets, air quality and toxic exposure on the one hand, and gentrification and displacement on the other. To use the old language of Shattuck, like you don’t have to squint much at those two issues to see a new version of crowding out. To go through some of the stats from West Oakland at the time, there were more than 400 contaminated sites in West Oakland.

That’s one reason why there’s still so many empty lots as you ride the West Oakland BART into the West Oakland station. Children were seven times more likely to be hospitalized because of asthma than the average Californian. 82% of residents lived within an eighth of a mile of an industrial facility.

Five times the toxic chemicals per capital, per capita were created in West Oakland than in the rest of the city, and the children of the ZIP code were the most likely to have lead poisoning. Yet, only 8% of the city’s lead abatement funding went to West Oakland. Despite all that, in the late ’90s and early 2000s, the money that had been created in the dot-com boom was flowing over into the area.

So even 20 years ago, people were not only fighting to push pollution out, but to keep themselves in this historic neighborhood, which had provided sanctuary for people’s parents and aunties and cousins, where they’d gone to dance class and eaten Thanksgiving dinner. The project’s first campaign was shutting down a yeast factory. I didn’t know this about yeast factories, but they’re disgusting.

You can think about that every time you’re putting it in your bread. Every 18 hours, the factory spewed a toxic, carcinogenic, and disgusting-smelling chemical into the air. They got the plant closed down, that drew more people to the effort.

And so despite losing their initial funder shortly thereafter, Miss Margaret stayed on to tackle the next big problem, which was the trucks, the trucks going into and out of the port. Decades before, Huey Newton, who lived, you know that one big tall building by the lake in Lake Merritt? He lived on the top floor there, looking over on the Oakland Estuary and therefore the port.

And he wrote an essay called The Technology Question, in which he argued, among other things, that supply chains dispersed ethical responsibility. At a time when Silicon Valley was the building the transistors that were often used in the military-industrial complex, Newton wrote, “The US capitalist has been able to spread out his entire operation. You put together his machinery and parts.

Thus you are not building a bomb, you are building a transistor.” One might have an ethical reaction to working directly on a bomb, but supply chains, the spread out made it harder to see the impacts of whatever anyone was doing. The scale and fluidity of production and logistics just make it hard to pick out who’s responsible for what.

For example, the Port of Oakland, in becoming a crucial node in the global supply chain of goods, required thousands of individual people to drive in and out of the port, spewing emissions. None of them was directly responsible for the disease burden in Oakland, but collectively, the system was making people sick just as it enriched others. So Miss Margaret and her organizing partner, a guy named Brian Beverage, took over the work of fighting the port.

People from West Oakland stood on the streets counting trucks. They documented how trucks idled outside of schools and ruined roads and sidewalks. They put air quality monitoring equipment inside Ms. Margaret’s home and found that her family was exposed to five times the particulate matter that other neighborhoods were.

As the 2000s wore on, they knew they had to build an actual coalition to win against the port. Ms. Margaret, as an old friend of hers told me, is a, quote, “Feisty little woman.” But she also knew she had to develop allies.

Sometimes those folks were old friends, like a woman named Gloria she’d known since they were in Hunter’s Point together as little kids. Some of them were people who worked with the truckers, like a baseball hat-wearing small businessman named Bill Labooty. Sometimes they were higher up.

As they maneuvered to create legislation, she found herself relying on then-governor Arnold Schwarzenegger. But she had no more important ally in the fight than a guy named Tony Iton, who took over as the county health officer in 2003. One of the first things that he did was to look at the county’s records of death certificates.

These deaths were also data that could tell them who was dying when. They mapped the life expectancy of people living in different parts of the city, and the results were, or at least should have been, shocking. If you were a Black person living in West Oakland, you’d die more than a decade before a Black person in the Oakland hills.

If you were a Black person living in West Oakland, you’d die up to 15 years before a white person in the hills. And it wasn’t actually because of gang violence, or drugs, or AIDS, or infant mortality. People in the flatlands were dying of the same things as people in the hills, just sooner: heart disease, cancer, respiratory illnesses.

That term kept coming up again, weathering. With these different types of data in hand, they began to lean on the port. Ms. Margaret got appointed by Ron Dellums to the Port Commission in 2007, and she’s still the only person ever to serve from the actual community impacted by the port’s operations.

They made major reforms both at the hyperlocal and state levels. One, they got the trucks upgraded to be cleaner. Two, the truckers were routed away from residential areas and overall truck trips were reduced.

Three, Schwarzenegger got legislation passed requiring container ships to switch to cleaner fuels when they got near California. And four, ships were required to plug into electrical power on the shore rather than running their engines while in port, burning fuel. So nasty, it’s basically asphalt at room temperature.

Ms. Margaret was instrumental in pushing through all of these initiatives. By 2015, diesel particulate emissions from trucks were down 98% from 2005. Emissions from cargo ships were down 75%.

The port had undergone a transformation and made West Oakland’s air radically cleaner. The reforms have actually been adopted acro– around the country, and Ms. Margaret is a national expert now on reducing the health impacts of the still booming logistics industry. It’s really and genuinely a triumph, an unlikely and incredible triumph.

And it really has remade this place, and it’s been an honor to tell that story with Ms. Margaret and so many others from West Oakland. But as Ms. Margaret would say, “There’s always another fight.” And I wanna turn to our city’s other set of problems, and we’re gonna thread all these stories together.

But first, I’m gonna drink a sip of water. In Oakland, you may have noticed, there is a great emptiness to a lot of city life. Bars and cafes and restaurants keep closing.

You often have the feeling of being alone among tall buildings. The sadness of blocks of ground floor retail filled with nothing but discarded dreams. One small business owner I know posted a receipt from so-called Small Business Saturday.

She made two sales, her worst ever Small Business Saturday in 20 years. And in the comments to her post, there are dozens and dozens of people saying similar things. These businesses and people are the backbone of a city, and yet they can barely survive.

And it’s not just in Oakland, it’s happening in cities all across the country. The economic historian Martha Poone said to me, “The city is based on exchange. It’s a place that allows you to meet and gather.

That’s the origin of the city, and that commercial model of life is gone.” What happened? I mean, we all know, it’s rampant inequality that’s pouring money upwards, pushing the middle class into precarity and the working class into immiseration.

And it’s also the Pacific Circuit sucking more and more dollars into apps and out of stores. The changes that brought began to transform retail many years ago. I mean, big box stores and Walmart were sort of the charismatic surface manifestations of the phenomenon.

But coastal cities had actually seemed resilient. They were growing and increasingly rich, and our dense patchwork of businesses didn’t get knocked out by the big box era. Money flowed steadily into the narrow sliver of real estate along the Pacific.

But the pandemic inaugurated a new time and perhaps pulled the future forward some years. Logistics came for the very idea of restaurants and the other low-key semi-public spaces that make a city a city. Internet entrepreneurs flaked off the profitable parts of urban businesses and cast off the weight of the positive externalities they generated.

What did they care if a cafe was more than a place to get a sandwich? They could sell you the sandwich easier, deliver it right to your mouth almost. The logic of logistics began to extend down into the marrow of our households.

Everybody with a phone is part of these networks for moving people and goods. A Chinese manufacturer can now direct something to you right to your house, bypassing any local business not involved in delivery. Uber and the Uber for everything apps can take you anywhere or bring anything to you.

And while that’s added some convenience to our lives, which I think is undeniable, there’s been a terrible collective effect. It’s now harder to open a shop selling anything. It’s harder to run a restaurant.

It’s harder to keep public transit running when it’s bleeding riders to apps. Just a couple weeks ago on forum, the mayor of San Jose floated the idea to me that it might be cheaper to subsidize Waymo than to keep their public transportation systems running. The Pacific Circuit hasn’t only changed cities, it’s also changed us.

There is such a thing as the logistical self now. Logistical figures, as the architectural researcher Claire Leister calls them, or maybe it’s us, were people who understand ourselves as nodes in a network of flows, less citizens of Oakland or San Jose than delivery or pick-up points across a variety of apps. One doesn’t wander the city, but draws on the whole world’s resources to deliver whatever is desired.

People who lived in big cities used to love having a guy, this guy of any gender, but having a guy who had access to niche products or services. Now, there’s always an app, a website, and then a delivery. Instead of a friendly set of trusted people across a metropolitan region, there is a data trail and a recycling bin filled with Amazon boxes.

It’s sad. This atomization, this running of the whole world on a different set of rails that bypass any sense of collectivity. There’s a story that Kurt Vonnegut tells.

It goes viral every once in a while. It seems like every six months, I see it going viral. And it’s about a time when he goes out to buy an envelope and his wife asks why he doesn’t buy 100 envelopes and keep them in his office, you know, that logistical thinking.

But Vonnegut has no intention of doing that. He says, “I’m gonna have a hell of a good time in the process of buying one envelope. I meet a lot of people, see some great-looking babes.”

That hasn’t held up as well. “and a fire engine goes by and I give them the thumbs up and ask a woman what kind of dog that is. And of course, the computers will do us out of that.

And what the computer people don’t realize, or they don’t care, is we’re dancing animals. “You know, we love to move around. And we’re not supposed to dance at all anymore.”

Cities are so good at building solidarity. Not the hard solidarity of getting into the streets in the interest of others, but the soft one of building human allegiance for no reason at all. With an exchange of money, there’s also the inefficient interchanges of life.

City life is filled with all kinds of little gives and takes, with grocery checkers, the bookstore people, a Japanese steel specialist who carries obscure gardening tools, the vintage store lady with an eye for French chore coats, the guy selling Street Spirit outside the café, the barista with an eyebrow ring and heart of gold, the woman who says, smiling, “Why, this dog? He’s a Maltipoo.”

(audience laughing)

If you want a hopeful note, I’ll give you a hopeful note. For all that we’ve lost in real life, I actually do think we’re approaching a natural breaking point in this massive arc of history. I don’t know how it’s gonna go, but I am optimistic.

On the one side, you have logistical forces, billionaires, liquid capital, artificial intelligence, of course, and they’re offering some sense of the new, of technological progress, and maybe somewhere in their future, there’s a better life for some of us, too. A more immediately satisfied, less lonely, less complex life, one with less and less and less friction. But there’s a problem.

The base reliability of anything you see on your screen is going down with each passing day. Like, right now is as good as it’s gonna be for the foreseeable future, and I think it’s gonna get much, much worse. That’s not to say whatever’s on there won’t be engaging, commercially successful, or even interesting in some ways, but the ability to believe your own eyes or your own belief that you’re communicating with another human is disappearing.

And it’s disappearing so that a small number of companies can become the most valuable entities the world has ever known in reaching a tiny number of people beyond comparison. Matched up against that, on the other side, and where I locate myself emphatically, there is the local. There’s the grass, the more than human world, the dog, the feeling of hugging someone, that thing where you walk into a room with friends and acquaintances and they all go, “Hey!”

It’s being a regular. It’s being a stranger meeting new people. It’s knowing the seasons by the smell of the air and the blooming of particular flowers.

This isn’t an atechnological vision, and it’s not a rural vision either, but it is a local vision, and I’ve never believed more strongly in the future of the local, of place, of the real world than I do right now. The side I’m describing is the side of real life, not simulations of life. It’s on the side of living beings, beings that have goals we can only dimly grasp, beings we can never fully know.

There are trees that have been alive since Jesus was executed by the Roman Empire. There are bowhead whales that have been alive since Moby Dick was written. There are communities of aspen trees that might as well be immortal.

The marigold that I have tattooed on my left arm is from the Florentine Codex. It’s the first place marigolds appear in the Western canon, and it looks just like the ones in my yard. We’re so much deeper in time than we like to pretend, so much more enmeshed in all the histories, geological, biological, hydrological.

Now is so long. Here is so big. Let’s just say for all the power and all the weight of money in the technological machine, the forces of the real world are adaptive and thrilling and powerful too.

But not all of them come without consequences. As much as people would like to ignore the social history of our cities that I talked about earlier in this lecture, the way that racism structured every single city in the Bay, the seas are making sure that we cannot forget. The very same places where our chemicals are buried, where Black people were forced to build lives, are now on the frontlines of sea level rise.

And like ghosts, the chemicals buried on these degraded lands are going to be pushed up as the weight of the water presses in on the lands. Here at Berkeley even have called the phenomenon toxic tides, and we’re gonna be dealing with those repercussions long before the waters over top the seawalls will end up building. You can bury things, you can pave over them, you can call them a park or a parking lot, but it turns out that the social history of race in America is inexplicably interwoven with our ecological crisis and the future of the city.

The only solution I can see is reparations, a reparations of place that enfolds many and unfolds over decades. In our region, it seems to me the answer is to resuscitate our land so they become assets for the people who were harmed by the discriminatory mid-century system. A program that actually repaired the places where black people have lived would make black lives better, and it would, like a curb cut, make everyone’s lives better.

We can’t fall into a cynicism that a gain for someone is a loss for everyone else, and my work on the Pacific Circuit has convinced me that we must stand with this place, our place. Not allowing it to be merely a box on a map or a node in a network, or a number of miles on a Strava recording, but a specific piece of earth with all its histories. Its legacy is woven into its trees and the chemistry of its soil, the peel of its paint and the poems carved into its walls.

And then we can ask, do we fight for this place or do we leave it behind? What do I need? What are the people who live here now and once lived here need from me?

I am an immigrant’s son and I believe in change and the future, and I don’t think you have to stay wherever fate plopped you down on this earth, but this is my place. I am of this place. I have become of this place.

Both feet here, both feet moving along the shore and up the mountains and through the streets. Perhaps it’s part of my belief in standing with life against the forces of not life, that you must honor the ancestors. Not just those in your own family tree, but those who have tended to and are embedded in your home, human and non-human alike.

We who live here are lucky to live on the edge of a vast wilderness. I will never forget one time, I was running out on the eastern span of the Bay Bridge when I spotted someone with a huge fish on one of the piers at the landing of the old bridge, and I ran over there and there were these two guys holding up a four-foot-long shovelnose guitarfish. It’s this kind of narrow ray that feeds on the bottom and swims like a shark, and the people who fish the bay know what lives in these waters.

Birders may have a more obvious and gentle connection with the more-than-human world, but the fishers possess a similar kind of specialized knowledge and deep connection. They understand the currents, the way the bait fish move, and the crabs on the sea floor. They know the small hours and the lonely piers.

The swimmers too know this coastline in a way that makes me envious. They know how the water moves, how to go with the tides, and they get views of our bay that no one else does. I’ve long been awed by the elders up in Point Richmond who simply walk into the bay and then emerge an hour later having made the waters their own in ways I can only imagine.

The bay is not a pool though. I know a swimmer out of the Dolphin Club, and a few years ago, she jumped into the water at Fort Mason. After a second, she felt a bump from below and then a chomp on her calf as a seal tested her out.

Then the animal was gone as quickly as it had manifested next to her in the water, leaving her to cry out in the shallows of the bay. It was like the bay itself had bitten her, a silent painful reminder of how life can be. I use these stories to illustrate that throughout these waters, there is life both known and unknown, and these are wild creatures, which means that the shoreline is actually a wild land urban interface.

Let’s bring Gary Snyder back one more time. He wrote, “Wilderness is a place where the wild potential is fully expressed, a diversity of living and non-living beings flourishing according to their own sorts of order. To speak of wilderness is to speak of wholeness.

Human beings came out of that wholeness, and to consider the possibility of reactivating membership in the assembly of all beings is in no way regressive.” That is to say the future does not have to be a state of technology. It does not have to rely on a product.

It does not need to be made in a fab in Taiwan or coded by a 19-year-old in Palo Alto. The future can be a new imagination for this place because one thing we know is how we imagine the bay can have tremendous consequences for what happens to it. When we imagine the bay only as an industrial resource and part of the arsenal of democracy for shipbuilding, it became that, and this had consequences all over the country as different communities were pulled to our bay shore looking for work.

So, how do we imagine a new era for this place and for the bay? We know the key conditions: for all humans, not some, for the health of all living creatures, not some, for the whole, not the parts, for an economy that is not shortsighted but draws on the older sense of the word “economy,” something much closer to stewardship, for plans and behaviors that work in concert with the vast hydrogeological and climatic forces at play in this world, not against them. Snyder wrote, “A place on earth is a mosaic within larger mosaics.”

The land is all small places, all precise, tiny realms, larger and smaller patterns. Our gorgeous Bay Area is our specific bay area, but it is also part of the pattern of cities, of estuaries, of California coastline, and of coastlines everywhere, which means reimagine this one place and we reimagine everywhere else too. I spent 10 years on this project, 15 thinking about its themes and contradictions, and where I’ve landed is this.

The country we need will not run from history, but learn from respect and eventually transcend what was wrought in the past. It’s history, but it’s something more too. Real life is built over time, place built over place, and it’s this sediment that creates the richness of the real world.

You cannot turn it off and turn it back on again. The apple rots once a bite has been taken. Not everything has a just-so place on a rectangle of glass or in an economic system.

In the real world, so much escapes our attempts at enclosure, so much diffuses into the place whether we know it or not. What is dust even but time, really the accumulation of being skin and hair, tiny dead bugs, and even tinier living ones? Can I pretend my efforts here to excavate how I have known this place, how I know it are some kind of cathedral, but perhaps an altar made of dust, of bits of life and death?

These offerings aren’t enough to solve any of our region’s problems, but maybe knowing more can make the streets feel less haunted. Those unexplained empty lots, those odd mounds by the waterfront, those underground chemical plumes, those daylighted streams. I feel like I have tried to recognize the hands and minds and lungs of the people who form this place, in struggle and in joy.

I may not be able to give the ghosts of the bay peace, but I’ve given them care. Thank you.

(applause)

(upbeat electronic music)

[WOMAN’S VOICE] Thank you for listening. To learn more about Social Science Matrix, please visit matrix.berkeley.edu.

CRELS

Maximilian Kasy: “The Means of Prediction: How AI Really Works (and Who Benefits)”

Part of the UC Berkeley Computational Research for Equity in the Legal System Training Program (CRELS)

Recorded on December 2, 2025, this video features a talk by Maximilian Kasy, Professor of Economics at the University of Oxford, presenting his book The Means of Prediction: How AI Really Works (and Who Benefits).

This talk was part of a symposium series presented by the UC Berkeley Computational Research for Equity in the Legal System Training Program (CRELS), which trains doctoral students representing a variety of degree programs and expertise areas in the social sciences, computer science, and statistics.

The talk was co-sponsored by Social Science Matrix, the Berkeley Economy and Society Initiative (BESI) Tech Cluster, the Berkeley Institute for Data Science (BIDS), and the UC Berkeley Department of Economics.

About the Book

AI is inescapable, from its mundane uses online to its increasingly consequential decision-making in courtrooms, job interviews, and wars. The ubiquity of AI is so great that it might produce public resignation — a sense that the technology is our shared fate.

As economist Maximilian Kasy shows in The Means of Prediction, artificial intelligence, far from being an unstoppable force, is irrevocably shaped by human decisions — choices made to date by the ownership class that steers its development and deployment. Kasy shows that the technology of AI is ultimately not that complex. It is insidious, however, in its capacity to steer results to its owners’ wants and ends.

Kasy clearly and accessibly explains the fundamental principles on which AI works, and, in doing so, reveals that the real conflict isn’t between humans and machines, but between those who control the machines and the rest of us.

The Means of Prediction offers a powerful vision of the future of AI: a future not shaped by technology, but by the technology’s owners. Amid a deluge of debates about technical details, new possibilities, and social problems, Kasy cuts to the core issue: Who controls AI’s objectives, and how is this control maintained? The answer lies in what he calls “the means of prediction,” or the essential resources required for building AI systems: data, computing power, expertise, and energy.

As Kasy shows, in a world already defined by inequality, one of humanity’s most consequential technologies has been and will be steered by those already in power. Against those stakes, Kasy offers an elegant framework both for understanding AI’s capabilities and for designing its public control. He makes a compelling case for democratic control over AI objectives as the answer to mounting concerns about AI’s risks and harms.

The Means of Prediction is a revelation, both an expert undressing of a technology that has masqueraded as more complicated and a compelling call for public oversight of this transformative technology.

About the Speaker

Maximilan_KasyMaximilian Kasy received his PhD at UC Berkeley and joined Oxford after appointments at UCLA and Harvard University. His current research interests focus on social foundations for statistics and machine learning, going beyond traditional single-agent decision theory. He also works on economic inequality, job guarantee programs, and basic income. Kasy teaches a course on foundations of machine learning at the economics department at Oxford. Learn more at his website.

Podcast and Transcript

(upbeat electronic music)

[WOMAN’S VOICE] The Matrix Podcast is a production of Social Science Matrix, an interdisciplinary research center at the University of California, Berkeley.

[MARION FOURCADE]: Hello, everyone. It is 4:10, so per Berkeley time, we will begin. So thank you for joining us today.

My name is Marion Fourcade. I’m the Director of Social Science Matrix and one of the faculty affiliates of the CRELS program, the, which is the main sponsors of today’s event. The UC Berkeley training program on computational research for equity in the legal system, CRELS, brings together doctoral students from across the social sciences, computer science, and statistics to explore issues at the intersection of computation and equity.

So we are delighted today to welcome Maximilian Kasy, professor of economics at the University of Oxford, who will discuss his new book, The Means of Prediction: How AI Really Works and Who Benefits. In this book, Kasy offers a very accessible yet incisive account of artificial intelligece, intelligence. Rather than framing AI as an unstoppable force, he invites us to consider the power structures and ownership arrangements that determine what AI systems do, whom they serve, and how their objectives might be governed democratically.

And please note that today’s event is co-sponsored by the Berkeley Economy and Society Initiative, especially, specifically the Tech Cluster and also by the Berkeley Department of Economics, where Max got his PhD. But before I turn it over to our guest, let me just mention the final event at Social Science Matrix this semester. It will, oh, we don’t have the–

Okay, this is the lineup for next, for next spring. But the, we have a final event this week. On Thursday, we will welcome Alexis Madrigal a journalist who is very well known to many of you through KQED and The Atlantic.

You know, he was the author of the COVID Tracker and did many really important projects. And he will give a, a Matrix lecture on Oakland that is entitled “To Know A Place,” and that’s on Thursday at 4:00 PM. And then you can see here the lineup for next spring.

We have a whole bunch of events. I especially want to spotlight our, you know, our Matrix on Point on corruption in America and on higher education under attack. Let me now introduce our speaker briefly.

So Max Kasy received his PhD here at Berkeley and joined Oxford University after appointments at UCLA and Harvard University. His current research focuses onsocial, the social foundations for statistics and machine learning going beyond traditional single agent decision theory. He also works on economic inequality, job guarantee programs, and basic income.

He does, you know, there’s a very wide range of topics and he teaches a course on foundations of machine learning at the economics department at Oxford. So without further ado please welcome Max for this lecture.

(audience applauding)

[MAXIMILIAN KASY]

Thank you, Marion. Thanks for having me, and thanks everyone for coming today. I am going to tell you today about my new book, The Means of Prediction, which came out a few weeks ago with University of Chicago Press.

And the book, as you heard, is called The Means of Prediction: How AI Really Works, so the “Really” part was inserted by my publisher, “And Who Benefits.” And all right, so to get things started, like if you’ve read any news in the last few years and especially any news related to AI, chances are you will have come across a story that, that goes something like, like this one here. The, the idea of this story is that we are close to the point of reaching artificial general intelligence or superhuman AI.

And in that point, AI will be better than humans at improving AI itself, and so you get this exponential explosion of AI capabilities. And that will maybe be nice in the short run, but then will be a major problem because the objectives of AI might be different from those from the humans. And so humans will want to switch off the AI at some point and because existence is a precondition of fulfilling its goals, the AI has to eliminate humanity first.

Right, so this is, this is a story that Silicon Valley loves. This is a story that Hollywood loves. I’ve counted, and I’ve found I think around in 40 Hollywood movies that all have the same plot line, going back to the ’60s with Space Odyssey or Terminator in the ’80s or more recently, Ex Machina, or The Matrix, or you name it.

It’s always this story of man versus machine. So it’s usually a man where there’s like one heroic actor that somehow in a battle for life or death with a machine. And going even going further back, beyond like the more recent age of AI, it’s, this story has been told many, many times.

So just to give you one example, there was this Disney clip from the ’40s called Fantasia, where you have like Mickey Mouse who’s, who’s a magician’s apprentice and wants the, wants the broom to carry, carry water, and do his chores because he doesn’t want to do his chores, and then falls asleep, and then the broom dutifully just keeps carrying water until Mi– Mickey almost drowns and has to be saved by the master magician. Right? So it’s again, pretty much exactly the same story.

You could tell many, many other versions. And so these stories clearly resonate, right? These stories, and clearly touch on some of our deepest fears, right?

So, it really goes to the core of our existence. Starts with, like, automation costing our livelihoods, continues to being ruled by these inscrutable forces, losing our autonomy, and ultimately becomes a matter of life and death, or even the survival of humanity. And all of that happens due to some incomprehensible, inscrutable, almost divine forces that are coming at us, right?

So, clearly, that story does resonate on some level. I don’t think it’s a good story in terms of enabling decisions about AI for kind of two broad sets of reasons. One is it’s kind of a story that’s happening to us, right?

The machine is somehow self-improving and then eliminating us. There’s no human actors in that story. It’s completely hiding that there’s like a million decisions to be made along the way of what technology to build, to what users to put it, when to turn it off or not, and so on.

And so it replaces human choices and agency by a story that’s just happening to us. And second, in this story, there’s never, like, a conflict within society about what to do with this, technology. It’s always, like, the heroic human actor fighting with the machine, as opposed to talking about the different parts of society having different interests, values and so on that impact what happens with the technology.

And so I think it’s probably for these two sets of reasons that the tech industry also loves to tell this story, both in kind of the boomer or doomer variety of the story, that are actually surprisingly close to each other. This is not a story I want to tell in this book. Um, instead, I’m trying to, to make a different argument that runs through the entire book, and that argument goes broadly as follows.

First, I mean, I have to start with the question, what is AI? Again, a very, very mystified question, right? What is intelligence?

Maybe what is consciousness? And so on. What is general intelligence?

Who knows? If you look a little bit under the hood of what happens in AI machine learning, it’s a lot more mundane at the end of the day, and 99% of AI is based on optimization algorithms. What does that mean?

Optimization basically means there’s some numerical measure of success. Can be very different across different contexts. And the machine tries to make that measure either as large as possible or as small as possible.

So that’s called either a reward function or a loss function in machine learning and statistics, right? And that reward function can be anything from the number of times you click on an ad to the number of people deported by ICE to the probability of correctly predicting the next word on the internet. Those are all the different rewards that you can put into these optimization algorithms.

Now, that’s, of course, not, no great news to computer scientists. Computer scientists, engineers more broadly, are very good at optimization. That’s what they spend two-thirds of their time on.

They have come up with all kinds of ingenious ways of running optimization efficiently in terms of compute time, in terms of memory used, and so on. They are very good at diagnosing optimization failures figuring out when something went wrong in the optimization and coming up with fixes and so on. So from, coming from that perspective, it’s kind of natural that if there’s seems to be some problem with a technology like AI, they gravitate to thinking of it as something went wrong with the optimization and we have to fix the optimization failure.

But which is kind of the academic counterpart to the man versus machine story where I don’t know, if you go back to something like say Space Odyssey. Like here, there is the board computer on the space mission and that has some programmed objective that the astronauts don’t know, and the astronauts want to switch it off, and so it has to kill the astronauts. But something went wrong in the optimization there.

I don’t think that’s the key issue in most socially consequential applications of AI. I don’t think that’s what most conflicts around AI are about, most debates. I think instead the key issue is almost always not did we fail to optimize, but what did we choose to optimize and who got to choose what’s being optimized?

So that’s a very different question. It’s not that the optimization went wrong, it’s what objective function did we pick for the optimization? And closely related, who got to pick the objective function?

Now, we can talk about what the objective function should be, and I spend some time in the book on that. But there’s the counterpart to that is like, who actually gets to pick the objective function? And given how our society is arranged, it’s typically those who control the inputs into AI, The, what I, what the title of the book actually comes from, The Means of Prediction.

The key ingredients that you need in order to build modern machine learning-based, statistics-based artificial intelligence. And those are first and foremost training data, Data on which the algorithms can learn things. Second, the compute, the processors, GPUs, data centers cloud computing networks that are used to both train and then run those models.

And a bit more secondarily, the expertise that’s needed in order to develop and improve those algorithms. And also crucially, the energy needed to run those data centers, So, and all of this happens at a massive scale at this point. So if you just think of the compute, this year alone the big tech companies are investing around $400 billion only essentially in buying processing units and putting them in data centers.

For next year, another $400 billion are budgeted. So these are just massive orders of magnitude, and similarly for the training data where at this point basically all of the internet is part of the standard training data sets, including things like transcribed YouTube videos and all that. Um yeah.

So that’s the means of prediction. Then I’ll talk more about how, what role they play in, in building AI. Now, if you buy the premise that the key question is what’s being optimized here, and we might have some normative ideas about what should be optimized, and that could be very different from what’s actually being optimized, given who makes the choices, there’s a question of how to close the gap.

And so the ultimate argument that the book makes is that what we need is that those who are being impacted by AI decisions also have a say over what AI is designed to optimize, right? So we need democratic control. And the book tries to sketch a pathway towards such democratic control.

Now, when you hear AI these days, again, like an AI being a mystified notion, it’s also gone through like massive oscillations over time, what people think of when they, when you say AI. Right, so for decades, it was kind of this obscure niche field of computer science for a bunch of nerds. And then there were like some spikes, like in the ’80s, often forgotten.

There was a big AI corporate AI boom with like massive investments into what were called expert systems and similar symbolic AI systems that ended up as a bust because the systems didn’t work out. Then, sometime early in the 2000s, pretty much anything related to data was called AI. Now, public perception has kind of collapsed again and now almost everybody thinks of language models when you hear AI.

What I want to focus on here is, in some sense, intermediate. It’s not everything to be not everything related to data, but it is automated decision-making systems that typically are based on training data, and so decision-making systems that optimize some objective. And so under that header, there’s a lot going on already, and very much implemented in daily life, that is very consequential for those at the receiving end, going beyond the headline-grabbing large language models.

It starts with algorithmic management of gig workers in platforms like Uber and other platforms, where you have algorithms deciding who gets to work when, for what wage, and so on. If you apply for any big corporate job now, chances are, there’s some AI system that’s pre-filtering your CV and your other application materials to decide who even gets invited to a job interview. If you go online to any like search engine or social media platform, basically your entire sense of reality will be filtered by some algorithm that decides what you get to see about the world.

Much of which, of course, is governed by ad targeting, right? So that’s still by far the largest application of AI is maximizing the probability that you’re going to click on some ads and buy something. But it’s not just the commercial corporate applications.

It’s also state actors of various forms, right? So there’s the whole question of predictive policing and incarceration, where algorithms decide where to send police who gets to go free on bail or not. And now our ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement bought a system from Palantir called Immigration OS, which is essentially targeting their immigration rates to put people in camps and deport them.

Or even one more extreme in the war in Gaza, there were algorithms called Lavender to decide who gets bombed and there is this set data predicting when people are home to decide when they are bombed. So yeah. Obviously, all of those, and there’s increasing severity, very much consequential if you’re at the receiving end of those algorithms.

And so I wanted to keep these, these examples in mind throughout the talk as, as kind of what I’m thinking of here, and not just large language models. All right. So the book has three major parts.

The first part of the book is essentially trying to be a non-technical, non-mathematical explanation of how AI and machine learning work. So that’s the kind of stuff I would teach in our, to our grad students mathematically, but instead, here trying to drop the math and just focus on some of the key conceptual considerations as a precondition for having a broader debate about what we should do with this technology. And I think that’s in particular interesting to learn about what economists would call the production function of AI, again, getting back to the title of the book.

So to figure out how the different inputs of like data, compute, and so on, map into how well these systems perform, and kind of who controls these systems. So that’s the first part. The second part is trying to lay out a framework to think about the political economy of AI.

So, thinking both about the normative side of things, like what should we optimize here, and the positive side of things of who in practice gets to control these means of prediction. What does that imply for who gets the profits, who gets to choose what’s being optimized? Thinking about which actors in society could be agents of change in the sense of possibly closing the gap between what is being optimized, and what we should want to optimize, and the role of ideology in the, in possibly preventing us from doing that.

Right, so that’s the second kind of big picture framework. First technical, then kind of this political economy framework, and then the third and largest part of the book takes these two frameworks, sort of takes them jointly to go over a range of debates that have been happening over the regulation and social impact of AI, things like data privacy and ownership, algorithmic fairness and discrimination, automation in the workplace– explainability of algorithmic decisions and so on, and tries to reframe these debates and put them under this kind of unifying umbrella of the frameworks that I put in the first two parts. But I also think this is also where I hope this book really makes a contribution, whether if there’s a lot of great books out there on AI, both from the technical side and from a more critical side.

What the book, I think, hopefully does is bridging the two and providing kind of a more unified way of thinking about all these problems that goes beyond the more journalistic account of here’s something bad that’s happening, and here’s something else that is bad that’s happening. All right. So, let me tell you a little bit about some parts of this first part of how AI works.

So yeah, again, trying to explain foundations of machine learning and AI without mess. So, what is AI? Again, kind of taking this intermediate perspective between everything created today, though, and just language modeling and kind of taking a more or less standard textbook definition of AI as automated decision-making to maximize some notion of a reward.

And, so, that’s in some sense almost the most important part of this, because it lays out the key framework of what AI is trying to achieve which is there’s some reward, some objective to be maximizing. There’s some space that we’re optimizing over, some set of actions that the algorithm might choose, and there’s some information that the algorithm is basing its decision on, like training data or some kind of prior knowledge that might be built into the system in some way or other. And in a way, like, in order to have a debate about a particular AI system, those are the most important ingredients to understand and to have a discussion about what’s being optimized over what set of possible actions.

Second however, we can go a little bit further under the hood. And AI in principle can be built in different ways. I already mentioned these expert systems that were more prominent in the past, or more broadly what’s called symbolic AI.

But over the last 20 years, the field has been pretty much completely dominated by machine learning, which essentially is AI using statistics, right? It’s more or less automated analysis of data in order to build systems that optimize something. Why has that approach dominated over the last 20 years?

I don’t think it’s because there have been any fundamental conceptual innovations that are all that different from what happened before. So, all the key ideas there have been around for 70 years or longer. But what has really changed at that point is, or like since the 2000s, is the scale of training data that are available and the scale of compute that’s available and affordable, right?

And it’s like once these things reach a certain scale, then things start to work. So the first turning point that was reached there was image recognition, right? So taking images and saying is there a cat in this image or a dog in this image?

You know, almost 20 years ago. It was the first big success of deep learning in particular. Then a bit later, there were the successes of gameplay with like AlphaGo, AlphaZero and more recently language modeling.

But essentially all these breakthroughs just happened at a point when the size of the training data and the available compute got to a point where various things could reach a performance that was satisfactory. And now when is this point reached? This is where a bit of theory about how these learning algorithms work is really helpful, and in particular a bit of theory around how so-called supervised learning or prediction works.

Which supervised learning, the idea is basically you have a bunch of data points that have some label or some outcome associated to them, and then from that you wanna learn to predict the label or outcome from it for a new data point. This could be a label that’s associated with the images. Is this a cat or a dog?

This could be for a sentence, what’s the next word in the sentence given the preceding words and so on. So there’s many different tasks that you can frame in terms of prediction. Any time you face these type of prediction problems, you face a key trade-off between what’s called overfitting and underfitting.

And so, this is like the one part here that I want to do a bit of a deeper dive in a minute, because I think that’s really what tells us about what the role of the different means of prediction is in terms of building AI by these thresholds of AI being workable or AI based on machine learning being workable, are reached, and what the importance of controlling these inputs is. So yeah. Let me jump into that and then talk about the last part.

So, overfitting/underfitting, another name for the same thing is variance and bias. But a key idea is when you make a prediction, often you’re gonna make errors. You want to make these errors as small or infrequent as possible.

Label as many images as correctly as possible, or predict the next word in the sentence as right as often as possible and so on. And or predict like which ad you’re most likely to click on, whichever the task is. And so, you make these prediction errors.

Your goal is to make as few prediction errors as possible. Those prediction errors can come from two broad classes of sources. One is what can be called estimation error, or the variance of the estimator.

And that basically comes just from the fact that there’s some random variation in your training data. And it’s just, basically, that’s a problem that can be solved with more data. The more data you have, the smaller the variance gets.

And so the smaller your estimation errors in your predictions get. But then there’s a second source of error, which is called approximation errors, or bias, or underfitting. And there the problem is basically that your model doesn’t accurately reflect the underlying structure of what you’re trying to model there.

There’s some kind of complexity that your model can’t accurately reflect. And that doesn’t go away with more data. But that potentially does go away by making your model more flexible or more complex.

And so basically anytime you do supervised learning, you face the tension between those two where as you have typically, you have to choose how complex to make your model. And there’s all kinds of ways you can do that. It can be the number of variables that your model has.

It can be how long you let some training algorithm run. Various other ways. It goes under the name of regularization.

But what it does for you is doing a trade-off between underfitting and overfitting, or between variance and bias. And so, that’s kind of reflected in this picture which, without exaggeration, I think this picture kind of captures two-thirds of machine learning theory which is why I want to spend a little bit of time on it. So I mentioned, like, we have this choice of how complex to make our models, right?

Like, how big to make a neural network, how long to let the training algorithm run, and so on. And what we see is, the more complex you make the model, always you’re going to get better at predicting your data in the sample, right? In your training data.

Basically, if you have a bunch of images and a bunch of labels, if you make a model complex enough, you can always exactly correctly classify every image in the set. It might just be for completely spurious reasons, right? Maybe all the images with dogs have a green pixel in row 23 and column 20 and you’re, and the algorithm picks up on that and perfectly predicts in-sample, but becomes completely useless for new images because they don’t have this random pattern in there.

And that’s why that’s where the variance part comes in. And so that’s why the out-of-sample predictive errors, right? The errors for new observations different from your training observations doesn’t always get better as you increase model complexity.

And instead, there’s what’s called the generalization gap, this difference between in-sample and out-of-sample performance. And so any machine learning or supervised learning algorithm has this sweet spot in the middle for model complexity. That sweet spot shifts as you get more data.

Now, why is that relevant for us? It’s, again, it’s relevant because it tells us what the production function of AI is. It tells us how compute and data determine how well you’re going to do.

Because what happens as you get more data here is the gap between those two gets smaller, and kind of the minimum here shifts to the right. So basically, as you get more data, you want to make your models more complex. But if you can’t get more data, it doesn’t really help you to scale up your compute more and more.

There’s a limit. And so this is, this observation is really what’s at the starting point of the boom of AI in the last five years. Because what first researchers at OpenAI and then at the other big tech companies realized is these laws which we know from theory for a long time, they kind of looked empirically for, like, language modeling and for other tasks, how these things scale.

And in particular, they looked at what happens to their prediction errors for language. Say, as they changed the number of training observations, right? The amount of data they put into the whole thing, and what happens as they make the model bigger or smaller.

Basically, as this were more or less computed, the whole thing. And as they did that, they came up with what’s called scaling laws. So OpenAI was in 2020.

This is kind of a, a similar paper two years later from, from Google DeepMind. Very similar idea. They came up with scaling laws that look something like this.

And so this is the one math formula I have in the slides. It’s not in the book, but I couldn’t resist. This is basically the law that told them if we throw more and more compute at the whole thing, which here is reflected in the model size, right?

So that’s how big the neural network gets. We can make our prediction errors smaller and smaller in a predictable way. And so they looked empirically over a range of values for how large the model is, and how much training data to throw at this, how this changes, and then concluded it pays off to just scale up the compute threw everything they had at the compute, forgot about all other approaches, and just made these things go bigger and bigger.

And so this is what we’ve seen in the industry over the last five years. There, here, this is for language models. What you have on the horizontal axis, in both cases, the release date.

On the vertical axis, here you have the data size. And here, you have the model size, so basically, how much compute to throw at the whole thing. But what you should notice is this is a so-called logarithmic scale, meaning as you go from 10 to 100 to 1,000, 10,000, billion training observations, and here the same thing from a billion, 10 billion, and so on, number of parameters in the neural network.

And so you get this more or less linear growth of the last few years, meaning it’s exponentially growing how big these training data sets and models are. What’s interesting though now is, they’ve basically reached the limit in terms of how much training data they can possibly throw at this, because every possible text in the world has already been fed into these things, right? The entire internet is in there, including every transcribed YouTube videos and you name it.

And so to keep scaling the compute now it’s a big bet to think that the scaling will continue and the, at least what statistical theory suggests, this might not work out because basically if it doesn’t really help you to increase your compute or increase your model complexity if you’re to the right of the minimum here. If you can’t scale up your data this isn’t going to get you very far. All right.

So, this is, again, what the industry calls scaling laws, what the economists would call a production function. Basically telling you how well these AI systems work depending how much you can throw at them in terms of inputs of data and compute. And so this one is for language models, but the same thing applies to all kinds of other things and there’s a bunch of things we can take away from that.

One is the potential of this type of technology for different applications. Right? So as I mentioned, like the reason these things have taken off in different domains, I think is largely because they reached a scale where this was viable, where the number of training data in particular, and also the compute was enough to get a reasonable performance.

Worked out for language modeling. There are other domains where there are clearly fundamental limits on how much data we can get relative to how much complexity the underlying problem has. Right?

So to take extreme cases are the same. You wanna predict financial crisis, there’s only one financial crisis of 2008. No amount of machine learning sophistication will allow you to do matrix statistical extrapolation from there.

Or if you take like diagnoses of rare diseases, right? If you only ever have like 200 cases of some rare disease that you want to diagnose based on, say, some imaging method. You know, again, purely statistical learning might not work out if the mapping from say images to the disease is too complex relative to the amount of data that you can have.

Right, so there’s, there’s clearly all kinds of domains where this, this purely learning-based approach cannot work out. There’s others where it has worked out, like gameplay, like language modeling. I think there’s also a lot of interesting more intermediate cases where it’s less obvious.

One interesting example for instance is, is genetics, where in the early 2000s like after this human genome project, there was a lot of excitement about now we are going to be able to predict all kinds of disease risks and cancers and whatnot from, from genetic data hasn’t really materialized. I think there’s good reasons for that which again you can think about in terms of this picture. It’s more or less a matter of counting where even if you sequence the ge– genome of all humans on Earth, and you allow just pairwise interactions between those genes, your, the, the amount of data you would need is very, very larger than what you could possibly get from all of humanity.

So I think there’s good reasons from that purely statistical learning cannot work out in a domain like that. All right, so this is just to give you like a bit of a flavor of why I think it’s interesting to think about the underlying statistics and imlications t has. Supervised learning is not the only thing that happens here.

Now, the key domain is what’s called online learning or adaptive learning. There, the key difference is for supervised learning basically the data are given to the algorithm and then it just learns some patterns from the data. But in many domains, the algorithm makes decisions and then observes consequences of these decisions.

All right, so that gives you a, that adds a key conceptual layer because it basically sees the causal effects of whatever it’s doing in the world and can learn something about these causal effects. And again, like, if you think about ad targeting, right? The algorithm can show you some ads, see who, sees who clicks on them, doesn’t, then from that learns about which ads will be successful in terms of, of maximizing corporate profits, say, right?

And so this introduces a second key trade-off they talk about in the book called the exploration exploitation trade-off, which is basically the tension between experimenting to learn something for the future, that’s the exploration part, or exploiting what you have learned to get kind of good rewards in the, in the moment. All right. Sorry, I should probably move on in the interest of time, but this is just to give you a flavor of some of the key ideas here that I think matter to think about the social consequences.

And so thinking about the scaling loss in production functions of AI in particular it tells us something about the potential for future improvements. It also tells us something about who controls these algorithms by knowing who controls the inputs into these algorithms, right? And so, in particular it’s the data and the compute that matter here.

And we see a lot of contests over property rights going on where they, I mean, creative products of people, intellectual property and so on being appropriated by AI companies. There’s a massive redistribution of the economy happening. Some bigger players can sue and get some money out of it, right?

Like, the New York Times suing OpenAI or something like that and then getting some, I don’t know what the sum was, but some decent amount of money for like them first illegally training their, their language models on the New York Times database. Many smaller actors can’t do the same things. Think of all kinds of like artists, scientists, and so on, all of whose outputs are, or coders for that matter, all of whose outputs are like part of the training data here.

And relatedly, and I’ll get back to that later, there’s also the massive question of externalities, especially when it comes to data related to individuals. So, by externalities economists mean like you do something that has consequences for others essentially that you don’t bear the costs or benefits for. And, that’s kind of core to machine learning, because anytime the data about you are used for training somewhere, that learns patterns across people, so it’s not really about you as the data point.

It’s about everyone else. Which again, has key consequences for how accumulation happens here. And I’ll get back to that later when I talk about data privacy and data ownership.

All right. So, I’m skipping here, like, the normative parts of the paper. The book has a chapter on thinking about kind of how could we possibly think about the, of a framework for what we do want to optimize as a society.

And obviously, political philosophy and economics and other fields have had discussions about this for 4,000 years. But it’s useful to remind ourselves of these discussions in this context. The counterpart to this normative question is like, who can possibly close the gap, right?

So, who can close the gap between what AI is optimizing and what we might think that it should be optimizing? And so, this gets to the question of who can be agents of change, so which individuals or organizations or parts of society have the interest, the values, and the strategic leverage to move things in a direction that might be beneficial here? Now, a lot of discourse around the ethics of AI is essentially, about telling engineers to be nice, right?

And I mean, there’s nothing wrong with engineers being nice, but I think there is strong limits on what that can achieve. Hmm. And kind of, if we go systematically, are these limits to, let’s say, like having like an ethics course in a computer science curriculum, how far that’s going to get us.

I mean, it’s great to have these ethics courses, but I think if you’re working at a tech company, you might be very concerned, say, about what your social media algorithm does to, like, public debate or mental health, and so on. At the end of the day, you’re working in a company that’s living off ad revenues. And so, that’s going to be what you have to maximize.

And so, I think a key call to people in the debate around AI, the social impact of AI, the regulation of AI, is to say that we should address much broader segments of society. And I think there’s all kinds of groups that can at least partially play a role of agents of change, right? So, there’s different kinds of workers that are tied into the tech industry.

There is, there’s of course the, kind of the core tech workers, but then there’s like, all the click workers who are sitting in, in container farms around the world, in places like Kenya or Venezuela or elsewhere, that do a lot of the work of generating the data used to create these AI models. There is the gig workers who are working on platforms governed by algorithms that determine the working conditions, whether you’re driving for Uber or you’re like, in an Amazon warehouse or s– some other place like that. There’s consumers whose reactions to what tech companies do has important influence, if only in the form of marketing or things like that.

But if you’re relying on consumers for your profits, then you’re afraid of having scandals. You’re afraid of having a shit storm around what you’re doing. And so, that imposes some constraints on what companies can do.

But then, more broadly, there’s the question of media and public opinion and parts of the state, different regulators, different components of the law. A lot of existing regulatory instruments, whether it’s competition law, privacy law, intellectual property law and so on, that all can have some bearing here. And that all can help to move the needle in terms of how power is distributed over who gets to choose the objectives of these systems that more and more govern our lives.

And so, I would think of this as kind of the short or medium run answer, is like, thinking about all kinds of different actors in society playing a role in shifting power. I think there’s a normative end point here that I would strongly argue for, which is that those who are being impacted by the decisions of an AI system should have a say over the objectives of that AI system. And since, again, it’s all it’s kind of by construction a collective thing in these algorithms, it has to, it can’t just be individual level.

It has to be a democratic or collective control. And so we have to build some form or other of institutions where people have a say over the technologies that impact them. One thing that might stand in the way of that is ideology.

Now, ideologies is a charged word, obviously. We often just say ideology when we mean the opinions of people we disagree with. But there’s also a more specific and useful meaning, I think, of the term, the way political theory might define it, which is that ideology is a representation of the world that might do one of several things.

It might represent the interest of a particular group in society as the interest of society at large, kind of obfuscating the fact that there is conflict of interest within society. It might take things that are actually choices that, that somebody or some institution is making and that are contingent, meaning that other choices could be made, and pretends that those choices are an objective necessity, kind of in the spirit of, of Thatcher’s famous dictum of, “There is no alternative,” right? There, many times, there is an alternative.

And third ideology often takes social relationships and represents them as technical one and correspondingly presents the solutions as technical ones. And so, I think this general framework of thinking about ideology very much can be useful to think about all these debates about AI, including the ones I started my presentation with, right? This whole like, intelligence explosion, man versus machine story.

Does all of these things, right? The man versus machine story, there’s– It’s the discussion is literally posing in the popular and in the academic version, how do we align the machine objectives with humans, right? They’re never in this description, do we see that there’s different humans who might want different things because of inequality, because of different values, because of whatever it is.

The story of the intelligence explosion is a technical version of this objective necessity, one. So this is just something that’s happening to us at most it can happen to can hope to get a little bit ahead of the curve as opposed to realizing that it’s humans all the way down in some sense. There’s choices to be made at every step of the process.

This is not something that’s just happening to us. There’s a more political version of this inevitability, or no alternative story is the political one or geopolitical one. In the U.S., it’s often something like, “If we don’t do it, China will.”

And therefore, we can’t do anything, we can’t regulate because great power competition. Other parts of the world, say in Europe, it’s often we can’t regulate because we have to catch up with the U.S. Makes it seem like it’s inevitable that those who currently control tech have to be in power because otherwise, somehow, the country is weakened. And there’s this technocratic argument that, it’s all very complicated.

Only experts can understand the idea for democratic governance is impossible. Just leave it to industry to self-regulate. And I think, I mean, all of those is if you listen to what’s the techie CEOs tell politicians, they very much push on all these stories as a way of arguing against any form of regulation or intervention.

And so, I mean, part of what the book tries to really do is make the case it’s actually not that complicated. I’m sure you have to invest a little bit of time to think through it, but the basic ideas are actually fairly broadly accessible and, say, knowing that Facebook maximizes clicks on ads and that it could maximize different things and when it chooses what it shows you. You don’t have to have a computer science degree to understand that, and to– And similarly for other domains.

All right. So that’s kind of broad outline of the political economy framework. And then the last and biggest part of the book is taking these frameworks and applying them to various debates about the social impact of AI and how we might want to regulate AI.

And so in particular, I’m going through like five, five different topics here that have kind of received attention, different, different fields. So some of them more in computer science, some of them more in the law and in regulation. Others more in economics.

But, I, I try to apply this unifying framework if I’ve tried to describe before to, to think through these. And so, yeah, let me go through each of them in turn. Excuse me.

Um, so the first one is this value alignment debate, right, where I’ve, I’ve already talked a little bit about that, but that’s kind of the, the slightly more academic version of, of the man versus machine story, which typically goes something like we have, we have an optimization algorithm. The optimization algorithm is maximizing something, some numerical measure of success. That numerical measure of success might be actually something we care about, but it’s not everything that we care about, and if it’s really good, it’s maximizing this incomplete objective, then things can go really, really wrong.

Right? So I’ve already mentioned the Mickey Mouse story. Another popular version comes from, from this philosopher Bostrom who, who has this paperclip story about the machine that’s programmed to produce as many paperclips as possible.

But then since we don’t need infinite paperclips, we might want to switch it off at some point to prevent that it has to kill everyone. Mm, which actually I mean this is a bit more of an, a site for economists, but there’s a, there’s an interesting parallel here actually between what engineers might call reward designs or picking what the numerical measure of success is and what economists have spent a lot of time thinking about, which is incentive design in, in fields like contract theory or mechanism design, where the question is what Yeah, how, say, to the design pay for employees or something like that.

And in that context, economists have actually also recognized problems that are quite similar to this value alignment argument under headers like multitasking or more specifically things like teaching to the test. And so the teaching to the test story is something like you have standardized tests, and you might use it, use those to reward teachers or select teachers. And those tests might even be perfectly fine in terms of measuring something that is genuinely valuable or part of what you’re trying to achieve.

They just don’t measure everything, but maybe they measure math skills, but they don’t measure the quality of social interactions in the classroom or something like that. But then, if you have high-powered incentives attached to the test, then you might put all the effort there and say the quality of social interactions might really suffer. But it– and I think that’s interesting, and it’s something to carefully think about in differing domains where important outcomes are hard to measure, then we might want to refrain from using high powered AI there in the same way that actually most companies refrain from using high-powered incentives for their employees for exactly that reason, presumably.

But, again, the bigger question is not how to align the algorithm, it’s the human controlling it. So, it’s not that the Facebook algorithm is not exactly achieving what Mark Zuckerberg wants. It’s what’s good for Mark Zuckerberg is maybe not necessarily good for, for everyone else.

Right. So it’s a question of how do you align the objectives of those controlling AI with the objectives of society at large? Um.

All right. Next one, which I think is really fascinating and important here, is the question of privacy and data ownership. Right.

So, I mean, data comes in all kinds of forms and applies to all kinds of things. But in the most socially consequential settings, it’s often, data that applies to individuals, right? So if you think about all this applications I started out with here, right?

Thinking about gig work as a job candidates, about people using social media, about people being incarcerated or bombed. That’s all data about individuals. And so, there’s the question of how do protect this individual’s data?

And that question has received a lot of attention both in the law and in computer science. So, in the law, you have things like in the EU, the General Data Protection Regulation. And I believe California actually has adopted a version of that.

Which more or less is about individual property rights over individual data, right? So you have the right to know what’s being collected about you. You have the right to be forgotten.

You have the right, maybe, to use services without sharing your data. So far, so good. There is kind of a computer science counterpart, which goes under the name of differential privacy, which is basically how can you design mechanisms or algorithms where, for an individual, there is almost no consequences whether or not you share your data.

Right? So, the technical definition is that there’s to be a bound on the likelihood ratio of whatever is coming out of the algorithm we serve with all your data. But really, what it means is it essentially makes no difference whether you share your data or not.

And so now imagine you have those two things together, right? So you have individual property rights, but it doesn’t, you, there’s no consequences if you’re sharing the data. So then you might as well share them if you get some convenience benefit, like some nice online service to use or something like that.

That doesn’t do anything to prevent any harms from AI. It doesn’t do anything to generate any benefits from AI. And the reason is what economists call data externalities.

Right? So another way of putting that is learning and machine learning, it’s all about patterns across individuals. It’s never about the individual data point.

Right? And so this is very similar to what happens with climate change, right? If you emit CO2, essentially that’s nothing to whether or not you’re going to experience some climate disaster.

If all of us emit CO2, might very much have consequences for all of us. With data collection, it’s the same, like you sharing your data has no consequences for you. All of us sharing the data might have consequences for all of us.

Positive or negative consequences. And so, because learning is fundamentally about these patterns across individuals and not about individual data points, that means that individual privacy or property rights fundamentally cannot prevent any harms from AI or generate any benefits. And so, to have the control over our data, we necessarily can’t stay on the individual level.

We need to have more collective or democratic governance. So this is one of the reasons why I think it really doesn’t make much sense to think of this in terms of markets where you have like an exchange between individuals ’cause it’s really at this collective level. All right.

I’m just throwing a bunch of topics at you now, just to give you a sense of how this framework, I think, can allow us to rephrase different debates. So, another one is the question of workplace automation and the labor market. So this is one that, again, economists have paid a fair amount of attention to, and that also looms large in the public debate.

And so this is a question that obviously doesn’t just apply to AI, but has applied to many technologies in history where a key distinction that’s important is between average productivity and marginal productivity. So let me explain what I mean by that. When you get a new technology, basically, it can shift how much we can produce with a given amount of inputs, whatever the sector domain is.

And it’s true whether it’s a steam engine or railway or electricity or AI or anything else. And so if it wouldn’t increase like the total output for a given amount of inputs, in some sense, there’s no reason for profit-maximizing companies to use that because they could just stick to the old technology and do better. And so because of that, what’s gonna happen is unambiguously going to increase the average output for given the number of workers, say that are working.

But there’s a part of that that is very much ambiguous, which is not the average but the marginal output. And so to give you an example of this, which is the type of picture that economists might draw where you have, say, the number of workers working in some firm, and the output of the firm. The more workers are there, the bigger the output.

And as we move from an older technology to a newer technology like AI, say, unambiguously, we are gonna get more output for given inputs because otherwise, why would you use the new technology? However, what is very much ambiguous is how that marginal output changes. And so this is a type of picture that would correspond to automation or to economic growth without shared prosperity, because basically what determines what share goes to workers, and what determines how many workers are hired is not so much the average output, but the output for an additional worker.

And that’s true in competitive labor markets, but it’s also true in markets with a lot of market power of employers and various others things. But this is not fate. This is very much ambiguous, right?

There’s nothing intrinsic to the technology that should make the slope bigger or smaller. It really depends on choices again, and something we’ve seen. See many examples in history.

There’s a point that incidentally Daron Acemoglu and others have also been making over the last few years. There’s a lot of choices and that’s especially true when you have a general purpose technology like AI that you can use for all kinds of purposes. You can throw in any objective in there that you can measure.

Right? And so whether which way it’s gonna go is very much going to depend on who picks what the technology is being used for. And so this is I think where workplace democracy really makes a difference.

Like are you gonna use the new technologies, new tools in a way that replace workers, that depress the wages of workers? Or are you going to use it, them in a way that maybe make work more interesting, make complementary to the skills of workers rather than replacing them? Again, the bigger, big picture message there is there’s a choice.

And who makes the choice matters for what choice is being made. All right. Another topic.

Fairness and algorithmic discrimination. It’s also one that has rightly received a lot of attention and debates about the ethics and the social impact of AI. And one thing that’s been happening over the last few years is there’s literally hundreds of definitions of fairness that people have proposed in that literature.

And there’s been a fair amount of attention paid to supposed inconsistencies between these different definitions of fairness. I think that’s actually quite misleading. I think by and large, the majority of these definitions capture more or less the same idea in slightly different mathematical form.

And the idea is, of these definitions of fairness or the absence of bias or the absence of discrimination, is that somehow people have the same merit, whatever merit means, are supposed to be treated independently of the membership in some group, some protected category, say by race, gender, or something else. And this is something where I think economists have had an unfortunate influence on what’s been happening because economists since going back to Gary Becker in the ’60s have had a leading definition of fairness called, or of discrimination called taste-based discrimination which Becker explicitly defined as the presence of non-monetary motives. So what does it mean?

Imagine, like, an algorithm for hiring or deciding who gets invited to a job interview. When would this criterion decide that the algorithm discriminated? Let’s take gender as an example.

If according to this criterion, the algorithm discriminates if you could have had higher profits by hiring more women rather than men relative to what you did. Right? That’s the definition of discrimination here.

But what does this definition do? It basically starts out supposedly with the interest of a disadvantaged group. In this example say it might be women.

But it’s kind of an amazing, I think sleight of hand because within half a minute we go from, like, the interest of the disadvantaged group and we’re actually not asking there about the interests of that group anymore. We are asking about the interests of profit maximization. Right?

We are asking, could we have higher profits by doing something different in terms of hiring? Which is a very different question from what does it do to gender inequality or inequality more broadly. But that’s something that runs through this entire debate on fairness and discrimination is asking basically defining bias as a deviation from whatever the objective of the algorithm is.

And that’s the fundamental way in which all these definitions of fairness actually coincide is by basically creating merit with whatever the objective of who’s in charge is, right? So in the hiring example, it might be the, say the contribution of an additional worker to profits, which we call productivity. And then asking is that being maximized?

But it’s very different from another perspective on evaluating algorithms, which is to ask what are the consequences for the people being impacted in terms of some notion of their well-being or welfare? Right? So one question is can we rationalize the treatment in terms of the objective of who’s in charge such as profits?

The other one is asking what is the implication of using this algorithm, this objective for the well-being of different people and in particular for people in different groups. Yeah. All right.

One last topic And then I’m happy to open the discussion after that which is explainability, right? So which often is discussed also in relation to questions of fairness.

Like how can we explain AI systems, right? Like I’ve been talking about democratic control. To control something, you first have to explain or understand it.

What do we mean by explaining AI? And this question keeps arising. There’s a lot of confusion about it, and I think part of the confusion is that different people mean different things when they say explaining an algorithm or explaining AI.

And so broadly, I would distinguish three types of explanations here. One is explaining decision functions, right? So you have a trained neural network, say.

If it gets certain inputs, it produces certain outputs. And you wanna know what this is doing. So in the context of deep learning, this has received a lot of attention over the last couple years under the name of mechanistic interpretability.

But similar also in other domains and that’s essentially about understanding the function, right understanding the whole mapping from inputs to outputs after the algorithm has been trained. And that’s something that in particular AI engineers care about. And the reason they care about it is typically because there’s actually something that’s missing from the objective that they’re optimizing that can be in the form of robustness, right?

So I mentioned example earlier of classifying images as dogs just if they have a green pixel in row 23 or something like that. That would be a non-robust feature of the mapping and you wanna diagnose issues like that to get algorithms that are robust in terms of making predictions in new problem instances. Related are concerns about causality, right?

Typically, this type of pattern fitting has nothing to do with causality. But if you care about the predictions remaining correct after you intervene and change some of the features, then you really care about the causal structure. And that’s again something that they care about in interpretability here.

But, so that’s kind of the engineering concern is, and that’s typically done by taking a complicated function like a neural net and trying to somehow approximate it by a simpler function, different from what lawyers care about, which most often is not at the level of the functions, at the level of the individual decision. Let’s say you applied for a job. You got rejected.

You want to understand why. And you cannot, you might want to know that for a number of reasons. You might want to know it in order to contest the decision, right?

Maybe there was something discriminatory going on. Say the algorithm just rejected you because you’re a woman, and that’s both unfair and illegal, and you wanna contest that. And so you want, and therefore you care about the why question.

Or actually, in a different way, you might care about if maybe there’s something you could have changed about your job application that would have changed the outcome, and you wanna know that for next time, right? Maybe if you just got, like, this certificate in coding in that language, then you would have gotten the job. Something like that.

Why questions are kind of intriguing because the way we tend to think about causality in social sciences, life sciences these days is typically in terms of what if questions. And what if questions, that’s actually where the algorithms shine relative to humans, because those are fairly easy to answer, like for an algorithm that makes decisions, we can actually say what the output would have been if you had put a, given it a different input, because you can just rerun the same algorithm and give it different inputs and see what happens. So at least conceptually or technically, that’s in some sense an easy question, this causal question of what if.

But this type of explanation, it’s the reverse. It’s the why question. It’s not, would you be hired if this happened?

But like, why did you not get hired? And so one way people have tried to resolve that is by kind of flipping this question or connecting the why question to a what-if question. That’s what’s called counterfactual explanations.

And so the idea here is, say for a job applicant, you ask, what’s the smallest change of the inputs that would have resulted in a different decision, right? So what’s the smallest change to your CV that you could make so that then you would get hired rather than not being hired or something like that. So, it’s a nice idea.

What’s tricky about it is it all hinges on what we mean by small, right? And so I already mentioned, like, different motivations you might care about this not being discriminatory, then small means a change of things that shouldn’t matter, like your race or gender. Or it could be about small meaning things that that you could easily change, then it might be almost the opposite.

And so these things tend to be somewhat fragile to what you mean by small. And so again, going back to my overarching story here there’s a third type of explanation, which in a way is the most important one. It’s not so much about explaining the function, and it’s not so much about explaining the individual decision, but it’s about explaining the decision problem that the system is solving.

And again, what’s the decision problem? It’s what’s the reward, what’s the objective that’s being maximized, over what type of actions, based on what information or data. And this is the type of explanation I think that we really need in order to build democratic control of these systems.

Because in a way, once you’ve specified this input of the decision problem, it’s very much secondary of how exactly you’re going to go about solving this decision problem when this is something you can show in a fairly straightforward mathematical way. It’s, it almost doesn’t matter what kind of learning algorithm you use. If you have enough data and the algorithm is not too stupid, then it’s going to essentially end up at the same type of decisions.

And so say in the context of deep learning, people have noticed this many times. You can play around with the model architecture of the neural network. You’re gonna get more or less the same model performance, at least within certain bounds.

And so I think, again, this is the type of explanation that both is fairly broadly accessible, right? Saying that, I don’t know, Facebook maximizes ad clicks and it does it by deciding which of your friends’ posts it shows to you or whatever. That, that’s a fairly easy-to-explain thing, and it is the thing that really matters in order to then have a debate about, is that what we want as a society?

Do we want to structure our public sphere by maximizing ad revenue, or do we care about other things? And so I think that’s the type of explanation we need for democratic control. All right.

So that’s broad overview of the book. If you’re interested in, it’s available for sale. If you use the code UCPNEW, you get 30% off.

(audience applause)

(upbeat electronic music)

[WOMAN’S VOICE] Thank you for listening. To learn more about Social Science Matrix, please visit matrix.berkeley.edu.

Matrix Teach-In

Seth Lunine: “Promise & Precarity: Exploring Oakland Through Community Engaged Scholarship”

Part of the Matrix Teach-In Event Series

Recorded on November 17, 2025, this video features a lecture by Seth Lunine, Lecturer in the UC Berkeley Department of Geography, who presented a talk reflecting on his experiences with collaborative scholarship between UC Berkeley undergraduates and community-based organizations in Oakland’s Fruitvale District. Lunine’s courses are part of the American Cultures Engaged Scholarship (ACES) Program, which aims to transform how faculty’s community-engaged scholarship is valued, to enhance learning for students through a combination of teaching and practice, and to create new knowledge that has an impact both in the community and the academy.

In Fall 2024, students in Lunine’s Geography 50AC: California collaborated with Canticle Farm and Restorative Media, two nonprofits located in the Oakland Fruitvale District. ACES students developed story maps to represent the spatial histories of the Canticle Farm site. To create these story maps, they analyzed historical newspaper articles, real estate promotions, archeological reports, and city planning documents, revealing legacies of Indigenous stewardship, the Brown Power movement, redlining, and criminalization that has shaped Canticle Farm. Another group of ACES students collaborated with the Executive Director of Restorative Media, an organization led by formerly incarcerated and systems-impacted people, to interview Canticle Farm stakeholders about their movement activism and life stories.

This event was co-sponsored by the Berkeley Public Service Center, and presented as part of Matrix Teach-Ins, a new event series featuring talks by UC Berkeley lecturers and professors who earn praise from students for their teaching. The speakers are invited to deliver a favorite standalone lecture, reimagined for anyone curious to learn.

Podcast and Transcript

 

(upbeat electronic music)

[WOMAN’S VOICE] The Matrix Podcast is a production of Social Science Matrix, an interdisciplinary research center at the University of California, Berkeley.

[MARION FOURCADE]
Hello, everyone. Welcome. My name is Marion Fourcade.

I’m the director of Social Science Matrix, and I’m really excited because we are starting a new program today that we call The Matrix Teach-Ins. These are events that are designed to spotlight Berkeley instructors known for their exceptional teaching. So we invite them to delve, to, to deliver a favorite lecture for anyone curious to learn.

And so today we welcome Seth Lunine, who’s a lecturer in the UC Berkeley Department and Geo– of Geography, and he will share his insight from his work connecting undergraduate learning with community-based research in Oakland’s Fruitvale district. So we couldn’t think of a better way of opening, opening this series than something that is really plugged into like the local community life. Seth’s courses are part of the American Cultures Engaged Scholarship Program, which integrates classroom teaching with collaborative projects that generate new knowledge for both the university and local organizations.

Note that today’s event is co-sponsored by the UC Berkeley Public Service Center and also by the Department of Geography. As usual, before I turn it over to Seth, let me briefly mention a few other upcoming events. The last few, the last two events this fall semester, on December 2nd, we have Maximilian Kasy, who’s one of our alumni, like Seth.

He’s an alumni from the Economics Department, and who now teaches at Oxford, and he will present his book just out this month, The Means of Prediction: How AI Really Works and Who Benefits. And then on December 4 we have Alexis Madrigal, who may be known to many of you because of KQED Forum, and, and he will actually speak on the topic that is very much related to this one today. It’s called “To Know A Place,” and the place in question is also Oakland.

Now, let me introduce our speaker.

Seth Lunine’s experience growing up in the East Bay shaped his academic interests in the historical roots of contemporary urban transformations in California. These interests guided his BA and PhD in Geography at Berkeley, as well as his MA at Cal State University, Northridge. Seth’s dissertation, ‘Iron, Oil, and Emeryville: Resource Industrialization and Metropolitan Expansion’ in the San Francisco Bay Area, 1850 to 1900, combined urban and economic geography to examine how industrialization influenced both regional capitalism and metropolitan growth.

He is currently building on this research through a book manuscript titled, oh, I love the title. ‘ Sin Suburb: Manufacturing Vice in Emeryville and the San Francisco Bay Area’, which explores urban politics, commercial entertainment, and popular culture. His new projects on the early high explosive sector and specialized Bay Area corporations highlight the decisive but overlooked role of innovative industries, not only in California’s development, but also in broader patterns of US economic expansion during the late 19th century.

So without further ado, I’ll, let me welcome Seth to the podium, and I look forward to this fabulous lecture. Thank you.

(audience applauding)

[SETH LUNINE]
Thanks so much for the generous introduction and for having me here. Let’s see, I need another layer on my introductory description in the Geography Department, because much of my recent work has revolved around community-engaged scholarship, in addition to the coursework. And that I found over the last several years to be the most meaningful and consequential part of my work here at UC Berkeley.

Chloe, can you hear me okay in the back? Thanks. So let me see.

Thanks so much for having me and your patience in putting this together. And what I wanna do today, I’m splitting the difference a little bit. I wanna do a piece of sort of classroom teaching, right?

And then take a step back and look at how it syncs up in part with this community-gauged research that we’re doing. And structurally so I’m, I teach. Well, I have an incredible job here at UC Berkeley.

I’m really, I had a moment in looking at some of the work we’ve done over this is my 10th year here. And I felt a lot of gratitude about the opportunities that I’ve been given by the Geography Department, by Doug and Victoria and the AC Center, by Sandra Bass and Casey and folks at the Public Service Department. And we’ve gotten to do quite a bit of work, and there’s been quite a bit of patience and grace, ’cause a lot of our community engaged scholarship is novel.

There’s no template or equation. It’s a lot of learning by doing. And again, I think it’s amazing work.

And one thing I’ve found increasingly important for me, having gone to undergrad here, having gone to graduate school, being a product of fifth through high school, public schools in Berkeley as well. One thing I’ve thought is increasingly important is, as my role as a lecturer and now a continuing lecturer is, how can I create some opportunities for undergrads? What does that look like?

And this is one way as well. Again, I want to talk a bit about a little piece of classroom learning, and then sort of scale out and look at how that intersects with or informs some of our community-engaged scholarship. And what I was gonna say, I teach these days two large lower division classes that fulfill the American Cultures requirement.

One’s on California, one’s on the Bay Area. I haven’t strayed that far from home. And then I teach a couple upper division classes that are essentially field studies, which means we get to go on a lot of field trips and walk around the Bay Area together.

So our ACES work, American Cultures Engaged Scholarship, which most generally is collaborative research between students in the class and community partners. And those community partners take a lot of different forms. For us, it’s primarily you know, NGOs or nonprofits and artists.

Okay? And I’ll talk more about the specifics in a moment. But the way it works, it’s a breakout group of students within the larger class.

So the larger classes are typically between 100 and 160 students. And from that group, we have a breakout. Today, we have a couple students, including Chloe in the back, who has done amazing work within the context, the broader coherence of a class.

So they’re doing essentially an extra section per week. They’re doing a lot of BART rides and visits. They have to deal with me quite a bit, which is a challenge in itself.

So these students do a lot of extra amazing work. And I can’t say enough about them. And then also, this is an interesting picture, right?

This is rigorous academic work. Um, but I had kind of a facile question in the description, something like, how can undergraduates at UC Berkeley meaningfully participate in community activism, or can they or something? And the answer is, of course.

And that takes a lot of different forms. But where I arrived just recently, looking at a lot of the stuff, is that moments like this are indispensable. They can’t be replicated.

That was lunch on International Boulevard, right? But this was one small group. They just did about four or five hours of interviews of stakeholders and community members at Kanikul Farm in Fruitvale.

Formerly incarcerated men who had been paroled from life sentences, right? A lot of young people involved in, um– And I know we have some friends of Kanikul Farm here as well, right?

Um, and let me say at the front end, I’m no expert. I claim the East Bay in terms of my own biography and where I’m from. I’ve lived, like I said, in the East Bay pretty much my whole life, except for six years in LA, which I enjoyed quite a bit, right?

But I’m a East Bay person. I have a lot of experiential knowledge, a lot of library knowledge, but I’m no expert on this stuff. I’m learning like everyone else.

We learn together, right? But this moment, they did all the interviews. This is Troy Williams of Restorative Media.

And that is, he’s the executive director and founder. He was incarcerated for 25 years and learned a lot about media production, and now has a media production company, nonprofit, that does an incredible array of filmmaking. They also do the formerly incarcerated speaker series on Alcatraz, which got a lot of publicity lately, as I’m sure you can imagine.

But Troy guided the students through every facet of production, from narration, interview questions, lighting, sound, directing, recording, conducting the interviews. But that was just sort of the icing on the cake. The students got to work with Troy, who’s a world-class educator and mentor.

Restorative Media. And that’s Robert, who recently finished his work, undergrad work in geography here at UC Berkeley, right? And he’s intimately involved with Kanikul Farm as well, right?

And he did amazing work at Kanikul Farm on daylighting the creek and environmental restoration. And he’s the real bridge between the classroom at UC Berkeley and the site in Fruitvale, right? But they had just done four or five or six hours of interviews that was the culmination of some of their work with Troy.

And then we got a celebratory lunch that I paid for. That was my big contribution, right? But the point is, this is the moment, and the type and caliber of work that I think matters most for us.

And that’s sitting down together, food or no food. That’s the conversations. That’s the learning by doing.

That’s sort of the critical reflection, right? So whether it’s a formal meeting, or whether it’s lunch, or whether it’s the work we’re doing together, where I’ve landed at the moment is that it’s the face-to-face conversations. It’s how we respond when one of our other partners tells us, ‘Yeah, they were in solitary confinement for 32 years at San Quentin.’

Or another one tells us about he was the only person who escaped from San Quentin and the story of his life. Or these young people who are working on Land Back, or these people who are open and show us the meaning of the word vulnerability. And then something shifts, and we are collaborators.

And I’m proud to say I’ve made a lot of friends. But that’s the stuff. There’s the work and the deliverables, and the outcome that’s integral, of course, but I think this is the stuff that we can’t really replicate, but it’s the hardest to create, right, in terms of planning and coursework, appointments the kind of appointment that syncs up with pay and salary, and stuff like that, and just the rigors of the semester.

So this is that moment. And I wanna talk about these students briefly, ’cause they’re young and dynamic and incredibly bright, but a lot of these students, they have real connections. They’re system impacted, right?

They fled areas of acute danger and arrived here. They’re from countries where there’s real oppression, especially in terms of gender, so there’s incredible overlap as well. So, hold on.

I found the more experience I have, the worse my time management is, so let me keep it moving. Here’s what I want to do. Again, talk a little bit about just the sort of blip of classroom material, okay, and then pull out a little bit and talk about some of these projects.

And what I wanna do, as long as this is a bit experimental in the format and things like that, I think if there’s a question of clarity, what I’m saying, what I’m referring to, would you just let me know in the moment? If there’s feedback or critique, there’ll be time for that too. But, like I said, I’m feeling incredible gratitude, Conticle Farm, Public Service Center, AC Center, of course Troy, and Restorative Media, right?

’cause I didn’t do that much. I often feel awkward talking about this stuff because, you know, I do my part, but it’s really without these partners, we wouldn’t have any projects. We wouldn’t have this work together.

They’ve created space for us in meaningful and durable ways over time. This bit on classroom material, this is from lectures that are oriented towards lower division undergrads at UC Berkeley. Okay?

This isn’t for faculty. This isn’t to create insiders and outsiders. I don’t try and do that in my classes.

This is to bring everyone along within the AC curriculum. And then, like I said, it’s not a seamless connection to some of the work we’re doing, but that’s how I chose to structure it as far as some of this experimental stuff. We talked about Troy.

The other thing is when I talk about some of the actual scholarship, and oftentimes there is a deliverable, there’s a product, there’s the embodiment of all this research we’ve done together. I’m not showing you that today. One, it’s not complete.

Two, we need consent before we show anything.

[LECTURER]
So I can show you pieces and talk about it and some older examples as well. So that’s what we’ll do. So I wanna know what you see.

In my classes, some of you have seen this before. We mix it up a lot. We mess around.

So a little bit on Oakland, right? Let’s talk about Oakland a bit. And again, well, at any rate, what do you see here?

This is public art. This is a mural. This is saying a lot about Oakland, its history, its authenticity, but what do you see in this street art?

Or what might raise a question to you? What are some of the references? We’re all East Bay people in one way or another.

What do you notice? Or what question might arise in terms of this authentic place? Yeah?

[STUDENT]
I see a Black Panther.

[LECTURER]
Absolutely. The Black Panther Party emanating in many, you know, certainly from West Oakland, although some of the origins in Bayview-Hunters Point and elsewhere are often overlooked, but certainly engendered by state violence, the failure of urban renewal, and more in West Oakland. So that iconic symbol of the Black Panther Party.

Thank you. What’s your first name?

[NIYAH]
Niyah.

[LECTURER]
Lila?

[NIYAH]
Niyah.

[LECTURER]
Laya?

[NIYAH]
Niyah.

[LECTURER]
Niyah. That’s how we do it in my classes, and then I forget. Excellent. What else do you notice here? Or questions that might come up? Yeah?

[LARISSA]
I see the shoe from Children’s Fairyland.

[LECTURER]
Nice. The shoe. Who’s been to Children’s Fairyland? Excellent, yes. It’s a must see. But the shoe from Children’s Fairyland by the lake. And what was your first name?

[LARISSA]
Larissa.

[LECTURER]
Thanks, Larissa. What else do you notice here? Or questions? Yeah?

[ELLEN]
I noticed something I noticed about my own work as a city planner for a long time, which is an absence of people.

[LECTURER]
Interesting. Not a lot of human beings depicted. What’s absent as well. And what was your first name?

[ELLEN]
Ellen.

[LECTURER]
Ellen? Thanks, Ellen. What else do you see? Yes.

[STUDENT]
Next to the tree. Is that like a weapon or something?

[LECTURER]
A what? Sorry?

[STUDENT]
Is it a weapon?

[STUDENT ONE]
Like a military next to the tree?

[LECTURER]
Well, it probably derives from military technology, but I think it’s the Chabot Observatory. Yeah. But good, yeah, absolutely. Absolutely. What else do you notice? Yeah, yeah, Gabby.

[GABBY]
Kind of two of the focal points are like the water and then the oak.

[LECTURER]
Yeah, it has this sort of flow to it as well. And the oak that’s been appropriated by Oaklandish, but we still like it, right? So the oak itself. Excellent. What else do you see? Yes.

[STUDENT TWO]
The BART.

[LECTURER]
The BART. Yeah. Absolutely. A lot of connection to other places. Other thoughts? Yeah, Doug.

[DOUG]
The Bay Area slang. The hello, the yee, the how it is.

[LECTURER]
Yeah, absolutely. A lot of their, I’m not authorized to use slang anymore, I’m too old. But a lot of the regional vernacular, right?

Hella took me so long to weed that out of my vocabulary when I came here for undergrad. Town biz and all that, so the authenticity, right, of Oakland itself, yes, what else? Any other thoughts?

Yeah, Jordan.

[JORDAN]
I’m curious about the giraffe.

[LECTURER]
You know, the zoo, I’m not sure. Interesting what the giraffe is eating which is another element as well. Any other thoughts?

[STUDENT THREE]
Is it the, the beast from like, mechanical beast from Star Wars?

[LECTURER]
Yeah, the AT-AT or AT-AT, I’m not sure which. I get called out one way or the other by the Star Wars aficionados, right? But that, it represents the containerization of the port, speaking of Alexis Madrigal amazing work, right? Yeah. How about this? What’s this represent?

[STUDENT FOUR]
Chinatown.

[LECTURER]
Chinatown, absolutely. So looking at this, right, it’s interesting ’cause it has a lot of form in terms of, you know, local culture street art, right? It’s really playing up on the authenticity of Oakland as well.

In many ways, what makes Oakland Oakland? What’s the intent of it? Is it some local artist from the ground up?

A piece they threw up or something like that? No, it says, “Visit Oakland,” right?

[SETH LUNINE]
And who’s seen this image? It’s a selfie wall at the Marriott, right? So one way in talking, and it’s obviously, it’s beautiful work, the– the point is getting at, well, these are largely Black cultural forums.

This is highlighting and representing the authenticity of Oakland, right? At the same time, it is veiling processes of gentrification, displacement, racial banishment, the loss of a lot of the people who are responsible for the formation of these things and their representation over time, right? So again, for students who are new to the East Bay and new to, well, what do a lot of undergrads here aren’t from the Bay Area know about Oakland?

They know they shouldn’t go there ’cause it’s not safe. Right? That’s not our message, of course, but that’s the social fact, right?

So again, how do we approach and begin to enter some of this discussion about what’s happening in Oakland today, right? And this notion of how the city is marketing and selling itself, and how that authenticity is in part veiling some of these processes. So Black, Latine, and other nonwhite aesthetics are increasingly appropriated to both fuel and veil gentrification, ’cause you know the story of Oakland in the last 20 years is a precipitous decline of nonwhite, particularly African American communities.

So sometimes we’ll enter into these conversations in a somewhat oblique way, right? To think about their interaction and experience in ways that some of these things are being represented. I should mention Dr. Summers, who recently, well, was at UC Berkeley and now is at Columbia, had this notion of aesthetic emplacement.

I didn’t cite her ’cause I’m not doing it justice, right? But we talk a lot in our classes about modes of erasure. And this is something a little bit differently– different, ’cause again, it’s representing the authenticity, grittiness, allure of these places, and at the same time, the symbols can veil, or hide, or obfuscate the loss of the people themselves.

So in our classes, we talk a lot about, “Well, what does this look like?

[PRESENTER]
How does it work, right? And you’ve all heard the term ‘gentrification.’ It’s sort of so ubiquitous, it’s lost its meaning to some extent, but it’s still important, especially more recent iterations looking at race more explicitly, looking at the role of state governments, and with our lower division students, we start at the start.

So the point is, well, what is some of this artwork in this very particular way veiling? Well, it’s the, like I said, drastic decline of the African American population in Oakland. And of course, we can get into a lot of intersections of race and class over time, but just some numbers, right?

Blacks in Oakland fell from about 43% to 21% of the total population during most of your all lifetimes, right? And more, and we talk about spatial histories of displacement, disinvestment, abandonment and the like through you know, certainly things like redlining restrictive covenants, urban renewal in West Oakland, and then this contemporary moment. We talk a lot about actual mechanisms, like how does it work, through things like, no-fault evictions, right, and urban entrepreneurialism, the role of the local government in facilitating gentrification and the like.

And increasingly, in our class right now, and how it syncs up with some of our community-engaged scholarships, we’re talking about houselessness and criminalization. So we’re talking about the criminalization of poverty, right? You can see in Oakland, the rate of housing insecurity has a far out.

The increase has far outpaced San Francisco and Berkeley, right? This is a bit dated necessarily ’cause a lot of the numbers stemming from the pandemic haven’t quite settled, right? But you can see Oakland’s per capita homeless rate was, higher, the rate was higher, larger than San Francisco and Berkeley.

It rose roughly 47% in two years, and that’s a lot about how that data was collected. Here’s the source, right? 70% of unhoused people in Oakland are Black, while the loss of the Black population is increasing, right?

So we can get a sense of the racialized violence and injustice. This is 2020, former Mayor Libby Schaaf, you know, luckily, Oakland is answering this crisis with a sense of urgency and innovation, right? What did that look like?

Who’s seen this before? Right? This was city of Oakland encampment management policy, which was deployed at the height of the pandemic, right?

And here’s a map of Oakland. There is an encampment management policy, which allows the city to remove people who are occupying urban space, essentially encamping or not consuming anything. And based on the language of the policy, this map is showing, the turquoise areas are where encampments could exist, and the red are high sensitivity areas are areas where people who were occupying urban space, who were involved in an encampment, could be swept off.

That’s all it’s saying. But where do you see the areas in turquoise as far as areas where people were allowed to occupy space or encamp, and the like, at the height of the pandemic?

[AUDIENCE MEMBER]
It’s the highways.

[PRESENTER]
Yeah, infrastructure, for sure. Any other thoughts? Getting to know Oakland in different ways. Yeah, Tyell?

[TYELL]
Industrial zones.

[PRESENTER]
The what?

[TYELL]
The industrial zones.

[PRESENTER]
Yeah, certainly in West Oakland, right? So-called Lower Bottoms and the edge of industrial areas. Deep East Oakland as well, a little area around Laney, right?

So, sort of the increased concentration of poverty in already impoverished areas and the like, right? So we begin to sort of map the city and see how it works. And I want to point out a recent undergrad, Cole Haddock, and another amazing student, Maria Toldi, recently sort of updated this mode of analysis, and seeing as far as the enforcement of anti-encampment policies and the ways in which we’ve kind of gone from a spatial reshuffling of housing-insecure people to just the outright banishment or sweeping away, as it says, “Swept off the map.”

So that’s brand new, but it used similar datasets to do a much more fine-grain analysis, and it’s really amazing work, right? So we’re talking about the criminalization of poverty, we’re also talking about more overt modes of criminalization that relate directly to some of our work. Who’s heard of the gang injunction safety zones?

Has anyone heard of those things? Interesting. Yeah, a bunch of people.

So again, taking a page out of the class, just so you know, this is a gang injunction safety zone in Fruitvale, right? Here’s our partner’s site, right in the middle of things. Okay.

And again, this is getting a little bit more into the crux of the issue, so we’ll talk about, you know, what is the role, when we talk about race, we’re talking about crime, right? And what is the role of something like criminalization in enabling, in this case, real estate capital to extract value from racialized difference? What is the role of the state in criminalizing people?

How does that embellish or precipitate increasingly profitable real estate development and the like? And this begins to touch down directly on our site and our partner’s work. So you can, and then this is a little foreshadowing of some of our original map icons that Chloe did, Chloe Bauer, that are really amazing.

I need to point that out ’cause some of these students have untold talents across the board. And these are we’re like, “Chloe can you do something?” Like, “How can we talk about gentrification, criminalization, do a camera or something.”

And next week, Chloe came back with this for a map icon that’ll prob, be part of our online presence and platform. So again, mapping the area. Some of these pieces will come together.

And this is a horrible slide, I feel like. There’s all this text. I’m talking, you’re reading.

Here’s the challenge in this day and age of AI and the like and engagement and getting back in classes and everything. I don’t allow digital devices. Well, we, the students consent to a no digital device policy, except for a pad to write ’cause I want students present and engaged.

And usually they like it. I give them an opportunity for rebellion. They have to organize collectively, there’s been nothing persuasive, right?

But the point is, no digital devices. Pen and paper, or a pad, an iPad and a digital pen writing notes, right? They consent through coercion.

The problem is sometimes I have, I want them to have the equivalent of a handout, I post the slides. There’s no async, I want us all together. There’s no async, but I’ll post the slides, so they don’t have to frantically scribble everything, so sometimes I have a slide like this.

So what are these gang injunction safety zones, right? So while they’re a mode of hyper-policing and surveillance, according to the City of Oakland this is a so-called safety zone that’s designed putatively to break up gang activity by imposing restrictions on gang members within a clearly delimited area, right? This is a civil lawsuit brought by the city against a group of alleged gang members, right?

Who are named individually or as John Does and Jane Does, right? Much of the information is engendered by, the Gang Affiliation Database, State of California, which is inherently flawed. But at any rate, when you’re named on that list, right?

You lose a lot of your civil rights. You cannot appear in public with other alleged gang members. There’s a curfew, you can’t be outside after 10:00 PM.

You can’t loiter, right? And you can’t mar, these are some of the stipulations. You can’t wear certain colors and the like, right?

So what these gang injunctions are doing, is essentially rendering people guilty until they’re proven innocent and giving the state ways to target populations, right? In ways where they don’t need to break a law, in order to be a criminal. So, there’s several in Oakland.

This technique was really developed in LA, places like Oakwood and the like, right? But this was something that’s really particular to our work in Fruitvale ’cause this is the gang injunction safety zone. The thing that’s interesting, is that these gang injunction safety zones aren’t effective and they’re not implemented in the area with the most crime.

[SPEAKER]
And that’s pretty consistent throughout California. Here is Fruitvale. And sorry, this is a little scrappy.

It’s some police reporting from the city. And you can see there’s a lot of variation in the numbers, but it doesn’t appreciably change over time with its inception of the injunction itself, right? So, one way that we’re looking at this, again, as a way in class and with our partners to put a fine point on certain methods and modes of gentrification, is looking at this gang injunction, not as the cause, but one element of gentrification, the increase in property values, the re sort of mapping discursively of the Fruitvale neighborhood.

So, this notion of a privileged adjacency, right? The gang injunctions are often implemented in neighborhoods adjacent to areas with higher property values, right? Rather than neighborhoods with the highest crime rates.

The intentions of the gang injunction zone is not necessarily reducing violent crimes for a city’s most vulnerable residents, but rather making neighborhoods appear safer to attract investment, wealth, and increasing property values, right? And again, this isn’t the cause, but it’s an element, right? In Oakland, we can see two neighborhoods where gang injunction safety zones were implemented briefly, and again, it’s not the core.

It’s not the cause. But it’s more than simply correlation. In Fruitvale, in North Oakland, both these areas, property values doubled, right?

In North Oakland in particular, you can see the Longfellow and Bushrod neighborhoods saw some of the most drastic rates or losses of African American folks, right? So, there it is. Like, what do we do with that, right?

And in our class, we talk a lot about solutions. We talk, you know, some actual existing meaningful policies around just cause evictions, around upzoning, around these very meaningful, real strategies, sort of from the top down. We certainly look closely at Sogorea Te’ Land Trust, at Moms 4 Housing what does land beyond property mean as a more conceptual or broader approach, right?

[PRESENTER]
But again, when we get into the ACEs work, it becomes much different. It becomes much more real. So, here’s this sort of disjuncture.

This is just a little component of the class, but I wanted to use that to quickly dovetail into some of this work that we’re doing. But let me take a second. Are you still with me?

More or less? Okay. Sometimes it’s hard to know up here.

Any questions or comments before we move forward? And I have this goofy beanie on ’cause everything’s fine, but I had a surgery a little while ago, and I’m still dealing. It’s mainly the patch on my head.

It’s not particularly interesting, but someone the other day asked me if I’m a hipster.

(laughs)

And I was like, ‘I never was, and if you have to ask, that’s probably a problem, and blah, blah, blah.’ But any questions or comments at the moment? Okay.

So let’s make a awkward pivot into some of this work, okay? This community-engaged scholarship, and again, it’s an outcropping of the course. It’s students who self-select to apply.

They self-select to do a lot of extra work. They do it in lieu of a course project. Now it’s multiple mini-projects, right?

And again, it’s a big chunk of time. They tend to be happy they did it, is my sense. And again, I think it’s one of the more rewarding aspects of my teaching practice, largely because it’s not about me.

You know, I don’t have to carry all that stuff around, right? I think we all do a lot better in some capacity when we’re working in the service of something other than or greater than ourselves. And I know the students, some of whom have been up here and spent time with us and our partners, something shifts.

It’s all exciting and interesting. Some students have direct experience with these issues in other places. And the issues is, are, vast.

Some have incredible curiosity. I think Berkeley students, you can’t teach that, right? They bring that with them.

Some you know, they’re just really, again, engaged, curious. There’s a values match and the like, right? So they’re bringing all that in, but once we get together, once we take BART.

We take BART to the BART station, and then we walk up, talk about the neighborhood, get to know each other, and walk up to our site. It’s about 20 minutes, but the first time we do it, it’s interesting. The students from LA talk about how Fruitvale reminds them of LA.

The students from the East Bay, many of them, talk about how they’ve never been here before. Then we have a debate on the best Mexican food, whether it’s LA or Oakland, or San Francisco, and the like. But it’s that experience.

It’s the experiential work, and it’s the time together, right? So at any rate, let me talk a bit about this what we’re actually doing. So there’s Canakel Farm, and another icon, um, which I thought was ingenious.

But this is Canakel Farm. It’s right on the edge of Foothill Boulevard, 36 in Harrington. And let’s see.

So, Ann S– uh, Sims-Bucher, the executive director who works a lot with us directly, if you ask her what’s Canakel Farm all about, she’ll just say, “It depends who you ask,” right? It’s very multifaceted. Let me talk a little bit about it.

So what this family did, they’re five, now I think seven generations of Fruitval– Fruitvale. You know, they had lived here and nearby, but recently, beginning, I think about 15 years ago, they started acquiring properties adjacent to their own home as part of a community-based nonprofit. And over time, it’s this entire area, and this is part of our work, looking at sort of different modes of real estate development, housing trust, working with the Unity Council, you know, really innovative things to create affordable housing, ’cause their programs include housing, right?

So they acquired multiple sites. They tore down all the fences. Robert Day lit the creek.

They planted a lot of native plants, right? They opened it up, and they have a number of programs, right? Canakel Farms, there’s a very self-conscious and critical, uh, Franciscan orientation to their work, the Canakel of the Sun.

[SETH LUNINE]
There’s a whole cosmology that’s fascinating relating to the sites, to the programs, and the like. But the point is, they have a number of programs. They have a program for formerly incarcerated men, which is where Troy works out of, and we’ve worked closely with folks in that program.

They work with Sogorea Te’ Land Trust and gave them well, rightfully so, conveyed property to that group and members. They have some work that we can’t talk about right now that’s incredibly formative. They have a lot of young people.

It’s all young people. Now everyone’s young to me, but a little older than a lotta undergrads, but young folks, deeply engaged in a lot of different types of activism, much oriented around climate change, social justice in its many guises, Louaya, and the Peace Poets from the Bronx in New York, an incredible array of people living there, passing through, and the like, right? And then some of the on-site work again in terms of environmental remediation, daylighting, and the like.

And the point is, there’s incredible attachment and deep roots to this land. So a lot of the work we are doing, half of it is about the spatial history of this site. But here’s the site.

Again, you wouldn’t know walking by, right? Was that fair to say, Jordan? And Chlo– you wouldn’t, and some of you wouldn’t.

It looks like some really nice houses, dense, older neighborhood, but when you get inside, it’s a lot different, right? This is springtime. It’s very lush, but it’s not a farm.

But there’s a lot of en– environmental activities and then those spill over into Robert’s work, into a lot of our partners’ work as well, right? So just getting a sense there’s frogs. There’s arboreal salamanders.

There’s a whole array of birds and its own sort of ecosystem that’s emerged with the daylighting of this creek, and with the implantation of native plants and the like, right? So we have laid out this project, and these are notes that a student was nice enough to transcribe. What we started with was, I’m someone, I’ve done a lot of archival research.

So one group of students, we want to tell a spatial history of this site, right, in order to explain what’s going on today. So these are all the layers and topics they tackled. And these, again, it’s shorthand, but the pre-invasion landscape and traditional ecological knowledge, right?

Stewardship and the like. You know, what was going on during the mission system? And we approach that in terms of mass incarceration, penal labor, and some important questions about genocide.

What was going, and that’s a little bit broader scale, but then we come right back to the site and the immediate area in terms of the land grants, right? And making connections with Verona, right? And some of the Indigenous folks that are stakeholders.

And let me be really clear about something. People consented to our work, but we don’t do anything. We offer them the work for their feedback, for their acceptance.

Whatever they want to do with it, it’s their call. We just have these amazing resources that we engage with, work together, but we don’t– the first thing I learned about this stuff is that we engage as humble visitors. And then we can talk about what that means.

But this isn’t our stuff. We’re not the experts. We present what we find, and we frame it all as much as possible in terms of some of the lit with people who represent, who are survivors, who are representatives of some of the issues, moments, and people that we’re talking about.

So we looked a lot about, you know, unfree labor and the like, and then we get into issues of real estate development. It just keeps going, right? You know, extractive economies apply to real estate.

A lot on immigration history over time, some of the older families there, ’cause that’s important to our partners. A parish history, ’cause that was a real anchor of the community, and it continues to be so. I’ve certainly learned a lot about the radicalism and rebellion of the Church over time, certainly in terms of what’s going on today internationally and how the Catholic Church undergirded a lot of the work of Cesar Chavez and the like.

A lot of ugliness.

[LECTURER]
A lot of original research on, you know, exclusion in this neighborhood over time from the restrictive covenants, to the KKK in East Oakland, to redlining and the like. And then a really important chunk derived a lot from Juan Herrera, who did his PhD in ethnic studies on sort of the Latine community formation, and then getting back into issues of contemporary gentrification or criminalization, racial banishment, however we wanna put it. And then full circle back to some of the environmental remediation and work, and really highlighting Robert’s work, ’cause he has just really taken off and done amazing stuff.

So we have all these topics, and then it’s the question, well, how do we map this stuff? And we’re using a platform online called StoryMap. And I don’t like it, but I’m grateful we have access.

And there’s issues of scale, and we couldn’t put it together, so we, these are just sketches. We have an amazing, you know, one other amazing incredible thing about this ACES work is that I get to work with many graduate students and advanced undergrads who are Chancellor’s Public Fellows. And I’m working right now with Angelina Springer.

She’s our fellow. She’s a returning student in geography and art practice, and she’s really sorta like a deeply informed project manager for the work. But the point is, we had different sketches and renderings of the site, and we can’t map the places.

So what we settled on was sort of a sedimented history, thinking of the layers of development that culminate, right? In the contemporary scene. And these are different drafts.

So each layer will be one of these slices, right? And the whole point of this sort of conceptual mapping is acknowledgment, and that’s a lot of the work that Kanikul Farm is doing, is to acknowledge these spatial histories and modes of oppression, right? And foregrounding the meaning of self-determination, but to enter into modes of conversation and restorative justice to engender healing.

[PRESENTER]
So on the top level, it’ll bring in the work of Kanikul Farms, the work that Troy is doing through interviews, through video snippets, through the constellation of activists, and young people, and programs that get into the healing of these layers. And it’s not all negative stuff by any means, but, but much of it is modes of acknowledgment. So that’s sort of the digitized platform.

But I just want to show you some examples of student work. Some of it’s ready to go, some of it isn’t. And it’s really, when we think about public-facing deliverables, it introduces a whole nother layer of work, of expertise, and the like.

But a group of students, they did sort of a model of riparian woodlands, pre-invasion as part of our traditional ecological survey, right? It’s pretty lush. But this was based on, t’s sort of a model, right?

And here’s our icon. I’m really going in, all in on the icons at the moment. Here’s some archival research.

They’re getting primary sources. It’s, again, this is decontextualized. They have an awful lot of writing that’ll all be presented, but this is the neighbor, the area–

Uh-oh. I did it. It’s not focusing.

We’ll scan back out. This is, it’s 1852, but this is a Peralta land grant. We call it settler colonialism in our class.

But it shows the sorta– Oh, up here. Here’s sort of the Mexican era, and this is where a lot of indigenous people who lived in Alisal or then Verona would work seasonally in modes of unfree labor.

So the point is there are students with maps, students at the Bancroft, Earth Science Library, Map Library, Oakland History Center, doing really in-depth research around this. This was, we had an amazing experience at the Earth Science Library at the Bancroft finding some very particular subdivision maps naming the neighborhood, ’cause we couldn’t get any information. We didn’t know the name.

It’s called Boulevard Park, right? So they did this, and this encompasses our site. And then got into other sources.

This is ugly. Right? It says, “No Mongolians need apply.”

This is the current side of Kanikul.

[SETH LUNINE]
Then we found the restrictive covenants dovetailed into redlining, and Angelina was doing a lot of work on the KKK second revival in Oakland in the ’20s, talking about exclusion. And then more recent stuff, and this is amazing research that students did in a mapping project. Some of it’ll filter through, some of it won’t.

Well, but the big thing about this work is, unlike a lot of my classroom stuff, there is learning by doing, there is problem-solving. There is challenges, right? It’s innovative work.

It’s collective learning. There’s not a script, right? So again, and then getting into some of the videos, some of the other types of media that in place on the top of the map some of the contemporary work, right?

And this is Robert. We had an entomologist come out and do a survey. We had some Alan Shabel, Shabel in integrative biology do some work, just beginning to look at this space in different ways.

And then of course you learn, well, if you wanna do a good job, well, that’s why we’re in our seventh semester, I guess, or something like that. But this is the real part. That’s Troy, that’s Annie, other community members sitting down.

They’re so generous in creating space with us. The restorative media side with Troy, I just get out of the way, right? They have done an array of interviews, and now they’re doing some work with another nonprofit on how we come to understand and see parenting among formerly incarcerated folks.

They’ve done work on his own website. They’ve done work to publicize the, Formerly Incarcerated Speaker Series. And again, depending on the group of students, he works with them as far as video production, as far as using their skills, as far as teaching them skills.

And he’s, has a bunch of snippets that’ll be part of our website that’ll be public-facing for Canticle Farm, and then he has some of his own documentary work, right? And like I said, well, I need to say Troy comes here almost weekly to work with our students.

[SPEAKER]
He’s recognized and we create some funding for him, but it comes nowhere near covering his time, and expertise and his mentorship. And a way to understand it, in the spring, he was working with a group of students, and they came at me ’cause they wanted more time with Troy in their incredibly impacted schedules. And then I said, “I don’t know about that.

You’ll have to talk to Troy.” And they said, ‘We did.’ I said, ‘What did Troy say?’

And they said, ‘That sounds fine.’ You know? So he keeps doing it.

He comes here, you know, and he works with these students weekly for hours and hours, and we need to foreground that. And he has his own interests and it benefits him, of course, but that’s the nature of it, right? What I’m saying is these projects would be nothing without the partners and their generosity and the like.

And really quickly, in putting this interesting talk together, I just had a moment ’cause I’m a continuing lecturer, there’s no sabbatical. I love my job and I’m grateful for it, but there’s not a lot of detached reflection. Just starting to look at some of the things we’ve gotten to do thanks to the Public Service Center, the AC Center, Geography Department.

We got to do some work with the Anti-Eviction Mapping Project early on. We got to work with Ramon Quintero Tenderloin Neighborhood Development Corporation. He’s not a real estate person, well, he’s at the Othering and Belonging Institute.

He’s an incredible scholar, but he’s also a community planner and organizer. And that’s when I found when we go to the Tenderloin and we sit down with residents of affordable housing, that’s how we learn, and that’s how we develop projects together. What do you need?

Well, the nonprofits and residents, they wanted a directory, cross-pollination of all the different folks doing work in the Tenderloin. It’s geography, so we went ahead and mapped it as well with Alex Stewart, our graduate fellow that semester. We kept on with TNDC, right?

And did a lot of community planning. We got to meet with planners City of San Francisco, right?

[SETH LUNINE]
We got to talk about how certain city planning initiatives to do remodeling at the Civic Center might affect folks in affordable housing in the Tenderloin, and promote some of that stuff. We got to work closely with the Creative Fellows. Formerly Adobe Fellows.

But the point is, we got to teach students, I use “we” pretty loosely, how to use different online platforms in the service of our work. Some students did interesting ecological survey of People’s Park, of all things. We did, I know a bit about Illustrator.

We worked on some infographics, pretty straightforward public stuff, but in the service of the basic Student Advocate’s Office, Student Legal Services, Basic Needs Center at UC Berkeley. More recently, online or during remote learning, we worked with folks who provide mindfulness and sort of trauma healing to youth, in the juvenile justice system. And also folks down in the Antelope Valley, doing work with really vulnerable people.

Many young people out of the foster care system around. The Hook is classic car restoration and job training, but they provide wraparound services. So, for this, it was disjointed, at least spatially, but they, we did a lot of work in curriculum development, in syllabus development, in sort of, they called it rebranding some of their educational stuff as well.

So it was pretty intensive. But I just want to leave it at this. Like, this is Brenda, an amazing artist at Kanekal Farm.

This is what we’re trying to do in one way or another, create some connection, give some students stuff to carry with them. For me, it’s entirely selfish. It’s the benefits I derive from it.

But I thought, this is some new artwork at Kanekal Farm, and really powerful, and I think it might not be the crowning, the jewel on the crown for a lot of students, but I think for most of them, it’s meaningful, generative, formative stuff. And it’s all enabled by our partners, of course, and by the outfits at UC Berkeley, I’ve said, I mentioned a number of times. So I’m of course running late.

What are your questions or comments, or things like that? And thanks for coming at this moment in the semester.

(audience applauding)

The rainy season and all that. I really appreciate it. Questions?

Questions? Or feedback? I should say also, I got some wonderful emails about folks doing work in Oakland, and I think it’s clear, but as far as the announcement, I didn’t mean for there to be anything definitive, as you can tell.

There’s no expertise. But a lot of amazing work that they wanted me to be aware of, and I’m glad they made me aware of, cause, you know, I didn’t mean that there’s nothing comprehensive or definitive here. Yeah.

Any questions or comments, or interventions? There needs to be one, I feel like. Oh, oh.

(chuckling)

[AUDIENCE MEMBER]
So, thank you. That was really wonderful. Do the students bring projects to you? Or, you know, how did it all start? You know, these different places that you have identified.

[SETH LUNINE]
Yeah.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER]
Is it something that you, you know, you had connections to before? Or is it sort of a back and forth with students?

[PRESENTER]
Well, initially, it was really challenging. Doug and Victoria at the AC Center facilitated some of the connections. Increasingly, I was able to draw on my own connections.

And what happened, it was really hard to find partners, cause we can’t impose too much. Oftentimes, our work with the partners represents a lot of extra work for our partners. So Ramon Quintero, at Tenderloin Neighborhood Development Corporation, he was a former GSI.

And then he created space for us. He saw the connections, he facilitated it. And then Robert was a former student, and I went to Kanekal Farm for his graduation party.

So that was sort of not the most precise. So increasingly, And I’ve had students who wanted to participate, who formerly did ACE’s work. So we had a little side grant.

It’s like, cause I’m not the best at networking, I said, “Well, see what you can make happen.” And they were responsible for the mind-body awareness and Lost Angels projects during the remote learning.

[SETH]
So when we sit down together, a lot of our work is designing the work we’re gonna do together. We collaboratively create the projects, and that’s, I think, some of the most meaningful piece of the work, because it’s the face-to-face engaged part. Yeah.

So we work it out together. The students bring their own skills, their own background, sometimes specialized, sometimes more just rearing to go. But the students bring in an incredible amount, but the actual formal projects that are eventually culminate in a deliverable, that’s stuff that we develop in collaboration.

Yeah, yeah. Lakshmi.

[LAKSHMI]
Thank you, Seth. So I guess I had one question and then a thing to propose, or how you might see something. So my question is, it sounds like there’s been a lot of unpaid labor from a lot of different people, and but you’re creating such interesting work, right?

And so I guess one of the questions I had is about scalability. How is this something that you think should be scaled up, or should be increased, more people should get involved? And if so, how?

And then secondary, if you were in– in charge of something at the university, and you had a bunch of money to do stuff with,

[SETH]
You’re saying I’m not?

[LAKSHMI]
Oh, okay, sorry.

(laughs)

So, how would you put the money in a way that–

[SETH]
Gotcha.

[LAKSHMI]
Scalable or something?

[SETH]
I’ve honestly never thought about that.

(laughs)

Well, I do think, I think it’s challenging as far as the time commitment, and I do think it doesn’t fit neatly into a lot of our existing structures and coursework. So I know there’s a lot of grad students and faculty who incorporate engaged scholarship into their knowledge production, into their publications. That’s their research.

When then I think it’s a little bit more seamless. For me, it’s been a add-on, not in terms of energy or intent, but in terms of fitting it within courses that exist. I know if I got in front of it, the Department of Geography would create extra coursework I could add to my appointment to hold it, I would suspect.

[SETH LUNINE]
But the point is that I think it’s a really great moment ’cause we are more and more embracing this work as a public university as considering sites of knowledge production and authorship that is non-typical, heterodox or something like that. But it i– there’s no way I’ve found around the time commitment. So, I think it needs to be recognized more in terms of time, method, and even legitimacy.

And I think it needs to be foregrounded, not as an add-on. And they do this in AC, don’t get me wrong. There are plenty of ACES courses, right?

I’m just talking about my own very narrow experience. But I do think increasingly there’ll be more space for it. And I think a big part of the challenge is a lot of it’s novel.

It’s new stuff. It’s not like drawing directly on antecedent models or something like that. So if I had money, I’d create more, more, more time for people to do it in terms of appointments, in terms of coursework and the like.

And I think that’s out there. It’s just sort of the bureaucratic wrangling. But AC Center does this through their grants for graduate fellows and community partners, right?

I’d want to compensate our partners more. But again, there’s mutual benefits. That’s part of the whole idea.

It’s just the better the partner, the more energy and time. Luckily, we have a lot of people that work with us. So it’s sort of who’s available when, but that would be a big thing for me.

And maybe creating more time for reflection, taking a step back, and synthesizing some of this stuff. So more money, more people, but I think we need to foreground and acknowledge this work. Is that fair, do you think?

For like acknowledge the rigors of this work a bit more, not tacking it on to existing coursework. Yeah.

[MARION FOURCADE]
So unfortunately, we, we are out of time, but I encourage those of you who still have questions to come and ask them to Seth. I just want to thank you very much for teaching us that another way to teach is possible, and also for being the first person to inaugurate this new series. Thank you, Seth.

[SETH LUNINE]
Thanks for having me.

(upbeat electronic music)

[WOMAN’S VOICE] Thank you for listening. To learn more about Social Science Matrix, please visit matrix.berkeley.edu.

Matrix On Point

Matrix on Point: Financializing Disaster

Part of the Matrix on Point Event Series

The technical world of insurance is a critical lens through which to understand the escalating crises in climate change and housing. As climate risks intensify, both public and private homeowner insurance markets face unprecedented pressure, revealing the interconnections between housing affordability, wealth inequality, and the broader financialization of our communities.

Recorded on November 13, 2025, this panel brought together experts to explore the intersection of insurance, housing, and climate. The panel featured Stephen Collier, Professor of City & Regional Planning at UC Berkeley; Desiree Fields, Associate Professor of Geography at UC Berkeley; and Dave Jones, Senior Director of the Climate Risk Initiative at UC Berkeley School of Law. Meg Mills-Novoa, Assistant Professor with a joint appointment to the Division of Society and Environment in the Department of Environmental Science, Policy & Management and the Energy and Resources Group, moderated.

The panel was co-sponsored by UC Berkeley Department of Political Science, the Department of Geography, and the Berkeley Economy and Society Initiative (BESI).

Watch the panel above or on YouTube. Or listen to the audio recording via the Matrix Podcast below (or on Apple Podcasts).

Podcast and Transcript

(upbeat electronic music)

[WOMAN’S VOICE] The Matrix Podcast is a production of Social Science Matrix, an interdisciplinary research center at the University of California, Berkeley.

[MARION FOURCADE] Hello, everyone. The, it’s nice to see a good group on a, on a rainy day. So thank you for joining us.

My name is Marion Fourcade. I’m the Director of Social Science Matrix. So as climate risks intensify, the stability of homeowner insurance markets has faced unprecedented pressure.

Actually, for me, there’s not a month that passes by without someone on my neighborhood email list complaining that they have been dropped by their insurance company and they need an alternative option. Of course, fire insurance is the biggest issue in this area, but elsewhere, it may be flood insurance or hurricanes or– So all of this is making homeownership less affordable. Meanwhile, insurance companies are selling new financial products, so-called catastrophe bonds, to offload the financial risks associated with climate change.

Now, today’s panel was put together by my predecessor, who just entered the room, Cori Hayden, while she was interim director at Social Science Matrix last spring, and I couldn’t have dreamt of a better panel. So thank you, Cori. Thank you for, for being here today.

So we are bringing together experts to explore how the shifting terrain of insurance, finance, and housing can help us understand and perhaps respond to the twin crisis of climate change and economic insecurity. Now, note that today’s event is co-sponsored by the UC Berkeley Departments of City and Regional Planning, Geography, and Political Science, and also by the Berkeley Economy and Society Initiative.

Now, before I turn it over, as usual, you know, those of you who come here often, you know that I always mention the upcoming events, upcoming attractions.

So on Monday we have a new program called the Matrix Teach-ins, where we, we bring some favorite teachers to teach one of their favorite lectures. And so I hope that you will come. It’s a very interesting lecture on exploring Oakland through community-engaged scholarship.

And then our last two events of the semester will happen after Thanksgiving. Maximilian Kasy, PhD in Economics from here, and Professor at Oxford, will talk about his books called The Means of Prediction. And Alexis Madrigal will be our Matrix Lecturer, you know, known to many of you through KQED forum and so on.

He will give a lecture on “To Know A Place,” also, I believe, on Oakland.

Now let me introduce our moderator. Meg Mills-Novoa is an Assistant Professor with a joint appointment to the Division of Society and Environment in the Department of ESPM and also in the Energy and Resource Group.

Meg is the Director of the Climate Futures Lab, a hub for social science research on the impact and equity of climate change responses. As a human environment geographer, her research focuses on climate change adaptation and decarbonization. She uses a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods from spatial analysis and quantitative service, to archival research and interviews.

She collaborates closely with communities and practitioners to improve the design, implementation, and outcomes of adaptation and energy transition initiatives that promote inclusion and equity. Regionally, Meg is working with communities across the Arid Americas, including the Andes in Ecuador and the Great Basin in the US. So without further ado, I leave it to Meg, and thank you all for being here.

(audience applauding)

[MEG MILLS-NOVOA]
Thanks for that kind introduction, Marion. It’s so nice to be here with all of you on a rainy day, and the sun’s coming out. So, good signs ahead.

As Marion foregrounded, we’re living in a time of intersecting crises. On one hand, we have a crisis in housing affordability, burdening both homeowners and renters with high costs and pushing many into marginal and risky housing, and some out of housing altogether. Sorry about this.

Back on track. And on the other hand, we have an escalating climate crisis causing many households to face not one climate risk, but multiple compounding climatic risks simultaneously. And homeowners insurance lies at the intersection of these crises.

The US home insurance sector is under intense strain following massive insurance payouts after major climate disasters like wildfires here in California, hurricanes in Florida, flash floods in Texas. This is happening everywhere in the US and beyond. And in response to these disasters, many private insurers are raising premiums, they’re canceling policies, or they’re leaving markets altogether, such as what Allstate and State Farm announced where they would write no new insurance policies in California in 2023.

So in, in the wake of the withdrawal of private insurance, risk is being transferred onto homeowners who are un or under-insured or onto the state, who’s absorbing high-risk policies as part of fair access to insurance requirements or fair plans transferring risk to the public. And often in discussions on homeowners insurance, we largely focus on the homeowner, but this crisis doesn’t just affect them. It also affects the Americans occupying the country’s 45 million rental units, contributing to ongoing financial distress within the rental market.

Just as an example of this, between January of 2023 and January of 2024, insurance on multi-family housing went up an average of 27.7% nationally, with the largest increases in the Southeast United States. And these costs are being passed on to renters, compounding the larger affordability crisis. And this crisis affects many, but not everyone equally.

Insurance is regulated by states, so there’s a hodgepodge of regulatory environments, which we’ll hear much more about today. Climate risks also depend on where you live, and also low-income often marginalized in racialized populations are facing discrimination in the housing, in housing generally, and also in rate settings specifically, often receiving poorer quality coverage at higher costs. So, the US home insurance crisis is not just going to go away and there’s not a simple solution, but today our three panelists are gonna help us contextualize this crisis, understand its impacts, and also weigh its proposed solutions.

So I’m really glad that you could be here with us today, and we’re really fortunate to have three just fantastic thinkers with us. First, we have Dave Jones, the Director of the Climate Risk Initiative at UC Berkeley Center for Law, Energy & the Environment. He was Senior Director of, for Environmental Risk at The Nature Conservancy from January 2019 to June 2021, and a distinguished fellow with the ClimateWorks Foundation.

Dave Jones served two terms as California’s Insurance Commissioner from 2011 to 2018. He led the Department of Insurance, and was responsible for regulating the largest insurance market in the United States. Jones pioneered insurance regulatory best practices regarding climate risk, including requiring insurers to disclose fossil fuel investments, asking insurers to divest from coal investment, implementing climate risk scenario analysis on insurer investment portfolios, and serving as founding chair of the international consortium of insurance regulators focused on climate risk, the Sustainable Insurance Forum.

Jones has testified before Congress, state legislatures, and the G20 Financial Stability Board, and numerous regulatory agencies about the need for financial regulators to a, to address climate change and the risks it poses to the financial system. Jones has degrees from DePaul University and Harvard University where he has a JD and Master’s of Public Policy.

We have Desiree Fields, who’s an Associate Professor of Geography here at Cal, where she is also a faculty associate with the Global Metropolitan Studies and Berkeley Economy and Society Initiative.

She also co-leads an interdisciplinary research group concerned with digital transformations in global land housing and property. She’s a critical economic geographer and urban scholar. Her research, teaching, and public scholarship investigate property, finance, and technology, with a focus on how they reproduce social and spatial hierarchies in the United States.

At its core, her work is about how these processes of economic and technological change unevenly restructure urban space and the social relations of land and housing. She’s also my Friday morning writing buddy, so really excited we can collaborate in this way too.

Stephen Collier is a professor of City and Regional Planning at UC Berkeley. His work addresses a range of topics, including climate resilience and adaptation, emergency preparedness and emergency management, neoliberal reform, infrastructure, and urban/social welfare. He’s the author of Post-Soviet Social, which came out with Princeton in 2011, and with Andrew Lackof, The Government of Emergency, which also came out with Princeton in 2021. His current work addresses fire risk, insurance, and urban adaptation in California, the topic of two articles currently under review, Insurance and the Rationalization of Disaster Policy, and Disorderly Urban Adaptation to Climate Change.

His previous publications on insurance include Enacting Catastrophe in Economy and Society, Neo-liberalism and Natural Disaster in the Journal of Cultural Economy, Climate Change and Insurance in Economy and Society, Governing Urban Resilience with Economy and Society, and The Disaster Contradiction of Contemporary Capitalism in Geoform. So for all of those getting ready for the qualifying exam, this is a great list for you. So just in terms of what we’re gonna be doing together over the next set of minutes before 5:15, is each of our esteemed speakers is gonna spend about 10 minutes really kind of setting the scene for the discussion in terms of how their work has taught, what that has taught them about the insurance crisis.

And then we’re gonna transition to a couple of questions I prepared for the panelists to discuss among themselves, and then we’re gonna open it up to the audience before bringing it out for a final closing question. And with no further ado join me in welcoming Dave Jones.

(applause)

[DAVE JONES]
Well thank you for that very kind introduction. Is this live? Okay, terrific.

I come bearing bad news. The insurance crisis that we’re experiencing here in California and across the United States and globally, is really the canary in the coal mine for the climate crisis, and the canary is dying. Just to set the stage a little bit, last year globally, insurance companies had $137 billion in insured natural catastrophe losses excluding earthquake.

That turns out to be 29% higher than the rolling 10-year average. In the United States, the insured natural catastrophe losses last year, depending on your data source, were about $112 billion. Also exceeding the rolling 10-year average of insured nat cat losses substantially.

So what’s going on? Global temperature rise is causing more extreme and severe weather-related events, which are landing as more severe and frequent wildfires, droughts, coastal floods, river floods, tornadoes, hurricanes, extreme heat. You know, that’s a partial list.

So, climate change is making all of these perils worse, and it’s killing more of us, injuring more of us, damaging more property, and consequently causing insurance companies to have to pay out ever-larger amounts. Climate change is also taking things that didn’t used to be quite so much a problem, and making them worse. If you’d asked insurance professionals 10 years ago were they concerned about severe convective storms, they would’ve looked at you blankly.

Last year, severe convective storms accounted for roughly 40% of the global insured nat cat losses. So what is this? This is temperatures rising, more water vapor staying in the atmosphere, climate patterns changing, large atmospheric rivers sitting over geographies, and heavy rain coming down.

In the United States, although that’s causing flooding, the flooding part isn’t what’s causing the insurance company losses ’cause remember, the private insurers in this country got out of providing flood coverage in the ’60s, so the federal government created the National Flood Insurance Program, but it’s simply the wind coupled with heavy rain causing damages to home that are driving the substantial losses. And the trends are all in the wrong direction. As you know sadly we’re not bending the curve with regard to global emissions fast enough, and so global temperatures are gonna continue to rise and we’re gonna see more of these extreme severe weather-related events landing in various levels of acuity across the United States and globally, and causing more and more payouts for insurance companies.

Now, it’s also true that the insurance companies’ losses are also being driven by our propensity for putting more people and businesses in harm’s way, and I think we’re gonna hear from our other esteemed panelists about that aspect of this crisis. But it is the case that we continue to allow a substantial amount of real estate development in the various areas where these disasters are falling most acutely. And then also, the cost of replacing property has been going up, so that’s also driving insurance company losses.

But I submit those last two things, more people and business in harm’s way and more costly replacement prices, wouldn’t matter as much if we didn’t have more extreme and severe weather-related events landing in these areas. But various experts say about 30% of the phenomenon, at least 30% of the phenomenon’s being driven by climate change. So as Meg alluded to, what are insurers doing?

They’re doing two things, they’re raising price, and they’re writing less insurance. And that’s happening to varying degrees across the United States. It’s not just California, not just Louisiana, Florida, but in the Midwest where severe convective storms are landing, in the New England area where you’re starting to see wildfires occurring, really throughout the United States in different levels of acuity.

So then the question becomes, what do we do about that? And I don’t believe that there’s a magic insurance wand, policy wand you can wave or a magic insurance regulatory dial you can turn to solve this crisis. Fundamentally, what we need to do is to transition away from fossil fuels and other major greenhouse gas emitting sectors and industries reduce emissions, and bend the curve with regard to global temperature rise.

If we don’t do that, then while there are some short midterm policies I’m gonna tick through very quickly in the five minutes remaining to me, and I’m sure we’ll have a chance to discuss these in greater length, that there are some policies that can help in the short midterm. Ultimately, they’re gonna be outrun by the growth in risk that’s occurring as a result of continued global temperature rise. But what are some of the short midterm things we can do?

Well, what Florida’s decided to do is deregulate the insurance market entirely. Their theory is that if they stopped regulating that insurers would then write more insurance. And so what that’s resulted in Florida is rates four times the national average.

It’s also resulted in less adequately capitalized insurance companies writing in Florida. It’s resulted in most national carriers not writing in Florida. And there’s a long list of ways in which Florida has worked to reduce costs and to deregulate their market.

But even so, there’s been some recent uptick in Florida, local Florida companies beginning to write insurance in Florida. We’re just one hurricane away from that market collapsing again. California’s taken a different regulatory approach.

They’ve continued to regulate rates and regulate the financial condition of insurers with some modification. Just last year, they adjusted the rules to allow catastrophe models to be used for rate setting. They allow reinsurance costs in rate setting.

But here too, while that might help in the shorter midterm get more insurance written in California, which by the way is still an open question. There was a New York Times investigative report that was published just the other week that found that notwithstanding the deal that my successor cut with the insurance industry in this regard, non-renewals continue to climb and there’s a bunch of loopholes in the provisions that required insurers to write more insurance in the high wildfire risk areas. So, it’s still an open question how much additional insurance will get written.

But even if more re– insurance does get written in California because of these changes, again ultimately it’s gonna be overwhelmed by the rise in background risk. So I think the policies that we should focus on are ones that actually are directed at the root cause of the problem, right? So certainly all of the panoply of policies around trying to reduce emissions, transition to cleaner sources of energy, et cetera, et cetera.

But in the insurance context, it may surprise you to learn that US insurers have over half a trillion dollars invested in the oil and gas industry. Which raises an interesting question: Why is the insurance industry investing in the industry whose emissions are the major driver of the climate change that’s causing an existential crisis for the insurance industry? And why are the insurers allowed to keep investing in those industries?

And I submit to you they shouldn’t be allowed to do so, and that states ought enact legislation requiring insurers to transition from their investments in fossil fuels as well as transition from their writing of insurance for fossil fuels as a way of contributing to the transition. Insurers also have an opportunity to invest in new technologies that are aligned with and that support the transition, so there’s an opportunity for them to play a role there too. It also turns out that every insurance policy written in the United States and globally has what’s called a right of subrogation attached to the contract.

And this right also exists in, in common law and statutory law in, in all the states in the United States as well as many national jurisdictions globally. What the heck is subrogation? It’s a fancy word for, the insurance company gets to stand in the shoes of their policyholder and bring lawsuits against third parties whose action or inactions caused damage to the policyholder that then caused the insurance company to have to pay out.

The most notorious example of this is when the insurers sued PG&E for starting the Camp Fire, you know, which killed 86 people, destroyed 16,000 structures, caused about $12 billion in insured losses. And the insurers exercised their right of subrogation, standing in the shoes of their policyholders to sue PG&E, to hold PG&E accountable for starting that fire. So given that insurers have a right of subrogation and they could be bringing subrogation claims against the oil and gas majors for their emissions contribution to the very climatic events that are causing insurance company losses, do you think any insurance company has done that?

Well if your answer was no, you’d be correct. So there are things though that states can do to nudge, push, and even require insurance companies to bring subrogation claims. And I’ve been socializing this idea for the last year.

The New York Times was kind enough to publish an op-ed shortly after the LA Wildfires, the title of which was, Who Should Pay for the LA Wildfires? And my answer was, well, in part, it ought to be the oil and gas industry. So those are some of the policies that could be, and there are others, that could be directed at insurance companies to help further the transition and actually hold more accountable at least one of the major sectoral emitters.

There’s also another issue which I’m sure we’ll get into as well, which is that there’s a tremendous amount of very important investment in adaptation and resilience. And so in the wildfire context in California, this is home hardening in defensible space. It’s also community fuel reduction efforts, and it’s landscape scale management of forests using prescribed fire and thinning, meaning, mimicking the way that nature used to manage our western forests where fire was a routine part of the ecology, it would burn through.

We’ve had about 150 years of fire suppression now in our western forests are choked with fuel, and then you have temperatures rising, drier conditions, precipitation falling in strange patterns. And so they’re just one ignition away from mega-fires. However, groups like the Nature Conservancy and others, including the State of California, have been spending a lot of effort in deploying management in the forest to reduce wildfire risk, including the State of California, which has appropriated $4 billion for this activity.

HOAs, cities, counties are taxing themselves to do forest management, et cetera, et cetera. So these things demonstrably reduce risk, home hardening, defensible space, forest treatment. But with the exception of maybe one or two insurance companies in this state, none of the companies are taking that adaptation and resilience into account and the models that they use both for pricing and for underwriting.

So that’s something that could be changed as well. States could enact laws that require the insurers to account for investments in adaptation and resilience in the models they use to decide whether to write renew insurance and how to price it. And in fact, I worked with some advocates to pass a law like that in Colorado.

A House Bill 1182 passed just this year, first in the nation, that requires insurers in Colorado, as they use these models to decide who to write insurance for and how to price it, that the models have to account for adaptation and resilience at the property, community, and landscape scale measure. So while I continue to hope, and we can talk about it later ’cause my time is done, that we can convince the insurers voluntarily to take up adaptation resilience, and I’ve done some work in that regard, placing an insurance product in the forest that actually accounts for forest treatment at a certain point I think we have to say enough’s enough. We can’t keep waiting and we can require that the insurers account for these things as well.

And that’s what Colorado has done. So we’re gonna get into a deeper dive, but thanks for the opportunity to do a rocket docket blitz through insurance. This is the part where most people, you know, wanna roll their eyes back into the fronts of their head.

But appreciate your kind attention. Thanks.

(applause)

[DESIREE FIELDS]
Okay. Hi folks. Thanks for the invitation to be part of this discussion. Let me put this up a little bit. I don’t work on insurance. So I feel like a bit of an interloper here. But I’ve already learned a lot from Dave. I feel slightly more terrified now than I did before you shared your comments.

(Desiree laughs)

And as a new homeowner whose insurance premium went up by 65% from last year, I also have a personal stake in this discussion. So most of my work has focused on the dynamics of housing financialization and from that perspective, I have a few points that I think are important to make about financialization and kind of assetisation and housing inequality, and then just a couple of points about how I think this intersects with the insurance crisis. And so the first thing I’d like to emphasize is the subjective hold of the ideology of property over America and how the shift toward asset-based welfare has sort of reinforced the hold of property.

There’s obviously a really long history to the narrative of the property owning democracy in the US, going all the way back to Thomas Jefferson and his vision of like smallholder farmers as hardworking, self-sufficient, morally upright. And similarly, home ownership has long been seen as a way of creating self-reliant and virtuous citizens whose material stake in society solidifies their support for national values and especially for capitalism. The racial politics of property are also important here.

Property ownership is sort of tacitly understood as an entitlement of whiteness that preserves the benefits of entrenched racial power, and the American Dream is of course inseparable from the Homestead Act and ideas of citizenship and belonging. These racial politics have always made access to the benefits of ownership of landed property sort of contingent and incomplete. But even while excluding millions beginning in the mid 20th century, the state also enabled a large-scale expansion of single family ownership through, largely through kind of intervening in the mortgage market.

And so this reality, I think, is really important for how it connects to the agenda for asset-based welfare in which individuals are envisioned as being able to provide for their own welfare needs by investing in assets. Usually that’s real estate. And then kind of banking on the idea that their prices will rise over time.

Now, asset-based welfare has its roots in supply side economics beginning in the 1970s and 1980s, really focusing on cutting taxes, especially taxes on capital gains as a way to promote investment and economic growth. Here, I’m drawing heavily on Melinda Cooper’s recent book Counterrevolution which I think is just really instructive. And I think one of the things that really comes through from that book is how supply siders really framed this agenda of cutting taxes to promote growth as, as something that was good for workers through increasing asset prices.

And this really sort of paves the way for the neoliberalism of, of Clinton and that kind of 1990s era. I’ll come back to this in a moment, but I wanted to say first a little bit about the municipal impacts of supply side economics. So along with national scale tax preferences for benefits including real estate depreciation, cities also got in on the supply side act.

They used tax abatements for property owners to help kind of revive private investment in the face of austerity at the federal level as well as the loss of their industrial base. So they were really kind of using tax incentives to draw investment back to cities in the face of declining federal benefits and trying to kind of revive industry. Cooper offers a really convincing explanation of how these tax incentives for real estate investment essentially work to sort of push up land and asset prices, which makes tax revenues grow even if the tax rate stays low, right?

And this makes cities structurally dependent on asset prices kind of going up and up and up. Of course, this regime of asset price inflation makes housing less and less affordable for regular people, both owners and renters, but it also means municipal governments are less and less able to resolve the housing crisis because they can’t acquire land or housing or build housing at market rates, but rising property values are also their key source of tax revenue, so they’re kind of stuck in this loop of asset price inflation. And even adding new supply can’t, on its own, really help us here, right?

Because as long as housing is a financial asset, adding supply just increases the pool of assets for investors. And by the way, pension funds, including our own are really a huge source of appetite for these real estate assets, and just an incredibly consequential driving force of financialization over the past several decades. So in tandem with this move towards supply side economics, the long-term retrenchment of the welfare state started by Reagan, really continued by Clinton shrank and conditionalized the social wage at the same time as real wages largely stagnated or declined and pensions offered by private employers dropped off.

And these processes really fundamentally changed our relationship to risk, to debt, and investment. So today, exposure to financial risk is really just widely understood as a requirement for present stability and stability into the future, and we have embraced asset accumulation as a way to protect against the precarity that we all experience under neoliberalism. So the notion that assets are the optimal way to achieve financial freedom and to safeguard against income shocks really operates as a kind of regime of truth that is normalized in our everyday lives.

And so this idea is the foundation of asset-based welfare, which is embodied in Bill Clinton’s nearly simultaneous rollback of welfare benefits and rollout of a national homeownership strategy which sought to increase homeownership amongst low and moderate income Americans and minority Americans. So by the late 1990s, we see this consensus across Democrats and Republicans that through expanding cheap credit, government can help everyone be an asset owner, and then that way everyone can benefit from asset price inflation. So asset appreciation really becomes this core economic policy and also central to popular economic subjectivity, right?

Even as racialized lending practices undermine the promises of asset-based welfare for the very groups that are at this nexus of welfare restructuring and efforts to promote homeownership. Okay, so I know this all sounds very far from insurance, but I think I’m gonna try to bring it back. And so here I’ll say two things.

The first is that while the 2008 crisis really did create a tremendous dislocation in housing prices, this was a very temporary dislocation. The average unadjusted sale price of a home in the U.S has increased by roughly 60% since the 2000 peak of prices and has nearly doubled since the prices were at their lowest in 2011. And so these rising prices mean that we are now confronting the limits of inclusion into that regime of kind of asset-based welfare and asset price accumulation, or appreciation.

Right? So you can see this very clearly in the rise of rent-to-own companies during the pandemic era real estate boom. But the structural factors underlying asset-based welfare have not really gone away.

We remain kind of on our own with a very much shredded safety net, right? And the subjective hold of property ownership remains, and this manifests in different ways. So some people overextend themselves to buy in high-cost areas.

Hi, that’s me. Or you know, move out to, you know, the edges of the region, so people who move out to Brentwood, Antioch, Oakley, Stockton, et cetera. Others continue to rent in expensive markets but invest in real estate in more affordable, often climate-vulnerable places like the Sun Belt.

Still others relocate from high-cost coastal real estate markets to become homeowners in these places. Meanwhile, wildfires, hurricanes floods have all intensified in frequency and severity, and with that comes increasingly high insurance costs. And so the climate crisis means that while the U.S homeownership rate is around 65%, so roughly two-thirds of the country own their own homes our most valuable asset and our largest source of collateral is both increasingly materially vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and increasingly unsustainable to insure.

And so here the risk is both to individual homeowners and their current and future asset-based welfare, and also to the municipalities that rely heavily on property tax for revenues as ownership becomes less and less sustainable for people. The second point I want to make draws from the work of Mark Kier and colleagues who work on this really interesting idea called real property supremacy. So this work argues that climate finance in the U.S is structurally biased in favor of shoring up the value of conventional single family homes and homeowners, while excluding or exploiting owners of manufactured homes, and also renters in multifamily dwellings.

For example, infrastructural responses like seawalls are much more likely to be afforded to communities with higher property values, while managed retreat programs are more likely to be promoted in lower-income communities. Whereas owners of single-family homes can draw on their home value to make climate-proofing improvements to their property, owners of mobile or manufactured homes, who are usually kind of locked out of mainstream housing finance, are much more vulnerable to predatory finance if they want to weatherize or climate-proof their property. And renters in multifamily housing often wind up bearing the cost of climate retrofitting in the form of increased rent and utility costs, as well as the higher insurance rates that landlords are paying.

And even when those climate-proofing interventions can increase property values and net operating income for property owners. And so to end, I just want to underline that the insurance crisis and climate finance, more broadly, is really entangled with these deep currents of property relations and social and economic policy in the U.S. Dave argues we wouldn’t be facing this crisis today if we could reduce emissions and kind of bend the arc of rising temperatures. I argue we wouldn’t be facing this crisis today if property ownership didn’t operate as a key form of privatized social welfare, and if our system of property relations were not organized around structural hierarchy.

Thank you.

(audience applause)

[STEPHEN COLLIER]
Okay. Thanks, Dave and Desiree and Meg, and everyone. Okay, great.

So in comparison to these first two talks, gonna take a very low-flying approach to this topic in connection with some work that I’ve been doing recently that relates to insurance and climate adaptation in cities. So maybe this’ll give a different kind of grounding, but maybe also connect to some of these bigger topics. So a central preoccupation for people who think about urban climate adaptation is that it’s really hard to get people to take action on climate change when it involves significant shifts in land use, changes to the built environment, and expensive investments in infrastructure.

And this is true for a couple different reasons. On the one hand, you know, there’s a kind of presentism in both individual and collective action. We tend to discount things that are cognitively distant.

On the other hand, adaptive change often presents costs, and these can be monetary costs. You have to pay to invest in a seawall. You have to pay to harden your house.

They could also be non-monetary. The seawall blocks your view of the water. It changes the landscape around your house.

You’re attached to your tree and your bougainvillea, et cetera. And against this background, one of the things that’s really interesting about insurance, and one of the reasons that I’ve been studying it from this perspective is that it can really reframe choices about adaptive change. And it does so by financializing disaster in a sense that’s a bit different from what Desiree was talking about.

And it’s a sense that I borrow from the sociologists Fabian Muniesa and Liliana Doganova, who understand financialization as a process through which objects are constituted as prone to generating future returns or losses, which is a maybe mysterious formulation, but let me try to explain it by referring to insurance. So if we think about insurance, it financializes disaster in the sense that it brings a sort of uncertain future value of investments of, in adaptation into the present. So for example, an investment in a seawall that may pay off because at some future date there’s some kind of event that it prevents, a flood that it prevents can also produce very concrete and tangible returns in the present for individuals who have better access to insurance or access to cheap insurance.

So it’s from this perspective that we can understand why insurance is actually driving a significant amount of urban adaptation today. But there are different ways that this could happen, and I think they’re quite important stakes of these differences. And I wanna illustrate this point by referring to two cities in California in which I’ve done some work.

One is Foster City, and the other is the Town of Paradise. So first on Foster City, as you may know, it’s located on the peninsula south of San Francisco. It’s built on landfill.

It’s very close to the bay. It is extraordinarily vulnerable to sea level rise. In 2013, the F– the Federal Emergency Management Agency completed a new flood study actually of the whole Bay Area, and one of the things that it showed is that the levees in Foster City, and actually a number of communities around the bay, would not be accredited for protection against a hundred year flood.

And the implication of this was that when the F– the FEMA made new flood maps for the fe– federal, the National Flood Insurance Program, sorry, basically all of the city would be remapped in, to what’s called a special flood hazard area. And as a result all, basically all of the inhabitants of Foster City would have to pay thousands of dollars a year in insurance, where they had not had to pay that before. So the city responded to this by requesting what is called a seclusion mapping designation.

This is sort of a temporary reprieve from remapping by FEMA. And this designation basically bought the city time to reinforce the levees. To pay for this project, city officials put a measure on the ballot that would raise property taxes to back a $90 million bond.

It’s notable that climate change was almost completely absent from public discussions of this measure. Instead, the discussions were about property values. They were about new floodplain regulations that would impose costs on homeowners, and above all, the discussions were about insurance rates which for homeowners would actually be many times more expensive than the property tax assessment that they were voting on would be.

The bond measure passed with nearly 80% support, which is a very high level for a spending measure in California, and the levee project was actually completed last year. So this is, and here’s a picture of The Levee Project. So Foster City is a clear case in which insurance drove urban adaptation to climate change.

It did so, again, by bringing the future value of investments in adaptation into present financial calculations for both residents and for the city government. There are a couple features of this process in Foster City that make it an example of what I would refer to as orderly climate adaptation. First of all, insurance premiums structured incentives in a very clear way.

They established a cost for not acting, i.e. you’re gonna have to pay for insurance. Oops, I lost that. And they also established, Okay.

(presenter chuckling)

I, I don’t know what I did. A benefit or a return on investment. And they did this due to relatively stable translations between insurance rates, risks, and adaptive actions that the city could take.

In this case, the construction of the seawall. The second thing I would note is that the rate map revision process and this seclusion mapping designation established a framework for a planned and relatively gradual process, which actually unfolded over about a decade, for assimilating new risk ratings into the system.

It’s also important to note that Foster City is a very wealthy city. It has ample resources, a really good bond rating, et cetera, so it was a very easy decision for the city to make, to, you know, invest some resources now on a project that would have actually medium and long-term savings for homeowners. The second contrastive example that I want to offer you is Paradise, California, which as I’m sure, basically everyone in here, in the room knows, is a town in the Sierra Foothills that was devastated in 2018 by the Camp Fire, which destroyed most of the houses, I think about 18,000 structures in the town.

So insurance was crucial to short-term recovery in Paradise. There was a relatively small number of people who were able to rebuild immediately after the fire. And it was basically people who had adequate insurance coverage.

Most people did not have adequate insurance coverage. The availability and cost of insurance for reconstructed properties is also a key to the longer, medium, and long-term future of the town. It determines the cost of living in Paradise.

It also determines the ability of new residents to get mortgages. And this centrality of insurance was actually recognized immediately after the fire by community leaders, who focused on how rebuilding could be organized to meet the requirements of insurers. So, for example, just after the fire an organization called the Rebuild Paradise Foundation launched an initiative to help the town and its residents achieve insurability.

In the short term, the initiative helped residents to navigate the insurance marketplace. In the medium term, it advocated for the adoption of building codes and landscape mitigation policies that would align with insurance industry standards for fire safety. But there was a problem.

And the problem was, as they’ve alluded to was that the insurance industry at that time, and in many ways, to the present day, didn’t have clear standards and practices for translating building characteristics and landscape mitigation treatments into insurance pricing and availability. So what developed in the subsequent years was the following situation. On the one hand, Paradise became a real standout in California and nationally in terms of its building codes and mitigation standards.

The physical and built environment in the town has been dramatically transformed. So it used to be a densely forested place, and it now looks like this. So a really dramatic transformation of the built environment.

On the other hand, and I took these photographs a couple months ago in Paradise.

So on the other hand, as has been the case in many high fire risk areas across the state, the insurance market in Paradise has been in a sustained state of distress, to put it mildly. So policies in the admitted market, if they’re available at all, have been many times more expensive than they previously were. People are paying, like, $15,000 and $20,000 for policies.

Most residents are insured today through the residual plan, the FAIR Plan, or many are going without insurance all together. And today’s city officials and community leaders see insurability as a fundamental barrier for reconstruction, which is actually going quite slowly. We’re now eight years after the fire, and about 30% of houses have been rebuilt in Paradise.

And in the medium and long-term, this is actually an existential matter for the city. Paradise is covering ongoing deficits in the city budget by drawing down settlement money that it received from PG&E for the utility’s role in the fire, and so they, basically reconstruction has to proceed fast enough that the property tax base recovers before that money runs out. And so they’re on a very short timeline in which this question of insurability is essential to reconstruction, which is in turn essential to the future of the town.

So in Paradise too, climate adaptation pathways are being driven by insurance, but with very different dynamics from Foster City. So first, in Paradise, and in the case of insurance for wildfire risk much more generally we don’t have these clear translations between insurance, risk, and adaptive actions that either individuals or communities can take. The insurance industry is still very much working out its views on fire risk and on the value of mitigation in reducing that risk.

Second, in the case of Paradise, there was no well-structured and deliberate process for assimilating changes in risk assessment or asset valuations, and said, we see these very sharp shifts that followed the fire, but also the breakdown in the California admitted insurance market that have produced what I would refer to as a disorderly process of climate adaptation. This is a process that unfolded first through the wildfire itself and then through the meltdown in the admitted market for homeowner’s insurance. And it’s had some serious consequences.

It’s resulted in the permanent displacement of a very large percentage of the people who lived in the town before the fire, and a very highly uncertain process of reconstruction that may or may not result in the town ever recovering to its former size.

So I’ll stop there, and I’ll just conclude by saying that I think that there’s one, one of the issues that I think is interesting to talk about is how we move from this very generalized concept of climate crisis to a more institutionally and analytically specified notion of what this actually looks like, and maybe these are some good starting points. Thank you.

(audience applauding)

[MEG MILLS-NOVOA]
Thank you, everyone. That’s like a moderator’s dream. Everyone was so on time and so prepared, so thank you.

You made it really easy on me. So I think that this has been a little bit implicit in our conversation, but I wanna really make it clear what the stakes are of the insurance crisis, and I was, I wanted to ask our panelists, like, what happens? What is the impact on policyholders, on renters if we don’t figure out a way to attend to this insurance crisis?

What does that look like?

[DAVE JONES]
So, you know, as Desiree pointed out in her excellent talk, a big part of people’s assets and wealth in this country are tied up in their homes and physical property. So the implications of the climate crisis or the insurance crisis don’t stop there. There are flow-through systemic risks across the financial sector and into the real economy.

I’ll give you one example. Jerome Powell, the Chair of the Federal Reserve System, no climate hawk he, testified about four months ago before Congress that in as little as ten years in this country, there’ll be parts of the country where you can’t get a mortgage because of the price or unavailability of insurance. So to get a mortgage in this country, you have to have insurance.

If you can’t afford insurance, then you can’t get a mortgage, or if you can’t find insurance, you can’t get a mortgage. And even if you have a mortgage and you end up dropping your insurance ’cause you can’t afford it anymore, every mortgage contract has a provision in it that says that the mortgage lender can force place insurance on you. And guess what?

The force placed insurance costs dramatically more than the insurance you couldn’t afford, which is the reason why you dropped the insurance in the first instance. So there are, there are flow-through impacts of this, of this crisis to credit markets, both for home lending, Desiree also talked about the impact, or Meg talked about the impact on multifamily housing. You know, there was a study done by the Minneapolis Fed a couple months ago that looked at the impact of insurance pricing on both market rate and permanently affordable housing.

Market rate housing, they’re shoving it into the rents, which has consequences then for low income and other people trying to rent. But for the permanently affordable housing where the rents are restricted in terms of how much they can be raised, those owners and operators don’t have the ability to pass on those insurance costs, so it then raises the possibility of more defaults or non-payments of loans that permanently affordable housing developers have gotten, and that has implications for anyone’s appetite to do more permanently affordable housing as well. And then I guess the final point is that the Dallas Fed did a study looking at geographies in the United States where insurance price is going up, and not surprisingly, they also found coincidently an increase in mortgage defaults and mortgage delinquencies, because as the price of insurance goes up, people can’t afford it,

And so then they default on their mortgage. So, so the implications of this are really bad. Now, it’s also possible that we could have a number of severe catastrophic events occurring relatively close in time across different geographies of the United States that would cause a number of insurance insolvencies to happen, right?

Now, that’s a lot less likely. I think instead we’re just gonna have a slow, steady slide into the abyss, economically. But there is also this outside risk that you could have a number of catastrophic events that drive insurance insolvencies, and that has potential flow-through impacts as well to investors in insurance companies, owners and operators of insurance companies.

So, it’s not good news.

[MEG MILLS-NOVOA]
No that came through clearly. Yeah.

(Meg laughing)

Steven, Desiree, do you have anything that you’d like to add?

[DESIREE FIELDS]
Do, I mean, not directly related, but actually kind of building off of Steven’s presentation. I was really struck by the, the ease with which Foster City was able to kind of get agreement from voters on raising taxes in order to, you know, to issue this bond. And it brought to mind Sage Ponder’s work on municipal debt and the kind of like racialized inequalities in muni– in municipal, access to municipal debt markets, right?

And wherein majority Black municipalities systematically pay higher rates on municipal debt than, than other municipalities. And it just kind of, it strikes me that, that is also, yeah, that’s kind of like also part of the stakes here, right? In which some geographies are going to have an easier time of adapting in an orderly way than others, and that also has implications for mortgageability, insured, insurability, and so forth.

[STEPHEN COLLIER]
For sure.

[MEG MILLS-NOVOA]
So I just will have time for one more question, then we’ll bring it out to everyone. But, you know, Desiree really laid out some of the important historical antecedents, but I wanna also say, you know, what are some other important moments in the past that really set the stage for this crisis, that maybe we don’t always think of as being really important, but that you want people to know in this conversation, that this was sort of how we got here?

[STEPHEN COLLIER]
I mean, one thing to say in the California context is that obviously, and this is something that Desiree was alluding to, is that, you know, we’ve, we’ve had this process over the entire post-war period basically of driving housing into high-risk areas, coupled with an insurance regime that, you know, was sort of underwriting that development in a certain way. And I guess Dave, I mean, has more direct experience with, you know, exactly the attitude about fire risk that was taken, you know, both by insurers in the state, you know, prior to 2017, and by regulators. But I think that we’re now having to sort of grapple with that legacy of sort of underplaying the significance of the risk accumulation process that was going on through that process of development.

I mean, one other point that I would wanna make, just as in the sort of antecedents category, is that, you know, it, you know, the landscape of disaster insurance is very complicated. And we have, we’ve been mostly talking about, you know, private property insurance that is regulated. The Foster City example is actually about a public program, it’s not about a private program.

And I think it’s interesting to note that you have very parallel crises in these two contexts. In both cases, you have a fundamental tension between the norms of affordability and availability. Like, you’re trying to keep it affordable, but you’re also trying to make it available.

And with climate impacts, making those things go together is getting increasingly difficult. And so, I think that it, we really have to think about this, not just in terms of, this is what private, what happens with private insurance, but a more fundamental set of contradictions in the way that we’re managing risk in the context of climate change.

[DAVE JONES]
But what’s super interesting about, about those two examples and, and the point you make about the Foster City example really being driven by a public insurance program, the National Flood Insurance Program in particular, is that the National Flood Insurance Program has provisions in it that actually provide that if a community does things to reduce community-wide risk of flooding–

[STEPHEN COLLIER]
Right.

[DAVE JONES]
–they can get a better rate for their policyholders. Or if they do the kind of things that Foster City is doing, which is to reduce the level of floods sufficiently below, what’s the standard now, one in 100 years, I guess that then there’s not an ob– there’s not a requirement that everyone have National Flood Insurance Policies. So, so what I take away from that is that, versus Paradise, where the community’s trying to make itself insurable, but the insurers have not yet responded to insurability, largely, is that it’s gonna require public intervention, right?

Yeah. We can’t wait for the insurance industry to voluntarily decide that it actually is gonna take adaptation and resilience into account. You would think they would have an economic incentive to do so, but really they don’t.

Because at this point where we are It’s not a market share game any longer. It’s a reduce my insurance to the people that will never make a claim, take that money, and invest it, and make money on the investment side, and avoid expanding coverage to people that might actually make a claim. And so, I don’t think, as much as I’ve worked on trying to get the insurance industry to voluntarily take up adaptation and resilience, they’re gonna get there.

And so that’s why I think we need interventions like the National Flood Insurance Program, where they say, like, you know, ‘If you do these things, then your public insurance price and the requirements associated with it will be adjusted.’ Just like Colorado said on the private insurance side, like, ‘We’re gonna require you to account for adaptation and resilience.’

[STEPHEN COLLIER]
So, although, although for other reasons, the NFIP isn’t working out very well.

[DAVE JONES]
No. I have a whole critique of the National Flood Insurance Program we can launch into, but yeah. But at least, I thought your two case studies were really instructive in terms of sort of public versus private.

[MEG MILLS-NOVOA]
Okay, thanks. So I just wanna thank everyone for being here, and to Dave, Stephen, and Desiree for their wonderful comments.

(audience applause)

(upbeat electronic music)

[WOMAN’S VOICE] Thank you for listening. To learn more about Social Science Matrix, please visit matrix.berkeley.edu.

Matrix On Point

Matrix on Point: Spaces for Thriving

Physical spaces profoundly influence community well-being. Understanding this relationship is crucial for leveraging planning and policy to foster equitable outcomes.

Recorded on November 3, 2025, this panel brought together experts to explore how thoughtful planning and strategic policy can shift power toward communities, creating conditions where all can thrive. The discussion bridged diverse perspectives on environmental conservation, design psychology, and disability studies to illuminate steps toward more just and inclusive environments.

The panel featured You-Tien Hsing, Professor of Geography at UC Berkeley; Sally Augustin, Lecturer at the UC Berkeley School of Public Health in the Interdisciplinary Center for Healthy Workplaces and Principal at Design With Science; and Karen Nakamura, Professor of Anthropology and Director of the Disability Studies Lab at UC Berkeley. Meredith Sadin, Associate Professor at the Goldman School of Public Policy and Senior Researcher at the UC Berkeley Possibility Lab, moderated.

The panel was co-sponsored by the UC Berkeley Interdisciplinary Center for Healthy Workplaces, the Possibility Lab, the Center for Research on Social Change, the Department of Geography, and the Department of Anthropology.

Watch the panel above or on YouTube. Or listen to the audio recording via the Matrix Podcast below (or on Apple Podcasts).

Podcast and Transcript

(upbeat music)

[MARION FOURCADE]
Thank you for joining us today for our Matrix On Point discussion. My name is Marion Fourcade, and I’m the director of Social Science Matrix. So, and I want to say before I introduce the panel, I want to say we have to thank Sarah, because I think, I believe you came up with this idea of doing a panel on Spaces for Thriving. And my predecessor as interim director last semester also really worked in putting together this panel with Sarah.

So, we know that physical space shapes well-being. Understanding this relationship is crucial for leveraging, planning, and policy to foster human flourishing.

And so today’s panel brings together scholars and experts to explore how thoughtful planning and strategic policy can shift power toward communities and create conditions where all can thrive. So the discussion will bring diverse perspectives on this topic, from environmental conservation, design psychology, and disability studies, to illuminate steps toward more just and inclusive environments. Now, before I introduce our moderator today, let me just give you a preview of coming attractions the last few weeks of the semester.

So next week we have another Matrix On Point on the twin crisis of climate and insurance, specifically in California. On the 17th, we will have something that we are introducing now, which is a series called The Matrix Teach-ins, where we bring, sort of favorite teachers from across the social sciences division to teach their favorite lecture. So come listen to Seth Lunine talk about Oakland and how to how to study and engage with the city.

On December 2nd, we have a talk by Maximilian Kasy, an economist at Oxford, who is also a former PhD from here, on his new book, The Means of Prediction: How AI Really Works and Who Benefits. And finally, our Matrix lecturer on December 4 is Alexis Madrigal, known to many of you from KQED Forum, and he will talk about To Know a Place, also about, I believe about Oakland. So let me now introduce our moderator, Meredith Sadin.

Sadin?

[MEREDITH SADIN]
That sounds so much better. It’s Sadin. Yeah.

[MARION FOURCADE]
Sadin. Meredith is an assistant research professor at the Goldman School of Public Policy. She’s a trained political scientist, and her work focuses on political access, community engagement, and inequality.

She has extensive experience collaborating with practitioners, policymakers, and government agencies on projects designed to evaluate, implement, scale, and improve public policies and programs, as well as access to the democratic process. She currently serves as the director of the Center on Civility and Democratic Engagement, I love this name, as well as a faculty research affiliate at the Possibility Lab. Also, a great name.

So you’re the perfect person to moderate this panel. I’ll turn it over to you. Thank you.

[MEREDITH SADIN]
Great. Thank you. Thank you so much.

(clapping)

I’m going to stand, just so you have some, you know, visual variation, which I think is helpful in a space. Thank you so much. It’s really great to be here and to see all of you, and I’m really looking forward to this discussion.

You know, I am a political scientist. And a few years ago, I had the privilege of working on something called Assembly Civic Design Guidelines. And so it was kind of a playbook for creating well-designed and maintained public spaces as a force for building trust and healing divisions in local communities.

And the guidelines actually took four years to write. They were pretty painstaking with respect to collaboration, experimentation. I got to do some very fun pre and post-experiments across the country.

And really kind of drawing insights from over 50 participating cities, years of research, and collaboration. And the goal was really to identify evidence-based design strategies for creating spaces where people trust one another and trust one another to the point where they want to civically engage and are able to. So practitioners now use the guidelines in all sorts of ways.

They apply checklists to public space projects. They spark dialogue with respect to civic challenges. They test low-cost design interventions.

And they guide decisions around capital investments. And what I love about this work though it is a little bit of a, I wouldn’t say a right angle to my scholarly work but what I like about it is that it really bridges the civic and the spatial, right? I often live in the land of the civic as a political scientist.

We often have a set of outcomes of interest we’re really interested in looking at. And civic space is messy. And so I love that.

It makes tangible this idea that how we design and maintain our shared spaces really influences how we relate to one another and how we relate to ourselves and how we relate to a higher story and conception of our community, right? Um, public space, and I encourage you to disagree, but I would say public space is never neutral. Every design choice, right, where a bench is placed, how lighting is used, greenery maintained, carries signals about belonging, about safety and they can really invite connection or reinforce division.

So I think of space as another form of power. Who gets to gather, who gets to speak, who gets to rest, who gets to protest. And when we consider that especially in this moment of polarization, of inequity, it becomes clear that public space is itself one of our greatest civic tools.

So today’s panel is really important. It comes at an important time and we’re gonna be talking a lot about how planning policy space can shift power toward communities, how we can create spaces that foster safety, connection, and the conditions for people to thrive. So I invite you to think about the spaces that you move through every day how they make you feel, what they make possible, what they might say about who belongs and those are the questions I think at the heart of both good design and good democracy.

And so I’m excited. Let’s dive in with our first speaker. You-tien Hsing is a professor of geography and the Pamela P. Fong Family Distinguished Chair in China Studies.

Her research and teaching focus on the political economy of development in East Asia, especially China. She’s interested in the question of power and space. And for her research, she draws inspiration from ethnographic work, including in-depth interviews and participatory observation with a reflexive perspective.

She believes that theorizing starts from the muddy realities and is a process of open dialogues and self-reflections of which the historical and the geographical, the institutional and the emotional are all indispensable parts. So let’s please welcome You-tien.

(audience applauds)

[YOU-TIEN HSING]
Thank you, Meredith. And thank you, Sarah, and thank you, Marion for the invitation. This is my talk today.

I take cue in the Space for Thriving and then think, “What could a geographer say anything about thriving?” So I will draw some stories from my research on Dryland Conservation Politics in Inner Mongolia just as a case study, as a starting point for our discussion. And just a little bit of a propaganda this is drawing from my forthcoming book, Conserving China’s Northwest Frontier, Nature, Culture, and Future, will be coming out in digital format in two weeks.

(laughs)

And it will be another month before the print version comes out. Well, okay, so that’s the end of my propaganda.

(laughs)

This research happens in three sites. Inner Mongolia is a northern border region of China. It’s bordering with Mongolia as a country, but Inner Mongolia is a Autonomous Region of China.

So I just want to clarify that. Um, so I– my research is in, this story today is from Ejinag in western Inner Mongolia. Yeah.

It’s a dry place. Okay. And then with all the policy concerns conservation in the drylands, I will be focusing on policies on combating desertification.

Desertification happens throughout many different parts of the world on North Africa, Northern India Central Eurasia so th– this is a universal concern and then it’s a universal industry as well. Um, so but then in Inner Mongolia it’s been leading uh, conservation uh policy concerns since the early 2000s and this is, believe it or not, the picture shoes– shows a former lake. It dries up in 10 years, and so by early 2000s, this is the bottom of a lake that was more than 20 meter alone in the ’90s.

So over space of 10 years, it becomes like that. So it’s a real thing, you know, desertification, sandification of lands, and this is a village that’s been abandoned because the sand basically bury the entire village. Only the rooftop is left visible.

So you can walk here. Um, okay, so it’s, it’s real, and then not to mention, the sand uh, storms bring all the sands to Beijing. So the policymakers, the leaders actually feel it.

It’s not just remote rural desert, but also in the urban areas and all the way to South Korea and North Korea and Japan as well. Uh, so it’s it’s a big concern for sure, and Chinese Government since the 2000s have been devoted a lot of resources trying to combat this problem. And then to turn the problem into a policy solution you need to identify the roots and the actors who are responsible for the desertification.

So we have two type of actors that are identify as the roots of the problem. One is the herder. They are too greedy.

They feed too many animals, you know, they raise too many animals, and the animals themselves, they chew up all the grass, and, you know, you must have heard this, you know, they eat the roots and then so the grass, you know, die. Okay. So these are the commonly identified culprit, you know problems.

So if we have identified roots of the problem and then we come up with a policy solution to address these problems, and so in terms of the animal as a problem, they say, “Well, no more grazing.” So there’s lot of area being fenced up. This is a wire fence that would designate large area of grazing land for grazing ban and, you know, for years or for certain seasons until, hopefully, the grass grow back.

And then for others, there are many areas reducing the size of the stock and also stop open grazing and put animals in the shelter and feed them with fodder. So this is a commonly, commonly used a policy solution to address desertification problem the world over, and China has been also very important part of this But it’s far from being the sole practicion, you know practitioner of this, this set of policy.

And then in terms of people who are responsible for desertification these herders, they are relocated from the pasture to the government-built resettlement like this. Okay. So people in Berkeley immediately will come will ask the question, “Is this fair?”

Is this workable?” And this is, “Where is the how fair is this?” And then so there is a, the debate in the policy world, you know, because when these relocation projects are built, animals are put in the shelter, it’s actually all framed in the language of development.

It’s really providing different mode of income-making opportunities under the climate change threat and, you know, people need to adapt. This is a way of adapting, adapting to the climate change, to the deterioration of the grassland. So, and then to provide new job opportunity, to introduce new animal species that’s more productive producing more milk, more meat, and better marketable high-quality animal products and so on and so forth.

So it’s all about thriving. Yeah. And then on the other hand, you can imagine this is, you know, getting lot of criticism.

(laughing)

Relocation, you know, these herders into these resettlements only, for these social critics, invites forced, involuntary sanitarization. So they can no longer just do open grazing. They got stuck in these concrete boxes.

So it’s instead of calling them ‘space for thriving,’ and this is truly a space of deprivation. So this is a major policy debate, not again, not just in China, but also in many other ranch land management community, and development study community, and dry land conservation community. This is the debate, right?

Whether, you know, and how we can relocate and we can recover the grassland and save it from encroaching deserts. But my question is, is this all there is about this story? I think the story on the ground has to be more complicated than the either/or picture that we have been reading about.

And then, sure enough, when I visit, you know, these places under grazing ban, I saw these hungry sheep actually crossing, you know, the fence into this, you know, forbidden zone and graze their heart out. And then, so this is how they just all go in there. No prohibition or anything.

And then the herder follow them and saying, ‘Well, my sheep go there. I have to follow them.’ So everybody’s, yeah.

So this is, and then there are a lot of patrol and, of course, fines and violence fighting over this kind of grazing ban. I’m not saying this is easy. This is not a, you know, sail, smooth sail.

But, you know, they have to do that at night when the patrol is not there and so on and so forth. Okay. But then nevertheless I ask, how effective and how real is this kind of either/or picture and thriving or no thriving?

And also, when I visited these relocation settlements, I thought I probably will meet mostly miserable herders feeling stuck, or some, you know, more resourceful, entrepreneurial ones probably are, you know, taking advantage of this and thriving. The thing is during my first few visits, I met none, neither. There is all empty.

These housing projects had no residents.

[BACKGROUND]
Mm-hmm.

[YOU-TIEN HSING]
And it’s not just this village but this one, too. And I visited six in my first two years of visits to these resettlements. I met two families in about, total more than 400 units.

So where are they? Some of them I saw in the restaurant, at home, tourism. These are the beautiful young and skilled ones.

They sing these Mongolian long songs and the soul singing. And very beautiful. Or they will be in the tourist spots riding the horses, performing like a Mongolian princes and for the tourists to take pictures and so on.

But these are beautiful young and skilled ones. Well, what about the majority of relocated herders? Where are they?

And then only after several visits did I realize I was barking on the wrong tree. And so I visited not just in summer but in different seasons and different type of desert, dry lands. And so in the spring where the sandstorms is on its peak, I found them, I actually went with them to hunt this wild congrong.

It’s a herbal medicinal herbs that is grown in the field of suosuo. It’s a desert shrub. So they spent long days from dawn to dusk in the sandstorming spring, so that’s why the mask, and all well-sealed and riding these different vehicle to hunt for this.

This is a very valuable plant that parasitizes on suosuo’s shrubs roots and is good for male potency. So the longer, the fatter, the better, and more valuable, especially the wild ones. And so the good one can fetch $500 a piece.

Of course, this is after many markup in, but still this makes, if you work hard enough for three months in the spring out in the desert this can contribute about one-third of your annual income. And it’s because it’s sandy. And then so it’s actually doesn’t really require too much of a tool.

And they sell this congrong to a wholesaler.

[BACKGROUND]
Mm.

[YOU-TIEN HSING]
And then so this is their home. That’s why I didn’t find them in the resettlement homes because they are actually out in the desert for the three months in the spring hunting for congrong. And this is another family’s home during the spring season.

Okay. In the summer, where are they? I still cannot find them, right?

In the resettlement home. They are in the gravel Gobi lands and digging semi-precious gemstone. This is called, you know, they actually use, and this is they need to use earth mover to dig the hole and then, gather these semi-precious gemstone, and some of them can be as big as two meters high.

It’s called desert rose. It’s also hap-, you can find them in Arizona as well, so different versions, different types. And so they sell it to collectors, to museums, to big hotels for these big ones, and small ones they sell it to tourists.

And in the fall the site I study has this brilliant a poplar tree forest cons-, you know, protected forest area. So tourists swam in, and then lot of moneys can be made. And one of the ways to take advantage of ecotourism is turning their relocation home into youth hostel

(audience laughing)

for ecotourists.

(audience laughing)

So I stay in one of them during my fall visit, and so this is my room.

[BACKGROUND]
Aw.

[YOU-TIEN HSING]
And because hotels are overbooked and there are just way too many, and it’s way too expensive and this is much cheaper. And then, so they, everybody in the relocation settlements especially those well-located ones more accessible ones, everybody rent out their home. So where do they stay?

They stay in internet cafe. Overnight, this, you know. So this is where they work.

And then so they sell these, you know, trinkets and stones on the tourist site in the fall. And over the winter, long and harsh Mongolia winter, then they return to their resettlement homes because it’s solar heated And it’s wonderful if they, again, they have this kind of facility.

Okay. So what I would conclude from this story is that whether it’s designed for thriving or imposed to deprive or both, space is only the beginning of this. This design is only the beginning, not the end of a story.

Relocation housing, in lot of the stories whether you praise it or whether you criticize it, always starts and ends in the relocation in saying they are stuck or they are thriving. But that’s only the part of the story. When you look at how they move around and they don’t you know it’s not about resistance.

It’s not about sanitization or automatically being sanitized by relocation. Instead, herders strategize to incorporate the relocation housing into a new mode of mobility, just that their strategies to survive conservation policies. Did not necessarily align with the intention of the policymaker.

And so I think there is a theoretical benefit to gain from this kind of geographer’s specialized social analysis. One, it helps us to avoid the binary story of authoritarianism versus resistance. They didn’t resist.

They didn’t run away. They just actively incorporate this housing into their overall grand scheme of surviving conservation. It’s not surviving environmental deterioration.

It’s surviving environmental policies. All right. Another thing that I think we can benefit of theoretically from this approach of looking at specialized social analysis is to avoid nostalgic story but end up nomadism.

You know people say, ‘Well, relocation housing just sanitize these herders. They have nowhere to go.’ But they do have many places to go.

It just it’s not about whether market or the state has end, end nomadism is really of different mode of mobility in the new rural economy in pastoral in Mongolia today. Again, last but not the least, this is another apology, which is for the policymakers. ‘Oh, it looks like a rosy picture.’

In my chapter, which I welcome you to visit,

(You-tien chuckles)

I’ve spent two-thirds of that chapter on nomadism, so-called nomadism today. And all the failure, you know, and all the increasing disparity between those well-endowed pastoralists and those poorly-equipped pastoralists under pastoral reform and conservation, those who has the capacity to aspire and those who do not have capacity to aspire under the new conservation politics. But what I want to do today is really just to show victims are not made automatically, and herders, relocated herder, still needs to be treated as someone with agency.

Okay, I will end here. Thank you very much for your attention.

(audience applauding)

[MEREDITH SADIN]
Thank you so much, You-tien. That was really, really such a fantastic way to kick off our discussion. And think about unanticipated uses of space and consequences of shifting space.

I think, as we get ready for our next presenter, who will be joining us remotely, I will introduce her. Sally Augustine is a practicing environmental and design psychologist. She’s the principal at Design with Science, and a researcher with the UC Berkeley Interdisciplinary Center for Healthy Workplaces.

She has extensive experience integrating science-based insights to develop recommendations for the design of places, objects, and services that support desired cognitive, emotional, and physical experiences. Let’s welcome Sally.

(audience applauding)

[SALLY AUGUSTIN]
Thank you for the opportunity to join you today. I’m gonna be speaking about places that flourish from a slightly different, where people flourish from a slightly different perspective. First, I wanted to take a moment to introduce my field.

I am an applied environmental psychologist, and that means I bridge the science and design practitioner worlds. And so what I do on a daily basis is I work with people who are creating places, or objects, or services, and I make design-related neuroscience-informed recommendations to them so that it increases the likelihood that the spaces, objects, services that they’re developing, you know, reach their desired goals, you know, the outcomes that are planned for them. So, I’ll talk to people about things like surface color, lighting, patterns, seen and heard textures that people feel on surfaces with their fingers or underfoot, scents that people will smell as they’re having one sort of experience or another acoustic experiences.

And, you know, because life is complicated, I don’t just think about, and people like me don’t just think about sensory experiences, but we also layer in psychosocial factors like making sure people have a comfortable level of control over their environmental experiences. You know, personalities need to align with the design of spaces for people to thrive, you know, so do national cultures and organizational cultures. So, you know, I bring this, you know, science and practice perspective to our conversation today, and I really wanna drive home the fact that the material I’m working with, what I do is science-based.

Sometimes people think I actually practice some sort of like feng shui or something like that, and that’s not the case. Environmental psychology is a division of the American Psychological Association, you know, we have journals, peer-reviewed journals, et cetera. We’re among the smallest divisions in the American Psychological Association, but we’re there, you know, and we’re as a group, very interested in enhancing lived experiences.

So when I think about flourishing, I think about spaces that enable people to achieve the primary motivations that are laid out by self-determination theory. And as I speak today, I wanna make sure I don’t sound too deterministic. Place, design, makes it more or less likely that people will satisfy one of these core human goals, et cetera, but it’s not the only thing that comes into play.

So when we think about self-determination theory, and the motivations it lays out, one of the first that always comes to my mind is competence or the feeling that you’re going to be able to effectively execute some sort of activity. And this is something that environmental psychologists have spent a lot of time thinking about in a number of different contexts. There’s so much research out there about things like how lighting, color, and intensity, and placement, on a tabletop, overhead, et cetera, how that influences how people think and behave.

There’s all sorts of research that relates to the sorts of soundscapes that can fill an area and how those soundscapes have repercussions for cognitive performance and wellbeing, et cetera. So, design definitely can contribute to whether people feel competent in a space. The second primary motivation outlined by self-determination theory is autonomy.

And that, in this case, would be the feeling that you’re choosing a particular behavior rather than having it imposed upon you. And something that environmental psychologists have been thinking about for a long time is providing people with a comfortable level of control over the worlds in which they live. People can be overburdened by an excessive number of choices and that leads to stress, which is not a good thing if you care about what happens in people’s heads and subsequently to their bodies.

But you know, there are a number of ways that people can affect their environment, control their experiences in a space. And the third primary motivation laid out by self-determination theory is relatedness or, you know, and really what it boils down to is spending time with the people you wish to spend time with when you choose to do so. And, you know, in related research, well, environmental psychologists have been all over this for years.

We’re really sociable, a lot among ourselves and encouraging people to mingle, if you will pleasantly with others is you know, something that’s been at top of many research agendas. So we think about things like furniture, you know, how important it is that anybody who’s participating in a conversation be in roughly the same sort of chair so that all the contributions that they make are equally valued. Not surprisingly, when we’re looking down at someone because they’re sitting on the floor and we’re sitting in a chair or up at someone in the reverse situation, well, that influences how we value what the other party is saying.

You know, and we’ve even got, gone so far as to learn about how colors influence how sociable people are. And since temperature, color temperature, physical temperature, and perceptions of social warmth are all processed in the same parts of our brains we’ve learned, for example, that when people are in an area with, where warm colors predominate, they’re apt to be more sociable. So when you combine this uh, research that relates to self-determination theory and put it in the context of environmental psych generally, you find that a place where people flourish actually uh, supports human lives in five different ways that I call the five Cs.

First of all, a place where people flourish supports communication, and that can be, you know, verbal discussions among people, but it also involves non-verbal messaging. This is probably actually more powerful than any of the other things that I’ll talk about in, in terms of leading to a situation where people flourish. So in places where people flourish, they can communicate, they’re challenged, which means they have the opportunity to develop in ways that are personally meaningful to them.

Places where people flourish continue in use over time. Particularly when individuals are stressed, it’s very important that they understand how to use the design that they encounter. And, you know, this all relates to a space continuing in form over time.

Something doesn’t have to be, a space doesn’t need to be exactly the same as other spaces, but it needs to be understandable based on previous experience. A space where people flourish, where they thrive is also comfortable. And this gets into things like biophilic design, which is incorporating natural elements, whether they’re natural materials, plants, natural light, curving forms, et cetera, into spaces.

So we’ve learned that a place where people flourish will communicate, challenge, continue, and comfort. And finally, a place where people will flourish will coordinate with the tasks at hand. If people need to focus, they’re not distracted.

You know, if people are in the process of healing, the art on the walls, et cetera, supports that healing. You get the general idea. So when I think about places where people flourish, I think about how design can create psychological experiences, and particularly psychological experiences that create positive, life-enhancing experiences.

So I’m looking forward to talking with you more later about my world and participating in the discussion. So, thank you for your time.

(applause)

[MEREDITH SADIN]
Um, thank you so much, Sally. Um, and now I’d like to introduce our last speaker for the day. Um, Karen Nakamura is a professor of anthropology at UC Berkeley and is the director of the Disability Studies Lab.

Professor Nakamura’s research focuses on disability, sexuality, and other minority social movements in contemporary Japan. Her books, films, and articles have resulted in numerous prizes, including the John Whitney Hall Book Prize, the SVA Short Film Award, and the David Plath Media Award. She’s currently finishing a project on trans movements as disability in Japan while launching a new project on robotics, augmentation, and prosthetic technology.

So please welcome Karen Nakamura.

(applause)

[KAREN NAKAMURA]
Thanks so much I thought at first that I would talk about my lab and show photos, but it, it’s difficult. And one of the reasons is every time I come back to my lab, it’s a bit different. And so I thought instead I would talk about design for some types of bodies.

And to think of the privilege that allows us, or at least to think of the work of others that have allowed us to be present in this space. We’re on the eighth floor of a building and so most of us, there are some in this room who maybe if there were no stairs and elevators, could have free climbed the eight stories. If there was no elevators, there’s a good chunk of you who could have walked up the stairs.

But then there’d be still a few that couldn’t use the elevator. And so it’s because of the work of previous generations who have thought of how do we create these spaces so that people can come, that we are here. We exist in a space that has lighting that seems to be suitable for us.

The temperature kind of works for many of us and so forth. But I wanna take also, and I do this in my classes and my talks, is to take um, some language from Margaret Price who’s at um, Ohio State University who really invites people at her talks to really hack the space to be like, “You know, we exist in spaces that are often don’t quite match what we need. And so if you need to lie down, please lie down.

If you need to stim, go ahead and stim. You know, if you need to get a glass of water, get a glass of water. If you need to stretch, if you need to fuss with the thermostat and turn it up, you know, we can turn it up and so forth.”

And to really take ownership of this space and to feel like you have that privilege to be able to change the environment that you’re in so that it better accommodates you. And I like how she is thinking, right? I there is this notion often in design spaces you hear it as called things such as universal design.

And I often have an allergic reaction to that, especially when it gets applied to campus environments. I don’t like the term universal design ’cause it imagines that we can envision a space that everyone can come and mingle as they are. And I think those spaces are very difficult to create.

There’s another concept from disabilities studies called conflicting accommodation. So I had invited, you know, you to change the temperature, but it’s gonna be very difficult for us to find a temperature that works for everyone. We all know the anecdote of walking into office spaces and all the women are wearing cardigans and have little space heaters underneath their desks because the temperature that’s been set for HVAC systems in North America is based on studies of young men doing light exercise and not on women doing office work.

And so finding universal things is difficult. I invited adjusting the lights. I find these lights to be somewhat painful in terms of it’s either the flicker or the CRI is painful.

I’d prefer it if they were shut down. But that would affect others who need the light to take notes. And so it’s very difficult to create a singular space where everyone can get accommodated at the same time.

And I had mentioned my lab is in this constant state of flux And I really want that. I encourage my students to think that they have ownership

And so every time there’s a break And I come back, they’ve changed the configuration of the lab and things have shifted. And I like that idea.

There’s this notion within the disability community, and I think this really works well with Yochain’s talk about that we are all hackers. That disabled people are the original hackers because we exist in spaces that don’t quite fit us. We have to make adjustments to things.

We have to, you know change the height of our countertops. We have to change the type of lighting to different lighting forms that won’t give us migraines. We have to widen hallways or get, pull up the carpeting or other things and so that the spaces can be changed to accommodate.

Within the disability community, we are pushing for design standards that allow for that type of hacking to say, “Okay, let’s get the classroom and make it very easy for the lighting to be shut off in one-half and to be bright on the other half.” Or let’s make, this is an ideal classroom, it’s very hackable, right? We don’t have fixed seating and so if people are coming in with scooters, we can easily move out some of the chairs so that they can accommodate.

But we’ve all been in classrooms on the Cal campus or other places where there is this predetermined notion of the type of bodies that will occupy it. Whether it’s that, okay, we’re only going to expect five percent of the population will be left-handed, so we’re only gonna have five tables that accommodate left-handed people. Or that people are not going to, are always going to be able to fit into these seats, and we know Americans are growing both taller and wider, and so we don’t fit into many of the seats that we used to fit in.

And so my invitation is to recognize that we need to invest more in hackable spaces and need to be more flexible about how we think about how spaces can be used. You know, I always think of the sadness about public spaces that suddenly be got turned into skateboard parks by kids, right? And so and then the efforts to make them hostile to skateboarders, right?

So they put those little pegs on, on surfaces so that they can no longer grind, I think is the term, I’m not a skateboarder, on them and so forth. And to think, you know, this was a public space and it was always an invitation to the public, but when the public starts using it in ways that we don’t envision and again, you know, kids are great hackers of spaces too, right? They’re constantly conceiving of new ways to use space.

The owners don’t like that. They’re like, “We don’t think that your use of this public space is appropriate.” And so we are going to make things designed in a particularly hostile way to make sure that you cannot be part of the public that we envisioned.

And we see that in many other areas of our world as well. This constant tussle between the people who make things and the people who use things. And part of what my group is trying to do is to say, we need to be better hackers.

We need to recognize that we hack and we need to demand legislation, recognition within design spaces, that once you make something and release it into the world, it’s no longer truly yours. It becomes all of ours and that this group ownership. This notion that, we will use it in ways that you might never envision and that’ll be fantastic.

Is something that you should celebrate and wrap into your design process. That’s what I think will allow us all as communities to thrive. So, thank you.

(audience applauding)

[MEREDITH SADIN]
Thank you so much, Karen. I’d like to invite You-Tien to come back up and join us. And we can also circle around so we can include Sally in our discussion.

I have so many questions for all of you. I’m going to start with just a quick question to each of you based on what you shared today. And let’s go in reverse order.

Since Karen your talk is fresh, as you were talking of inviting us to potentially lie down, I thought that invitation felt so radical, and trying to think through why. And what I came up with was, okay, there are norms of who is in charge and they aren’t necessarily the norm, the people who built or constructed the space, but they are based on some construction of power. And so I’m curious about how power has entered into your work with respect to hacking the norms.

You brought up the example of skateboarding. But I’m curious, specific to either the disability rights movement or–

[KAREN NAKAMURA]
Yeah, I think, you know, the disability rights movement was, was born in Berkeley, and part of that was this notion that the space just doesn’t work. But also against this notion that UC Berkeley’s claim to be inclusive, but it wasn’t and there’s that mismatch that got people really riled up. How can you claim to be a public university when you’re not?

And got them into hacking different spaces on campus, famously the Rolling Quads went out with hammers and other tools of destruction, and started making their own curb cuts, right? Charm, making it so that wheelchairs could go from street level to sidewalk level. And because the city of Berkeley was dragging its feet or rethinking about how the public bus system isn’t properly including folks.

And I think, they had certain amounts of privilege going in, right? To certain amounts of claim as students, as citizens of California, that they could claim the space in particular ways. And also shame the university or shame the city or shame the state, and then eventually shamed the nation after the 504 movement, including them.

But it’s still a constant process, but it is that notion of power, right? And we see power operating, especially against folks who are unhoused, in ways that equally make them feel very much as if they are non-citizens, non-community members, do not have a right to public space, to use the public space in ways that other people, right? If I can just rest at a bus stop and just go, ‘Okay, just I need to take a breath,’ they are not allowed to just rest, they have to move along.

And so yes, it is very much contextualized in this notion of power. Right now, we are in this particular political movement where people who look like undocumented immigrants feel very much like they do not be in the public anymore, and we are creating these apparatuses to make them feel unwelcome. And I think we need to recognize the ways that people are othered and felt to be excluded, as well as ways of inviting them in and saying, “Hey, this is your space.

Hack it, own it.” And it is small things, like a call in the talk for people to use the spaces as they need to see fit. Another one often in class is eating.

It’s like, eat in class. We all know that Berkeley students are food impoverished. And insecure.

If you need to eat because you have three jobs, you need to eat. And if you need food, let us know, and we’ll try to figure out food. And so I think there are these various ways that you can do to give people that sense of ownership.

But this also involved me having to let go for my lab. It’s like, “Okay, you did that.”

(laughs)

Not what I was thinking, but, you know, I think that’s great. And that’s also a much more difficult step, and sometimes very difficult. Ed Roberts Campus is a building complex above Ashby BART.

[MEREDITH SADIN]
I live right next door to it.

[KAREN NAKAMURA]
Yeah. It’s a fantastic building that’s designed around the principles of universal design, but and to be very open to the public. But they found that they do not have the resources to be open to the public, and over the years, it has become more and more closed until now they have gates, and a barrier, and a guard, and the public has difficulty accessing a space that was originally designed to be very open.

And that boils down to that they cannot live up to their principles because they don’t have the funds to live up to those principles. And I think what we’re seeing a lot these days is this funding agencies aren’t giving money. The state isn’t giving money.

And so people are being feeling very squeezed, and that is what’s making those very hard decisions which I think breaks their heart. So yeah, great question.

[MEREDITH SADIN]
Absolutely. Yeah, I remember years ago, I wrote an op-ed about the importance of maintenance.

[KAREN NAKAMURA]
Yeah.

[MEREDITH SADIN]
Because I think I was like, I love a good headline, and it was “You Can Build It, But They May Not Come,” because you can build it, and then if you have the funding for a year in some of my survey work, we found actually one of the kind of biggest illustrations of civic life is a like well-maintained vibrant playground, and then one of the biggest illustrations of the kind of deterioration of civic life is a poorly maintained playground. Right? And so you can go from one end of the spectrum to the other really quickly without a maintenance budget.

So, thank you. Okay, Sally I have a question because you must see the insides of a lot of people’s workspaces.

[SALLY AUGUSTIN]
I sure do.

[MEREDITH SADIN]
And yeah, I am so fascinated. Is there a case that you could share with us that just flies in the face of your, kind of tenets of, you know, competence, autonomy, and relatedness, and you know, how and why? You know, what would you change?

And it can be a public space or it can be a private space, but I’m just kind of curious to anchor some of your expertise in some real example.

[SALLY AUGUSTIN]
I think things start to go awry pretty quickly when designers of various sorts make assumptions about how the product that they’re creating, the space, an object, whatever, will be used. And, you know, I see this, I used to see it more, now I see it less, which is great, which mean, you know, we’re making progress, in moving the world forward. But, I’ve seen instances where designers even argue with the people who will ultimately be using a space.

For example, you know, people are asked something that boils down to, “What do you need to do in your workplace, to perform to your full potential?” You know, “What sorts of behaviors, outcomes, whatever, “are rewarded in your world at the end of the year with bonuses and things like that?” So, I’ve seen people asked something that boils down to, “What do you have to really do well in this area?”

And designers listen, and then I’ve seen them argue. Like, “No, you know, that isn’t actually what you need to do to be successful here.” What you need to do to be successful here is this other thing, which is how I intend to design your space.

And it depends on economic conditions, and specific professions, how much power users will have in a workplace, for example, to continue the workplace example. But even if they don’t officially have a lot of power, they’ll take whatever is built and use it in the way that they need. So you can see spaces that ugly up fast.

If whatever people are doing really requires no visual distractions in a workplace, to continue with the example has visual distractions. People will build little walls around themselves with whatever they can come up with. And it’s really ugly.

And it also sends a really awful silent message, like, the people who run this place, don’t really care what I need to do to be successful. But I’m not taking this lying down and I’m seizing control of the situation myself. So, I do see inside a lot of workplaces.

I see ones that are sometimes not designed to align with what people need to do there. But I also see lots of users who take matters into their own hands and make the changes in an area they need in order to be successful as they define success.

[MEREDITH SADIN]
I imagine also, this notion of workspaces being designed to maximize productivity relative to thriving. And when those things may be at odds–

[SALLY AUGUSTIN]
Well, they should align because our professional performance is such a key component of our self-concept, the way we think about ourselves, et cetera. But it’s important to keep that top of mind because when you start to drift away from design that supports what humans need to achieve in an area. No, well, don’t waste the resources, don’t build it.

You know just do something else.

[MEREDITH SADIN]
Speaking of don’t build it, Yutian. I was really struck by the empty relocation housing. And I’m curious because I think your presentation really, it really did not take a normative approach.

I am curious, given that desertification is happening. From your perspective, are there things that can be done to maybe better inform environmental policy? Or do you see a counterfactual where, I mean, in some ways, it doesn’t necessarily seem like a disadvantage that this housing was built, but it just wasn’t designed to actually serve the purpose that it’s now serving for ecotourism.

So it’s, yeah, I’m curious what you think about the way that policy is evolving.

[YOU-TIEN HSING]
You know, I was in planning school. That’s where my PhD is.

[MEREDITH SADIN]
Yeah.

[YOU-TIEN HSING]
But then I am now in geography for a reason. I’m very bad at thinking about what to do.

(laughing)

What is there to be done? I think that before we get to that point, it’s more, at least intellectually, I feel, I like to know more about what is going on. Yeah, and then policymakers the same, but then because of time pressure and everything else, you need to go to that conclusion about what to do faster.

But I enjoy the luxury of not having to go there. So it’s, first of all apology. But at the same time, one of the many things that I feel that can, that policymakers and thinkers can benefit from is really to understand this is, I learned the hard way, that desert and desertification are two entirely different things.

But they are so productively mixing and morphing, you know, morphing into one another in the policy thinking and doing, meaning that all desert is bad to begin with. And then all desert is considered as being desertified. And therefore needs to be fixed.

Not knowing two thirds of all the, of, on the Earth, face of our planet covered by various sandy soil is not desertified. It’s been there for millions of years. But then they are all being seen as evil, as, you know, deterioration.

There was a good old time when all the deserts were forest before. But that which is not true. And this idea is actually inherited from the colonial period in the 18, 19th century when the French colonialists went to, you know, Asia and Africa and see all the desert, and the, because local people’s naivety, ignorance, and greed.

And they destroy it. We have to recover the desert. The desert, is actually a very stable ecological system.

Just like your rainforest before it’s been destroyed, you know, snowy mountain, it’s a complete, comprehensive, very complex ecosystem. And it’s really the edge of the desert where, you know, farming, mining, you know, you know, deforestation happen when desert, you know, these very fixed, immobile sand dunes become mobile. And that’s when the problems happen, at the edge, but not in the heart of most of the desert we know of today.

But then all these development projects, relocation, you know, new production projects go all the way deep into the desert that does not need to be fixed. But they are all considered and perceived by policy makers, thinkers, as, you know, so that’s why turning the brown color desert into green color forest is considered the way to go. But desert theory does not benefit from growing too many trees.

Imagine you grow trees that suck up all the groundwater and in the name of protecting it. And not to mention you need to build a lot of roads in order to transport labor and water into the desert to grow your little seedlings. But it’s a very productive thing because imagine in this how big the money is to be made with this green money, green investment.

So that’s one thing I feel most fundamental in our policy thinking is really where is the desert and where is the area that needs to be fixed as being desertified. But even, you know, UN Convention of Combating Desertification is a big international organization, the most prestigious one, also confuses these two.

[MEREDITH SADIN]
Wow, yeah. That’s really interesting. And also in examining which of these spaces needs to be fixed, you know, who needs support and what kind. And then, as you pointed to, who is to blame?

[YOU-TIEN HSING]
Right.

[MEREDITH SADIN]
And who are the victims if we want to kind of label in that way.

[YOU-TIEN HSING]
It’s always the local people, even if the problem comes from somewhere else.

(laughing)

You live in a deteriorated area, it must be your fault. Right? But it’s not. It’s some, you know, from far away.

[MEREDITH SADIN]
All right. Thank you so much for such a fantastic conversation. To each of our panelists, thank you very much.

(upbeat music)

Matrix On Point

Matrix on Point: Conspiracy Theories

Part of the Matrix on Point Event Series

Conspiracy theories are a pervasive and powerful force in contemporary society, shaping public discourse and influencing real-world events. Understanding their origins, spread, and impact is crucial in navigating today’s information landscape.

Recorded on October 27, 2025, this panel brought together experts to delve into the multifaceted world of conspiracy theories. Drawing on diverse academic perspectives, the discussion explored the nature of conspiracy theories, their societal implications, and how they are understood and addressed.

The panel featured Michael M. Cohen, Associate Professor of American Studies and African American Studies at UC Berkeley, and Tim Tangherlini, Professor in the Department of Scandinavian and the School of Information at UC Berkeley. Lakshmi Sarah, journalist and lecturer at the UC Berkeley Graduate School of Journalism, moderated.

Matrix On Point is a discussion series promoting focused, cross-disciplinary conversations on today’s most pressing issues. Offering opportunities for scholarly exchange and interaction, each Matrix On Point features the perspectives of leading scholars and specialists from different disciplines, followed by an open conversation. These thought-provoking events are free and open to the public.

This panel was co-sponsored by the UC Berkeley Department of Scandinavian, African American Studies, and the Program in Critical Theory.

Watch the panel above or on YouTube. Or listen to the audio recording via the Matrix Podcast below (or on Apple Podcasts).

Podcast and Transcript

(upbeat instrumental music)

[MARION FOURCADE]
Hello, everyone. So my name is Marion Fourcade. I’m the director of Social Science Matrix.

So I’ll give a short introduction to this, to this panel. We live in a golden age, really, of conspiracy theories. They’ve moved from the margins to the mainstream.

They drive political movements. They undermine public health efforts. They occasionally trigger violence, including political violence.

So they now command massive audiences, influence policy debates, they challenge our sense of reality. So, how did we get here? What is it about our current moment, our technologies, our institutions, and our anxieties that make conspiracy theories seem so potent?

And so today’s panel will explore what they are, why they flourish now, and what their ascendance means for democracy, truth, and social cohesion. This is a panel that is co-sponsored by the UC Departments of Scandinavian Studies, African-American Studies, and the Program in Critical Theory. Before I turn it over to the panelists, let me just briefly mention a few of our upcoming events this semester.

We have a whole set of events. So next week, we have another Matrix on Point on Spaces of Thriving. A little bit after, we’ll talk about the insurance crisis that, you know, has come to us as a result of the climate crisis.

On December 2nd, we have Maximillian Casey, an, an economics PhD from Berkeley who has just published a book on the means of production. This is part of our program on critical empirical legal studies. And then we have a Matrix on Point event, oh, sorry, Matrix Lecture event, Alexis Madrigal on December 4th and the title of that event is “To Know A Place.”

Let me now introduce our moderator, Lakshmi Sarah. Uh, Lakshmi Sarah is an educator and journalist with a focus on experimental storytelling. Uh, she has produced content for newspapers, radio and magazines from Ahmedabad, India to Los Angeles, California, including AJ+, Die Zeit Online, and The New York Times.

She was a digital producer and reporter for KQED News until The Great Journalism Reckoning in the summer of 2025. She’s now an on-call producer and a lecturer in the UC Berkeley Geography Department. She has developed curriculum training for journalists in video and immersive storytelling skills in the US, India, and around the world.

Previously, as a lecturer at the UC Berkeley Graduate School of Journalism and also at Berkeley’s Advanced Media Institute, she taught multimedia and VR workshops. Her teaching and reporting have brought her to Hamburg, Germany as a Fulbright Fellow, Berlin as an Arthur F. Burns Fellow with Die Zeit, and to India to report on ethnic violence in the northeastern state of Manipur as a Pulitzer Center Grant recipient. So without further ado, let me turn it over to Lakshmi and I look forward to this panel enormously.

Thank you.

[LAKSHMI SARAH]
Thank you so much.

(applause)

Okay. Thank you so much. Thank you, once again, to all the organizers for putting this on.

I’ll be moderating today’s event, and as a journalist, I try to do a few main things. Um, taking big, complicated topics and making them more easily digestible more easily to under, more easy to understand for audiences, from everything from ethnic violence in India’s northeastern state of Manipur to reparations in the State of California. Another thing I try to do is to understand multiple perspectives on the same issue, how and why people do, believe what they do, and when and how and why people believe what they do and oftentimes I’m doing that by interviewing people on one topic.

Um, when I interviewed asylum seekers traveling to Germany in 2015, the assumption was that we would be talking to Syrian refugees. We ended up interviewing people from all different countries, from multiple different countries, and each person had their own story of both departure and arrival. In this effort to grasp different perspectives, I’m currently working on research about a cult-like community in California, and in the process, I’m in the process of listening to many different people and interviewing and really trying to understand people are– where people are coming from, and then I find that sometimes I take on their concerns.

After speaking to members about black magic, I too wonder if I will be subject to black magic, and then I wonder if it’s a conspiracy or if it is actually reality. And now, more recently, I find myself on social media attempting to verify and debunk threats of ICE and the actions of the federal government. When reality feels increasingly like a conspiracy then I begin to wonder how do we live in the world in a way that makes any sense to anybody and hopefully to multiple people trying to think about the same things at the same time.

Um, and I’m hoping that our panelists will unpack a bit of this for us. So without further ado, let me introduce our panelists and get started. So Michael M. Cohen was born in Denver, Colorado, the child of two public school teachers.

He holds a BA in history from the University of Colorado and a PhD in American Studies from Yale University. He is currently an associate teaching professor, here, with a joint appointment in American Studies and African American Studies. He’s the author of The Conspiracy of Capital, Law, Violence, and American Popular Radicalism in the Age of Monopoly.

His general research and teaching areas cover the cultural and political history of the United States from the Civil War to the present. Areas of emphasis include, racial capitalism and racial formations in the United States; labor, work, and radical social movements; Marx and the Marxist tradition in world history and theory; cultural studies, popular culture, and US film and literature; theories of conspiracy and conspiracy theories; political cartooning and comic books; race and drugs in the US; and US history and contemporary US politics and social change. Tim Tangherlini is the Elizabeth H. And Eugene A.

(unintelligible)

— sorry, Chair–

(unintelligible)

(panelists laughing)

–chair in Undergraduate Education. He is Professor in the Department of Scandinavian and in the School of Information. A folklorist and ethnographer by training, he is the author of Danish Folktales, Legends, and Other Stories, Talking Trauma, and Interpreting Legend.

He has also published widely in academic journals. He is interested in the circulation of stories on and across social networks and the ways in which stories are used by individuals in their ongoing negotiation of ideology with the groups to which they belong. In general, his work focuses on computational approaches to problems in the study of folklore, literature, and culture.

Without further ado, Tim, please kick us off.

[TIM TANGHERLINI]
All right. Thanks so much, Lakshmi, and, and thanks so much, Marion, for hosting this event. I wasn’t really sure how to, how to get into this, but yes, you should be worried about the black magic.

And, and that is going to make you even more worried. So one of the things that’s very interesting is what she just kind of expressed is how you get inoculated to ideas, and not against them, but you actually get inoculated with ideas. And then once you have an idea, it’s very hard to unhear that idea and you start to negotiate your own stance on that.

And so, I’m very interested in, in storytelling and storytelling environments. And one of the great advantages of working now is that social media is, in some ways, a giant natural experiment in storytelling. And we also have computational power to try and understand the latent narrative spaces that seem to be driving these conversations.

And so we are, as Marion pointed out, in this moment of great acceleration of this kind of storytelling. So, pretty much my entire life, I’ve been very interested in stories told as true. The stories that we tell each other that, about things that have happened and things that are important to us.

Things that rise above the level of reportability so that we remember them. I think those things encapsulate, in many ways, the norms, beliefs, and values of those groups that we belong to. And so, when we tell a story, we’re in part signaling at least some aspect of those norms, beliefs, and values that we’re constantly negotiating with the people who we interact with.

Now, legends, rumors, these are sources of information that thrive in low-trust or low-information environments, or both. So if we have low trust in our sources of information or if we have low access to information, we’re gonna turn to each other to ask, “What’s going on?” And this is where storytelling can be incredibly helpful.

We are information-seeking organisms. It’s something that we do, and we use that to create ideas of socialization. So in the past few months, really the reemergence of the Epstein rumors and conspiracy theories has been ongoing.

And of course, might be driving in part some of the government shutdown. What is legend? You’re thinking of sports legends perhaps, but really, legend is a genre, we’re using this ethically short, believable, mono-episodic narratives told as true in an informal setting, often conversationally.

And in that case, rumor is simply a hyperactive transmission state of legend where a lot of times the legend tells the story retrospectively, whereas the rumor stops at that moment where there is some sort of threat to the community. And at that moment, the rumor basically says, “Hey, this is a threat. What should we do about it?”

And that can move action in real life action. So it says, “Here’s a threat. What are you gonna do about it?”

And then over the course of some short period of time, we can maybe perhaps decide on a reaction to that threat. So, the complicating action of these stories often proposes that there’s a threat or disruption. So this is why I use Ghostbusters.

Ghostbusters is perhaps the most profound movie of the– Well, ever, actually, because it asks that question, “When ghosts appear in the neighborhood, who are you gonna call?” And the answer to that is always ideological, right?

So when there’s a threat to our community, what should we do about it? And when you answer that, right? When you negotiate the answer to that, you’ve made an ideological decision.

So you come up with a strategy. And so what we can do now with social media, is we can look at all of these different threat narratives. Who we are, how do we construct an us?

How do we construct an inside? And then what are the strategies we propose for dealing with any type of threat or disruption? And we can then catalog and rank the various sources of threat or disruption, the various strategies that are being proposed, and if it’s told retrospectively, the eventual outcomes.

And we can see that– I’ll show you very quickly in the context of Parler, one of these social media sites in January 6th, what we wound up with was a conspiracy to create what– And I’ll tell you what the difference is between conspiracy and conspiracy theory, a conspiracy to take over the Capitol based on a conspiracy theory that was being uh collectively negotiated on the pro– platform itself.

When we do this type of analysis, we learn a great deal about the group in which those stories circulate. So, the difference between conspiracy theory and conspiracy, at least in my model, is that conspiracy exists in the real world, and it actually provides support for conspiracy theories. A conspiracy is some small, maligned group of actors working clandestinely to affect some outcome, usually in their own self-interest and against the interest of the broader public.

We can think of Bridgegate, if you remember when the George Washington Bridge was shut down for a week. That was an actual conspiracy, right? There were people working together to shut down the bridge as a political payback operation.

Did it help anybody? Not really. Uh, there, there were people stuck on the Wa– George Washington Bridge for a week.

Conspiracy theories, in contrast, exist only in narrative. They propose low probability links based on esoteric knowledge that the storyteller or storytellers have access to between otherwise distinct domains. It might be nature, governments, and tech industry to make some causal claim about the order of the world.

Birds aren’t real. They aren’t. Um, no, I’m just saying that just as an add-in.

Birds aren’t real. No, but that kind of illustrates this kind of thing. They often include one or more domains that are either poorly documented or hypothetical, or otherwise secret or hidden hence the Illuminati.

A lot of times, you’re gonna get threats from different directions. They could be threats from inside, witches, black magic. They could be from outside, some other group, us versus them.

They could be from above, the government. They could be from below, the poor people coming across our borders, or some combination of these. What’s interesting, we discovered is that conspiracy theories aren’t robust.

People say, “Well, why don’t you just point out that these are not true?” They depend on these low-probability links between different narrative domains. Why not just attack those low-probability links?

Yes, but it’s like Terminator 2, right? You can knock it out, so it’s not robust, but it’s resilient. It comes right back.

So, conspiracy theories are not robust, but they’re resilient. That’s why we are not really able to address them. One of the questions we also had, “Is the real world messier than fiction?”

So we derived these basically walls of crazy for different types of narrative domains, often based on social media forums. So, here is an early wall of crazy for all entities in Pizzagate from Reddit. And that looks pretty complicated, and I’ve weighted the edges and stuff like that.

And we’ve got, you know, we’ve got the Central Intelligence Agency and the Clinton Foundation, and we’ve got Haiti in there. I’m not sure why. Uh, actually, I do know why, but I’m not gonna go into it.

Um, we’ve got Jesuits in there we’ve got Y Combinator and we’ve got Belgium, of course. Whenever you see Belgium, you know you’re dealing– No, no, no.

Uh, whenever you see the Illuminati using it, you know you’re dealing with a conspiracy theory. Some are like, “Wow, that’s really complicated.” Then we did the same type of modeling for Bridgegate.

That’s the wall of crazy for Bridgegate. That’s all of New York/New Jersey poli– uh, politics, and it’s only in one domain. You could delete all of the actors and their relationships from this network, and the network would continue on without any sort of hiccup at all.

So, real conspiracies tend to hide in the thicket of real life, right? New Jersey/New York politics just keeps going along, even if you deleted Bridgegate. Not the case in conspiracy theories.

At the same time as Bridgegate, we had Pizzagate, and you can see here, if you re– remember Pizzagate, it really was about, on one level, Democratic politics, and here we found a nice little network of Democratic politics, and then we found a network of the Podesta brothers, and we found a network about casual dining in Washington, DC. Uh, and then we also found an interesting conversation about Satanism. You don’t usually need to talk about all of these together when you’re talk– you know, if you’re talking about Satanism, as you do with your friends, you know, you’re probably not also gonna talk about Democratic politics until the WikiLeaks dump comes in.

And you can see here, we’ve got a series of disconnected components narratively, and then when we bring in the interpretation, that esoteric knowledge of interpreting the WikiLeaks dump all of a sudden, I can create a unified narrative space in the aggregate. I can delete the WikiLeaks edges, and it’ll fall apart. I just put them back in, and we’ve got Pizzagate again, and that becomes the basis for QAnon.

We also looked at January 6 and Parler, and this was really where we found out it was a conspiracy to combat a conspiracy theory. We did some analysis on the platform, and we did our narrative extraction, and we discovered, you know, the actants and their relationships, their semantic roles, and modeled some of the edges, and it allowed us to detect the different narrative communities. What was really interesting here I’ll skip over that, was that there were several narrative connected computing communities, but there was a single giant connected component, suggesting a consistent discursive space.

And in these spaces, we got these very clear narrative space that was redolent of conspiracy theory structure, right? So, the topography of the graph was one of those where we could find some small separating set, and the narrative graph would fall apart. Um, and yet, there was also a conspiracy sitting on top of that of people suggesting that they should all, as a strategy to combat, this conspiracy theory that they should all converge on the Capitol on January 6th.

And that goes back pretty early. Uh, there was unbelievable semantic consistency in these in these in these graphs with Trump often in the, in the center, closely aligned with truth, and everybody else on the fringes being corrupt. We’ve also found that social media is accelerating conspiracy theories.

Conspiracy theorizing has become socialized, where the tinfoil hat-wearing wall of crazy drawing lone wolf is perhaps no longer the proper model, but rather social groups reaching consensus where there’s a motivation to propose and prove new nodes and edges, however low their probability in the narrative framework graph. These become refined, and the overarching concept space can become monolithic and totalizing, as in QAnon. We risk a great deal, I think, if we simply dismiss these low probability narratives and high velocity narrative communities as simply sort of, I lost the thread here.

The, there is actually, I finished my thought on my version of these slides. As simply fringe. Rather, these are actually common and pervasive.

So we have to be aware of that. So we know this knowledge that we’ve derived, we can use it for bad, right? We can take ChatGPT.

We can do a sampling over the graph. We can make valid posts. We can control a little army of robots.

And we might lead to, at least, if not the end of the world, the end of democracy, which is what we might be living through right now. A great deal of attention has been focused on these improbable connections and misinformation. Might it be possible to focus on strategies results and outcomes?

Is that where we might be able to make some sort of ongoing low-level interaction with communities that might have come to a point where they’re willing to take violent real-world action that undermines democratic institutions? What would this look like? I’m not sure what it would look like.

And that’s sort of the end of my presentation. I went a little bit fast because I want to save time for your much more interesting questions. So, thank you.

(applause)

[MICHAEL MARK COHEN]
Yes, thank you all for coming, for The Matrix for organizing this for my fellow panelists. And I just want to evoke, like the origins of the term conspiracy comes from the Latinate “conspirare,” meaning to breathe together, which is, in fact, what we’re doing right now. So thank you for being a part of that.

I’m gonna try and not spend the entire time talking about Thomas Pynchon, but I can’t resist. And here a quote from the new novel, “They”. “The federals who had you in are likely just a front, okay?

It’s the outfit that’s behind them, a nationwide syndicate of financial tycoons, all organized in constant touch against the forces of evil, namely everything to the left of Herbert Hoover.” I’ll just let that sit there. And yes, you should read it.

It’s great. It’s a lesser, Pynchon, but worth reading. On July 18th, 2024, on the same day of the Republican National Convention, the last day of the final, the Republican National Convention in Milwaukee, just five days after the failed assassination attempt on Trump in Butler, Pennsylvania, a retired professional wrestling champion named Hulk Hogan took the stage in character to introduce his friend and fan, Donald Trump.

With a red headband, a large silver crucifix, and a blue blazer, Hogan’s hype man growl greeted the delegates as, quote, “A room full of real Americans, brother.” In a well-rehearsed windup, Hogan began to remove his blazer revealing a trademark bronzed and bulked arms, and a T-shirt bearing an image of himself waving the American flag. Soon he was shouting, “But when they took a shot at my hero and they tried to kill the next President of the United States, the ecstasy induced by this pronoun-driven conspiracy fed Hogan’s trademark striptease.

As he wrote, he tore the T-shirt bearing his own image in two to reveal another T-shirt with the Trump-Vance logo.” “enough was enough.” He shook to rapturous cheers from the delegates and I said, “Let Trumpamania run wild.”

Hogan’s reference to they, the third person pronoun offering a syntactical ambiguity of both agency and gender in the accusation of conspiracy lies at the center of the MAGA movement’s ideological cohesion. The evil conspiratorial and gender non-binary they evoked by the spray tanned septuagenarian masculinity shared by both Trump and Hogan serves MAGA as what Judith Butler has described as a phantasm. For Butler, the phantasm is, quote, “A way of ordering the world that absorbs and reproduces anxieties and fears about permeability, precarity, displacement and replacement, a loss of patriarchal power in both the family and state, a loss of white supremacy and national purity.”

“the contradictory character of the phantasm,” continues Butler, “allows it to contain whatever anxiety or fear without having to make it cohere. Indeed, the liberation from historical documentation and coherent logic is part of an escalating exhilaration that feeds a fascist frenzy and shores up forms of authoritarianism.” In other words, the hypocrisy is the point.

Indeed, the fusion of the conspiratorial they and the transgender non-binary they was made explicit shortly after the RNC when the Trump campaign began running a series of TV spots during the World Series accusing Kamala Harris of promising, “Taxpayer-funded sex change operations for prisoners and illegal aliens.” These ads ended with the campaign slogan, “Kamala is for they/them. President Trump is for you.”

This Phantasm, MAGA’s they, is a reactionary psychosocial fantasy that derives its explanatory power from an explicitly incoherent blending of fact and fiction that is innate in most conspiracy theories. It is a formidable ideological project that has enabled the richest and most powerful white men in the country to overthrow multi-racial democracy by scapegoating one of the nation’s most vulnerable minorities, namely trans and non-binary youth, all by evoking what Daffy Duck and Professor Butler might recognize as pronoun trouble. Of course, Trump’s failed assassin was no they.

The shooter’s name was Thomas Crooks, a 20-year-old white man with no overt political ideology and little in the way of social connections. On July 19th, the day after Hogan’s speech, the New York Times reported that Crooks lived in, quote, “A solitary corner of a nearly invisible life.” And what Cro– and that Crooks was, quote, “More like a 21st-century school shooter than John Wilkes Booth.”

This reconfirmation of the terrifyingly ordinary place of mass shootings in America was quickly drowned out of the news cycle. And a year later, further investigations offered no revision to this initial assessment of Crooks’ motivation, other than to turn up the fact that he’d asked Google six days before the shooting, quote, “How far was Oswald from Kennedy?” This dynamic escalated dramatically with the murder of Charlie Kirk, in which the accused lone gunman, a white Mormon with no known political affiliations, has now been framed up as both trans-adjacent and overtly leftist.

Though no co-conspirator has ever been charged in the Kirk case, this new they has been exploited by the MAGA FBI and Justice Department into a counter-subversive crusade that seeks to declare every center-left social movement from No Kings to Antifa, from BLM to bla– naked black excuse me, naked bike parades, not to mention declaring the mere existence of trans and non-binary people as a criminal, if not terrorist, conspiracy. Maga’s conspiratorial inclination has been there from the start. Nearly 15 years ago, Donald Trump’s first stirrings of presidential ambition led with birtherism.

By July of 2016, on the verge of winning his first term, polls indicated that Trump’s GOP base included nearly 71% who doubted the current president was born in America, with 41% flatly denying Obama’s legitimacy to be president. Indeed, the leading demographic indicator of a Trump voter in 2016 was not race, age, economics, or geography, but a belief that Obama was, quote, “A secret Muslim.” This trajectory, riding a once fringe conspiracy theory into the White House, marks MAGA as a unique example of what the historian Richard Hofstadter described in his now classic 1963 essay, The Paranoid Style of American Politics.

For Hofstadter, the paranoid style evidenced what he called a style of mind found in social movements throughout US history evoking, quote, “The qualities of heated exaggeration, suspiciousness, and con– conspiratorial fantasy.” The political paranoid believes in, quote, “A vast or gigantic conspiracy is the motive force in historical events.” “History is a conspiracy,” writes Hofstadter, “Sat in motion by demonic forces of almost transcendental power.”

Yet writing at the high water mark of mid-century consensus liberalism, Hofstadter argued that tolerating political paranoia while keeping it confined to the fringes was the necessary price to pay to preserve what he called the vital center. Yet, as the MAGA example demonstrates, the greatest flaw in Hofstadter’s argument provides one of its deepest insights. Namely, that conspiracy theories are not a fringe phenomenon.

Rather, the most dangerous conspiracy theories in American history, anti-communism or the war on terror, for example, have always emerged from the very center of political power. This contradiction was theorized in the 1980s by Berkeley’s own political scientist, Michael Paul Rogin, as the counter-subversive tradition. Rogin, not unlike Butler, offers a political demonology to call attention to what he described as, quote, “The creation of monsters is a continuing feature of American politics by the inflation, stigmatization, and dehumanation– dehumanization of political foes.”

These demonized enemies are easily listed as they shape our national identity, periodize our history, and animate the repressive state apparatus. The subversive, the, and they are things like the savage, the native savage, the rebellious slave, the bomb throwing anarchist, the subversive communist, the foreign terrorist, and now the woke they/them. Such fears are not promulgated by extremists, but by politicians, opinion writers, business leaders, and police who name the subversive enemy and attach personal anxieties to violent political projects.

Quote, “Fearing chaos and secret penetration, the counter-subversive interprets local initiatives as signs of alien power,” writes Rogin. The counter-subversive needs monsters to give shape to his anxieties and to permit him to indulge his forbidden desires. Demonization allows the counter-subversive, in the name of battling the subversive, to imitate his enemy.”

In other words, as with MAGA, every accusation is confession. But there’s also another meaning of conspiracy that MAGA also embodies. Returning to Hulk Hogan’s appearance in the RNC, behind the conspiratorial accusation, one finds the definitive network of real capitalist conspiracies that mark this moment.

We can begin with the almost quaint traditional forms of corruption linking Trump and Hogan via their longtime business partners in the WWE, namely Vince and Linda McMahon, who is now, and for as long as the agency survives, the Secretary of Education. But more importantly, the wrestler’s sexual projection evoked a secret relationship between Hogan and the ultra-wealthy, ultra-conservative, Stanford-educated, and Antichrist-oriented obsessed venture and surveillance capitalist, Peter Thiel. Not only purchased J. D. Vance and, I mean, in a full se– You know, that, that is the sentence.

Thiel not only purchased J. D. Vance and pr– secured his place in the, the 2024 ticket, solidifying reactionary Tex ascension to state power, but as he was first forging this alliance with Trump in 2016, Thiel secretly bankrolled a lawsuit on Hogan’s behalf to destroy their common enemy at Gawker Media. In 2012, Gawker Media published a leaked tape of Hulk Hogan having sex with the wife of his best friend. Hogan called it a violation of his privacy.

Gawker said it was news. Hogan sued Gawker, and in 2016, a Florida jury awarded Hogan, whose real name is Terry Bollea, $140 million in damages, a sum that drove the once sprawling media empire into bankruptcy. Shortly after the verdict, financial journalist Andrew Ross Sorkin revealed that the lawsuit had been bankrolled by Thiel to avenge an article published in Valleywag, Gawker Media’s Silicon Valley gossip site that outed Thiel as gay back in 2007.

Valleywag was feared by the increasingly imperial tycoons of The Valley, with Thiel calling the outlet, quote, “The Silicon Valley equivalent of Al-Qaeda.” Thiel’s successful conspiracy against Gawker is just one among many myriad examples of the billionaire class secretly trying and largely succeeding to manipulate, if not outright purchase, the news media that critically covers them. In forging this alliance between Hogan, Thiel, and Trump, we find perhaps our era’s definitive expression of what Karl Marx, and Emma Goldman once called the conspiracy of capital.

An openly authoritarian ruling class plot against the free press, the rule of law, popular democracy, and consensus reality. Quote, “Those who persistently blame others for indulging in conspiracies,” wrote the German critical theorist Theodor Adorno, “have a strong tendency to engage in plots themselves.” This may have never been more true about any American political figure than it is for Donald Trump.

Indeed, it is worth remembering– Oh, and this is my book of the same title, but we’ll, you know, self-promotional. Indeed, it is worth remembering that one of the oldest definitions of conspiracy comes from the common law, where conspiracy is first and foremost a criminal agreement.

Conspiracy is a crime, first and foremost. A crime that the current President of the United States has been convicted of 34 times, stemming from yet another sexual cover-up that the Manhattan District Attorney charging documents described as, quote, “A conspiracy to undermine the integrity of the 2016 election.” So, while a counter-subversive phantasm animates much of what MAGA believes, my effort here to include the history of conspiracy laws in an argument about conspiracy theory enables us to take a wider view of the, the role of conspiracy in American political life.

In general, the concept of conspiracy contains three interrelated horizons, wherein a conspiracy is a criminal act, a political plot, and a theory of history. Each horizon offers its own scale of action, level of abstraction, and narrative form, from a plan to rob a bank, to a plot to overthrow the government, to a secret society that seeks to control the world. Real conspiracies like Nat Turner’s Rebellion, La Cosa Nostra, Watergate, Al-Qaeda, the Christmas Adventurers’ Club, the Illuminati, or Donald Trump’s plots to blackmail universities, privatize the military, and immigration enforcement, steal $230 million from the Justice Department, re-segregate the federal workforce, or hire T– Or hire Peter Thiel’s company Palantir to spy on all Americans.

Each emerges from one horizon while bleeding out into the other two. And in narrating these plots through the lens of conspiracy theory, we see what Fredric Jameson once described conspiracy theory as, quote, “A poor person’s cognitive mapping.” This movement between the criminal to the political to the theoretical horizons, both on the level of narrative and methodology, becomes the work of conspiracy theory.

Conspiracy theories then, in their explicitly prosecutorial and accusatory forms, are simply the speculative stories we tell each other about what are, or were, real conspiracies, ranging from the Kennedy assassination, to the mafia, to QAnon and back again. The mode of detective fiction, a la Dashiell Hammett or Chester Himes, is typical of left-wing approaches to this, in which we begin with the investigation of a crime, which leads up the social ladder to narrate a world of political corruption and manipulation before revealing just a glimpse of the true source of power that the hiring preterite gumshoe can never hope to touch. And this is, of course, the plot of every Pynchon novel.

Whereas from the phanta– from within the phantasm, the far right of QAnon believes that the grand conspiracy metanarrative that spawns myriad imaginary political plots of the Deep State and the woke agenda and Pizzagate and the like, and that animates self-anointed saviors who go looking for conspiratorial crimes to thwart, like the young man who attacked Comet Ping Pong in Washington, DC looking for a Democrat-run child rape dungeon, or the mob that attacked the Capitol on January 6th,2021, to stop the steal, right, as we already heard. Let me just leave it here. As such, the power to define what is and is not a conspiracy and what is and is not a conspiracy theory is a jealously guarded political privilege.

And there is a lot at stake in this question. After all, this is what happens when the police declare a march or a demonstration to be a an unlawful assembly before the truncheons and gas comes out, or when the President declares anti-fascism to be domestic terrorism, or when a professional wrestler evokes an assassination conspiracy to unleash the lawlessness of Trumpamania. We find in the politics of conspiracy, set between the accuser and the enemy, the legal doctrine and the ideological representation, is a distinctive political and historical dynamic, whereby conspiracy begets conspiracy in an escalating dialectics of conspiracy, in which the stakes are both all too material and dangerously ideological.

This is why conspiracy theory remains an explicitly extensive divisive terrain in US history, fractured indelibly along lines of race, class, gender, and sexuality, they, them being the primary axis of the moment, and why it may be in this era of shattered consensus, the central point of contestation between the social movements for justice and the fascist state is the battle of the future. Thank you.

(audience applauding)

Do you want to leave this up, or? All right, excuse me.

[LAKSHMI SARAH]
Okay. I don’t know where to go from there. So right now, we have discussion and then we’ll open it up for questions, so as we’re starting to speak if you start to think of questions. I did wanna, I was curious if either of you have questions for each other after listening.

[MICHAEL MARK COHEN]
Yeah, I loved the data charts. I mean, they look like some of the art that I put up there, the Mark Lombardi and the–

[TIM TANGHERLINI]
Oh, Mark Lombardi was one of the–

[MICHAEL MARK COHEN]
Yeah, exactly.

[TIM TANGHERLINI]
Yeah, I saw that.

[MICHAEL MARK COHEN]
And I always have like collect wobbly cartoons in which spiders and marionettes are sort of key figures. And so there’s an aesthetic history to this kind of stuff. But I guess my question is like, how we think about, you know, what happens when these things leap off of social media and into the streets?

Like how you can kind of think about that, ’cause I think this is what Unite the Right was, right? And they were very clearly like, the alt-right is coming off the internet and into the streets, and so there was this sort of fascist coming out party. And I’m just wondering how, like–

[TIM TANGHERLINI]
Yeah, it’s a great question and one that we, you know, think about a great deal. When I first started storytelling, studying storytelling way back when, people were like, “Why are you studying stories? They’re not important.”

(panelist one laughing)

And I thought, “Well, actually, I think they’re kind of important.” I think a lot of people make decisions based on stories. I think a lot of people take action based on stories, worries, concerns, fears that they’ve negotiated in groups.

I think interestingly, with the rise of social media, we’ve been able to almost witness a natural experiment where we can see these things playing out in real time and seeing how stories are negotiated in a very noisy fashion. And so it doesn’t surprise me that somebody picks up a gun and drives through the night from North Carolina to Washington, DC, to confront the people in, in Comet Ping Pong, to be given access to non-existent underground tunnels. I mean, the people in the restaurant were absolutely baffled.

They’re like, “It’s built on concrete slab.” You know, “We will let you into our walk-in freezer.” And so I think there are a lot of these things where people, now we can watch in real time, but at much larger scale, large groups of people without social breaks, negotiating strategies for dealing with these types of threats.

And so once you construct and reach an idea of who we are, who is us, and then who is them? Where are these potential threats coming from? What are those threats?

Is this really a threat? And you agree, this is a threat. This is a threat to our way of life.

It’s an existential threat. And the story does ask, really, “So what should we do about it?” So in some ways you could, say, “Well, let’s keep it in the storytelling realm.

They didn’t do anything, and this is what happened.” Or you can push it like a lot of rumor does into the realm of action. So I think that’s what we’re now witnessing.

What’s interesting about the social media environment, it doesn’t have the social breaks that we had earlier. If I went out with friends for beer and pizza, and I started talking about threat A

And they thought it wasn’t, even legitimate, right? Because I’m a social being, I would probably pull back, right? And so we’d have this negotiation.

I want to continue interacting with my friends. That’s the whole premise of having friends, I’ve been told, right?

[MICHAEL MARK COHEN]
–So we’re told.

[TIM TANGHERLINI]
Yeah, yeah. And so if I want continued interaction, I’ve got to adjust perhaps my more extreme ideas, right? Otherwise, you do wind up in a situation where you are isolated, and nobody likes to be isolated.

But on social media, those breaks aren’t there. It’s no longer these low-level face-to-face interaction settings. It’s one to many or many to many, but you’re not even sure if those many are– How many of those many are actually robots, you know?

There are a lot of bots on these sites. And so there’s also platform affordances that give you a little dopamine rush when somebody gives you a thumbs up, or something gives you a thumbs up, right? So there’s a reinforcement mechanism.

So you’re getting much greater speed, and you’re getting also greater directionality. You get velocity in social media and that can lead to a feeling that this is critical, right? That taking action is now urgent, right?

And so then you can trigger this cascade into real-world action.

[LAKSHMI SARAH]
I think the Parler example is really interesting one. Does your research also look at, so when something is looking like it’s going to happen, what are the ways that people can stop it? Or is that–

[TIM TANGHERLINI]
Yeah.

[LAKSHMI SARAH]
how–

[TIM TANGHERLINI]
I mean, there are some thorny, ethical concerns that you then raise there. You know, as researchers, it’s already hard enough, you know, the observational element of it.

[LAKSHMI SARAH]
Mm-hmm.

[TIM TANGHERLINI]
With Parler, we basically did not work with user IDs and things like that. Even though it’s, they were accessible to us, we just decided to work with the text. But I think, you know, you wind up in a very difficult position.

Do I want to make some sort of intervention that could prevent some downstream action that I find objectionable, right?

[LAKSHMI SARAH]
Mm-hmm.

[TIM TANGHERLINI]
Who is making those decisions? So now we’re getting back into the realm of these power dynamics. You do wind up chasing your tail a little bit, right? Because you wind up thinking conspiratorially about exactly the object of study.

[LAKSHMI SARAH]
Hmmm.

[TIM TANGHERLINI]
Yeah. So who’s behind this, and why are they behind it? That’s not really answering your question, but it’s raising some concerns.

[LAKSHMI SARAH]
Another question that I had, maybe for both of you, it feels as though we’re in this moment where there are more conspiracy theories, or more people are susceptible to conspiracy theories. Is that accurate, and why is that?

[MICHAEL MARK COHEN]
It’s very hard to determine. I mean, like, there’s, no data equivalent to this from the 1950s, you know, but it’s hard to say, looking at the ubiquity of McCarthyism, or you know, go back to the 1830s in which Know Nothing parties and Nativist parties, you know, were running the US government, that were in the 1920s when the Ku Klux Klan ran entire states. That somehow like we’re in a more expansive phase of it.

Um, I do think the Trump moment is exceptional, at least in terms of within living memory of recent history. Um, you know, Joe McCarthy was not President of the United States. Um, he didn’t actually control the Justice Department of the FBI.

He couldn’t, like, weaponize the law and conspiracy laws against social movements in the same sort of way. But I, I do think that there’s, you know, I– I– amongst slaveholders in the Antebellum South, they lived in constant fear of Nat Turner and Frederick Douglass, as well, they should. You know, holding people in slavery produces a culture of conspiracy, an entire society living on the edge of fear of subaltern insurrection.

So you know, I mean, the entire Caribbean after Haiti, I mean, it’s like, it’s sort of hard to, sort of to argue that this hasn’t actually– I mean, you can go, you know, on the level of political theory, go far enough back to where, you know, and read Machiavelli’s Discourses where, you know, in Florentine Europe, all politics is essentially conspiracy of one form or another, right? It’s either a plot against the king or a plebeian uprising. Either way, it’s an illegitimate expression of political movement.

So it’s hard to say that, like, you know, the history of conspiracy theories is very thick. We have had it a long time, but we do have new ways of thinking about it.

[TIM TANGHERLINI]
Yeah. And we’ve got access to it, and we’ve got the data, but I mean, if we think about witchcraft and trials about witchcraft going all the way back, you know, 16th century we’ve got very clearly sort of both conspiracy theories and conspiratorial machinations. Um, go back to stories that were circulating in the aftermath of huge epidemics that, that raged through Europe in the 14th century, right?

So it’s not really that we don’t have historical examples of this. So I think people are storytelling animals and we use stories as a way to negotiate this consensus of who we are as a group and what we feel threatened by, and also what solutions would be for dealing with that threat. And it could be on a micro scale, it could be as little as, has anybody ever been on Nextdoor?

Anybody been on it? Oh my God, this place is fantastic. Because it’s–.

[LAKSHMI SARAH]
Wait, why?

[TIM TANGHERLINI]
Why? Because it’s all of these sort of like tiny little–.

[MICHAEL MARK COHEN]
Look how racist your neighbors are?

[TIM TANGHERLINI]
You know, when you find the little micro, micro communities and the threats these micro communities see, right? The pickleball court and what should we do about it and all of the different strategies for dealing with that.

[MICHAEL MARK COHEN]
Or there’s a Black person in my neighborhood, what is he doing here?

[TIM TANGHERLINI]
Yeah. And then all the way up to social media, that’s dealing with both global and national phenomena. So the speed I think of this communication, what I actually call velocity, because of directionality, we can really focus on it.

And the idea that these discussions are siloed, right? There isn’t necessarily the type of interpenetration of different concerns in groups that we feel in our everyday life. Right, we’re all parts of many different groups, and we’re constantly adjusting according to the demands of those sort of complex interdependencies.

[LAKSHMI SARAH]
I’m kind of curious do either of you have examples of either recent conspiracy theories and, well, I’m curious about ones that you were like either like, ‘Oh wow, this is a really, like, fascinating one.’ Or ‘Ooh, maybe I believe this one.’ Or are there ones that you, I mean, you study it, so I–

[TIM TANGHERLINI]
They’re all my children. They’re all equally, I love them all the same.

[LAKSHMI SARAH]
So you don’t have a favorite, okay? Okay. Then never mind. But I’m just curious about–

[TIM TANGHERLINI]
I do like the one that came up recently was the MedBeds.

[LAKSHMI SARAH]
I don’t know about that one.

[TIM TANGHERLINI]
Whoa. Oh, you don’t know about MedBeds? I’ve got something to sell you after, after we meet here.

[LAKSHMI SARAH]
Oh, okay.

[TIM TANGHERLINI]
But the MedBed actually is a technology. It’s only really available to the billionaires. But through an arrangement that I have, I can actually get you one. And it’s a bed.

[LAKSHMI SARAH]
So this is not a multi-level marketing scheme?

[TIM TANGHERLINI]
No. [LAKSHMI SARAH] Just a Bed? It’s just a bed.

[MICHAEL MARK COHEN]
It’s an AI video that Trump circulated.

[LAKSHMI SARAH]
Oh, okay, got it.

[TIM TANGHERLINI]
Yeah, but it’s also in, it’s sort of lots and lots of conversations about these.

[LAKSHMI SARAH]
Okay.

[TIM TANGHERLINI]
That kind of a cure-all, right? And will rejuvenate you. And it’s part of this whole sort of, yeah, so that one I found really interesting, because it ties in with all of these ideas of living forever.

And then some of the other institutions that are kind of involved in living forever, Buck Institute, for example, people are curious about that because it looks sort of so isolated and nefarious sitting up there on its mountain redoubt. It’s actually a very good institute doing good science, but people– when you don’t know something about something, you can backfill these stories. But the MedBed is like a big one.

[MICHAEL MARK COHEN]
Yeah, I mean–

[LAKSHMI SARAH]
A favorite or–

[MICHAEL MARK COHEN]
Well, I wouldn’t call it a favorite.

[LAKSHMI SARAH]
Probably not– [MICHAEL MARK COHEN] –But it’s– –a favorite.

[MICHAEL MARK COHEN]
–it’s like watching the Charlie Kirk thing unfold in real time is utterly fascinating. I mean, first of all, who knew that there were this many former Special Forces bros with podcasts? Like who–

[LAKSHMI SARAH]
Do you listen to them?

[MICHAEL MARK COHEN]
No. I wouldn’t say them. I mean, because that’s my–

[LAKSHMI SARAH]
Fine.

[MICHAEL MARK COHEN]
But I have. I mean, I watched– You do watch them, and if you get far–

[LAKSHMI SARAH]
Very much. [MICHAEL MARK COHEN] –enough into TikTok– No, it’s fine. Whatever.

You’ll get enough into TikTok because they are, they aren’t just podcasts, they’re video. TikTok– [MICHAEL MARK COHEN]

It’s all on– –YouTube. [MICHAEL MARK COHEN] — YouTube and like- So to watch the Kennedy-

This sort of ideas around the Kennedy assassination just sort of reproduced themselves, magic bullet theories, the lack of autopsy footage, the fact that the investigation was closed before it really even effectively began, people parsing the videotape of that dude running across the rooftop like– It gets very deep very fast. And it has this really extraordinary capacity to render the official narrative, which is nuts. If you really break it down, it has the shooter changing clothes three times in under an hour assembling a gun, dissembling a gun, reassembling the gun like with something that takes like 15, 20 minutes given the size of the rifle, in less than 30 seconds each time.

I mean, I went to all of my– I went to my son, my Gen Z son, and was like, “What are these memes that they wrote on the bullets?” Like, “What does this mean?” And he very embarrassingly explained it all to me just cringe-dad moment, but it was necessary.

And these kinds of– The ways in which this stuff floats around, I mean, in addition to maybe the most delightful fake thing I’ve seen come out of the government since maybe the MedBed videos which is that reported transcript of the conversation between the shooter and his like femboy partner, which is just literally the fakest thing I have ever seen. Look, there is nobody in this planet younger than me that has referred to a police car as a squad car.

(audience laughing)

Just the language itself literally makes no sense. And so watching this thing kind of unfold and yet how profound the martyrology around Kirk, the incredibly widespread cancellation, the destruction of anybody that says anything about critical of Kirk, or someone fired from The Washington Post simply for quoting Kirk– For saying unimaginably awful and fascist things, right? So there, I think this is, but these, this is really consequential.

There is going to be a trial whoever these kinds of nonexistent co-conspirators are, this romantic partner, whoever they are and I, I mean, I feel for them, like being in the clutches of the FBI and the Justice Department and what kind of pressure is being brought to bear on them to get this to conform to some kind of narrative is, this is going to, this is going to trial. Like Crooks, Thomas Crooks is dead, he was killed within eight seconds of firing multiple shots at the president, right? He’s dead, no trial.

This guy this, who killed Charlie Kirk is going to trial and this is gonna be a very big deal. Questions from the audience?

(panelists laughing)

Okay, I saw the hand over here first.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER]
I just wanted to ask about Where in conspiracy theories do you think satanic ritual abuse fits and like the McMartin Day Care scandal, if you remember that, and then what do you think of anti-vaxxers who call them self vaccine skeptics, like are those conspiracy theories?

[TIM TANGHERLINI]
I, you’re looking at me. Whenever people talk about vax Satan, they always look at me.

(all laughing)

I’m wondering about that.

[LAKSHMI SARAH]
And maybe Just for, so everybody’s on the same page if there’s a conspiracy theory you don’t know if everybody knows, if you can just break it down, yeah.

[TIM TANGHERLINI]
Right, okay. So I mean, why Satanism? I mean, Satanism is really, it’s kind of a catchall outside threat, right?

So if you are a Christian community and going all the way back to, certainly all of the folklore that I’ve studied from the 18th 19th century, right? One of the things that distinguished us versus them is that they were not Christian, right? So it’s Christian, not Christian who is the who is the person who’s got control of all of the the non-Christian realm, that would be Satan.

in my folklore class I just tell the students, “Look, if we’ve got some sort of outside creature in 19th century Scandinavian folklore, the answer’s probably gonna to be at some point it goes back to Satan, who are they aligned with.” So it’s a very good and useful construct in the context of what I would kind of call vernacular Christian belief, if that is one of the elements of defining the community. And so, Satanism being related to some sort of ritualistic eating, particularly of children has a very longstanding sort of backstory.

There’s a reservoir of motifs. We can think of blood libel in the context of antisemitic narratives, but we can also think of it in the most contemporary of ways. One of the things that is most precious to us as a community is our children, so what would be the worst thing that could happen to our children?

That they could be abused in all sorts of ways and that they could be eaten. So now you’re in ritual cannibalistic child abuse. Who is most likely to be behind that?

Well, Satan. So that’s how we get to satanic ritualistic cannibalistic, wherever we are. Wherever we are, I don’t want to be there, but that’s how we wind up there.

And this is heartbreak. Now let’s talk about vaccine, what is now referred to as vaccine hesitancy. We did a lot of studies early on mommy blogs.

I don’t know if you’ve, if you have children, you know that you have, when you get to the hospital you have your baby, everybody’s very happy, extremely tired. And when you leave the hospital, they give you a squirming little baby and they basically say, ‘Don’t kill it.’ I mean, that’s generally the instruction manual.

And so you’re sitting there looking at this thing like, ‘I’m so tired, did I miss, the instructions? Because I don’t know what to do.’ So you go onto mommy blogs, right?

You start saying, ‘Hey, how are you guys keeping yours alive?’

(audience laughing)

And there are a lot of discussions and one of them is, like, ‘They wanna give them a lot of vaccines,’ and people are like, “Oh, yeah. No, vaccine preventable diseases could be terrible, but you gotta be careful. A lot of these vaccines,” And then some arbitrarily long list of potential effects.

So in these blogs, we discovered that the vaccines themselves were the threat agent, not the vaccine preventable diseases. Nobody was talking about how bad Polio or Measles or Pertussis or Diptheria. That wasn’t what was being talked about.

What was being talked about as potentially threatening was the vaccines, and so the conversations turned very quickly to exemption seeking behavior, right? So how do we get exemptions? Because the best strategy, if the vaccines are the threat, the strategy is, don’t vaccinate, right?

What was interesting was to see that over the nine year, we retrospectively studied this over nine years and discovered that there was more than 100% churn in the people in these communities, right? The people at the beginning were nowhere near the same as the people at the end, but these discussions about exemption seeking were constant, right? And so this is, when you’re inoculated to an idea, you basically wind up taking a stance on it.

And when the consensus is hesitate, perhaps don’t vaccinate, um, oh, God, that sounded like a, like a slogan. But rather seek exemptions that’s what we saw. And so that led to a diminution, diminution high enough in herd immunity that we could get measles outbreaks in, in California where before it had been eradicated.

So that’s a very long answer to a very straightforward question. I apologize.

[LAKSHMI SARAH]
In the back.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER]
Hi. Thank you both for your wonderful presentations. Um, so I have a question probably more for Michael, but I guess applies for both.

Um, I was wondering how important is the American state in the context of modern day production and consumption of conspiracy theories in the United States. Um, so I know from my research that in certain places of the world, like in Russia, for instance, right, state is definitely a crucial institution around which the nexus of conspiracy theorizing kind of revolves. But in that society, one might say the state is more important in general.

And then in the US, right, you have all the deep state conspiracy theorists, right? They’re pretty popular and are used by Trump and, I don’t know, right-wing politicians to um, kind of delegitimate the federal bureaucracy and all those decisions.

And on the one hand, you might say that it’s just the result of the instrumentalization, politics, or maybe market commodification, but then you also think about the question of the government transparency and validity of its certain actions, right? And so more broadly the question is how important the state is and how deep you think are conspiracy theories rooted in state and legal institutions in the US? Thank you.

[MICHAEL MARK COHEN]
Yeah. Thank you for the question. It’s a very good one.

I mean, yes, obviously the state sits at the center historically. I mean, I think we begin the first sort of you can dig deep into the literature in terms of thinking about conspiracy as a real entity. It is always a struggle over state power itself, whether it’s the conspiracy of Catiline or it is Machiavelli’s Discourses on Levi that is about the state as both conspirator and conspired against, right?

And that those two are always working in conjunction, that there are conspiracies against the state. Rogan talks about the king’s two bodies, right? There’s a conspiracy against the body of the king and then the body of the king as conspirator.

And so that it works in both directions. Counter-subversion is an important way of thinking about this particularly in the US and democratic states in which, you have these democratic state apparatuses that nonetheless harbor deep within them these incredibly violent reactionary institutions. The FBI, the CIA, the US military, police, and prisons, that under neoliberalism in particular have really risen to the surface as the primary function of state behavior in general, right?

The only thing that’s really left of the state is prisons, borders, and police, and, prisons, police, boarders, and the military. And so as a result there is this kind of increasing centralization of these ideas around the state. Now, one of the things though that remains about the state in the US, it’s one singular flaw, according to certain forms of fascist theory is that it is potentially democratic, and that’s what’s got to stop, right?

And so these versions of the conspiracy theories that bless Trump as dictator, that see him as divinely ordained, all these various things, so that Trump can come in and use the mechanisms of democracy, conspire against the democratic mechanisms of the state to provoke or to produce this sort of pure, purified revived MAGA, to Make America Great Again. And so the narrative form here is to say, And I think that. Yes, I will keep coming back to Hulk Hogan, but it is this kind of version.

I mean, I think to me that line about that once they, them have been defeated, and they, them is civil society, right? It is this sort of liberal project of civil society. It is these trans and non-binary minorities and youth that somehow represent this fundamental threat to American greatness, American stability once they have been vanquished, then Trumpamania will run wild.

Or perhaps it is that simply once we have gotten past this necessary but unwanted threshold of an actual election, Trumpamania will effectively run wild by eradicating they, them. And so I think that this kind of, yes, it is always about state formations, but, like, the problem that we have, of course, is, like, the proper political scientist knows that the state is never a single entity. It’s always multiple, overlapping, competing interests.

It’s never a single entity. Conspiracy always, often, right, reduces it to this kind of singular entity, but, like, even within state formations, there are the repressive apparatus, the secret government, such as the, you know, you get into the histories of the COINTELPROs, anti-communisms, all of these kinds of things that are very real conspiracies that have real political outcomes, that the bill, the conspiracy theories float around, so. Yeah, thank you.

It was a good question.

[LAKSHMI SARAH]
Another question in the back, and then we’ll come to the front. Oh, sorry. Right in front. Yeah, right here.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER]
My name is Lynn. Hello. Thank you so much for this presentation.

I’m a sociocultural anthropologist, pretty new to computational text analysis. So I’m wondering a little bit about the context of, you know, how much of a corpus you take, and to draw kind of conclusions about appropriate interventions for us as educators and researchers working with some people who might very much believe in aspects of this, or confronting media in terms of being really irresponsible and propagating stuff in work way. I am really interested in zones of intervention.

I am interested, too, in the aspect of doing the research and not actually identifying the agent who perpetuates a certain narrative or contributes to the conversation going on online, because my idea is that sometimes there are a few people who are the loudest in the room and with bots, it’s hard to figure how to tackle it research-wise. But I primarily work in WhatsApp spaces with people ’cause I work with a couple of public universities in Haiti, and there’s a lot of stuff that happens lost in translation as well when information circulates in the diaspora and people aren’t first speakers of English, and how that gets passed along, and the misunderstandings that happen there. So my limited role as an educator, a white foreigner who’s spent a lot of time in Haiti, I try to be very careful about it and very respectful, and I also see really interesting kernels of, I don’t know, values and stuff like that that are expressed in the creation and propagation of certain narratives.

So I was wondering if you could talk about the agents, talking about the kind of appropriate corpus to be able to draw conclusions and our roles as educators with students, peers, and the media.

[TIM TANGHERLINI]
Wow. That’s a hard question. It’s a really good one.

It’s one I struggle with a lot. So when we’re doing our corpus sort of formation a lot of times, social media is extremely noisy, so we might be working with tens of millions of posts and then filtering that for certain types of noise. So to give you an idea, I think for Parler, for Parler, we were sampling somewhere between 20,000 and 100,000 posts a day because computationally we ran into a barrier.

With the Mommy Blogs, it was somewhere around, I think, the scale of about 81 million posts to these things. Qanon is so big but we were sort of letting that sort of wash over us with a real-time method. But it took us 24 hours to process a day’s worth of input, so we wound up sort of, hitting a time barrier.

And then on COVID-19, that was one of the ones where we actually saw in real time the Film Your Hospital hashtag not only gaining prominence, but connecting to some of the other narrative communities that surround basically that were part of the whole QAnon, sphere. And so there, that was one where we thought, “Oh, this is gonna get pretty bad, pretty quickly.” And we were right.

Then that goes to the questions of intervention. Who do you alert? You could say, “We think that this is going to happen.”

We worked a bit with public health agencies in the context of vaccine messaging and worked with them a little bit because we knew that the message that was getting out was a one message fits all. That was the way they were doing vaccine messaging, and the recognition that as your cultural anthropologist, so you know that different messages work differently. They sound different in different communities.

And you have to have sort of a thick contextual knowledge of the groups to understand those you talk about kernels of values. I really say this is, the cultural ideology is always gonna be negotiated in storytelling environments. And so figuring out how to come up with messages that are respectful of the group and yet allow for a way to understand that the strategy of, in this case, vaccinating your children, makes a hell of a lot of sense.

And so those are kind of strategic interventions. So you don’t challenge, these low probability links. They’re eating the dogs and cats in Springfield.

No, they aren’t. And what I thought was great was that the mayor came out and said, “Well these are all people of Springfield.” And they had, they actually had, a celebration that was, all and these were largely Haitian immigrants.

And they were embracing not only them as part of the community, but also the food ways, right? So that it wasn’t, you know, you were eating dogs and cats, which is you know, an accusation that you can make to really other or someone. And it’s been used in, for example, Europe, in some xenophobic storytelling.

I’d written in 1992 an article about rumors circulating about immigrants eating dogs and cats in neighborhoods of Copenhagen, 1992. And that was being leveraged for right-wing political candidates. So we tend to work with pretty large-scale corpora, and our methods, I think are getting better.

Several of the people who are working with us on the methods are in the room, so I hope they’re getting better. And these interventions, these are challenging areas. So, you know, that’s where you work with communities to try and understand their values and what would work best.

And then you’ve gotta figure out the narrative interventions. A lot of these things are getting really manipulated. It’s not just bots like sending out spam.

The bots have gotten very sophisticated. It’s a great thing called the Observatory on Social Media at Indiana University, OSoMe, Observatory on Social Media. They do a lot of work on this.

There’s a guy also at USC, Emilio Ferrara, who does a lot of work on Twitter and Twitter communities. So those were people’s work I’d look at in this context.

[LAKSHMI SARAH]
Thank you. I think we had a couple questions in the front. One right here.

[MICHAEL MARK COHEN]
Can I ask you a question?

(moderator laughing)

[AUDIENCE MEMBER]
Thanks. I think I have a question for each, but I’ll be short, I hope. I guess, for Michael, I’d ask the question of what the difference between a plan is and a conspiracy.

So I was thinking about contrasting maybe Project 2025, which was pretty out in the open, I suppose, or, and versus, like, when the Allies were trying to convince that they were going to invade France at Calais, rather than Normandy where they did. And I guess a question for Tim, I just had a factual one. I seem to recall that there was a video of Kamala Harris being asked if she would support prisons.

[MICHAEL MARK COHEN]
It’s in the video. Yeah, it’s in the ad.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER]
So, that’s a true thing?

[MICHAEL MARK COHEN]
Yeah.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER]
Okay. All right then, I guess the remaining question is contrasting Project 2025 versus the D-Day. How do plans differ from conspiracies?

[MICHAEL MARK COHEN]
Yes, these might be conspiracies, like deception, espionage, all of that stuff involves, ’cause I evoked detective fiction earlier, you can invoke espionage literature in the same sort of vein. Deception and these sort of, these are essential components. The thing about a conspiracy though I do think that, and I wrote a whole book on the history of conspiracy theories and conspiracy law in the late 19th and early 20th century.

Conspiracy laws go back to the 13th century, and they are criminalized agreements. So, if you and I make a plan to rob one of you but don’t do it, we’ve com, exactly, We’ve committed a felony. In fact, in a certain case, something that carries a greater penalty than the actual assault or robbery in the first place.

So, conspiracy laws criminalize collective action in a way that corporate law insulates corporations from. So, corporations are private individuals, thus they have the rights of individuals. So, they can conspire in all sorts of ways and not be subjected to criminal agreements.

Whereas social movements and ordinary people, when they agree to do something like, I don’t know, be anarchists or join the Communist Party are, all of sudden now, engaged in a criminal conspiracy. Crimes for which, in the 19th century, particularly after the Haymarket bombing of 1886, people were executed for. So, this is not a game.

There are very real consequences of what is and is not a conspiracy. And so, the conspiracy laws had been used to the first use of the conspiracy law in the United States is the 1805 Philadelphia Cordwainers’ case, which criminalized labor unions. The first use of the conspiracy law in American history was to ban labor unions.

Now, organizations of masters, they’re cordwainers, other words, shoemakers. The workers tried to organize to raise wages. The shop masters organized to suppress wages.

The courts in Philadelphia said that workers trying to raise wages was against the common interest, and thus a criminal conspiracy, and that the masters attempt to suppress wages was in the public interest, and thus not a conspiracy. And so, these kinds of things, like, play themselves out through 19th-century labor law. They work all–

I mean, really, you, you didn’t have a right to strike in the United States, or a right to picket, or even a right to boycott until the 1930s. And in many places, those rights have been since stripped, right? So, rights to strike, rights picket, rights, all these things are highly contested and often have successfully been undermined.

So, there is a sense in which, right on the one hand, there is a kind of crime. Trump was convicted of these financial manipulations and it was all, the conspiracy is against election integrity, but what did he do? He forged documents, he made an agreement with Michael Cohen and they made–

You know, no, no relation. And they made, you know? And so, there is this kind of process by which whatever the state decides to, whatever prosecutors decide is somehow a kind of criminal conspiracy, then finds it’s, well, it’s self-persecuting.

Now, you know, the example of D-Day is one thing, right? But, like, keep in mind that the, you know, the Nazi high command in Nuremberg, what were the charges against them? They were all conspiracy charges, right?

Conspiracy to commit aggressive war, conspiracy to commit violations of human rights. They were, like, the entire panoply of crimes that you know, that they were executed for were conspiracy charges. So, it plays, like, in this, this kind of profound way, but they, again, like, the right, the– And the conspiracy law is this very hard block that sits– Clarence Darrow is, like, the great American theoretician of the conspiracy laws, the great enemy of conspiracy laws, and generally spent his early career fighting them.

And it’s a lot of what my book is about. But, like, in the end, the conspiracy, you know, is o– It, the right to decide what is and is not a conspiracy theory. And we, as traditional intellectuals in the academy, also choose for ourselves the right to decide what is a legitimate form of social theory, and what is a conspiracy theory, right?

You can’t be a conspiracy theorist in the academy, right? You have to use legitimate forms of social theory of one kind or another, right? And there’s always an attempt to discredit or undermine certain kinds of thinking as conspiracy theories.

The the cultural Marxist types will tell you that Marxism is a conspiracy theory when it couldn’t possibly be farther from it, right? And so there’s all of these sorts of ways. But the, who gets to decide what is and is not is an exercise of power with tremendous social and political consequence.

[LAKSHMI SARAH]
I think we have time for one more quick question. Right here.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER]
Yeah, thank you so much for this panel. And, actually what you were just saying kind of helped cue up part of what I’m gonna ask about, which is, are we losing something analytically when we talk about conspiracy theories in this way? ‘Cause in this talk, when you were asked the initial question of, “Have conspiracy theories increased over time?”

And there was kind of a deflection to, “Well, there’s always been things like witchcraft, or we can look to kind of slave rebellions, right?” We can talk about this longstanding fear of insurrection, questions about power, questions of who’s actually in control, right? And then, now, in contemporary times, we see a lot of contestation.

The Right calls a lot of what the Left does conspiracy theories. The left calls the right conspiracy theories. There’s kind of this at once conspiracy theories are this trans-historical, enough sense.

[MICHAEL MARK COHEN]
I can be very brief, and I’ll let you, Trent. But, like, I think that on the one hand, this is why I’m particularly interested in grounding this in legal questions. The conspiracy law becomes a very effective way of grounding this, so that it’s not just crazy ideas that people have, but there are court transcripts.

If people go to prison, they’re executed, right? The other is to sort of think about the distinction, right? And you make the distinction, but between conspiracy and conspiracy theories.

And so my thing is very much a version that says conspiracy theory is the general discourse we have about the presence of actual conspiracies. And so that kind of question, right, I do think it does become dangerously vague. That’s always a danger.

That is a challenge. But there are a few ways to conceptually anchor these things that often does require archival historical research, that require a much criminal forensic investigation. Things like that actually can then go about determining these kinds of things.

There is an epistemology that sits behind all of this, that, literature, that criminal investigation, that, that podcasts, things like journalists, like, do, so.

[TIM TANGHERLINI]
Yeah. I mean, I, as you know, I work about, with this, both narratively, but also sort of in the context of historical sort of scope. And, you know, I, there was a, there was an unfortunate period at one point where we started talking about things like urban legends, and there was really nothing urban about them.

It was just they were contemporary, contemporaneous versions of stories that we had seen circulating in other contexts. I think, really, the big change here is the performance context in which these are emerging and the reach and the scope. And that might be something that we have to take into account when we’re thinking about the impact of this kind of storytelling that has, of course, as we’ve been talking about, real-world effects, right?

It’s not like when people were criticizing me for studying stories, like, they’re not really that important. You know, we both know that these are extremely important and that there are certain affordances that actually might, and probably are, we know, be, are being manipulated and that has changed what I would call the ecology of storytelling. And so conspiracy theory might actually be sort of evolutionarily adopted to optimize for the new affordances of this communication ecology.

Yeah.

[LAKSHMI SARAH]
Thank you.

[TIM TANGHERLINI]
Thank you, yeah.

[LAKSHMI SARAH]
Are you guys teaching any classes in the spring that the people should know about?

[TIM TANGHERLINI]
I’m teaching a course in information called Information 230, Cultural Analytics. So, we’ll be working with data-driven analysis of cultural phenomena.

[MICHAEL MARK COHEN]
I get a bit of a break next semester, but I’m just teaching one, an honors seminar in American studies that that I call The Secret History of America. I don’t know what that means, but it’s a great sort of title to just explore certain things. And then we have students, like, we workshop, and students write and publish essays on the internet, so.

[LAKSHMI SARAH]
Okay, great.

[TIM TANGHERLINI]
But all the reading is secret, and they have to –.

[MICHAEL MARK COHEN]
Well, I mean, not for nothing, but like the first time I taught the class, like half the books were like, ‘The Secret History of Wonder Woman’, and ‘The Secret History of The Office’, The Secret, and it’s like it’s a terrible publishing trope. We learned that in the course of the semester. This is a bad publishing trope.

You don’t ever wanna write a book that is the secret history of anything, because. Because it’s not a secret, and it never was. But like, anyways, but thank you.

[LAKSHMI SARAH]
Yep, thank you. Thank you all for coming.

(audience clapping)

(upbeat dramatic music)

Authors Meet Critics

Engendering Blackness: Slavery and the Ontology of Sexual Violence

Presented as part of the Authors Meet Critics series

On October 15, 2025, Matrix hosted an Authors Meet Critics panel on the book Engendering Blackness: Slavery and the Ontology of Sexual Violence, by Patrice Douglass, Assistant Professor of Gender and Women’s Studies at UC Berkeley.

Professor Douglass was joined in conversation by Salar Mameni, Associate Professor of Ethnic Studies at UC Berkeley, and Henry Washington, Jr., Assistant Professor of African American Studies at UC Berkeley. Courtney Desiree Morris, Associate Professor of Gender and Women’s Studies at UC Berkeley, moderated.

The event was co-sponsored by the Center for Race and Gender, the Department of Gender and Women’s Studies, and the Department of Ethnic Studies.

The Social Science Matrix Authors Meet Critics book series features lively discussions about recently published books authored by social scientists at UC Berkeley. For each event, the author discusses the key arguments of their book with fellow scholars.

About the Book

Engendering Blackness book cover

In this incisive book, Douglass interrogates the relationship between sexual violence and modern racial slavery and finds it not only inseverable but also fundamental to the structural predicaments facing Blackness in the present. Douglass contends that the sexual violability of slaves is often misappropriated by frameworks on sexual violence that privilege its occurrences as a question of ethics, sexual agency, and feminine orders of gendering. Rather, this book foregrounds Blackness as engendered by sexual violence, which forcefully (re)produces Blackness, corporeally and conceptually, as a condition that lacks the capacity to ontologically distinguish its suffering from what it means to be human.

By employing and critically revising Black feminist theory and Afro-pessimism, Douglass reveals that engaging primarily with the sexualization of the slave forces theories of sexual violence to interrogate why this violence — one of the most prevalent under slavery — continues to lack a grammar of fundamental redress. There are no reparations struggles for the generational transfer of sexual violation and the inability of present frameworks to rectify the sexual stains of slavery lies precisely in the fact that what made this history possible continues to haunt arrangements of life today. “Engendering Blackness” urgently articulates the way our present understandings of Blackness and humanness are bound by this vexed sexual history.

Podcast and Transcript

Listen to this panel as a podcast below or on Apple Podcasts and other streaming platforms.

(soft upbeat music)

[SARAH HARRINGTON]

Welcome, everyone. My name is Sarah Harrington. I’m the program manager here at Matrix. I’m very thankful to be introducing today’s Authors Meet Critics panel. The conversation today is about Patrice Douglass’s book Engendering Blackness: Slavery and the Ontology of Sexual Violence.

(applause)

Very exciting. Congratulations. Dr. Douglass has written a profound and challenging book that compels us to confront the history of sexual violence rooted in slavery as indissociable from the production and reproduction of blackness.

This book exposes a critical truth, what made this history possible continues to haunt our present day understandings of what it means to be human. Our panelists will reflect on the profound implications of this work and what it means for the conversations we are having today. Today’s event is part of our Authors Meet Critics series and co-sponsored by the Center for Race and Gender, the UC Berkeley Departments of Gender and Women’s Studies, and Ethnic Studies.

Extra special thank you to Eric Stanley from Gender and Women’s Studies for your support.

(applause)

Finally, thank you both to Cori Hayden, our interim director for spring, who helped get this all set, and Marion Fourcade, who’s our faculty director here, for their assistance in programming this conversation. Marion is teaching and was very sad to miss this today. And thanks to Chuck and the rest of the Matrix staff.

Before we get going with the panelists, I just wanna mention a few things we have upcoming here for the rest of the fall semester at Matrix. We also have a whole set of spring events in the works, so please stay tuned for that. Our next two events are Matrix On Point conversations, “Conspiracy Theories” and “Spaces for Thriving,” and then a talk on “Insurance in the Climate Crisis.”

Another book talk by Maximilian Kasy, who’s visiting from Oxford in December, and then we’ll wrap up with a talk from journalist Alexis Madrigal at the end of the semester. So before I leave the floor to the panelists, let me introduce our moderator, Courtney Desiree Morris, on the end here.

(audience applauding)

Courtney Desiree Morris is a visual conceptual artist and an associate professor of Gender and Women’s Studies at the University of California, Berkeley. She teaches courses on critical race theory, feminist theory, Black social movements in the Americas, women’s social movements in Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as race and environmental politics in the African diaspora. She’s a social anthropologist and published a book, To Defend This Sunrise: Black Women’s Activism and the Authoritarian Turn in Nicaragua, which examines how black women activists have resisted historical and contemporary patterns of racialized state violence, economic exclusion, territorial dispossession, and the political repression from the 19th century to the present.

She is currently developing a new project on the racial politics of energy production and the dispossession in the US Gulf and South Africa. Her work has been published in American Anthropologist, the Bulletin of Latin American Research, the Journal of Women, Gender and Families of Color, Make-Shift: Feminisms in Motion, and Asterisks. Without further ado, I will now turn it over to Courtney.

(audience applauding)

[COURTNEY DESIREE MORRIS]

Okay. Can everyone hear me? Am I mic’d up properly?

Okay, great. Thank you for that introduction. It’s really good to be here.

I am, I’m actually on course release this semester, but when I was asked to moderate this discussion for Engendering Blackness, I thought, of course, I must come back and make myself available for this very important celebration for our dear colleague, Patrice Douglass. And so, I’m really delighted to be here. Thank you all for coming.

I’m honored to moderate today’s discussion with our colleagues, Salar Mameni and Henry Washington Jr. And so I’ll begin by just introducing all of our panelists and then offering a few opening remarks, and then I will hand it over to Professor Douglass.

Patrice Douglass is an assistant professor of Gender and Women’s Studies at UC Berkeley. Her first book, Engendering Blackness: Slavery and the Ontology of Sexual Violence, examines the relationship between sexual violence and modern racial slavery and finds it not only inseverable, but also fundamental to the structural predicaments facing blackness in the present. Her current book project, Race and Abortion Ethics, which is well underway  — the subtitle is Anti-Blackness and the Opacity of Liberty — interrogates the impermissibility of abortion in US law and politics. Specifically, the project critically examines how situating abortion as an ethic is sutured by the vexed relationship between philosophical and juridical notions of liberty and property.

By attending to social and legal histories, US geographies, the rhetorical strategies of abortion concerns, race and abortion ethics illumines how Black– how racial Blackness, excuse me — subtends the conceptual framework of reproductive rights and anxieties about their inevitable usurpation. Her research on blackness, gender, Afro-pessimism, reproductive justice, and Black philosophies has been published or is forthcoming from Discourse: Journal for Theoretical Studies of Media and Culture, Political Theology, Journal of, the Journal of Legal Anthropology, the Yale Journal of Law and Feminism, Prism: Theory in Modern Chinese Literature, Souls: The Journal of Visual Culture, Theory and Event Literature and Culture, and the Black Scholar. And you can clap for Patrice ’cause she’s amazing.

(audience applauding)

Please clap for Patrice, always.

(audience applauding)

Our first speaker responding to Professor Douglas’s remarks will be Salar, Salar Mameni, who is an art historian specializing in contemporary transnational art and visual culture in the Arab Muslim world, with an interdisc– interdisciplinary research on racial discourse, transnational gender politics, militarism, oil cultures and extractive economies in West Asia. Mameni is the author of Terrascene: Accrued Aesthetics, which was published by Duke in 2023, 2023. I also taught it in one of my graduate seminars this spring.

It’s fire. And this work considers the emergence of the Anthropocene as a new geological era in relation to the concurrent declaration of the War on Terror in the early 2000s. Playing on the words terror and terra, Mameni proposes the term Terrascene in order to think of the planetary in conjunction with ongoing militarization of transnational regions under terror.

The book engages contemporary art and aesthetic productions, paying particular attention to artists navigating the geopolitics of petrocultures and climate change. Professor Mameni has published articles in Kipral, in Catalyst, Signs, Women and Performance, Alrida Journal, Fuse Magazine, Philip Review, and the Canadian Art Journal, and has written for exhibition catalogs in Dubai, Sharjah, and Istanbul. Mameni was the curator of Snail Fever at the Third Line Gallery in Dubai that explored art as a pandemic, bringing together artists from the region whose works consider the embodied viral and contaminating nature of sonic and visual aesthetics.

Please welcome Professor Mameni.

(applause)

And then our final respondent for our panel today is Professor Henry Washington Jr., who is an assistant professor of African American Studies here at UC Berkeley. His research broadly explores how dominant constructions of cultural difference help justify the persistence of inequality in the era of inclusion, as well as how minoritarian cultural forms attempt to contest these constructions and produce more complex truths about humanness. He is at work on his first book project, “Looking to Be Included: Social Science, Black Imagination, and the Culture of the Criminal, 1896 til,” which elucidates the shifts in the nature of power and in the forms of Black cultural production affected by the postbellum emergence of “the criminal” as an alleged exemplar of race and gender alterity.

His writing appears or is forthcoming in the peer reviewed journals Women and Performance and Camera Obscura, the edited keyword collection Think from Black: A Lexicon, and the exhibition catalog for the Berkeley Art Museum and Pacific Film Archives, New Time: Art and Feminisms in the 21st Century. Please welcome Professor Washington.

(applause and cheering)

So before we begin, and I hand things over to the mighty Patrice Douglass, I, I wanted to offer a few remarks. I recently had to read all of Patrice’s work, and it was just so incredible to really sit down and engage with the truly prolific and just deeply rigorous body of work that she has produced over the past decade. And so, as I, you know, I didn’t bring my copy of my book today, but I was telling Patrice before I started that it’s now completely brutalized and dog-eared and starting to, the pages are beginning to curl because it’s really a book to work and to think with in a deep and sustained way.

And so in Engendering Blackness: Slavery and the Ontology of Sexual Violence, Professor Patrice Douglass argues that sexual violence was not simply another horrific form of injury in a long red list of terrors under slavery, but rather is, quote, “the ontological anchor through which subjectivity and the scale of humanness are mediated.” End quote. In this trenchant work, Douglass disrupts the tendency in feminist and queer theories of many kinds to marshal the figure of the slave to anchor liberal projects for the reclamation of rights, citizenship, and state recognition of modes of redress for regimes of racial and sexual terror.

Throughout the work, she demonstrates that sexual violability is not an effect of the plantation, but rather its fundamental condition of possibility. To ground her arguments, Douglass offers the concept of racial sexuation as an analytical tool for thinking slavery, sex, and sexual violence, and the production of Blackness as a form of nonbeing. She defines it as “the process by which slaves were made vulnerable to sexual acts and other acts that may not be perceivably sexual.”

Though following Franz Fanon, she suggests that all forms of rich terror carry a latent sexual residue “to bar the slave from entrance into the human sexual order.” If, as Douglass argues that “the sexual violability of slaves still requires a theoretical vocabulary,” racial sexuation provides just such a new conceptual framework for thinking the relationship between sex, violence, slavery, and nonbeing. In this work, she takes several conceptual fields including some of my own beloved conceptual fields like Black feminist theory, queer theory, as well as white liberal feminist legal theory and philosophy, and Marxist theory to task in their treatment of sexual violence, slavery, and Black ontology.

Specifically, Douglass is concerned with how gender as the central analytical object of various feminist intellectual projects obscures the force of sexual violence as a tool of racecraft. She extends the insights of Hortense Spillers and by interrogating the analytical claims of a range of scholarly actors that reproduce gender differentiation as a transparent category while ignoring the many ways through the law, cultural discourse and social practice that the slave exists outside of the humanizing forms of subjectivity upon which normative gender is premised. In so doing, Douglass not only challenges critiques of Afro-pessimist thought as a masculinist theoretical endeavor that cannot account for gender, but rather illuminates how gender as “a possession of the human” is destabilized by Blackness, which, as she argues, exposes its outer limits.

Douglass deploys a rigorous multi-disciplinary method and I would actually maybe argue even anti-disciplinary in your kind of utter rejection of these sort of somewhat arbitrary distinctions between the kind of forms of knowledge production. She deploys a rigorous anti-disciplinary method assembling a broad range of analytical objects, including legal cases, novels, Shakespearean plays, archival documents, films, and popular commodities. Importantly, a significant number of her critiques focus on texts and legal cases that have long been objects for critique in the field of Black feminist studies.

Yet, while working with seemingly well-worn materials, the analysis never feels derivative or redundant. Instead, Douglass brings a fresh and innovative analysis to these familiar objects, pointing the way to more robust and unflinching modes of Black feminist critique that move beyond binary gender logics that obscure the vexed structural position of the slave in a white supremacist settler colonial social order. And I have to say, if for me, reading Patrice’s huge body of work now, it’s really difficult to overstate the impact that this work will have on the fields in which many of us labor.

And apparently I have it on good information that the children are already organizing reading groups on Twitter. Engendering Blackness is a groundbreaking text in the truest sense of the word that will unsettle, that will vex, and hopefully transform Black feminist approaches to the archive, legal theory, and political philosophy, and will no doubt be on heavy rotation in classrooms across the country and around the world as we grapple with what her interrogations into the archive of the slave suggest for contemporary struggles for Black liberation, and an end to the necro-political project of man that now poses an existential threat to the future of human and more than human life on the planet. This is an incredibly powerful and relentless work of insurgent Black feminist thought that I’m sure will become required reading for anyone serious about doing any serious kind of theoretical work at all.

As a colleague who’s familiar with Professor Douglass, I can say with no exaggeration that she is a scholar of rare brilliance, and who has produced a singular work of Black feminist critique that will have many rich and varied lives as it is taken up by scholars thinking in the wake of this tremendous contribution. So please join me in celebrating Engendering Blackness

(members applauding)

–and Patrice Douglass.

(members applauding)

[PATRICE DOUGLASS]

Oh, wow, Courtney that was amazing. Oh, and I didn’t have any nerves before you started talking. But whoa, how am I supposed to live up to it?

(Douglass laughing)

Like I have so many nerves now. But thank you. I have so many thank yous, but Courtney, I’ll start by saying thank you so much for that introduction.

I’m really at a loss for words and that’s not something that’s common of me. I have some students in the room, they know I can talk a lot. So thank you so much.

Also, thank you to Salar and Henry for agreeing to participate in this conversation with me, taking the time to engage the work and to provide serious comments that get me to think even further than perhaps I thought when I wrote Engendering Blackness. Okay, I’ll just say thank you to the Social Science Matrix for making this event possible, and specifically to Sarah Harrington, who has wrangled me multiple times to solidify dates and to get things moving and her tenacity and consistency with poking me has made it possible for us all to be here today. So thank you.

Also thank you to my home department, Gender and Women’s Studies. So many of my colleagues are here today. Specific thank you to Eric A. Stanley, who made it very clear that this book needed to be celebrated and made sure to clear the path such that it could be done.

And so, thank you, Eric. I appreciate that. Also thank you to all of you who are in the room.

I’m overwhelmed with– Oh, thank you. I’m overwhelmed with just the sight of you all in your presence, and I know that you could have chosen to be many other places today, and your choice to be here is deeply felt and appreciated.

I also saw someone walk in the room who I went to high school with, and that touched me deeply. Hi, Lonnie.

(audience laughing)

I, small bit, this is not about the book, but I grew up here in Berkeley. And so I went to Berkeley High, and so I have a deep root in this place, and so it feels wonderful to have so many faces whom I’ve interacted with in, in various ways here. So I wanted to start by actually talking about the artwork of the book and how that came to be.

Which is not apparent to people unless you know me and you know what the little marking on the back of the book suggests about who made this artwork for me. So this was actually made by my son.

And so it’s a painting that he made for me when I started my first academic job at Duke University some years ago, and I had this very empty office and no artwork and nothing sort of adorning the walls, and I couldn’t think of a way to honor my space and to honor myself, and he knows that the colors of black and white or the shades of black and white are important to me. And so he made this paint stroke canvas painting for me that I had in my office when I began this journey. And I thought it was best to try to incorporate it in the cover of the book somehow, and I reached out to my editor, Erica Wedder at Stanford University Press, and I said, “If there’s any way you can maybe like put it in there a little bit,” and they sent me the mock-up and it was the entire cover.

And so it’s not only my book, but it is also my son Lathan’s book, and he takes that very seriously. So I just wanted to start there with some levity before diving into very complex and hard topics, which is a conversation about sexual violence under slavery, which is not an easy conversation to have, nor is it a simple history to sit with. And so I wanted to write a book that honored that history with the respect and attention that it deserved and, set out to write this book different than the dissertation.

I completed the dissertation, and I felt that it was incomplete in some of the gestures that it made, some of the conclusions that it drew, and so I wanted to write the book anew. And so that is essentially what this version of Engendering Blackness came to be. So Engendering Blackness interrogates sexual violence as the most refracted violence of slavery.

It is found everywhere, historically and presently, in all things from antebellum employment disputes, the Fugitive Slave Acts, distinctions between federal and state law, and early American political theory to post-emancipation literature, Hollywood film, and critical theory. As objects of investigation, I employ the archive of U.S. slavery, legal records, newspapers, autobiographies, political communiques, log and record books as primary objects. Furthermore, my book places Black feminist theory and critical conversation and intention with feminist philosophy, feminist legal theory, queer theory, and political theory to unpack and critique the reoccurring trope of the sexually violated slave across various fields.

Engendering Blackness argues that most feminist, philosophical, and legal theory works lack the conceptual rigor to grapple with a slave as structurally denied or structurally deemed unrapeable and genderless, yet ripe with sex. These genres of thought subsume the racial dynamics of sexual injury into broader theories of how sexual violence, namely rape, impacts a universalized feminine or vulnerable subject. However, Engendering Blackness contends with, I’m sorry, contends that while sexual violence is a universal experience that traverses all historical epochs, modern racial slavery produces a relational difference in the utility of sexual violence as a forceful measure of the scales of humanness and slaveness.

Slaveness. Which is to say while anyone can experience sexual violation, the sexualization of the slave through violence was central to the racialization of Blackness as ontologically bound outside of the sexual dynamics of human life. The significance of this intervention is not solely for historiographic purposes, but most importantly, it’s to articulate the ways in which the present terrain of Black gender and sexuality is still captive to this relation.

Engendering Blackness investigates how present conversations on anti-Blackness, gender, and sexual violence must contend with this history to attend to the gendered and sexualized contours of violence, both sexual and otherwise. In this respect, Engendering Blackness present– prevents– presents a philosophical envage– engagement with the relationship of sexual violence and slavery as an ontological question. And so the images on the screen here are some that I include in the final chapter of the book where I talk about 12 Years a Slave in the circulation of both the images of Patsy’s repeated violation on screen, and also the subjugation of Platt, who is named Platt under slavery, but is Solomon by his free name, and how they’re both bound and constricted by a sexual arithmetic that the film tries to work to disavow but is unable to do so.

And I do that by sort of bringing the film into conversation with the press tour that the film had. Um, thinking about how Patsy becomes sort of understood as triangulated within a sexual matrix of mistress in relationship to her master and mistress. But in reality, she’s a sexual object that doesn’t have the agency that the actors and the director are trying to sort of usurp her into, and so I questioned whether or not I would do film analysis in the book

but I end it there, and I think that it did some work in terms of making the present tense of this particular conversation more apparent. So I arrived at this project after immersing myself in deep readings on antebellum case law, slave narratives, and other 19th century records. There are countless appearances of sexual violations against the enslaved in the archive of U.S. slavery.

However, these harms were not registered as crimes or injuries. What was profound to me in my readings was the frequency with which sexual violence appeared in text or documents where one would not assume to find such acts. This engagement with the archive led me to consider further how pervasive sexual violence was across all iterations of the antebellum world, and furthermore, and perhaps more centrally, these findings led me to contend with sexual violence at what, as what gives rise to Blackness rather than understanding sexual violence as an act committed against Blackness as a preconstituted subject integrity or form of being.

Engendering Blackness is a part of a growing body of literature that is invested in contending with the history of slavery and the presump– presuppositions about Blackness through philosophical registers. Additionally, it places a particular focus on the gendered and sexual dimensions of slavery to illuminate the intractability of Blackness from gendered and sexual concerns. Sexual violence is taken up as the primary concern to highlight its latency in public discourses on slavery, and the incompleteness of its emancipation.

So the book develops the concept of racial sexuation to elaborate a more expansive framework for understanding the implications of sexual violence as a structural component of modern racial slavery. Racial sexuation connotes how the slave is suspended within a terrain of sexual violence as a permanent status of ontological obsolescence. It indexes a condition of non-being that is always sexualized and violating, an indeterminate status that is propelled into structural relations by force through proximity and repetition, and most essentially, through fantasy and desire.

I employ terms like sexual violability or sexually violable to symbolize the manner in which racial sexuation is realized through grotesque and mundane forms of sexual brutality, how sexual violations were structured as a permanent potential for the slave, even if each slave did not individually experience such, and more crucial to the argument laid out here, that every violence of slavery, sexual and non-sexual, arguably works in service of preserving and protecting the slave as gratuitously sexually available in a manner inconceivable for non-slaves. Everything relating to Black slaveness is sexually violent because all violence is oriented by the sexual. The engendering of Blackness through sexual violence exposes the realm of racial sexuation that makes human gender possible, and holds the slave ontologically captive to the human’s multiplicities.

What sexual violence and slavery reveals is that the sexualized force that conditioned the lives of slaves serves to mark violation as a permanent status for Blackness, while also wagering the value of being human as an otherwise to this status. In this respect, the sexual violability of the slave as potentiality and the acts and fantasies of these violations inaugurates a grammar of value meaning matter of what it means to be human as an ontology that is distinct and structurally protected from the gravity of capture, dispossession, and loss that constitutes Blackness. Thus, the title of the book sits in tension.

The ontology of sexual violence demarcates a structural logic of accounting for sexual violence that forecloses the ability of thought to grapple with Blackness, which emanates from sexual violence. This position challenges the perception that the sexually violent experiences endured by Black people from slavery to the present are but one component of racialization. Instead, I contend that sexual violence operates as a modality of force that reinaugurates the conditions of slave capture that usher Blackness into modern coherence by marking, by the marking of peoples as Black through an identification of their perceived sexual otherness and fecundity.

Racial sexuation as a modern predicament is what made and propelled Blackness into thought as the amorphous and violable condition that reason incessantly attempts to capture, even centuries after the first slave ships set sail for worlds unknown to the captives onboard. It’s critical to note that Engendering Blackness is a critical expansion of Afropessimism, which is a theory of anti-blackness and ontology in violence. Offering a radical return to the Fanonian treatise on Blackness, Afropessimism contends that slavery is a paradigmatic relation rather than a historically situated experience.

Though one, although one can point to 1865 as the formal end of slavery in the United States, Blackness as the slave of modernity maintains a captive relation within the hu– with the human and its world. This position contends that the human is not, or I’m sorry, this position contends that the Black is not human, nor is it a subject of the human world. Nonetheless, anti-blackness is essential to the over-determination of the human as a universal signifier of common struggle and community.

The argument taken up in the book maintains that the human is a political ontological category constructed and maintained through a violent relationship with Blackness. Reading the captive condition on its own terms without equivocating towards humanness and its various forms of subject differentiation allows for an unflinching attunement to the scales of violence’s force. Violence here is more capacious than physical acts, as it engulfs Blackness within a totalizing ontological erasure.

Afropessimism interrogations clarifying Fanon’s insistence that “Ontology, once it finally admits as leaving existence by the wayside, does not permit us to understand the being of the Black man.” Questions linger about the import of Afropessimist frameworks on studies of slavery. How does manhood relate to, “The unbearable hydraulics of Black disavowal,” that Frank B. Wilderson III describes as saturated in gratuitous violence?

Is the violent thrust of the world that Afropessimists described rooted in a type of masculine violation reserved for cis men or masculinist appeals towards reading violence as a singular truth? What is gender to Afropessimism? My book is a response and a disavowal of the assumption that sits at the heart of these questions.

The Afropessimist is demanded by other Black Studies feminist and queer theorists to disavow the objectification that the archive reveals, and to assert that the truth of the structural predicament of the slave is one of denied entrance into human community. Thus, there is a great effort to amplify the social life of the slave in contradistinction to emphasizing the totalizing conditions of social death. As a theory, social death contends that the slave is natally alienated, generally dishonored, and subjected to gratuitous violence.

Yet social death is not disproved by the social life of the slave. Prioritizing the focus on social life instead of social death is meant to produce a more nuanced reading of slavery, not fully shrouded in violation. The desire here is to render the racial slave more than just their violating conditions, and thus a human suspended by abjection rather than a “true,” and I do this in italics, “slave who is totalized by objecthood.”

Recognizing the social organization of gender and sexuality within the communities of slaves is meant to illuminate social life, and thus contour slavery as a totalizing condition. This position, however, is belated, insofar as it fails to question why gender and sexuality demand forceful implementation within the social arrangements of captive life. Why is the theoretical project of most area studies to forcefully insert the significance of slave gender and sexuality within a history where its subjective qualities are vaguely present, rather than to question the explanatory power of those identificatory terms for the captive condition altogether?

Scholars across many fields have explored the vexed nature of sexual violence in slavery. Many Black feminist historians have explored the role sexual violence played in shaping the experience of slaves. Furthermore, Black feminist theorists such as Angela Davis, Evelyn Heyman, Saidiya Hartman, Dorothy Roberts, Hortense J. Spillers, just to name a few, have connected the history of sexual violence under slavery to structures of power that continue to orient, orient and control Black life in the present.

Building on this work, Engendering Blackness is critically concerned with how concepts like Blackness, womanhood, manhood, sexual will and agency, and human liberty are challenged as neutral and natural descriptors when engaged through the sexualized terror of the slave. Despite their thorough research on sexual violence and slavery, scholars who examine the particular femaleness or maleness of the experience of sexual violence for the slave have yet to consider how the value and grammar of these terms are produced at the nexus of sexual terror in the m– emergence of New World slavery, which is to say, although sex/gender difference are constructed, or, I’m sorry, although sex/gender difference as a constructing order predates modernity, slavery unearths a new paradigm of gender and sexuality that employs sexual violence to constitute a distinction between being human and the subjugation– subjugated category of slaves. The vast history of sexual violence and slavery illumines a structural distinction between gender and sexuality, which def– sorry, which define aspects of personhood undergirded by liberty and filiation in Black gender and sexuality, which was constituted under sec– slavery as a relation of reproduced by force.

Furthermore, my work challenges binary assumptions about what constitutes gender and its relationship to shape to sexual orders of violence. I guess, I should explain my slides before I move forward. These are the texts that really sort of inspired a lot of my thinking in this book and also are texts that I deeply engage throughout.

So one of them is Black Holes and the Geometry of Black Female Sexuality by Evelyn Heymans. This is an image from Hortense Spillers’ Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe: An American Grammar Book. The central image Black Women’s Roles in the Community of Slaves by Angela Davis is perhaps one of the first radical engagements with the predicament of sexual violence under slavery, thinking about its implications for Black women’s radical insurgency.

Scenes of Subjection, which there’s no words that I can give to give it credence, but the third chapter of the book “Subduction and the Ruses of Power,” really helped me to start to think about sexual violence as something that cannot be assuaged or wrapped up, that it is inherently embedded with contradictions. I remember having a professor who told me that that chapter in that book was a problem, and I think just hearing that person say that incited within me a drive to really want to sit with why this person was so scandalized, but also kind of disavowing that this chapter needed to be a part of this book. And I think I’ve taken up, obviously, a call and response to that flippant dismissal.

And Dorothy Roberts’ Killing the Black Body, which has become a text taught in numerous classes across college campuses, but has also become sort of a central, not sort of, but has become a central pillar in the fight for reproductive justice. And I think that the way that Roberts scaffolds this book across thinking the predicament of the female slave to thinking the context of reproductive control and coercion in our present tense animated questions for me that also continue to sort of undergird what’s going on in the book. So I thought it important to not just skip my slides, but additionally, I’ll let you finish your picture, Paola.

(all laughing)

These are images the objects that I analyze in the book. So I analyzed Betye Saar’s Liberation of Aunt Jemima, which was a mixed-media assemblage that was produced by Saar for a call for revolutionary Black art in response to the 1968 assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. It was a call from a Black institution, cultural institution here in Berkeley called Rainbow Signs, where they were looking for representations of the political moment, and this is what Saar produced for that call.

The image in the middle is called Virginian Luxuries where it’s an undi– unidentified artist of, from 1825 representing the sort of luxuries of white male sexual possibility with sexual violations of Black women and physical brutality of Black men, and thinking about those things as orbiting in a similar access. And the last image here is a clipping from a nine, I’m sorry, a 1778 newspaper about a runaway slave named Sarah. And I used this ad in my second chapter to think about how Sarah is construed within this ad and objectified as a sexual object, but also a gender deviant, to use that as a way to usher in a conversation with Black feminist theory about assumptions of gender and particularly assumptions about the mobilization of womanhood and what the field perceives to do with that category.

So I’m almost done here.

(Patrice giggling)

So my work challenges binary assumptions about what constitutes gender and its relationship to sexual orders of violence. Engendering Blackness thinks Blackness and gen– gender beyond biocentrism, which is the belief that each is innate to the body and or genitals, and instead interrogates these terms in relationship to sexual violence as what makes and unmake slaves and humans. Lastly, by drawing on history, theory, philosophy, and aesthetics, Engendering Blackness argues that the replication of the sexual vulnerability of the slave as an allegoric object is not a, is not unique to any particular field or mode of thought, but illustrates the capaciousness of the unrelenting hold of slavery on the conceptual frameworks of its afterlives.

Thank you.

(audience applauding)

[SALAR MAMENI]

So I’d, I’d like to start by expressing my gratitude to Patrice for inviting me to be a part of this conversation to Sarah for organizing the panel, and of course it’s a pleasure to be in conversation with Henry and Courtney. So, thank you so much. As I expect you’ve already gathered from Patrice’s introduction, Engendering Blackness is a theoretical book that’s meant to provoke thought, to unnerve, and to destabilize disciplinary and political assumptions about its key components of analysis, namely blackness, slavery, gender, violence, and sexuality.

At its core, this is a theory book. As Douglass notes in her introduction to the book, quote, “What does it mean to theorize about rather than to accumulate facts on sexual violation and slavery?” End quote.

This, I believe, is an important point to highlight since theory inherently provokes. Theory pushes against our broad understandings of the structure of the world and works to rearrange our basic assumptions and perceptions about how things work. So, in the time that I’ve been given here, I’d like to enter into dialogue with two of the theoretical strands of Patrice’s book.

My entry points are, of course, through the lens of my own disciplines and my own research interests but which I hope will offer some lines of inquiry for further thought and conversation. So again, thanks for opening up the space for dialogue. So first, while reading Patrice’s book, I was struck by the extent to which, unbeknownst to myself, Afro-pessimism, or maybe I should say feminist Afro-pessimism as a framework, had influenced my own theorization of the figure of the terrorist.

My book, as Courtney generously just mentioned, titled, Terracene A crued Aesthetics, published in 2023, theorizes the figure of the terrorist as a racialized other who falls outside of the category of the human. What is significant in the context of my conversation here and in the context of Afro-pessimist theorizing, is that the terrorist is not an identity category, right? We don’t think of the terrorist as an identity, and this is exactly what makes it so hard to define the figure of the terrorist from a humanist ontological framework.

The figure of the terrorist cannot be claimed as an identity or presented as one mode of social life or one mode of being human amongst many. By definition, the terrorist is a violable and killable body, one who falls outside of security apparatuses of protection. Furthermore, as I detail at length in my book, the terrorist is fundamentally non-human in that it emerges from within inner species’ ecologies and geographies of war and disaster such that state and governmental definitions of terrorism are equivalent to unpredictable sites of danger, such as hurricanes and viral diseases, all of which they seek to preemptively eradicate and eliminate.

So, to be called a terrorist, in other words, is to be defined as a non-being in a state of ontological crisis. So, Afro-pessimism as a theory as Douglass quotes, quote, “Is a theory that in which slavery is a paradigmatic relation rather than a historically situated experience.” End quote.

It seems to me that Afro-pessimism offers the tools for theorizing terror in a way that a humanist lens simply cannot. Indeed, Patrice’s book stages a forceful critique of academic studies of slavery that prioritize, quote, “The focus on social life instead of social death.” End quote.

The desire in such studies, Douglass argues, is to render the racial slave more than their violating conditions, and thus a human suspended by abjection rather than a true slave who is totalized by objecthood. In other words, Douglass poses a question about the desire to transform the institution of racial slavery into what she calls compulsory humanism. So before moving on to my second point about the book, I want to pose an open question for Patrice should you wish to respond.

My question is this: Do you see Afro-pessimism, and, you know, I think I sh– I should say feminist Afro-pessimism, as applicable to this theorization of the terrorist as I have, you know, briefly laid out here? In other words, does Afro-pessimism, in your view, offer an analysis that can allow for the institution of racial slavery to create the conditions of possibility for this later figuration of the terrorist, which of course includes but is not exclusive to Blackness? I’m here thinking about the close association of the concept of the terrorist with Muslims, and in this particular moment of ongoing genocide in Gaza, it is the figure of the terrorist that has enabled an utter global consensus and disregard for Palestinian humanity subjected to violent killings, torture, and famine, and orchestrated ethnic cleansing alongside silencing of any opposition to this ongoing terror.

So while prior to the 20th century, the category of the Muslim in the context of the transatlantic slavery, was an index of humanity, as we learn from scholars such as R. A. Judy, Sylviane Diouf, and Aisha Khan amongst others, the Muslim over the course of the last century has become folded into the terrorist. So to clarify, I’m not asking if the category of the slave is analogous to the category of the terrorist, this is not about analogizing, but rather if the institution of slavery can be understood to produce the conditions for the figuration of the terrorist, and if Afro-pessimism enables this more expansive mode of theorizing. So that’s one question.

Now to my second inquiry. One of the many provocative aspects of Patrice’s book is that it invites us to think about the implications of racial slavery transnationally. An instance of this is the discussion in chapter four, where Douglass carefully reads through a number of late 19th century case studies appearing in the work of the Austrian sexologist Richard von Krafft-Ebing.

In these proto-psychoanalytic cases, Austrians discuss their sexual fantasies in which Black slaves on the American plantation become objects of arousal, desire, identification, and sadomasochistic fantasy. Through reading these cases, Douglass powerfully argues that, quote, “The psyche, like the plantation, is arranged by anti-Blackness.” This is an anti-Blackness that is not limited to the psychic formation of the white master on the plantation, but a global psychic formation far removed from the plantation.

In my reading, Patrice’s theorization has implications far beyond Europe, and I think an obvious place to look is Indian Ocean slavery, which predates the historical timeframe of transatlantic slavery. A figure that features prominently in discussions of Indian Ocean slavery is that of the castrated eunuch. Orlando Patterson has provided important analytical starting points for understanding the eunuch in the context of a general analysis of enslavement globally and across centuries.

I want to bring attention to one aspect of Patterson’s reading of this figure. In his seminal book, Slavery and Social Death, published in 1982, Patterson calls the eunuch, quote, “The ultimate slave.” He writes, quote, “The ultimate slave is best represented in the absolute person of the eunuch.”

While I cannot go into much detail here, the eunuch’s body in Patterson’s study is the site of convergence of his three definitional aspects of slavery, natal alienation, violence, and dishonor. For Patterson, the eunuch’s castration was not only enabled by natal alienation, but prevented kinship ties, rendering the enslaved eunuch socially dead and hence a non-threatening figure to be brought into royal inner circles such as within the Fatimid courts in Egypt, Ethiopia, Byzanti, or Chinese slave systems across Africa and Asia. And these are some of Patterson’s own examples.

The unique thing about eunuchs, Patterson writes, quote, “Was that they had been castrated, which added to their secondary sex changes did create an anom– anomalous third sex.” End quote. What stands out in Patterson’s theorization of the eunuch’s third sex is his highly gendered description of the eunuch’s body.

So I’m gonna read you just a long quote from Patterson. He writes, “It is an established medical fact that eunuchs undergo many physical changes, which do indeed make them appear abnormal. They tend to grow fat and their skin has an effeminate quality under which thin lines appear as they grow older.

In the vivid terms of one observer, they come to look like mummified old women. Their voices remain girl-like for a long time, then as they grow older come to sound like harsh female shrieking. They waddle rather than walk.

They perspire excessively. Modern study suggests that no cognitive changes result from the operation, but surely the trauma of castration must have had an emotionally destabilizing effect on every person who has experienced it.” End quote.

Now, I read this elaborate quote because I want to ask Patrice a question about gender. Patrice’s book convincingly argues that while gender is often called upon to understand sexual violence, the category of gender does not explain the overwhelming archive of gratuitous violence within the institution of racial slavery. Douglass indeed refutes theories that read cases of violent castration of the Black eunuch as emasculated, arguing that the category of Black masculinity cannot explain violent castration.

My question, however, is related to this elaborate gendering of the eunuch, as described by Patterson. To what extent do global practices of castrating slaves, which goes back to antiquity, have had an effect on our very understanding of gender binary and the production of the gendered human? In other words, does the institution of slavery, in fact, produce the embodied illusions of gender just as they produce the psychic formations of sexuality, you know, in the Austrian examples possessed by the human?

So just to wrap up, I’m very grateful for this opportunity to think of, you know, about the far-reaching implications of, of your theorization and in particular with these figures of the eunuch and the terrorist, which are, which I think, you know, you inspired me, inspired me to think that these are not just abjected w– figures awaiting humanity, but produced through the very violence that is humanity itself. So thank you.

[MODERATOR]

Thank you,

(unintelligible)

.

(audience applauding)

[HENRY WASHINGTON JR.]

Okay. Can you hear me? Okay.

I’m excited to be in conversation. We are running out of time, so I’m gonna hop right in. In the introductory chapter of her 1987 landmark text, Reconstructing Womanhood, Hazel Carby describes the aspiration of her critical undertaking as a gesture toward a Black feminist criticism that might be, quote, “Regarded as a problem, not a solution, as a sign that should be interrogated, a locus of contradictions.”

End quote. This aspiration emerges from Carby’s dis-ease with certain dimensions of bla– of the Black feminist project, at this time very much still in its early formation as a self-conscious intellectual tradition. This included what Carby decried as a bioessentialization of the Black female body, as Black feminism’s putative subject and object of inquiry, along with an– along with a fetishization of tradition as a paradigm through which Black feminist institutional practice might proceed.

Owing in part to its institutional imperative to produce a project that might find legibility and thus resources for sustenance in the US, US university, Black feminists had rehearsed an idea of the project’s interpretive and ideological unity into critical hegemony. This necessarily foreclosed the more rigorous dynamic thinking, Carby suggested the position of the Black woman might otherwise open up. I begin here because Engendering Blackness‘s relationship to and critique of the idea of intellectual tradition, Black feminist and otherwise, is to my mind one of its most important contributions.

Douglass’s book is one of the fullest realizations of Reconstructing Womanhood’s aspiration I have seen published in its wake. Its attention to the ontology of sexual violence as that which is inaugurated in part through racial slavery’s physical acts of brutalization, but is exhausted neither by its material dimensions nor its experiential reality, demands a critical reassessment of some of the terms and conceptual logics that an accounts of racialized gender under New World slavery and so-called freedom are now legion. The idea of Black feminist tradition, as fashioned with varying degrees of critical introspection by the Black feminists– the Black feminist historians Douglass mentions, like Deborah Gray White and Darlene Clark Hine, alongside such Black women literary critics as Debra McDowell, Mary Helen Washington, Cheryl Wall, and Barbara Christian, demanded at once a singularity and a familiarity.

That is, it would require the attestation of a unified Black female experience and Black feminist aesthetic on the one hand, alongside an avowal of the kind of universalizing intelligibility of her form and forms that might lend its project canonizability on the other. This twinned imperative, with its attendant contradictions, perhaps explains why the project proceeded as it did, with largely unanswered questions about several key conceptual problems. Most importantly for our concerns here being the promise and peril of Black women’s inclusion, both in the annals of the archive and in the order of human gendering.

As Douglass elaborates, quote, “Within Black feminism, the Black woman operates as an uncontested figure of truth whose violation produces the conditions of possibility for autonomic resistance to centuries of unflinching violence.” End quote. But the violence of slavery is, for Douglass, not reducible to a historical suppression of the female slave’s gender.

Which is to say her alleged humanity cannot be surfaced with recourse to her renaming nor through her resistance or its retrospective description and imagining. Rather, as Douglass’s concept of racial sexuation insists, the structural predicament of the slave, male or female, quote, “Indexes a condition of non-being that is always sexualized and violating, an indeterminate status that is propelled into structural relations by force through proximity and repetition and most essentially through fantasy and desire.” Differentiation as such needs the Black as the embodiment of its fantasy of lack to give form and flesh to what it means to be human.

As the second chapter argues, Suspended Absences and the Substrates of Naming the Female Slave, Black feminist appeals to this taxonomic paradigm of difference-making are not only unrealizable, but actually entail their own violence. Naming the female slave the Black woman as an attempt to counter dehumanization necessarily proceeds by way of a logical reliance on a presumption of so-called inalienable and innate womanhood. In this schema, genitalia is taken to evidence the Black slave’s capacity for gender’s mimetic emergence.

Sylvia Wynter is perhaps the most provocative interlocutor for this critique. For Douglass, her Beyond Miranda’s Meanings suggests that the void of the Black woman here Caliban’s woman, is an ontological erasure that can be redressed through a kind of accounting and recovery that womanism might model, the assumption being that simply occupying demonic ground might re-enchant humanism, ushering in a new praxis of relation. Douglass further argues that in Wynter, anatomical sex difference still over-determines Caliban’s supposed patriarchal potential.

Which is to say that in Douglass’s view, we actually misdiagnose and under-theorize the Black man’s parallel violation. Both these figures lack coherent claims to gender differentiation, having only, quote, “Fantasms of fantasies, desires, and phobias that can also speak back, what some call resistance, but are trapped in the violence of their anti-Black unmaking.” End quote.

Having long distanced herself from Black feminism, at least as a descriptor of her intellectual project, it is ironically by way of Douglas’ critique of the essay’s investments in humanization that Wynter’s project becomes clearly legible within what Douglass terms the theoretical politics of dissemblance predominant in Black feminist discourse. This is all to say that the primary way I am left to think with Engendering Blackness is as an invitation to consider more carefully what might be described as the cycle politics of Black and Black feminist theorizing and tradition-making. If one of the book’s central insights is its refutation of the ontological possibility of Black woman as a mimetic category in terms of its explanatory potential for the terms of violation under which the female slave suffers and as a framework through which that suffering is imagined to be redressed, then it begs the question, what attachments or desires have given rise to the artistic and critical practice of the discourse’s pervasive investment in the humanization of gendering?

After all, as Douglass writes, it is not for want of clarity about the violence of categorization that Black feminist theory sustains this investment in Black womanhood and her tradition. As she writes, quote, “As a field, Black feminist historiography has an acute awareness of the contradictions of extending the category woman to female slaves and Black women more generally without caveat. However, this understanding does not result in the field abandoning the use of woman as a qualifier for slave or Black.

Rather, the scholarship redoubles the category of Black woman as a primordial figure whose affection and response to violence and violation are, to use Davis’ term, their own mythical transpositions.” End quote. I wonder then what mode of historicity might a delineation of desire in Black feminist art and theory help affect?

Jared Sexton has convincingly argued that we cannot presume the slave desires freedom, in part because of the imposition of the master’s volition and desire, which is as psychic as it is material. Are the conditions by which one might disentangle something like a Black or Black feminist revolutionary desire from the master’s volition and desire imaginable? Or are they entirely lost to the onset of racial sexuation in its totalizing force?

This is a particularly provocative and important set of questions, especially insofar as they are posed by a self-consciously Black feminist project. As a kind of meta-critical examination of Black feminist tradition-making undergirded by a persistent longing for inclusion, by way of what Calvin Warren has described as the cloak or garment of gender that never quite fits Black being, Douglas’ critical Black feminism unearths a way forward, if counterintuitively by way of a metaphysis– if counterintuitively by way of a metaphysical descent. Answers to these questions can at times be somewhat difficult to ascertain in the text as written, in part because I am speaking to concerns that I think are not Douglas’ priority, even as they are latent throughout.

But I think this is also because precise accounts of desire’s functioning and indeed the mechanics of the numerous psychoanalytic presuppositions that buttress so many of the book’s evocative claims, like sexuation and the death drive, are not elaborated. Such inclusion would aid my reading substantively. Perhaps a consequence of how generously the book delivers on Carby’s call to take up– to take Black feminism up as a problem and not a solution, it at times provides less than one might hope in terms of critical genealogies generally.

As another instance of this, I am also curious in terms of the text’s thinking with and alongside Black feminist philosophies, what intellectual history undergirds Douglas’ use of ontology? Wynter and Spillers seem to mean something like a Blackness ontologized, perhaps in the case of Spillers because of her heavy reliance on a Lacanian account of the Black woman’s misnaming for her account of ungendering, and for the Black intramural communicative rationality delineated in her essay, All the Things, as having the potential to rewrite the Black woman’s narrative in a restoration of Black subjectivity from a prior emptiness, a space of silence or denied speech, and denied relation to others. In the case of Spillers and Wynter, I think slavery is cast as at once productive of an ontology and heavily indebted to knowledge claims, which are evidently alterable given the fact of their own emergence in relation to a particular conjuncture.

Douglass seems to mean something more permanent than this, but what is the critical departure from a particular conception of ontology that gets us here? And somewhat relatedly, in terms of ontology’s privileging of totality, I would like to know more about how we might think the interpretalive protocols of racial sexuation, particularly in so far as they might be understood as intention with the instability and incoherence of racial seeing. I’m thinking about this in part because we’re reading Passing in my Literature and Black Feminism class, which provoked a question for me about how the kind of context of Passing might model a less straightforward script for Fanon’s look a negro encounter in its kind of sexuating dimensions.

And finally, this is a smaller question related to these larger ones, given how the violence of slavery sature– saturates conceptuality and naming for Douglass, I would like to hear more about the topographical decisions throughout the book, especially capitalizing the word blackness alongside or maybe against the striking through of the word mother. To be sure, these are all questions that emerge from my strong conviction that this is a book saying something unique and important, which scholars across gender and sexuality studies, black studies, philosophy, and beyond would do well to take seriously. I am excited for the opportunity in this conversation to gain even further guidance on thinking with and taking up its evocative formulations.

(panelists applauding)

[COURTNEY DESIREE MORRIS]

Thank you both for those really wonderful and just very thoughtful contributions. Patrice, if you’d like an opportunity to respond?

[PATRICE DOUGLASS]

Yeah, I mean, there’s so much that can be said. We have 15 minutes left.

(all laughing)

[COURTNEY DESIREE MORRIS]

20.

[PATRICE DOUGLASS]

Thank you, my mic’s, it’s hidden under my chin.

(laughing)

If you wouldn’t mind, I think I may want to sort of go in order, and then make some connections, but I’d, first I’d like to say thank you to you both for extremely evocative and thought-provoking comments, which I’m still thinking through as I attempt response, and emphasis on attempt.

(laughing)

So I think to come back to your initial question, Solar, on the figure of the terrorist and how Afro-pessimism may speak to or provide some kind of alternative lens or, or complementary lens to think about. For me, this sort of guides me to think about the kind of black trad– black political tradition that underguards Afro-pessimism that sometimes people don’t think so so readily about, but in some of the earlier works of Frank Wilderson and also my some of my current works we think a lot about black political insurgency and think about the, the legacies and the consequences of black political action in the 1960s and ’70s. And so I think for me, in terms of thinking about the terrorist and its interrelatedness to the FBI’s counterintelligence program and the response, the very forceful and violent response to the idea that Black people could imagine their own liberation, I think is all interconnected.

And as you were saying, it’s not allegorical but it definitely highlights and amplifies the structural relationality of the U.S.’s violent force as a permanent constitution of its racialization and racial naming, classification in making, but also how those struggles begin to sort of bleed into one another. And so I’m thinking specifically about Assata Shakur who recently passed may she rest in power, and how she was the first woman who was added to the FBI’s most wanted terrorist list. And that there’s a continuation of this struggle of sort of Black political struggle that’s being animated through the conceptualization of the figure of the terrorist as a central component of the U.S.’s war on so many things.

And so, it also, you know, as I was thinking with your comments made me think about in addition to Assata Shakur also, as you’re noting, the hyper surveillancing of Black Muslims once the War on Terror began, the infiltrating in very similar ways to COINTELPRO of Black mosque and the indictment charging and permanent incarceration of Black Muslims under terrorist charges. And so I think that Afro-pessimism often gets understood as like an exclusively black conversation when in reality, it is first and foremost a conversation around structural positionality and thinking about scales and sort of consistencies of violence. And that I think sometimes the assumption about differentiation between those violences are about how certain groups are perceived as maintaining certain qualities of humanness that blackness erodes and so therefore there’s a kind of distancing.

But to again quote Frank Wilderson, “The call of Afro-pessimism is to invite whites and also racial junior partners,” as he says, “to dance the dance of social death,” which is to embrace and to embody the anxiety that these figures that are attuned in spaces of only solely violence and then beginning and thinking solely there rather than trying to escape towards some flight of freedom or some kind of reappropriation of the current terms of the world as possible for some other kind of remaking. And so I think that’s how I would frame sort of a response to the ways that Afro-pessimism can inform or think with the terracing. I think that the question around the eunuch is a really big one.

And as you were reading Orlando Patterson’s quote, I could not get over the hyper feminization of the figure of the eunuch as its particular heightened, like permanent slaveness. And so for me, it brought up, like, I have a section in the book on the Black eunuch and how Eldridge Cleaver, also within the same tradition of Black radical insurgency and Black political insurgency is writing about the Black eunuch as a divestment in his ball. So it’s a divestment in a certain kind of anatomical claim to gender.

But I think what was very interesting for me in hearing you read Patterson is also how, you know, there is this way that gender or the experience of sexual terror becomes the grounds for which there’s sort of a super or a hyper exponentializing of the– the gravity of the condition because Spillers kind of does an inverse where the female slave becomes exponentialized as the quintessential slave through her own sexual violation. So there’s an interesting way in which there’s a hierarchy that is mapped out along the lines of an assumption about what kinds of sexual violence is sort of the zero degree of conceptualization, the end of zones of being, the sort of point of no return. I think it’s a chicken and an egg.

It’s not really something that one can come to a conclusion on, is the female slave more quintessential as the power or harmed more, or this slave is harmed more? And then when you start to deconstruct, you see that there’s some gender assumptions at play in how the concern even animates itself in the first instance, which is that the concern is on sort of the aftereffects of a morphing into a more feminized gendered subject, rather than actually on the violence itself, which is the violence of castration and physical amputation. And so there’s no focus on the anatomical features of that violation, but more so sort of a transitioning that that violation may cause, and so it’s a fear of transitioning, a fear of transness at play.

And I think i– It’s important to know how trans studies and specifically uh, the work of someone who I’ve been thinking with for many, many years, Cecilia Cooper, has really helped me to undo the way that gender stakes a claim on thought, even in ways that we may not perceive, which is to think that perhaps the TransAtlantic slave trade morphed something that was prior to so– something conceptualizable and real, you know? And that slavery comes in and changes the scope of things.

Rather, looking at gender as a as a– an ins– imposition that is not an aid and it’s not natural, it’s not something that exists since the dawning of man, which is a very Christian sort of assumption about gender. But really looking at gender as a script of power and possession, that even womanhood falls underneath the category of, or within the purview of, and my book is trying to really get at where those investments might then redouble a very cis-centric and very transphobic investment in gender as a solution to a history that is predicated on those very demarcations and binary conceptions in the first instance. And so that’s all a way to say that thinking about this particular figure helps to get at the sort of anxieties of what people are perceiving that this slave is losing and therefore, perhaps may then sort of mark a form of loss that may be conceived as inconceivable.

And to me, Patterson is a very seemingly afraid of transness.

(Patrice laughing)

Maybe perhaps not aware, but that doesn’t matter.

(Patrice laughing)

It– it’s there nonetheless, and so I think on that particular point connects me to some of your readings, Henry, which are really pushing me. So if I’m not complete, it is because I am still thinking. Yeah.

But the– the figure of the– the female and the Black woman and how that orients the second chapter of the book is also, again intent on sort of amplifying an anxiety, where there’s been a very sort of repulsive gesture within Black feminism to say that to be termed female was to be termed in some way that was deracinating and incomplete, and that womanhood could come around and recover.

[HENRY WASHINGTON JR.]

Mm-hmm.

[PATRICE DOUGLASS]

And I think that there’s no way to dissect womanhood from its racial violence, and that the value of womanhood and the privileging of womanhood is because of its exclusionary categorization. And so the work of the Veolia Glymph is really helpful for me in that way, which comes into that chapter as well, where she’s thinking about the constitution of the mistress and how the mistresses distinction between the female slave is the mistresses’ proprietary claim to violence in the domestic space. And so, I think, you know, I am deeply indebted to the various feminists that you name, that I name in the book that I’m working through, and as Courtney and I were talking about before anybody enters the room, the work is pushing Black feminism, but it is not disavowing or discarding Black feminism.

But it’s really wanting to push the theory in a direction where it’s engaged critically in the same ways in which other forms of critical theory are engaged. And I found myself writing that particular chapter, which is pushing even some of my own previous work forward, is to avoid the kind of deification of Black women’s scholarship and Black feminist scholarship as something that is sort of recited like a Bible, but not something that is actually engaged and disarticulated in certain ways to push our frameworks to stop replicating things that don’t serve us. And there’s a way in which Black feminism has taken up this investment in cis womanhood that I think is very transphobic, and is very exclusionary, and doesn’t do the work of thinking capaciously about the laundry of slavery for all Black people, not just Black people who identify their gender by their genitals.

And so, rather than saying it like that, I wanted to get into some of the most critical text that may not call themselves Black feminist text, but are read within Black feminism to make new departures within the question of womanhood, and to look at how these texts are very serious in certain ways. They give us a very sophisticated theoretical language, but perhaps are not rising to the occasion of being able to think about gender as critically as perhaps it could, you know. And so, I teach Beyond Miranda’s Meaning a lot, and I’m always really taken back by the assumption of the possessive nature of Caliban’s relationship to this woman.

And I remember, like, flippantly, I was like, “Well, what if really, like, Caliban doesn’t want a woman? And what if a woman doesn’t want Caliban? And what if Caliban’s like, you know, just all of these various differentiations that would then make the argument break apart.

And so then, as I approached engaging with the afterwords, which is the afterwords to Beyond Cumbia or I think that’s the name of the, the collection. But, or Out of Cumbia or maybe it’s not even that. But, regardless, engaging with this afterwords in a way that allows us to not sort of rest at the demonic grounds as this sort of reclamation, but even in some ways tear that apart, which Cecilio Cooper does a really good job at.

And I continue to plug Cecilio because I think they’re really brilliant. But I think in terms of the psychoanalytic piece you’re right, it is underdeveloped, and it’s underdeveloped for a reason.

(laughing)

Because I didn’t want to give a lot of space in the book to the kind of patriarchal maneuver that occurs in psychoanalysis often, which is like allegiance to a father or even an allegiance to a mother, right, where you sort of have to stake your claim. Like, is this psychoanalysis through Freud? Is it Lacan?

Is it LeBlanc? Is it this? Is it this?

Is what it? You know, I just wanted to think about some of the terms that psychoanalysis makes operable and useful, like desire and fantasy, drive, death drive, but to not engage in the tango of trying to privilege a certain school over others, which takes a lot of space. But I do appreciate the gestures that Spillers makes in All The Things She Could Be.

And I didn’t get a chance to get into the argument a lot, but there is a disagreement within Black studies about, or at least within certain angles of Black studies where how to deal with her particular departure from Lacan, or how she sort of asserts that Lacan is unable to see, or that it fails or falls apart on a question of racial intrusion. And David Marriott thinks that Sylvia, I’m sorry, that Spillers is completely wrong. And then Frank Wilderson thinks that she’s completely right, right?

But then it gets into this tango, which diverts away from the question of sexual violation and sexual violability in a way that I just wanted to touch on in certain points of the book, but to not go so deeply into that direction. And so in a sense, I left it intentionally vague and incomplete. But it’s interesting, as Courtney was saying, that there are some Twitter students who are formulating reading groups.

It is a point that continues to come up, which is like, what is the relationship of the text to certain veins of psychoanalysis? And I really appreciate other people arguing that for me, ’cause I don’t have any stakes in that fight. But I did find in coming back around to the idea of the book post-dissertation that certain psychoanalytic gestures were necessary.

Because there was a way that sexual violence was persistently thought of only in material terms, in terms of the material effects on the body and embodiment, and that here was less said about the psychic dispersion of the sexual status of the slave into places like Eastern Europe and other contexts where people haven’t even encountered someone to say, “Look, a Negro,” but yet they’re fantasizing about sexual encounter with the power dynamics of the plantation, such that their own sexual awakenings emerge through th– through this paradigm. And so I wanted to be able to account for that as a part of this, not something that’s excessive or somehow an anomaly or something to scratch your head at. But you know, if you go to Germany, there are these huts that are Uncle Tom’s cabins that you can go and engage, and they still exist, and Germans will still fight for them to exist.

And I think that there’s something powerful there and important to rest on, rather than to sort of just shoo it to the side, and I found that out actually while writing chapter four. I was in Germany in summer 2024, explaining to someone who had brought me over as a Fellow that I was writing this, and he’s like, “Oh, yeah, there are lots of Uncle Tom’s cabins.

In fact, one of the train stations in Berlin is called that.” I was like, ‘What?’

(chuckling)

It just exploded my world, right? So like, there’s an unendingness to the way that people derive pleasure from slavery. And that’s what I wanted the book to be able to, in some way capture.

And so, rather than trying to announce this particular truth the book wants to deepen the contours of the story, and to not sort of inaugurate some primary way of doing it, but to call attention to the contradictions and to the things that are still unsettled. And then I look forward to how the book may produce work that moves forward and continues to even push my own frames of thought. So I’ll end there.

Thank you.

(audience applauding)

[COURTNEY DESIREE MORRIS]

Thank you all for being here this afternoon. Thank you, Salar and Henry for your wonderful comments. Thank you so much, Patrice, for this incredible work. And thank you all for joining us. Have a great day.

(audience applauding)

(soft upbeat music)

CRELS

Legitimation by (Mis)identification: Credit, Discrimination, and The Racial Epistemology of Algorithmic Expansion

Part of the Computational Research for Equity in the Legal System Training Program (CRELS)

Recorded on September 22, 2025, this video features a talk by Davon Norris, Assistant Professor of Organizational Studies and Sociology (by courtesy) and Faculty Associate at the Stone Center for Inequality Dynamics at the University of Michigan.

Professor Norris’s research is broadly oriented to understanding how our ways of determining what is valuable informs patterns of inequality with an acute focus on racism and racial inequality. Often, this means he studies the history, construction, and operation of various ratings, scores, and rankings whether that be at the government level (i.e., government credit ratings) or individual level (i.e., consumer credit scores). Other work that comes out of this interest in valuation processes further probes questions related to finance and the role of credit and debt in shaping inequality.

His research has been published in outlets such as Social Forces, Socio-Economic Review, Social Problems, and Sociological Forum, and has received awards from the Future of Privacy Forum and American Sociological Association. His work has been funded by the American Sociological Association. Davon received his Bachelor of Science in Accounting (2014), Master of Arts in Sociology (2018) and Ph.D. (2022) in Sociology all from The Ohio State University.

This talk was presented as part of a symposium series presented by the UC Berkeley Computational Research for Equity in the Legal System Training Program (CRELS), which trains doctoral students representing a variety of degree programs and expertise areas in the social sciences, computer science and statistics.

The event was co-sponsored by Social Science Matrix, the Berkeley Economy and Society Initiative (BESI) Tech Cluster, the Berkeley Institute for Data Science (BIDS), and the UC Berkeley Department of Sociology.

Watch the panel above or on YouTube. Or listen to the audio recording via the Matrix Podcast below (or on Apple Podcasts).

Podcast and Transcript

(upbeat instrumental music)

[DANYA LAGOS]

Hello, everyone. Thank you all so much for coming to today’s talk in the series of the fall colloquium for the sociology department, in collaboration with the Social Science Matrix, the Berkeley Institute for Data Science, and the Computational Research for Equity in the Legal System Training Program.

So a big thank you to all of our co-sponsors. It is my distinct pleasure to introduce Professor Davon Norris.

Professor Norris is a three-time Buckeye, having received a BA in Accounting, an MA and a PhD in Sociology, all from the Ohio State University. In what must be a very fun and interesting dynamic as a Buckeye in Ann Arbor, Professor Norris is an assistant professor of Organizational Studies and Sociology at the University of Michigan.

Professor Norris is an economic sociologist who examines the tools that determine what is valuable, worthwhile, or good, and how they are implicated in patterns of inequality, particularly racial inequality. And his research has been published in a number of our discipline’s leading venues, including the Nature of Human Behavior, Social Forces, Socio-Economic Review, Social Problems, and Sociological Forum. And we’re gonna play by sociology rules today for our interdisciplinary audience work.

I’ll take stack, so feel free to all sit towards the front And I’ll face the audience when it’s question time And I’ll take notes to call on you all. Let’s give a warm Berkeley welcome to Professor Norris.

(applause)

[DAVON NORRIS]

Yeah, thank you. Good afternoon, everyone. Thank you all for being here, and thank you, Danya for that introduction.

I wanna give a shout-out to Marion, CRELS, BIDS, and all of the other letters and acronyms that are a part of the reason why I’m here today. And I also wanna give a shout-out to Alina for handling all the logistics and making sure that I actually got here today despite an earthquake.

(audience laughing)

So as mentioned, I’m Davon Norris, and before I actually get into my talk, I have this personal tradition, you might even call it a ritual that I do before talks. So I love sneakers, and because I love sneakers, I always seek out a reason to buy a new pair.

So something I started doing with talks like this is buying a pair of shoes that I think encapsulates something about the school, the place, or just what comes to mind when I think about where I’m giving a talk. So when I sat down last month to think about the right pair of shoes for today’s talk, the thing that I, that my mind always jumps to when I think about the Bay Area is obviously the Black Panther Party, not just because of their politics and style, but also because I lived in Chicago for a period of my life, and when I lived there, I began learning about people like Fred Hampton and just learning more about the history of that organization. So I wanted a shoe for today that reflected the Bay Area via the Black Panther Party and paid a little homage to my time that I spent in Chicago.

And for that purpose, the choice was obvious. I went with the Triple Black Jordan 3s. The Jordan sneaker obviously pulls in Michael Jordan and those, for those hip in the sneaker lingo, you would know that this Triple Black colorway on a pair of Jordans is referred to the Black Cat colorway. So I’m wearing these Black Cat Jordan 3s today, and I’ve been putting all of my experiences and conversations I’ve had with folks into these shoes.

That way if things go really well, I can pull these out and be reminded of all the wonderful conversations that I had. Or if things go poorly, I can just throw these in the back of my closet so that I never have to think about this moment again. And for the graduate students in the room, that’s how you compartmentalize in these academic streets. So what is it that I actually wanna talk about today?

So I’m gonna be talking about this paper that is clunkily titled, Legitimation by Misidentification: Credit, Discrimination, and the Racial Epistemology of Algorithmic Expansion. Now, beyond being a mouthful, this piece is me trying to do my best to make sense of a recent dynamic in consumer credit markets that I don’t think existing accounts have a good or satisfying explanation for. And this dynamic is best exemplified by a 2019 congressional hearing.

This hearing was about evaluating whether increasing the types of data that are used in consumer credit scores could expand access to credit. Now, these new types of data, or so-called alternative data go beyond typical things like amount of debt borrowed, types of loans, and history of repayment to incorporate newer data sources like rental and utility payment history checking account information, and perhaps more concerningly, things like shopping habits, college major and one’s occupation. Now, that we are seeing new kinds of credit scores or new firms that are leveraging newer types of data in their underwriting, right?

Like, that is happening is probably not that surprising, right? That’s kind of what we would expect in this AI, big data, yada yada moment. But I think this is surprising for at least two reasons. So first, it represents a noted shift within Congress.

So from 1968 to 1989, Congress organized hearings, public discussions, and introduced dozens of bills that sought to limit the information used to determine credit access and by extension, used in credit scores. And at the time, Congress scoffed at notions offered by credit scorers of the period like William Fair, co-founder of Fair, Isaac & Company, FICO, when William Fair suggested that all legally available information must be used.

They scoffed at this idea. But today, companies parrot effectively the same claim, where they note that all data is credit data. And instead of experiencing pushback as they did in the 1970s, they’re starting to find openness. Across the aisle, Democrats and Republicans express a growing comfort with expanding the data used in consumer credit scores.

And beyond policymakers, state and local governments stay in tanks, and even some consumer advocacy organizations are increasingly leaning into this idea that we want to expand the data used to create consumer credit scores. Second, I think this is surprising for a second reason, and in fact the most puzzling aspect of this, is that this push for alternative data in credit scoring unfolds largely unaffected by concerns about reinforcing racial inequities. We have a vast literature over at least the last 10 years that has accumulated information that the use of data in scoring functions as a growing problem of racial exclusion.

And in contemporary policy discussions, many critics raise these points. However, those critiques have failed to stymie the march towards more data. Now, that wouldn’t be all that surprising if it weren’t for the fact that proponents of expanding data articulate the expansion in the language of inclusion and racial inclusion.

Right? So the deepening of credit scoring via expanded data that goes into them is not only combating critiques of exclusion or simply ignoring those critiques, but this expansion is able to be positively framed in the language of inclusion and it is resonating as such. So this paper is me trying to make sense of this.

What explains why legislators are comfortable with expanding the data in consumer credit scores today, but were not in the mid-20th century? And how is it possible that alternative data resonates as racially inclusionary in the face of claims and widespread critiques to the contrary? So at the heart of this, this is an instance where we see an effort at deepening and expanding the reach of algorithmic credit scores. So as I’ve been trying to understand the answer to these questions I’ve been going back to and revisiting the prior, what prior research has to say about the mechanisms that drive or enable the expansion of algorithms and data collection across various domains.

And this isn’t the most super cohesive body of work but there are, generally speaking, two broad flavors of explanation. The first of which locates the drivers of algorithmic expansion in internal organizational dynamics. This manifests in more bureaucratic or extractive variations, but the idea is that organizations leverage algorithms and data in their pursuit of efficiency.

Instead of relying on subjective or potentially error-prone human decisions, data-driven assessments aid in standardizing and rationalizing the decisions that companies make. So in the context of credit, this enables lenders to identify who to lend to with greater speed and accuracy.

Hopefully accuracy. And of course this bureaucratic, this push is supported by technological advances that make it possible for organizations to collect and extract or analyze new types of information. In a complementary organizational account, besides this, the bureaucratic focus is what I’m labeling here as sort of extractive, which roots algorithmic expansion in this sort of contemporary data imperative which makes accumulating information paramount to firm survival in this sort of era of capitalism.

This suggests that the expansion of data is less about alleviating bureaucratic problems per se and more about extracting larger profits. And this serves as a material profit-driven impulse to be particularly cunning in collecting, obfuscating, and exploiting information from people. All right, so organizational insights primarily emphasize these internal material interests that organizations have in pushing towards the expansion of data.

External, or what I’m labeling here crudely as political accounts, I don’t really have another good word for this, these external accounts take the position that organizations are at times coerced by, or find opportunities created by legislative efforts. In this regard, one particularly important historical thread illustrates how a mechanism sparking the expanded use of algorithms and data was the shifting political landscape of the 1960s and 1970s. In this period, social movement organizations advocated for the passage of anti-discrimination laws, and these laws had the effect of problematizing more subjective approaches to figuring out who to hire or who to lend to, thereby unwittingly providing an external impetus, pushing organizations towards relying more heavily on data and scoring as a kind of more procedurally rigorous or hopefully more accountable alternative.

A second thread of political explanations, which shares an affinity to the extractive variations of organizational accounts, centers the relatively permissive regulatory regime in the United States around collecting data and using it to develop scores. So in this case, organizational ambitions to gather more data and extend scoring are only realizable because there is a legal context that creates few barriers which enables rather than constraints these organizational ambitions.

And we were talking earlier about GDPR in Europe, can’t do much of what I’m gonna talk about today in Europe, but can in the US. So these are kind of the existing arguments that I’ve been able to at least find that get at the drivers of algorithmic expansion. And while certainly these things play a role, these accounts don’t really seem to fit the contours of the contemporary expansion in credit markets.

It appears that what is aiding the expansion of algorithms in this credit context, right today, is an ability to legitimately identify scoring and more data collection as inclusionary, in general and racially inclusionary in particular. And prior explanations can’t really make sense of this.

In part because prior explanations offer contrasting intuitions about the consequences for scoring and expanded data collection on racial exclusion. Bureaucratic explanations suggest that, in part, by standardizing decisions, data reduces pressures for biases that shape decisions, thereby potentially reducing racial inequality. Extractive variations contend that algorithms are inherently racialized and reinforce and increase inequality and thwart attempts at accountability. And political explanations exhibit a sort of similar kind of ambiguity.

On one hand, they demonstrate that the expansion of scoring was a response to mid-20th century concerns about discrimination, so we might think this has a myriad of impacts on racial inequality. But on the other hand, the lack of robust regulatory and legal barriers creates a context for extractive actors to operate. Now, this ambiguity and contested interpretation matters because it is present in policy discussions.

Some argues that algorithms and more scoring and more data increase or reinforce racial exclusion, while others contend the exact opposite. And rather than producing some like regulatory gridlock, there seems to be a growing consensual orientation towards expansion, which is increasingly, as I mentioned, justified in these inclusionary terms. So not only do prior explanations yield contrasting intuition, but they’re also poorly suited to understanding why a particular interpretation of the racial consequences of scoring has gained traction over others.

So it seems to me, that in order to understand the contemporary expansion of data and credit markets, that we need to understand how scoring has gained traction as a legitimate tool to promote racial inclusion in the face of claims to the contrary. And to make sense of this, I argue we must attend to more epistemic questions that weave through the gaps in prior explanations. What does that even mean?

In this regard, I think Eric Schoon’s recent work on legitimacy is useful. Schoon conceptualizes legitimacy as a relational phenomenon that emerges from how a given object conforms to expectations of an audience to garner support. Schoon’s model emphasizes the relations and processes that generate legitimacy avoiding an essentialist ontology of legitimacy being something an object is or has.

Now, why am I saying this? Well, for the question at hand, I think this is super important and indeed even profound. To be a legitimate tool of racial inclusion, as scoring increasingly resonates, scoring and data must necessarily conform to expectations of being not exclusionary. But crucially, scoring need not actually be non-exclusionary, only interpreted and understood as such.

In other words, the question of whether expanding data and credit scores actually produces genuine inclusion is potentially less important than how institutions come to know the answer. Right?

In the present case, we have a situation where one particular perspective is coming to dominate in the face of opposition, and we need to understand why or how one answer is beating out the competition. And I think Somers and Block offer one influential way of resolving this tension.

They demonstrate that some ideas have an epistemic privilege, meaning they circulate with a sort of built-in plausibility and credibility that make them more compelling than alternatives. In their analysis, they highlight how the so-called perversity thesis, which is this idea that government social supports hurts people in poverty as opposed to helps them, that this idea has its own, in their language, epistemological bootstraps, its own built-in plausibility and credibility that enables it to resonate, and as they argue, gives it power in shaping discourse over hundreds of years. And this use, this insight is useful for me in helping explain why some ideas dominate. Some ideas are just better than others and make more sense than others, regardless of necessarily their sort of underlying truth.

But the focus on an idea that has its own bootstraps means that their analysis leaves to the side the mechanisms through which less intuitive or more contested ideas gain traction. So my sort of general argument is that I argue that ideas without this built-in plausibility require some scaffolding that confers epistemic privilege by guiding interpretations and understanding in certain directions as opposed to others. An example of this is Dan Hirschman’s recent work where he highlights the importance of, ‘Knowledge infrastructures,’ that facilitate the tracking of empirical phenomena. Such infrastructures like the decennial census, or in his case, over a whole host of surveys that left the growth of the top 1% of incomes invisible, guide attention towards tracking and understanding problems in certain ways, but leave invisible significantly other kinds of problems.

Relatedly Beth Popp Berman argues that besides infrastructures to aid empirical identification, there exists more diffuse modes of thinking that provide a conceptual toolkit for how to frame problems ex ante and evaluate and interpret empirical evidence ex post. What does all this mean?

So if we pair these insights, I think we get a sense of there being this sort of underlying epistemological infrastructure composed on one hand of tools of conceptualization, and on the other hand, methods of empirical identification that are important in structuring the cognition of problems and shaping the evaluation of solutions. And with this epistemic focus, we begin to see that missing from prior explanations of algorithmic expansion is attention to the conceptualizations and tool, empirical tools that undergird or support policy debates, thereby making possible the identification of scoring as legitimately racially inclusionary. So the rest of my talk then is gonna be focused on offering a sort of formation story here of how, one, a particular conceptual model of exclusion, namely discrimination, emerged in consumer credit markets. Two, how this model was institutionalized via regulators’ efforts to empirically identify discrimination.

Three, how that pairing of conceptualizations and empirical identification work together to produce an understanding of credit scoring as race neutral, and thereby not, and therefore not racially exclusionary. And finally, how all of that came together to have the consequence of underwriting contemporary efforts at expanding data and credit scores under this sort of banner of racial inclusion. So this is gonna be where we’re headed here.

And given this focus, my empirical approach is not gonna be geared towards deconstructing what could have been over the history of consumer credit scoring, but towards delineating the properties of the path that emerged, and explaining how this path has enabled the contemporary orientation towards expansion. And to do this, I constructed a corpus of documents composed of congressional hearings, regulatory documents, court cases, and assorted reports, and news articles from 1968 to 2019.

And I focus on this period considering 2000 or 1968 was the first year in which Congress passed the first big consumer credit legislation. And 2019 aligns with the creation of a Consumer Financial Protection Bureau policy that was designed to nurture innovations like alternative data and consumer credit scoring. Though, as you’ll see, my analysis here sort of bleeds into a few years before 1968 and a few years after 2019 because of really important context. The process of gathering this data involved focusing on identifying key congressional hearings as the sort of main source of information via targeted queries in the ProQuest Congressional Database, which includes, a comprehensive collection of legislative histories, hearing transcripts, and other documents related to public congressional interactions.

I queried this database for keywords that emphasized credit scores, discrimination, and any reference to consumer credit legislation. From these searches, I produced basically a list of 14 hearings from 1968 to 2019 that were the most relevant for my questions.

By most relevant for my questions, I mean lots of conversations around credit scores has happened in conversations about social media, and a lot of those social media hearings were not necessarily super related to the questions that I’m concerned about. I then validated and supplemented these 14 hearings with information from the prior historiography of consumer credit and credit scores, and then added news articles, court cases, and other documents that sort of provide, again, more context and background to what I was observing. The analysis of over this, these 4,000 pages of documents was composed of four steps, close readings and coatings in NVivo, which were sort of there to sort of help me get organized and track discussions.

Notes on the hearings helping me identify important moments. A third step, which was notes on my notes which involved my own commentary and just trying to sort of narrow down the focus of what’s really important for across these hearings, and then finally, a set of analytic bullets and memos, which were these kind of meta documents that produced from the initial three steps and were then enhanced with relevant insights from secondary sources where appropriate. And with this analytic approach, I proceeded basically chronologically through my corpus of documents moving between notes, memos, and prior literature, and moving through the data in this way proved useful as what emerged were three key dynamics.

The first details the emergence of a particular conceptualization of discrimination in credit markets. The second demonstrates how that conceptualization was institutionalized via particular empirical methods used by regulators and courts to identify discrimination, and the final section illustrates how this underlying infrastructure had the consequence of enabling a wide cadre of actors to legitimately identify credit scores as non-exclusionary, thereby underwriting the expansion of data collection in credit markets. And I refer to these sections using the shorthand of emergence institutionalization, and consequence, and because these dynamics are broadly delineated in time, I used these dynamics to sort of structure the results, so I’m gonna be marching us through this timeline shown here. Now, after all of that wind up let’s get into this.

So this period of emergence highlights the importance of establishing a particular conceptual definition of discrimination as there was no legislative model of discrimination in the 1960s. Indeed, there was not even a sense that racial discrimination existed in consumer credit markets. When Congress passed the Consumer Credit Protection Act in 1968, they created the National Commission on Consumer Finance, the NCCF, to study issues in consumer credit markets for more or less the first time at the congressional level. The NCCF issued their report in 1972, and on the question of racial discrimination, they concluded that they did not find sufficient evidence to prove the hypothesis that there is racial discrimination in the granting of consumer credit.

Right now, this conclusion is somewhat odd when we think about 1970s US. Indeed, it flew in the face of the Kerner Commission Report, which five years prior to the release of the NCCF report, had noted that discriminatory credit practices were among the key reasons animating the racial unrest in the 1960s. All right, so we have this sort of weird dynamic here, but ultimately because of this sense that there was not racial discrimination in credit markets, the model of discrimination that emerged and the consequences of what happened was not so much about race, but around issues of gender and the actions of gender activists in the 1970s.

So groups like the National Organization of Women, the Center for Women’s Policy Studies, amongst many others, brought forth such compelling evidence of gender of gender discrimination that from 1972 to 1974, over three dozen bills were introduced discrimination on the basis of gender and marital status. Only one bill over this period even referenced race.

This evidence was made particularly clear during hearings in June of 1974, where during these hearings, women’s organizations revealed how pervasive the overt consideration of gender and marital status was in credit markets. An example of which is shown here, which comes from a 1960s credit application that I actually gifted to my dissertation advisor on my graduation. This application asks for a lot of information.

But in the yellow box, if married, all information must apply to the husband. All right, so clear examples like this, very powerful and compelling for legislators in 1974. In the face of overwhelming testimony, the issue was not if equal credit would be passed, but whether the law could be written without destroying a creditor’s right to make business judgments on the basis of an individual applicant’s creditworthiness.

And here is where efforts by women’s organizations faced significant friction. As Greta Krippner notes, “When the position of any individual woman was considered, individual creditworthiness seemed a reasonable standard.

But when the structural features of markets that produced group disadvantage were taken into account, individual merit stood against the murky shadows of history.” And in congressional debates, feminist organizations chose to sidestep that larger issue of structural inequality to focus on a reduced form of discrimination.

In an article submitted for the Congressional Record, co-director here of the Center for Women and Policy Studies Margaret Gates indicated that “Women as a class are economically disadvantaged. And this unfortunate fact explains why women, why fewer women than men obtain loans and credit. But it does not justify the denial of credit to a woman who is, by all objective criteria, as qualified as a man.” During these 1974 hearings, activists took on a logic that all else equal, women should not be denied because they are women.

This view focused on rooting out overt considerations of gender or marital status in decisions. Limiting the definition of discrimination in this way foreclosed upon an understanding of how structural forces constituted women’s position in society as disadvantaged. Indeed, concern for these structural manifestations of inequality was all but absent during these 1974 hearings. Indeed, there were many of these groups organized against such a reckoning.

So when the ink dried on the Equal Credit Opportunity Act in October of 1974, Equal Credit Opportunity Act, you will hear me refer to that as ECOA, Congress banned the use of gender and marital status as over considerations in credit decisions. Race and other protected categories would eventually be added to ECOA in 1976, but this original 1974 legislation christened a particular model that identified discrimination as simply the use of the categories of gender or race.

And this would have very important consequences. Legislation and subsequent regulatory guidance produced by the Federal Reserve in its Regulation B, which is the regulation governing credit scoring practices, would say nothing about how group-based differences were expressed through non-group characteristics, basically what is shown in the bottom.

This would effectively give lenders carte blanche to include anything they wanted in their credit scoring and underwriting except for the explicitly banned criterias. Indeed, that is explicitly written in Regulation B. However, shortly after the passage of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act to include race in 1976, Congress began wanting to go further, began wanting to exclude the use of information, began to, wanting to exclude the use of more pieces of information from credit decisions. But they would run into challenges as this, the model of discrimination passed in 1970, ’74 created important barriers. Specifically, and this sort of key moment here, is that Congress would grapple directly with the question of whether the correlated nature of a whole host of characteristics and race would be deemed illegal or not when they met in 1979 to discuss this Senate Bill 15, which sought to eliminate the use of ZIP codes in consumer credit scores.

So by 1979, the use of credit, use of ZIP codes in credit decisions and credit scores had become very common. Everybody was doing it. But this raised the specter of racial redlining, and indeed the title of the hearing, Credit Card Redlining, sort of made that intentionality explicit here. So the Senate heard lots of testimony like that shown here of Columbia Business School professor Noel Capon that argued, “The use of ZIP codes effectively discriminates on the basis of race.”

However, the further efforts to limit the information in credit decisions got from the actual categories of race or gender, the more challenging it became to see those features as linked to inequalities according to the ECOA model of discrimination. Member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, Nancy Teeters, drove this point home to the Senate.

She indicated that, quote, “It may be the case that ZIP codes should be prohibited. Congress should take note of the fact, though, that other characteristics can be called into question.” Teeter contended that if you eliminate ZIP codes because of its potential to racially discriminate, then you must consider homeownership or, quote, “Almost anything related to financial status.” The implications of this proved too much.

Senator Paul Tsongas expressed unease and discomfort with continuing to allow the use of ZIP codes in credits decisions, but noted, quote, “I don’t think this is anything we should legislate.” So Senate Bill 15 failed to move out of committee. From 1979 to 1989, nearly a dozen bills in the House and Senate that sought to eliminate the use of geography, occupation, work title, and course of study because of their potential to racially discriminate met a similar fate. And the failures of these bills is important because it settled a way of conceptualizing discrimination that emerged with the passage of the original Equal Credit Opportunity Act.

This model functioned according to a narrow overt usage model bracketing any inequities that manifested through other, through variables other than those protected categories themselves. So, with congressional desire to legislate what goes into credit scores effectively evaporating in the wake of the failure of Senate Bill 15, any future constraints on credit scoring would have to proceed through the courts and via the efforts of regulators that were tasked with moving from this conceptualization stage to the stage of empirically identifying discrimination. And over this period, we would see regulators and courts do so in particular ways, which is nicely reflected in the case of Cherry versus Amoco Oil. So in 1978 Mrs. Claire Cherry, a white woman living in a predominantly Black area of Atlanta, applied and was declined for a credit card with Amoco Oil.

Amoco sent Mrs. Cherry this letter here that stated they are declining her because of their experience in her geographical area. Claire Cherry then was like, “All right, well, that’s kind of racist.”

(audience laughing)

She sued them based on the notion that using geography had a racially disparate impact or had the effect of discriminating on the basis of race. And while Congress chose to not legislate this as specifically illegal in 1979, the courts had some authority here. Her lawyer enlisted the help of a sociologist, go sociologists at Georgia State University, Robert Snow.

And Robert Snow put together this analysis here. Snow put together an analysis that showed a reliably significant relationship between a significant relationship where approval rates by Amoco Oil decreased significantly as the percent of Black in Atlanta zip codes increased. Although Snow presented this robust evidence, the court agreed with Amoco Oil in 1980 with their decision that said this system does not illegally discriminate on the basis of race.

So this case reveals a very important key challenge of empirically identifying discrimination in scoring systems. Even the most sophisticated analyses showing stark racial disparities may fail to become institutionally legible.

And this challenge created significant frustrations. By the late 1980s there were over a half dozen or so regulators that had some responsibility covering fair lending. And in 1989, each of these regulators presented a slew of statistical evidence on the state of fair lending to Congress.

Across a two-and-a-half-hour meeting or hearing, it’s not really a meeting, two-and-a-half-hour hearing, each regulator introduced evidence of stark racial disparity, with Black loan rejection rates being roughly twice as high as white applicants. Yet no regulator concluded there was any racial discrimination. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, in particular, noted that they had received 37,000 complaints from 1987 to the middle of 1989. And after investigating each one, quote, “No violations were cited.”

Moreover, they did nearly 3,500 compliance examinations across 239 banks, also finding no indication of illegal discrimination. Senator Alan Dixon was in disbelief when he noted, “I think it to be somewhat incredible that the substance of the testimony is mostly that you haven’t found any violations when the evidence is pretty clear. I find it pretty close to remarkable that we never find any violations.” And in the same hearing community organizations also presented information of being disheartened and sort of discomforted by the fact that no one in Congress was, or no one, no regulator was able to articulate any evidence of discrimination.

And this kind of exchange was common through this sort of late 20th century period and conveys a clear dissonance between the enforcement and the realities of people navigating credit markets on the ground. This disconnect emerges because of the tools regulators used to identify racial discrimination. This was put very clearly by the New York Federal Reserve vice president, who explained to Congress at a field hearing in Brooklyn, that regulators focused on, regulators focused on using statistical analyses to identify statistically significant race variables in regression frameworks. If present, then they added controls for loan size, income, credit score.

If race was still significant at that point, then they added even more variables. If it was still significant, they continued to add more variables to try and explain these racialized differences in lending that regulators were observing. In effect, what counts as racial discrimination is identified through the existence of a statistically significant race variable in regression.

As regulators tried to bridge the racial differences in White loan rejection rates, here shown with an example data on the left and Black rejection rates on the right, their approach treated differences in income and credit scores as functionally unrelated to race, and most importantly, unrelated to the enterprise of rooting out racial discrimination in credit markets. As a result, stark disparities became reframed as legitimate outcomes rather than raising regulatory alarms about violations of fair lending law.

This regulatory approach was reinforced in this, in this period, by the way also that anti-discrimination legal doctrine of disparate impact would involve and be interpreted by courts. So, as commonly understood, disparate impact or the effects test is intended to pick up on the ways that discrimination can operate through non-group characteristics, right?

The disparate impact was the grounds and basis along with Mis, along which Mrs. Claire Cherry sued Amoco Oil. And in that case, we saw that disparate impact was not an effective tool. And this is in part by how this legal doctrine has been interpreted. So, disparate impact as a legal concept in the US originates from this case in 1970 when the Suprem, this 1971 Supreme Court case, Griggs versus Duke Power.

And it has evolved to be a three-step burden-shifting framework that has been applied to the enforcement of Equal Credit Legislation. In Step 1, a plaintiff must pres, make a claim, typically using statistical evidence that some racial disparity exists because of a lender’s policy.

Step 2 shifts the burden to the lender to indicate that disparity is linked to a legitimate business necessity. If this is possible, then it shifts back to, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to identify a less discriminatory alternative that will be just effective as the lender’s initial policy. In the context of credit and credit scoring, getting past the second step is functionally impossible, right? Attempts to meet hurdles of this burden-shifting framework were dead on arrival.

As countless industry representatives have explained to Congress, credit scores are created by evaluating which variables are associated with loan repayment. Only those variables that are demonstrably tied to debt repayment are included in the creation of credit scores and credit decisions. This provides a baseline business necessity defense for any claim of disparate impact. Indeed, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency issued a very clear bulletin in 1997.

They noted that the OCC, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, will conclude a variable is justified by business necessity and does not warrant further scrutiny if the variable is statistically related to loan performance and has an understandable relationship to an individual applicant’s creditworthiness. As a result of this, all litigation challenging credit scoring on disparate impact grounds have failed. In 2004, in a 2004 case, courts summarily rejected claims that the use of credit histories and credit scores create a disparate impact on Black consumers. The court notes that ECOA regulations explicitly permit lenders to use, quote, “race-blind factors” such as credit histories and income when determining whether to extend credit.

So here, we see the melding of this particular model of discrimination in the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, the tools regulators use to identify creditworthiness or to identify racial exclusion, and the legal arguments found to be compelling in courtrooms effectively work to dispatch critiques of racial exclusion. Even ZIP codes, which are the go-to example any researcher uses to argue and demonstrate racially disparate impact has failed to be seen as discriminatory in the history of consumer credit scoring and is still today not technically illegal, right? It is precisely because of the infrastructure of Equal Credit Legislation and its enforcement that legitimates an identification of scoring, in this case, as not racially exclusionary according to this sort of model of discrimination.

This ultimately establishes the bounds of debate and the epistemological terrain upon which discussions of credit scoring and the expansion of data used in credit scores would basically operate on in the 21st century. So as we turn to the 21st century, there has been this wave of new technology companies seeking to expand the types of data used in consumer credit scores. And unlike prior period, when Congress begins to discuss the growing use of alternative data, efforts to reduce data fed into these algorithms is basically all but absent. Because of the epistemological bounds set by the original Equal Credit Opportunity Act and its enforcement, a growing group of actors began to see credit scoring as inclusionary by its very nature.

The issue that began to take over congressional and regulatory discussions was not the inequality of credit scoring itself, but the racially uneven problem of not having a credit score, that is, of being unscored. After George Bush signs the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act in 2003, Congress learned that many Americans, many consumers may not have sufficient information in their credit report to create a credit score. Estimates in 2005 put this number around 35 million people. Besides being a large population, credit invisibility or in this problem of, quote unquote, “unscored populations” disproportionately affects some groups more than others.

For example, Black, Hispanic, and populations living in lower-income neighborhoods are all much more likely to not have a credit score. So when folks from the credit scoring industry sort of discussed this problem of the unscored, they noted that, well, if we just expand the data that goes into scores, it would effectively deal with these prob– this problem of the so-called unscored. And this led many legislators to begin seeing that expanded data would allow millions to climb out of the shadows to build a credit history, which would also then be a boon for racial inequity. And this move towards more data reflected, again, the sort of growing comfort that credit scoring itself did not reinforce problematic inequality.

Pursuant to the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act, the Federal Reserve 2007 completed and delivered this report to Congress. And Sandra Braunstein of the Fed summarized the key finding’s in front of the House and brought home that there is no disparate impact or discriminatory impact of credit scores across racial groups.

A Fed report in 2012 would basically make the same point. Even when members of Congress push back on credit scores by noting, “Yeah, but they’re distributed unequally across racial groups,” credit scoring executives are able to effectively and easily dispatch those claims.

Stuart Pratt, the president and CEO of a consumer data trade association noted, “A credit score is blind. It does not know my race.

All it does is look at empirical data. Scores, because they are blind to these triggers, these ECOA triggers, they have removed the risks of those triggers.”

So not only are industry representatives able to push back, but they’re able to do so within the guardrails in language explicitly established by the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. Or as Lisa Nelson, Vice President of Operations at FICO put it, “We sit perfectly inside the regulatory framework that exists today.” So Congress, members of Congress are getting increasingly on board with this. While that’s happening, consumer advocacy groups representing those on the fringes mobilize to bring forth some concerns.

At every step of discussions around alternative data, the National Consumer Law Center, especially with the efforts of Chi Chi Wu, expressed reticence about the use of new data. While they generally found some potential value in giving and providing some consumer choice about including certain kinds of data, they expressed particular concern around growing efforts to include information about educational background and occupation beginning, because, again, of their potential to produce a racially disparate impact. And the House met in 2019, this is the hearing that I sort of began earlier with, to discuss some of these more disconcerting kinds of alternative data. At the center of the hearing was Upstart, a financial technology firm that leveraged new kinds of information.

And during the hearing, many expressed concern about Upstart’s credit scoring tool because it incorporated data about individuals’ employment history and educational background, the exact same characteristics members of Congress sought to ban in the 1980s. CEO of Upstart, Dave Girouard began his testimony.

He said, “In the early days of Upstart, we conducted a retroactive study with a large credit bureau, and we uncovered a jarring pair of statistics.” “Just 45% of Americans have access to bank-quality credit, yet 83% of Americans have never actually defaulted on a loan.

This is not what we would call fair lending.” He continued and said, “We decided to use modern technology and data science to find more ways to prove that consumers are indeed creditworthy.” And this language is very convincing to many members of the House, but others that were present to give testimony raised significant concerns.

They said these new types of data may actually just be proxies for protected traits and result in decisions that have a disparate impact. Relatedly Chi Chi Wu from the National Consumer Law Center noted, “We know there are tremendous racial disparities with respect to traditional credit scores, and alternative financial data is also likely to have these same racial disparities.”

Shortly after this congressional hearing, shortly after Upstart discusses its credit scoring system in front of Congress, the Student Borrower Protection Center issued a report titled ‘Educational Redlining,’ demonstrating how Upstart’s use of educational data could exacerbate racial inequality. And this report sparked then the formation of an agreement between Upstart, the Student Borrower Protection Center, and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund to employ an independent third party to evaluate Upstart’s lending model for racially unequal outcomes. Like regulators attempting to empirically identify racial discrimination, the report focused on identifying statistically significant race variables in a regression framework. And when the independent third party released their report in 2021, they, like the National Commission on Consumer Finance in 1972, and regulators all throughout the late 20th century, found no evidence of any fair lending violations.

Insofar as there were meaningful disparities between Black applicants and non-Hispanic White applicants. These disparities were, quote, “Measured on an unadjusted basis without attempting to control for legitimate creditworthiness criteria and therefore does not, standing alone, demonstrate a fair lending violation.”

So with the combination of conceptual tools embedded in the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and the evolution of enforcement through statistical analyses, efforts to contest scoring as racially unjust by the organizations like the NAACP and the National Consumer Law Center smash into this epistemological wall. This clears the way for algorithmic expansion as those with an intuition that credit scores are racialized in objectionable ways are unable to make those critiques legible to political and legal institutions. Without an inability to cognize deeper inequality in credit scores, the orientation towards financial inclusion has effectively become clear. As lawyer and former director for credit practices at the Federal Trade Commission, Anne Fortney, put it to the House, “The obvious solution is to increase the amount of information available to credit score developers.”

So to summarize the argument here, contemporary efforts to expand data and credit scores were seeded with the passage of the 1974 Equal Credit Opportunity Act. ECOA melded a particular conceptualization of discrimination with regulatory enforcement that relied heavily on statistically significant race variables in regression.

Such approaches work to limit the scope of exclusion legible to regulators. Despite stark disparities across racial groups in credit outcomes, the infrastructure permeating regulation and law fostered an understanding of those disparities as not related to race. Consequently, notions of exclusion and inclusion at the turn of the 21st century were anchored within this epistemological infrastructure.

Critics deploying more expansive frameworks failed to generate resonant critiques. Creators of credit scores could easily just fall back on the style of reasoning embedded in Equal Credit legislation and enforcement to convincingly demonstrate an absence of any discrimination traceable to race.

This evidence of absence then legitimated credit scoring as not wrongfully exclusionary according to the law. The only racial exclusion that was then legible to policymakers became the existence of millions of Black and racially marginalized consumers without a credit score. As a result, expanding the data in credit scores became a straightforward, even morally necessary solution, that given the racial epistemology and anti-discrimination enforcement could be legitimately identified as racially inclusionary.

So what? So I think this account is useful as it helps reconcile gaps in prior explanations. While prior research tends to emphasize algorithmic expansion in organizational, technical, or even political terms, I demonstrate how these accounts underappreciate algorithms and their expansion as problems of knowledge, where specific epistemological infrastructures shape both the cognition of problems and define the landscape of solutions.

And I think this is useful in explaining the contemporary expansion in credit markets, as it highlights how a reason why legislators saw expanding data as data in credit scores today as a solution to racial exclusion, unlike legislators in the mid-20th century, is because legislators today literally do not have the tools available to them in legislation and regulation that equip them to see this as a problem. And a key contribution, and I think theoretical payoff to this insight is in beginning to flip the debate at the nexus of economic sociology and the sociology of race on its head a little bit.

So much of this literature is oriented around evaluating whether the use of some algorithm or piece of data in some context increases or decreases racial inequality. And I think what I’ve helped to clarify in this analysis is that maybe the question we should be asking, indeed the more challenging and politically consequential problem question, I think, may have to do with trying to figure out which ways of coming to know the answer to those questions are deemed legitimate. And I could continue going on and on about the relevant contributions to the historiography of consumer credit, what this means for how social scientists should study race and racism, or how we should think about the possibility of ameliorating racial inequality in this sort of big data moment.

But I really want to get into the conversation with you, right? So this is the first time that I’ve actually presented this work. And I have no idea what questions people have.

And I’m eager to hear which parts of this you think are dope. And I’m also most eager to hear which parts of this you think suck or need clarification. So with that, I will conclude. Thank you.

(audience applauding)

(upbeat instrumental music)

 

New Directions

New Directions: Borderlands

Part of the New Directions Event Series

Borders reflect the many social, historical, and political forces that shape global movement and identity. While borders often suggest fixed lines of division, the experiences within and around them increasingly influence national and global understandings of belonging, sovereignty, and human rights.

Recorded on October 1, 2025, this panel together a group of UC Berkeley graduate students from the fields of history, sociology, and ethnic studies for a discussion on borders and their impact, particularly through the lens of migration, mobility, and resistance across the U.S.-Mexico border.

The panel featured Carlotta Wright de la Cal, PhD Candidate in History; Adriana Ramirez, PhD Candidate in Sociology; and Irene Franco Rubio, PhD Candidate in Ethnic Studies. Hidetaka Hirota, Professor of History, moderated.

The Social Science Matrix New Directions event series features research presentations by graduate students from different social science disciplines. This panel was co-sponsored by the UC Berkeley Department of Sociology, Department of Ethnic Studies, and Department of History.

Watch the panel above or on YouTube. Or listen to the audio recording via the Matrix Podcast below (or on Apple Podcasts).

Podcast and Transcript

(upbeat instrumental music)

[MARION FOURCADE]

So we have, as you probably know, at Matrix we have several series. By the way, I’m Marion Fourcade. I’m the director here. I forgot to say that. But we have several series, you know. We have Authors Meet Critics, we have the Matrix On Point, and we have the New Directions.

And New Directions is really one of my favorite series to schedule every semester because it’s a series that features the work of the graduate students in the social science division. And so it’s always particularly energizing when I see many of you here, you know, that suggests that that’s, this is where the future lies, the future of social science research lies. So today’s panel will help us explore how experiences within and around borders shape understandings of belonging, sovereignty and human rights.

And so we have assembled a group of UC Berkeley graduate student to think about this question through the lens of migration, mobility, and resistance across the US-Mexico border. Note that today’s event is co-sponsored by the UC Berkeley Departments of History, Ethnic Studies, and Sociology. And I should add that it was actually designed and put together by my predecessor as Matrix director, Cori Hayden, last spring, and of course, by our director of programs who’s sitting there in the back, Sarah Harrington.

Now, before I turn over to introduce our moderator, let me just say a few things about upcoming events at Matrix. Next week, there will be a first Author Meets Critic event with Patrice Douglass’s book. She’s from the Department of Gender and Women’s Studies.

And then in we have a succession of three Matrix on Point on conspiracy theories, on spaces for thriving, and on insurance and the climate crisis. And then we have two big lectures in December by Maximilian Kasy, who’s an economist from Oxford with a graduate from the Berkeley Econ Department, who will talk about his book, The Means of Prediction. And then finally, our Matrix lecture is journalist Alexis Madrigal.

Okay, let me introduce our moderator. Hidetaka Hirota, he’s a social and legal historian of U.S immigration, specializing in nativism, immigration control, and policy from the antebellum era to the progressive era. His first book, Expelling the Poor, which was published by Oxford in 2017, examines 19th-century deportation policies and received multiple awards.

He is currently working on the another book called The American Dilemma, which explores the tension between nativism and labor demand in shaping U.S immigration policy, as well as projects on Japanese immigrants and the history of anti-immigrant sentiment. His research has appeared in leading history and migration studies journals. And here at Berkeley, he teaches U.S immigration history, and he co-directs the Canadian Studies program.

He was also a Matrix faculty fellow last year while he was working on his next book. So without further ado, I will turn it over to Hide. Thank you.

[HIDETAKA HIROTA]

Thank you. Thank you, Marion.

(applause)

Hi everyone. Welcome to this New Directions panel on borderlands. I’m Hide Hirota in the history department, and I teach, as Marion said, I teach U.S immigration history here at Berkeley.

So borders, borderlands, we hear about these things all the time, right? And we constantly get information about those topics when we hear about this. But then in media, especially, we rarely get actual sense of what happened in the borderlands in the past and what’s going on in the borderlands today, especially from migrants’ perspectives and how multiple, you know, issues were interrelated with each other in different ways.

So what we hear often today, I think, is a really simplified version of this history of borders and borderlands. So today, you know, we are extremely fortunate to have three graduate students working on those subjects, and we’re very fortunate to hear, again, new directions, the cutting edge research on this subject. So each of the three panelists here will speak about their project for 10 minutes, and then after that we’ll, the panelists have some conversations, and toward the end, we will have time for Q&A.

So let me just first introduce our three panelists here from your left edge, I guess, right? It’s my right edge. It’s your left edge.

Carlotta Wright de la Cal is a PhD candidate in history at UC Berkeley. Her research examines how indigenous and migrant Mex borderlands navigated and resisted overlapping systems of legal and corporate control from the 1880s to the 1940s. Drawing on archives in Mexico City, Washington DC, and various state and private collections, the project reveals how state and corporate actors deployed immigration law, federal Indian policy, and labor systems to display mobile racialized populations.

While workers strategically exploited jurisdictional gray zones to advance autonomy and resistance. Our second speaker panelist is in the middle is Adriana P. Ramirez. She’s a PhD candidate in the Department of Sociology here at Berkeley.

Her research interests revolve around migration, citizenship, Latin America, political sociology, and race and ethnicity. The influence of growing up as a migrant student between Mexico and the United States is evident in her work, which explores transnational migration dynamics. Her current work examines how young return migrants adapt to different spheres of Mexican society and formulate their identity and a sense of belonging across context of reception in the cities of Oaxaca and Jalisco.

Her previous work studied how young return migrants navigate their double Mexican-US citizenship to negotiate a sense of belonging and better opportunities in Mexico. The work was recently published in Social Province. And the third panelist here is Irene Franco Rubio.

She’s a PhD student in Ethnic Studies, again at UC Berkeley, and she’s pursuing a designated emphasis in gender, Women and Sexuality Studies and New Media. Her research examines multiracial coalition building, grassroots resistance, and social movement histories in the US Southwest, with a focus on how cross-cultural solidarity emerges in response to racialized state violence. Drawing on critical ethnography or histories and community-engaged methods, her work highlights how communities resist criminalization and reimagine abolitionist futures, offering new frameworks for understanding coalition-based resistance.

She is a Soros Justice Open Society Foundations Fellow, and the host of award-winning #SchoolsNotPrisons podcast, which examines the entanglements of the criminal legal system. Irene also received the Dr. Riz Hui Memorial Graduate Student Scholarship, a Social Science Matrix Award given annually to one graduate student dedicated to addressing urgent real-world issues throughout their scholarship. So, without further ado, we’re gonna start the presentation, first by Carlotta.

(audience applauding)

[CARLOTTA WRIGHT DE LA CAL]

All right. Hi, everyone. Thank you for being here today and thank you so much to the Social Science Matrix for putting this panel together.

Also to Sarah for organizing everything. And yeah, and to my fellow panelists and Hide. So my presentation today is going to offer a bit of a snapshot of, okay, there we go.

A bit of a snapshot of my wider dissertation project, which is a social legal history of railroad expansion across the US-Mexico border from the 1880s through to the 1940s. As you can see, here is a pretty expansive map of the ways the railroads spanned across the Southwest and into Mexico. I examine how railroad corporations, specifically the Southern Pacific and the Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe, which is the railroad this map is of reshaped the social, spatial, and legal landscape of the region.

Centering, in my research, the experiences of especially Indigenous and migrant workers as they encountered, navigated, and contested lots of overlapping regimes of territorial and legal control in the borderlands. I look at the railroad line and the way it bifurcates and crosses over and crisscrosses over the line of the border. In, and I look at the ways it both facilitated, you know, state and corporate control over territories and communities that were deemed unruly and in needing of management but also the ways this infrastructure paradoxically facilitated resistance against this control through their strategic use of mobility legal gray areas exploitation of immigration law, et cetera.

And I expand upon this briefly in a case study that begins one of my dissertation chapters. Yeah, so project overview. And as part of kind of my methodology railroads are usually I studied in US history from kind of the east to west through the model of the transcontinental railroad, and I look at them north to south looking at connective tissues across borders and communities from the US to Mexico and back again.

And I focus on the US-Mexico borderlands, the US Southwest specifically Arizona, New Mexico, and California, and I look at the ways also these territories are shaped by these hybrid overlapping systems of colonialism different inheritances of conquest, so Spanish colonial, the Mexican national period, as you can see in this map, and the journey in the US federal system from territory to state. And evidently now, the US-Mexico border is constructed in popular culture as a site of division a dividing fixed line. But the border at this stage in, at the start of the 20th century, as historians such as Deborah Kang and Kelly Lytle Hernández have explained, was, you know, really not particularly professionalized and it was simultaneously tried to be a space that was open and closed.

Closed in the name of nativism, national security, but open really in many ways to serve the desires of local business, agribusinesses, railroads, mining, and their, you know, their need for Mexican labor, and the people, the communities that routinely spanned across the border. So how I see borderlands then for my project in the interest of defining them is as these kind of, you know, this moment of drastically porous zones that are rooted in spatial mobility, identities that are flexible by national ambiguities of legal and social power. I really like the work kind of more metaphorically of Chicana scholar, Gloria Anzaldúa’s theorization of borderlands as this kind of inherently effective relational intimate dynamics.

So I’m going to give just a brief context as to why railroads are important or interesting for borderlands history and history of migration. I mean, starting from really zooming out, railroads totally reshaped territoriality in American West and Southwest in the second half of the 19th century. So mass expansion through land grants into Indigenous treaty territory and the rise of, you know, checker boarding jurisdictions where you have this system of dividing land in these overlapping kind of, you know, intersecting parcels.

Also especially in Mexico, railroads really transform the land and relationships with mobility and indigeneity. Because there was such massive US investment into Mexico to establish a railroad system overnight from nothing. Through the courting of foreign capital investment by, you know, under the rule of President Porfirio Diaz, who saw railroads as the key to modernizing Mexico, unifying the country, and spurring economic growth through exports.

So, the railroad there in Mexico and the accompanying land laws that encourages construction led to mass dispossession of rural Indigenous communities from communal lands called ejidos. And then this displacement forced people into migrant labor stream, many of whom were then recruited into US, to work for US railroad companies on US lines, especially after the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. Railroad companies used the well-known process of enganchadores or labor recruitment agents where they would send agents to recruit on the southern side of the border, bring them to the north side of the border.

And they would house workers in often in boxcar villages, which were essentially company towns where the workers were lived in boxcars. There, from my research in the trade journals and the management literature, these railroads were really invested in establishing control over migrant workers. Not only in terms of space but also in terms of intimate lives, and space was a normal one.

It’s, I, there are a lot of comments like this one acknowledging that it was extremely rare and frowned upon to call for any kind of local police or sheriff authority. So, control of foreman was pretty much a kind of, they were legal intermediaries. And trade journals also began praising in the 1910s, especially boxcar family housing, insisting that patriarchal single-family domestic arrangements would improve behavior for the, I quote, “Mexican vagrant class,” and they ran Americanization and citizenship schools in the, for the workers’ children in very boxcars that also housed the workers.

So thinking about this context of railroads as these transformative infrastructures in the border and the context of specialized power, insulation from state oversight in many ways I was interested in whether we could find histories of resistance or of worker, you know, like examples of worker agency, especially Indigenous workers, because they’re such an important part of the story of the land here. And I think we can, especially through moments of encounter between workers and the state. And so for example, in May 1906, Mexican border agents arrested two Indigenous Yaqui men, Francisco and Cayetano Matus, on the Arizona-Sonora border.

And they were returning to Tucson for employment on the Southern Pacific railyards. At this time, Yaquis were in armed revolt against the Mexican states

[HIDETAKA HIROTA]

Railroad workers in US–

[CARLOTTA WRIGHT DE LA CAL]

–genocidal violence, and had established extensive refugee communities in Arizona, especially in Tucson, and worked were very integrated into the wage labor economy of the Southwest railroad mine on both sides of the border. So the Matus brothers told inspectors of their long-held strategy of working these jobs to cross onto the northern side to tap into family and kin networks in cities like Tucson, known for thriving arm smuggling networks. Alarmed upon hearing this from the Mexican War Secretary, the Mexican Consulate in Naco, Arizona urged Washington to use immigration checkpoints discreetly and privately identify and prosecute Yaqui rebels as violating international neutrality laws, weaponizing border controls to suppress Indigenous resistance.

Mexican diplomats also entreated US immigration officials to avoid confusing Yaquis with American Indians, who, you know, were at the have as many American Indian tribes in the Southwest have transborder specific rights and mobility and avoid giving them special privileges. This administrative paper trail and this moment of encounter further intertwines migrant labor, border surveillance, and the racialized state management of Indigenous people for me. Um, yeah.

And Francisco and Cayetano Matus, it seems clear and they mention lots of other Yaqui workers strategically using the mobility, money, and kinship networks of railroad infrastructure, railroad labor afforded them in the US to resist back home and put them in contact with communities of people who lived these transborder lives at the margins of state and in spaces of, you know, pretty accepted illegality. A Mexican detective sent by the consulate undercover to Sonora reported that smuggling networks formed a kind of society with links to powerful local figures on both side of the border. And he reported back that wives of ferrocarrileros were as involved in the smuggling trade as their husband.

The wife of a conductor was known to stuff bullets and cartridges down her stockings and personally disperse the merchandise in Sonora whenever her husband drove the train down from Tucson. There’s also recent research that shows that rail work fermented transnational alliances between the IWW, the anarchist-leaning Partido Liberal Mexicano among Mexican workers in the US Southwest, and that these movements were especially successful at recruiting Yaquis and Mayos in the mines and the rail yards that migrated from job to job and circulated these ideas across the border. So I’m running out of time.

But I want to sum up and say that these vignettes offer US insight into how indigenous rebels, indigenous migrants were made legible to the state as migrant workers. And that it seems clear there’s this dynamic here where corporations, especially railroad corporations, simultaneously facilitate mechanisms of control while also generating, in this time of more porous border and borderlands life unexpected opportunities that indigenous and migrant workers used to sustain their communities, resist state violence, and continue to living lives that existed on both sides of the border. Thinking about just quickly, implications of my research for today, it seems to me increasingly important for historians of immigration to understand indigenous history and its importance, and to understand how the frontier and the border overlap historically as regimes of racialization and labor control.

At the US border today increasing numbers of migrants speak indigenous languages as their first language and are fleeing land dispossession, identity-based violence in, from Central America, and often use La Bestia, which are dangerous freight networks that are used to travel north to the United States. Many migrants risk their lives by riding these dangerous trains as you can see here that carry goods like corn, cement especially to bypass immigration checkpoints and detention centers. Overall, by illuminating the long history of railroad infrastructure and in the lens of migration and indigenous history and how it served as both a tool of colonial control and a means of indigenous resistance my research aims to reveal colonial patterns that still structure migration and marginalize indigenous migrants today.

Thank you.

(applause)

(sighs)

[ADRIANA RAMIREZ]

Thank you all for joining us today. Thank you for organizing this. Thank you to the Matrix team.

Today I will be talking about my working dissertation chapter titled Ready or Not: The Road to Return. Since around 2010, more Mexican nationals have left the US than entered, reversing decades of increased migration. The sustained shift, partly driven by the 2008 Great Recession, represents a different type of return with three main characteristics.

Return migration has become less circular, more forced, and increasingly has been including more children and adolescents. These children and adolescents are moving to a place that they’ve either haven’t been there before ever or hardly have a memory of being there. Yet this move is shaped by their parents’ histories and expectations, and expectations of the communities receiving them in Mexico.

Thus, here return migration refers to the migration to one’s own or parents’ place of origin after residing in another country. When it comes to return migration, the literature is largely focused on adults. Part of this literature is focused on the motivations for return, distinguishing between voluntary return such as for economic recessions or an economic plan being completed or forced, sorry, or fear of deportation.

On the other hand, there is forced return which is deportations. Now when it comes to the reintegration of adults into their country of origin, research tells us that reintegration is more challenging for forced returnees who experience more difficulties with employment, access to services, and social networks.

(sighs)

But when it comes specifically to children’s return migration far less is known. The literature tells us that children experience de facto deportation when following deported parents to Mexico, thus facing difficulties in school, disorientation, and emotional withdrawal during their reintegration to Mexico. However, children’s return motives are rarely examined because they’re seen as dependent on adults with little choice in the migration decision.

My dissertation focuses on these young returnees. And in this talk specifically, I will focus on this aspect of the return process that has been less explored. In particular, I ask, how do children experience a time between when their families decide that they will be returning to Mexico and actually leaving the US?

I argue that for children, the migration experience is not just about the reasons for return, whether forced or voluntary, but also about whether families prepared children for this return, as well as the degree of agency that children are given in the decision to return, all within the structural constraints of the U.S. immigration system. In this sense, preparation matters because it shapes children’s psychological adjustment, ability to navigate new environments, and a sense of security, thus reducing anxiety and building resilience. While agency is crucial because it operates differently based on age and legal status.

For the purpose of this talk, however, I will only focus on the first part of my argument regarding preparation for children’s return. I carried out this research for this project from September 2022 to November 2023 in the Mexican states of Oaxaca and Jalisco. I conducted a total of 115 interviews, 98 of these interviews were with young returned migrants and 17 with organization employees.

The average age at the time of interview was 20, but all but five of my respondents returned as minors. 60 were born in the U.S., 38 were born in Mexico, 59 identified as female, 39 identified as male, 15 were de facto deported, and 83 were returned voluntarily. The first thing I found by looking at all these interviews was that about half of the respondents stated that their parents prepared them for their return in one or more of the following ways.

Usually, the mothers would give children informal Spanish lessons after school, sometimes lasting one to two hours. Many parents use technology such as Google Earth or YouTube to show their children what their future home would look like, the streets around it, and videos of the town’s yearly fiestas or festivities. At the same time, many told their children from a very young age about their plans to return to Mexico in the near future, and to help them ease their transition from the U.S. to Mexico.

Take the case of Gabriela, who was born in Mexico and lived there until the age of two, when her parents brought her to the San Francisco Bay Area. The Bay was the only place that Gabriela knew until that point, but she never freely called it home because as she shared, “My mom, when I was very little, she always said, ‘We’re here and well, we’re going to be here for a while, but this isn’t our house. It’s not our home.

We come from Mexico. We have family there.’ So they were always telling us, and I think that got to us, as a way of helping us not be so affected by the change.”

As Gabriela and other returnees mentioned, by framing return as an expected part of a family’s trajectory rather than an abrupt disruption, parents help children develop psychological readiness for the move and a framework for understanding their transnational identity. This was not the case for the other half of the young returnees that I spoke to, who were not prepared by their parents in any of the previously mentioned forms. Some parents may not have had the time to prepare their children because they were working multiple jobs and long hours.

However, some withheld vital information from their children, such as their legal status and their plans to return. And others instead told their children they were going on vacation to Mexico, thinking this would ease the difficult transition for their children from the– of moving from the U.S. to Mexico. However, this lack of preparation created significant challenges for children.

Children arrived emotionally unprepared and without understanding why their lives had changed, leading to feelings of powerlessness and resentment that complicated their reintegration. For example, David was a baby when his parents brought him to the US, and when I asked him to walk me through the moment he found out he would be returning to Mexico, he said, “We thought we were going to go to Mexico for vacation for one or two months, and then we were going to return to the US. I don’t even remember saying goodbye to my friends.

It was like really fast And I didn’t think much about it. I didn’t think much about the fact that we were leaving.”

Once David realized this wasn’t a vacation, but a permanent move, his excitement turned to anger and deep sadness. Even when happiness existed in certain moments, sadness and fear remained inescapable. Among those who were unprepared for return were 15 whose fathers were deported, and whose mothers decided to return to Mexico to reunite their families.

Some fathers were detained for weeks or months, leaving little time for children to learn Spanish or mentally prepare themselves for this return, all amid the family experiencing state violence and family separation. For all of the 15 respondents, this limited time to prepare and the sudden return manifested in deteriorating mental health. This was the case for Leo, who was born in Mexico but was brought to Southern California as a baby, where he grew up until the age of 12 when his father was detained by ICE.

Leo’s future briefly seemed clear when his father might win his case and stay in the US, but this hope vanished when his father lost his case and was deported to Mexico. Leo stated, “And the day when my mom gave us the news, there was more of a letdown. You feel more sad, you feel more, more lost, feel nervous.

You don’t know what’s about to come. I had to go through the process of overthinking, you know, not paying attention in class. I mean, going to Mexico, what can I say now?

It’s like a huge restart.” Leo’s father’s deportation erased any hope for a clear future in the US, intensifying Leo’s sadness and uncertainty. Settled in the US, he was not prepared to restart in Mexico.

Given these findings, we can see that when studying the return migration of children, it’s not enough to study the motivations for return and the reintegration experiences, but we must also focus on the time in between to see how US immigration enforcement directly affects the kind of return families experience, and thus, affecting parents’ ability to prepare children for a return. Noting that children’s preparedness is significant in easing their transition to their new lives in Mexico and lessening depression, anxiety, and isolation upon their return. Thank you for listening.

I look forward to our discussion and your questions.

(audience applauding)

[IRENE FRANCO RUBIO]

Well, hi. It’s nice to meet everybody. I, yeah, would like to say thank you to the Social Science Matrix for inviting me. I would also like to note I am not a PhD candidate. I know it says that.

(laughing)

But, yeah, so I would say the way I’m approaching this presentation is a little bit more about my research interests, what brought me to this work, and how I sort of situate myself in relation to borderlands. And then using my own lived experience as like testament or as method for making sense of the kind of research that I hope to do.

So yeah. So just to preface that.

But yeah, so my name is Irene. I’m a second year PhD in Ethnic Studies and I’m presenting on Contested Borderlands and the Carceral Laboratory and thinking about Arizona immigrant detention and abolition and the interlocking system between those.

Yeah. And I’m hearing we’re talking about, everyone’s talking about Arizona, so I was like, “This is actually perfectly situated to help us, help me position what I’m thinking about.” So I guess to start, you know, I grew up in Phoenix and I was talking to my dad about this yesterday, like, oh, I’m gonna be presenting on SB 1070, and it was this, something that we all think about and we all remember.

And I was like, oh, what do you remember about it? And so, so yeah.

So my dad is a Guatemalan immigrant still living in Phoenix, Arizona and lived during the SB 1070 era, like myself, and he described it as a time of panic. Panic, Latinos were worried, we had to worry. He remembers the checkpoints that are described in Latino neighborhoods on Friday nights where the sheriff’s deputies would stop people because they looked Latino with policies allowing the collaboration between local law enforcement, the sheriff, and ICE.

And for many, this meant avoiding whole parts of the city, changing work patterns to working night shifts, and even fleeing the state altogether. But this lived experience reminds me that borderlands are constantly contested spaces, prone to breeding resistance as well like myself. Arizona became one of the most visible contested borderlands where racist spectacle politics turned everyday life into a site of border enforcement.

So it also became a place where migrants, youth, and everyday community members learned to challenge these logics of exclusion and mass criminalization and where grassroots resistance redefined belonging and possibility. So when I describe Arizona as a contested borderland, what I mean is that the borders aren’t fixed lines. They were sites of struggle and shaped by competing political, social, and cultural forces.

So in Arizona during the Senate Bill 1070 era, are folks familiar? I feel like if, you know, folks, yeah. Yeah, okay.

Well, if not, I feel like this is a good intro. It was notoriously known as the Show Me Your Papers bill, and so in a lot of ways we’re seeing the repercussions of that today. And it was, the contestation was particularly evident.

Policing detention in everyday life collided in ways that blurred the line between the border, the state, and beyond. Arizona passed SB1070 in 2010, and it remained one of the strictest and most draconian anti-immigrant laws in US history, as it allowed police to racially profile and detain people that they suspected of being an immigrant, much like we’re seeing today. The law unleashed widespread racial profiling, mass displacement, deportations, and a culture of fear and fearmongering that shaped everyday life for immigrant communities.

Its core, SB1070 was built on the doctrine of attrition through enforcement, so the idea that daily life should be made so hostile, so unbearable that people would feel forced to self-deport, which we explored a little bit in these presentations. It deputized not only local law enforcement, but also police officers and even neighbors, effectively turning entire communities into immigration enforcers. And Arizona was not an isolated case.

SB1070 became celebrated by anti-immigrant legislators as a model law and quickly copied in other states like Alabama and Mississippi, spreading this punitive blueprint well beyond the Southwest. So I won’t go too much into it but 287 G is really key here and we’re seeing this now as on a sort of national scale. But it was a provision in federal immigration law that allows ICE to delegate immigration enforcement authority to state and local law enforcement.

So under Joe Arpaio’s leadership, which, well, I’ll get into in a second, Maricopa County operated what was called a task force model. So this meant that deputies weren’t working in jails. They were empowered to conduct street level immigration enforcement, blurring the line between local policing and federal immigration control.

Deputies conducted the sweeps that I mentioned in Latino neighborhoods, pulling over Latino drivers up to nine times more often than others and made unlawful stops and arrests based solely on race. So I have a little bit of a timeline here ’cause this also helps me situate how I, again, approach this work and why, you know, I’m in ethnic studies and how I sort of came to be. So similarly to SB1070, there was an attack on ethnic studies that formalized, was formalized through House Bill 2281, which prohibited courses that promoted to, quote, “Overthrow the U.S. government resentment towards a race or class of people or ethnic solidarity instead of individual treatment.”

Hence my interest in multiracial coalition building. In 2010, this program became the epicenter of national controversy and the law dismantled the Mexican American studies program in Tucson, which stripped students of a program that had affirmed their histories and identities. Some of the books that were banned include, which we talked, you mentioned in your presentation Gloria Anzaldua’s Borderlands/La Frontera Pedagogy of the Oppressed House on Mango Street, among others.

So what’s important here and the reason I even mention it is that Arizona wasn’t only policing bodies at the border or in neighborhoods under SB1070, it was also policing knowledge and identity inside the classroom. The state targeted ethnic identity and belonging on multiple fronts at the same time, criminalizing Latino presence in public space while simultaneously dismantling the programs that affirmed and empowered students, students of color. This reveals the mechanics of state-sanctioned violence and control where legislation, law enforcement, and education intersect to regulate racialized populations, basically in many ways extending the border into every dimension of life.

And then as you all know, with the recent Supreme Court decision expanding enforcement and the increase in ICE detention centers, which we’ll get into as well. So from this book called Inventing Latinos by Laura Gomez there’s a quote that I was reading about last week And I was like, “Oh, this is perfect.”

So he, Arpaio, brags about helping write the “Trump playbook,” telling a reporter in 2012 that he planned to turn every illegal immigrant he was forced to release from county jail into “the Willie Horton” George H.W. Bush had in 1988. In this way, Arpaio was drawing on a long history of racist political strategy in the U.S. So for context, Willie Horton was a Black man whose image was infamously weaponized under the Bush administration under their campaign.

And Horton’s case was used in attack ads to stoke racial fear, portraying Black men as inherently dangerous and linking that fear to policy about crime. And so Arpaio used and intended to use the same playbook by now situating Latinos and immigrants as a political symbol meant to justify harsher policing, detention, and deportation. This isn’t fully relevant, but I just like to include this every time in anything that I do.

So this also illustrates the deep interconnection between the criminal legal system and the immigrant detention system. So people move from county jails to ICE custody, from prisons to detention centers and are caught in overlapping systems designed to criminalize their existence. So Arpaio’s rhetoric, which we’ll also see a few other examples made this pipeline explicit, equating immigrants with the logic of criminality to expand both prison and detention infrastructures.

So Arizona, in many ways, I see it as and I argue, it became a carceral laboratory or testing ground for the longstanding fusion of mass incarceration and detention and a convergence that has historically and continues to shape national policy today. So one of the key things that sticks out from SB-1070 and we are seeing replicated is this notion of tent city. So Arpaio had styled himself as America’s toughest sheriff since the early 1990s, focusing on drugs and gangs.

But in 2007, as Arizona began to be a main gateway for migration he focused his efforts on this. Also, it’s important to note he is the son of Italian immigrants, which I always thought was so funny.

(laughs)

Okay, so he created an outdoor jail close to downtown Phoenix, and this is something we would see on the news all the time. His own tough on crime creation which was often described as a concentration camp. So for months at a time, incarcerated people who were sentenced for minor crimes slept in these green cloth tents that were actually surplus military tents that were left over from the Korean War laid on bunk beds, on large slabs of gravel.

And in the summer, most notably –I don’t know, has anyone been to Arizona? Have you been there during the summer? Okay, someone –Okay.

The summer is brutal, I don’t know if folks know. But in the summer, temperatures inside could reach up to 130 degrees Fahrenheit in the dry Arizona heat and there’s no air conditioning, and they were often given expired food expired Gatorades, and I think they would sometimes allow people to go inside But I don’t know how often that was.

And they were also issued pink underwear. So this was, like one of his most notorious things And I actually saw last year, he started his own, like campaign since Trump pardoned him so he didn’t have to serve a federal sentence.

But they were issued pink underwear, long sleeves, sandals and the sheriff said that he chose pink so prisoners wouldn’t try to steal them, though we know that these were a humiliation tactic in larger questions about men and masculinity. And in jails, Latino inmates with limited English proficiency were also punished and denied services while critics of the sheriff’s office faced retaliation. So proud of his prison experiment, Arpaio frequently invited the media to witness these new cohorts of detainees being sent to Tent City.

He said this was an inexpensive way to get his anti-immigration message out to the public, and we would. We would see it in real time on the news and this would be like a regular occurrence. Inmates were also forced to work on chain gangs which had been abandoned by the US in 1955, but Maricopa County also ran the only all-female chain gang in the country.

So other detainees had mandatory work inside the jail and some were part of a furlough program that they were able to go work outside and come back to the Tent City to sleep and created this super production tough on crime image. So Tent City ran for more than 20 years and stood within a larger jail compound, in an industrial area near, like south of downtown Phoenix, and at its peak it consisted of 82 of those war era military tents and housed 1,700 inmates, and then after 2009 it could hold up to 200 immigrants at a time. But to call the borderlands contested spaces is also to recognize the power of resistance.

So community members didn’t simply endure these policies, we saw these things happening right in front of us and decided to resist. So grassroots organizers, community members pushed back and redefined what it meant to belong. So contestation in this sense wasn’t just about state violence, it’s also about the ways people survived and organized in a state that had not been strictly, that had been strictly defined by its borders, and was also a fairly young movement that had not historically engaged in movements of resistance before.

This created an emerging era of movement building informing young people lived experience like myself and other Latino youth, the children of immigrants, and included civil rights and immigrant rights groups like the ACLU, the National Day Labor Organizing Network, and then more local grassroots spaces like LUCHA, Living United for Change in Arizona. So framing Arizona as a contested borderland helps me situate this story as more than just, like an Arizona history. It’s about how the state became emblematic of broader struggles over who belongs, who gets policed, and how communities resist, and how it created the framework we’re seeing today with the recent Supreme Court racial profile ruling that now allows federal agents to consider factors like race, ethnicity, and language in immigration stops, among other tools the state that seek to replicate these logics.

And so a key example of this is seen through Eloy Detention Center in Arizona. One of the orgs that I’ve had the chance to work with is called Detention Watch Network, which is a national coalition of immigrant rights groups. And they released their report in October 2024 compiling decades of abuse at the detention center.

So Eloy is operated by CoreCivic, which is one of the leading private prison companies, and has become one of the most notorious immigration detention facilities in the US. It holds over 1,500 people and it is considered to be the deadliest detention center. And really Eloy’s history reflects the broader evolution of immigration policy during, from Trump’s zero tolerance era.

It was one of the few sites detaining, yeah, sorry, I got mixed up. Anyway, so those are two reports that are available online. Here’s a little bit on what we’re seeing in terms of the detentions expanding today.

And then, I guess the last thing I’ll think about is, so Tent City symbolized the spectacle of punishment under Arpaio. It created the manifestation of what we’re seeing today. We were living in Trump’s America long before Trump took office as America became a testing ground where humiliation, racial profiling, and carceral spectacle were normalized.

So what began as a local experiment foreshadowed the more surreal and grotesque landscapes of punishment we see today, like Alligator Alcatraz as an example, where cruelty and spectacle combine in even more militarized and dehumanizing ways. Yeah. Let’s go on with that.

(audience applauding)

[HIDETAKA HIROTA]

Thank you. Thanks so very much. These are really interesting presentations and I think this panel really reflects the interdisciplinary spirit of the social science matrix.

And we have historical project sociological project, and an, a project in ethnic studies. And, and really enjoyed looking at those projects, you know, that are characterized by different perspectives. So, we have 10 minutes actually for the conversation among panelists, and then I wanna make sure that we have enough time for Q&A.

And perhaps I can also ask questions during Q&A if there’s any chance. But, I just came up with one question which I didn’t mention to you earlier. It’s a new one.

So apparently, you know, all of those projects have various strong implications for today, and let’s say that a journalist approaches you saying that “I’m writing this episode on US-Mex borderlands,” or, you know, you’re asked, you’re invited to write an op-ed in a newspaper or any kind of journalist outlet. What is, what do you wanna do to write about? You know, if you have those kind of opportunities or just got a interview request.

So in other words how would you want to, so with your project, you know, how would you sort of try, hope, you know, hope to, how would you try to inform the broader, you know, public about the history or the situation of the new US-Mex borderlands? It can be from historical perspective. It can be from more political perspective.

Any approach is fine, but again how does your project kind of help us better understand yeah, like, you know, better understand sort of contemporarily developments and issues? So it, sometimes this is a hard question for historians.

So but yeah, anybody can start, yeah. Carlotta, if you want go first, that’s okay.

[CARLOTTA WRIGHT DE LA CAL]

Okay. And everyone can hear me?

[HIDETAKA HIROTA]

Yes.

[CARLOTTA WRIGHT DE LA CAL]

Yeah, okay. Well, I spoke a little bit about it at the end, but I think for me, it would be the ways I think the just like the legacies of colonialism, especially like settler colonialism in the US are still present in the border. And I mean, I feel like in this imaginary op-ed a nice hook would be the recent tweet by the Homeland Security Twitter account where they use a painting of railroad expansion called American Progress, where they show the railroads expanding and the kind of like–

And it’s called American Progress And it’s has this image of, I suppose, Lady Liberty, and it’s a very clear idea of expansion and civilization through industry and infrastructure. And then I think the caption there was like, “A homeland worth defending,” or something.

And it’s also interesting that Kristi Noem, the current secretary of Homeland Security actually I think she used to be the governor of South Dakota, and she got into a lot of controversy and was banned from reservations in South Dakota for saying that she was worried about cartels being present in reservations. And so there’s still all of these interesting layers of border control settler colonialism, imperialism And so I think one thing I would want to I guess put forward from this research is that sometimes it seems like, historical research seems very bounded in the past, but especially when you research I think his yeah histories of the borders, it’s important to see the kind of the echoes into the present and also something else I would highlight is that for me, it’s important to kind of explain the ways that the bor– the ways the border looks today is not the ways it’s always looked.

And not to say that it was like any kind of like wonderful space or anything throughout history, but that these spaces were not by any means as defined by division as they are today.

[HIDETAKA HIROTA]

Great. Thank you. Adriana.

[ADRIANA RAMIREZ]

This is a question I always struggle with ’cause I wanna tell everyone everything. I would probably start with–

[HIDETAKA HIROTA]

But you only have like 750 words.

[ADRIANA RAMIREZ]

50 words? Okay.

[HIDETAKA HIROTA]

In op-ed.

[ADRIANA RAMIREZ]

Okay.

[HIDETAKA HIROTA]

Maximum of 1,000 words.

[ADRIANA RAMIREZ]

I’ll give you four bullet points. Okay. I would probably start with the situation we’re in right now, right?

And how the current policies of the current administration are I think, we might not know yet the impact that it’s having on return migration exactly in this particular moment. Maybe we’ll know it in next year or the following year or more years after that. But I think speaking from what I see in my own community, what I see on social media, I do think more people are starting to ask themselves this question about self-deportation and also of just in general leaving the US.

So I would start with situating what’s happening now and say that there is a possibility that return migration or self-deportation, however, it, we can’t really call it voluntary, although the literature sometimes talks about it as forced and involuntary, right? Even when it’s considered voluntary, to what extent is there a choice, right? When your choices are so limited.

So it might become a more significant possibility that the graph that I showed is actually showing a higher number of returned migrants in the future. So it is important not only to highlight that the Mexican government is not prepared to receive migrants, even though they say they have Mexico te abraza, or embracing, Mexico embraces you, right? These policies that say they are welcoming, which symbolically they might be, and they might have some material aspects to them, but at the end of the day a lot of the work that ends up happening on the ground when it comes to helping returned migrants reintegrate into society happens through civil society and organizations.

So I think that’s where a lot of the bridges need to be made between the Mexican government in order to help more returned migrants. I’ll keep it there. I think that was more than 50.

[HIDETAKA HIROTA]

That’s right. Thank you.

[IRENE FRANCO RUBIO]

I didn’t get to it, but one example of something that I actually was able to write with Silki Shah, who I mentioned the org called Detention Watch Network, and so it is this national coalition of immigrant rights groups. And we wrote an op-ed arguing that, well, really, the outcome of that is like coalition building and building a movement of shared solidarity is one that can like tackle the entanglement of the criminal legal system, particularly in the ways that immigrant detention and like prison abolition groups primarily kinda operated in movement silos. What we’re seeing now is an entangled nature of the state and like in the same way that the state operates movements for resistance can also be intertwined and be interlocking to sort of challenge a competing interlocking system.

And so, yeah, I guess I would just generally argue coalition building.

[HIDETAKA HIROTA]

Thank you. Let me ask you one more question before I open up the floor for general questions from the audience here. This is a kind of devil’s question, and you know, it sounds really mean, but I try to be sort of, you know, stimulate the conversation here.

But in some ways, studies of migration, border control can be predictable, like in a sense that Yeah, so we can expect to see, you know, lots of racism, lots of suffering, so the regimes are racist, regimes are coercive, here are capitalists who exploited workers, here are the migrants who suffered a lot. So, you know, I think we are kind of prepared to see those kinds of things.

But what are some of the surprising findings in your research, you know, that kind of you know, some of the findings that really betrayed your, you know, assumptions or something that you already expected to see. Right? Yeah, anything is fine.

So, yeah. And then you can basically, you know, share, you know, your research trajectory or, you know, things that you felt as you did research, but yeah, so. What are some of the, yeah, surprising findings in your research?

[CARLOTTA WRIGHT DE LA CAL]

Sure, I can go. Well, for me part of it was the story that I was talking about in my presentation because I think it kind of does go against the story, and it shows this really thriving community of migrant workers who obviously were, you know, are dealing with at the time the Yaquis were being genocided in Mexico, are dealing with poverty, with dislocation, dispossession of community, or dealing with being refugees in Tucson. But I found these sources where they’re talking about, you know, like, “Lots of Yaquis are well-armed in the streets of Tucson.

Anyone will sell us weapons whenever we want to.” There’s these networks of people where this detective is sent to a few different towns on the border, and is just really frustrated because everyone in these towns is involved in the trade, and they live lives where they spend some time in the North of the border, then they go over to Tucson. Like it’s, it was a, it showed a society where this idea of like you, that the border was extremely militarized and you had to choose a kind of a dividing line was not present in the same way as it is now, and that allowed all these different opportunities for kind of resistance against forces of exploitation and, or, you know, they’re, you know, and I’m talking about like explicit resistance but also just like, you know, the forging of communities or being able to participate in a union or sharing political literature, that kind of thing.

And so I felt like that was a surprising find and sound to my idea of like mobility as a strategy of resistance.

[ADRIANA RAMIREZ]

I had a few surprising findings. Maybe some of them I don’t, aren’t part of this chapter. But I think the one that surprised me the most might be the resistance, or maybe it shouldn’t have surprised me, the resistance and rejection of the US in terms of parents not wanting their children to grow up in the US as being part of the reasons, compounding reasons why they’re returning to Mexico.

Also, some of those some of the young returnees I interviewed not wanting to return to the US. And the way it was talked to me or discussed with me was “Why would I want to return to a country that didn’t want me?” Right?

So they’re seeing it as a political resistance of, “I’m gonna make my life here in Mexico, because I don’t need to be, The US is not the only way to live.” And with that, the last thing I found really interesting was that in one of the towns I interviewed, even those that were born in the US and had the possibility of coming back to the US, they really only saw it as their grandparents and parents saw it before, as a means to come here, work, and then invest in creating a life in Mexico, building their house in Mexico. So continuing that culture of migration pattern that has been happening for a while.

So those were the things I found more interesting.

[IRENE FRANCO RUBIO]

Not a serious finding but I guess something that I definitely want to look into is, I guess getting at the expansion of detention centers and the role of private prison companies in that process and how the state sort of mediates that versus a county jail too. Yeah, private prison company and how does that show up in sort of different states and the different policies that they’ve interacted with.

[HIDETAKA HIROTA]

Thank you so much. I think unfortunately, our time’s up. It’s now 5:30, and so I as a moderator, I have to close the session. But thank you for coming and please join me in thanking the panelists.

(applause)

(upbeat music)

Matrix On Point

Technology and China in the New Political Economy

Part of the Matrix on Point event series

The innovation, use and experience, and exchange of new and emerging technologies today are influenced by the role that China plays in global politics and economy.

Recorded on April 18, 2025, this Matrix on Point panel brought together experts of the Chinese political economy and law and society in a conversation to discuss the political, economic, security, and social dimensions and complexities of technology in China’s internationalization during times of global tensions. Topics covered included the institutional foundations of China’s technological development, technology governance and industrial policy, global technology competition, and legal technology and societal impacts in today’s China.

The panel featured Mark Dallas, Professor of Political Science and Science, Technology, and Society at Union College; Roselyn Hsueh, Professor of Political Science at Temple University and Visiting Scholar at the Berkeley Economy and Society Initiative; and Rachel E. Stern, Professor of Law and Political Science at UC Berkeley. AnnaLee Saxenian, Professor in the School of Information, served as chair and moderator.

Matrix On Point is a discussion series promoting focused, cross-disciplinary conversations on today’s most pressing issues. Offering opportunities for scholarly exchange and interaction, each Matrix On Point features the perspectives of leading scholars and specialists from different disciplines, followed by an open conversation.

The panel was co-presented by the Berkeley Economy and Society Initiative, and co-sponsored by the Institute of International Studies (IIS), the UC Berkeley School of Information, and the Charles and Louise Travers Department of Political Science. This public panel is a part of the two-day Bringing the Sector Back In conference, also co-sponsored by the Institute of East Asian Studies and the Institute of Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies.

Watch the panel above or on YouTube. Or listen to the audio recording via the Matrix Podcast below (or on Apple Podcasts).

Podcast and Transcript

[MUSIC PLAYING]

[WOMAN’S VOICE] The Matrix Podcast is a production of Social Science Matrix, an interdisciplinary research center at the University of California, Berkeley.

ROSELYN HSUEH: Hello, everyone. I want to welcome all of you to here, in person, as well as online. My name is Roselyn Hsueh. I am a visiting scholar at Berkeley Economy Society Initiative, and also a professor of political science at Temple University.

And I’m delighted to welcome you to the technology and China in the new political economy panel. This panel is the culminating panel of a very stimulating, bringing the sector back in workshop, that we just had the last two days.

And I’m delighted to have AnnaLee Saxenian, who is the professor at the School of Information at UC Berkeley and also the former Dean of the School of Information, chairing today’s session, and also moderating us and joining our conversation, so on the social, political, economic, and security implications and consequences of China in today’s technology. So thank you so much. And without much ado, let AnnaLee go. Thanks.

ANNALEE SAXENIAN: Thank you very much, Rosie. I am delighted to introduce this very interesting group of scholars who will speak to you. First, we’re going to, the organization is that we will each, each of the panelists will speak for about 5 to 10 minutes about their research. And then we’ll have a discussion of some contemporary issues, and then we’ll open up to questions from you guys.

But first, I want to introduce Roselyn Hsueh, professor of political science at Berkeley. Not at Berkeley, but she has a PhD from Berkeley. She’s at Temple University. Yes, to my far left is Rachel Stern, who is a professor of law at the Berkeley Law School.

And to my right is Mark Dallas, professor at Union College, who is currently on leave at the US Department of Commerce. So I am going to turn to Roselyn to start a conversation about the institutional foundations of state business relations and China’s technological development.

ROSELYN HSUEH: Yeah, so I want to just provide a little background on what I call the institutional foundations of technological development, and also the consequences of technological development in China and the role that China now plays in technology, how state business relations and market governance in China and the role of the Chinese state plays a role in that.

I want to make three points in this time I have. And point number one– and I’ll go into greater detail for each point. Point number one I wanted to make is that the interconnectedness between China technology and China’s distinctive global economic integration, particularly since China’s entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001, is critical for the role that we see China today, that China plays in technological development, advancement, as well as even the responses globally on China’s growth and technological development. So that interconnectedness, that distinct global economic integration, I’m going to talk about.

Number two, I am going to then also emphasize that there has been sectoral variation in that dominant patterns of market governance, that economic integration into the global economy, and that then affects the industrial policy that has shaped technological development in China.

That sectoral variation in the market, governance that comes along with it, will then lead me to the third point, which is that throughout the last two decades, from WTO accession into the global financial crisis and the rise of Xi Jinping, and then also, the trade war that we see and where we are today, the new political economy, what we see is that, because of that sexual variation, we do, indeed, see the preponderance or the exponential growth of private initiatives.

And, at the same time, we also see political consolidation of the state. So it’s both. And that bifurcation is very much to do with that distinctive economic integration. And so I’ll begin with there. But those are the three points I would like to make.

And so in my own work in the first book that China’s Regulatory State, a New Strategy for Globalization, which took me to China to right around the time of WTO accession, what was really, what stuck out to me, empirically and very different from, intellectually within political science, what was the story about the developmental state was that during this height of neoliberalism, the height of the global, when we could call the liberal international order, we saw that China was, indeed, liberalizing, that it became a member of the WTO and, indeed, made these commitments to liberalize.

But what I also saw empirically was that, as I traveled across the country when I first went to China, was that we saw not just some subnational regional variation, but a lot of sectoral variation. And that what I, then, called the liberalization 2-step. China liberalized on the macro level and then reregulate at the sectoral level. And that reregulation at the sectoral level really then dictated the industrial policies. That was the institutional foundation of technological development.

And so what we had, and this is where the sectoral variation comes in, is that in sectors that are perceived to be of strategic value to the state, capital intensive, value-added sectors that have application for the national technology base that contribute, I mean, contributes to the national technology base to Indigenous development, industrial development, and have applications for national technology.

Those are the sectors, then, the state will have more involvement in, will participate more, will intervene, and will partake in industrial policy that, in many ways, is what many of us might think is the typical pattern, which is that state capitalism.

It must be because of state-owned enterprises and the role that state owned enterprises play in, and the role that the state plays in mobilizing research and development, and the different ministries coming in, particularly at the central level, at the state council level, all the different working groups mobilizing for that technological development. That’s the dominant view. And that, indeed, was true in these sectors that contributes to national technology base and national security.

But then there’s also the other view. There’s a bifurcated picture, which is that, in the sectors that are labor-intensive, less value-added, and have less applications for the national technology base and implications for national security, but nonetheless is important to regions and to some national governments for economic development and economic competitiveness. That’s where we have decentralized market governance.

And that decentralized market governance, we will see some national governments institute industrial policy, and we will see that there are going to be that growth of private sector in China and that, indeed, that distribution of property rights that we see in China today is very much part of that liberalization 2-step.

And how do we make sense of it? Well, it’s that bifurcated capitalism. It’s that bifurcated technological security developmentalism that allows us to see that sectoral variation in those dominant patterns. And those dominant patterns have laid the foundations for the different type of industrial policies, the extent and scope of state control, and the dominance of different property rights arrangements across sectors.

And these have huge consequential implications for China’s technological development, and also, importantly, with how foreign direct investment have been strategically used by the Chinese government for technology transfers, for knowledge transfers. And some of the state methods include rules on market entry, rules on business scope, rules on investment level. And unsurprisingly, in the more centralized sectors, that’s where the government may have more of an intervening role.

At the same time, that doesn’t mean that the government doesn’t involve private business, doesn’t involve foreign direct investment, doesn’t involve the role of decentralized actors, but that role of centralized governance will continue to be there. And we see these dominant patterns play out through the last several decades. And that is true across time, including beyond the political consolidation and centralization that we have seen through Xi Jinping.

And one more point I just want to make is that, that predominance, preponderance, and exponential growth of private initiative, that use of foreign direct investment, that use of private initiatives and private investment and private development of technology, and the role that state plays will have implications at the business level.

And we see that the telecommunications infrastructure, the backbone infrastructure, remains state-owned. But the value-added services, so it goes to the subsector, the value-added services that operate on top of telecommunications backbone infrastructure– the Alibaba’s, the fintech, the Alipay, even TikTok, and the social media– they operate on top of state-owned infrastructure. So they are, many of them, which are private initiatives and foreign direct investment.

At the same time, we do see if political consolidation for the Chinese Communist Party becomes an important imperative, there will be state intervention. And the last point I’m going to make is that we saw that in the 2020s in the internet blitz that intervention into fintech. And we continue to see that in different sectors of high tech.

And so the distinct global integration, the sectoral variation in dominant patterns of market governance, therefore, also industrial policy, the role of multi-level governance, different actors and the wide range of distribution of property rights, including foreign investors, but with that strategic value logic, really have shaped technological development in China today. And so that’s the institutional foundations that I want to leave us with.

ANNALEE SAXENIAN: Great.

ROSELYN HSUEH: Thank you.

ANNALEE SAXENIAN: Thank you so much for providing a framework for us. I’m going to turn this over now to Rachel Stern, who’s going to speak to us about legal technology.

RACHEL STERN: I am. Hi, everybody. Good afternoon. This is such a wonderful first for me. I’m a little bit surprised to find myself– this is my first time on a panel on political economy and on a panel on tech. Those are both firsts.

I study state society relations, and I study social legal studies. But I found myself I’ve been working on it for a couple of years on a comparative project, where the two key case studies are China and France, and I’ve done field work in both places on the politics of access to legal information.

And through this project, once legal information, specifically, I’m looking at court decisions, once both countries made a decision to make millions of court decisions available, hundreds of millions of court decisions, a legal tech industry sprung up to capitalize on this new data. So I found myself knowing something about legal tech.

So that’s what I’m going to talk about today. I want to talk about it a little bit first, just as a sector. What I mean by legal tech is it’s the use of software and technology to help legal professionals do their job more efficiently. So that’s a lot of stuff. That’s everything from automated contract drafting to e-discovery software, to billing and accounting software for lawyers.

What I’m interested in is, I’ve been interested in data analytics, legal analytics. So software that takes those millions of cases that are now publicly available, that are now in the public sphere and puts it into a dashboard. And what it delivers is information that can help predict case outcomes, analyze judges tendency to rule one way or another way, or court’s tendency, or even to look at opposing counsel.

And I’ve become, especially, interested in how courts themselves, at least in China, are using legal analytics. And I sort of backed my way into an interest in sectors, partly, by knowing Rosie and reading her really excellent piece that’s forthcoming, I think, in perspectives on politics. But part of it was it gave me a way to think about legal tech as a sector.

And what has resonated with me about a sectoral approach is that legal tech is both embedded in the global arena and in the national arena. And that’s been one of the things that’s hard for me to write about in untangle, that Rosie’s work has helped me to see.

And let me just tell you a little bit about what I mean. It’s embedded in the global arena because it’s adjacent to AI. All of these legal tech companies will tell you they’re doing AI. I mean, it’s contested what is actually AI and what’s not. But this is all like taking AI into the legal space.

And, of course, AI is, this is about global geopolitics. We’re in a global race for AI. It’s a high value strategic sector for everywhere I can think of, but, certainly, in my case studies, certainly in AI, certainly in China, certainly in France. And so thus, you have to talk about geopolitics.

And it’s also global because if you do fieldwork as I’ve done and you go to legal tech offices in different countries, it becomes really clear that they’re all really oriented towards Silicon Valley as their model of how to operate. And they’re more similar than they are different.

Like if you go to a legal tech company and probably some people in this room have been to them, what are people going to be wearing? Hoodies, sneakers. I promise you, there’s going to be breakout rooms, there’s going to be free coffee, there’s going to be free snacks, and there’s going to be a lot of slogans about disrupting something. That’s the orientation.

So this is really interesting for those of us who study the legal profession, because it’s much more so. These legal tech companies are much more Silicon Valley than they are big law. They’re much closer to any startup in the Valley than they are to Paul Weiss, for example.

And so it’s been very, just their very existence in– entry into the legal profession has been disruptive for the legal profession itself. So that’s what’s global. But then, nationally, there’s a lot that’s going on nationally as well. And I think this is what’s interesting about legal tech, is AI adjacent.

It’s a little bit of a backwater. Like, these companies are operating in what’s sometimes called a zone of public inattention. I mean, I think it’s not an accident that nobody ever talks about legal tech on panels like this one. It’s not DeepSeek. Nobody’s ever heard of these people. And so that adds an interesting kind of layer to it.

And second, it’s mostly national markets because legal systems are mostly national. The statutes are national. The case law is national. Law is stubbornly national. So it’s impossible. Not hard, but not impossible to create products that crisscross jurisdictions.

And then sectorally as a sector, we see variation in regulation across countries. So one of the things that piqued my interest in this project was in 2019, France just decided that they were going to ban judicial analytics.

They just banned the whole thing. They said, you can’t run any data on judges. You cannot run and publish data on the case records of individual judges, we’re just going to make that whole thing illegal. Just an example.

So let me bring it to legal tech in China because we’re talking about China today. And I have, and here, I’m going to draw very much on work that I’ve been doing in collaboration with Ben Liebman at Columbia Law School. So he’s been a big part of this as well.

We’ve been looking at legal tech in the courts in particular. And, for me, at least, having also just spent a year in France, one of the takeaways is to just ask, how much of what happens in China is authoritarian, and how much isn’t?

We were talking about this a little bit. It echoes a remark that John made yesterday. Obviously, a lot that happens in China is related to authoritarianism. But I think by the time you get down to the sectoral level and you’re looking at legal tech in particular, there’s also a lot that isn’t about authoritarianism. Let me give you some examples.

So first, in terms of what technology is doing in the courts, we’re interested in this because technology is front and center for the Chinese court system. This is not a secret. It’s in every high level policy document.

They’re really, really interested in integrating and using technology to do their jobs more effectively, and to some extent, to change what the job is, to analyze their own record, to learn about the kinds of disputes that are happening in society, and to become a smarter learning state. So that it’s front and center. And, of course, technology is being used to serve party priorities. It’s a one-party state. This is not a surprise for any of us who study China.

What’s been interesting for us is to see how technology can be used as what we call a policy accelerator, when the party’s priorities shift. So we saw this big quick example. We saw this big push for technology starting in the 2010s.

A man named Jun Zhang was in charge of the Supreme People’s Court. He had a whole series of initiatives called making Chinese courts smart. And a lot of the push for technology, at that point of time, was about bringing cases into the courts, increasing the caseload so that a lot of technology was introduced to make it easier to file cases online. And it was in line with the goal of accepting all cases that should be accepted.

So all these reforms seem spectacularly successful. The number of cases filed surged from just about 14 million in 2013 to 45 million in 2023. So it flips, the party becomes concerned about too much litigation. And Xi Jinping, in 2020, was talking about his fears that China would become a big litigation country.

Anyone know a big litigation country? I’m pretty sure we’re sitting in a big litigation country. So then the use of technology changes and the courts start rolling out what they call litigation risk assessment tools, where people who are thinking about filing cases can go see what their odds are of winning.

And for various reasons that I can talk about, including just the name of the litigation, risk assessment assumes that litigation has a risk. But the publicly acknowledged goal of these tools is to help litigants, rationally, choose methods for resolving disputes and to reduce the public litigation burden. So the deck is stacked. These are tools meant to nudge people away from litigation.

And yet not everything in this space is about authoritarianism. I think a big push for the use of technology has just been that the courts are overburdened. The Chinese, they talk about the too many cases, too few judges problem. Just making the courts work more efficiently to handle that massive caseload.

But I think here looking comparatively is helpful as well. This is not a problem that’s unique to China, nor is it a solution that’s unique to China. I’ve been doing some interviews recently in Taiwan, where they’ve also been experimenting with the use of technology to say, generate decisions because they also have really overburdened courts and that are under strain.

Let me conclude by just saying that where China stands out for me is with the court system’s unusual enthusiasm about technology. And this is, I happen to be looking at legal tech. I think the enthusiasm about technology is probably something that you can notice looking at almost any sector.

It’s been noticed by lots of people, sometimes called the fetishization of technology. But I think, for me, as someone who’s been looking at the Chinese legal system for a while now, I think it raises interesting questions about the future of authoritarian law and legality.

So even if the modest changes on the ground don’t live up to the court’s hype about what’s happening on the ground, because of course, there’s political incentives to oversell what you’re doing and how cool it is and how futuristic it is, I think it’s clear that legal tech is an area in which the courts want to be seen as pioneers.

So if artificial intelligence stays a party priority, which I think it’s likely to, if the courts continue to experiment with it, which I think they’re likely to, I think that Chinese courts are going to become more and more visibly futuristic, looking, at least to our eyes sitting here in the United States.

So I think what we’re looking at is where, I think, the Chinese courts will enter our popular imagination is I think they’ll come to challenge, in some ways, still common popular assumption that authoritarian legal systems are somewhat behind the times, or even benighted. I think that increasingly, that the way in which technology is being integrated in the court system is going to make the Chinese courts look like the future. And so I’ll leave it there. Thank you.

ANNALEE SAXENIAN: Great. Thank you so much, Rachel. It’s interesting that we’ve accepted that Chinese cities are technologically advanced, their infrastructure. But somehow, the courts, we don’t think about that. That’s a fascinating presentation. And now, I’m going to turn to Mark Dallas, who will speak to us about global value chains and US technology competition.

MARK DALLAS: Well, thank you very much for the invitation. As Ann said, I’m on leave from University. I’m working at the US Department of Education. So I have to say that everything I say today is my own private view and doesn’t reflect the view of the US government or US government agencies.

So I’m tasked with talking more about the global dimension, US-China relations. But then also just China in the world focused on global value chains. And I want to hit on three topics. One is to explain a little bit of what’s the big deal about global value chains. But really to focus on the scoping of security.

So a lot of the discussion today is security-oriented. When I started to study about global value chains, it was all about development issues– Chinese firms upgrading, encouraging development.

Well, that conversation over the past five or six years has really shifted to one of all about security– supply chain resilience, vulnerabilities, and whatnot, let alone other higher level military and other types of security issues as well. So I want to discuss a little bit about the scoping of security and how that concept can just keep growing and growing until everything becomes security.

And finally, which almost contradicts that second point to a certain extent, is a tension of technologies today that have become infrastructures. So internet as infrastructure, cloud computing is infrastructure, even social media as infrastructure, AI servers as infrastructure.

And I know that’s all digital-oriented, but that’s one of the concerns, is technology is not only infrastructure but it’s global scale. And it crosses all these countries. And how do we deal with that situation.

There are sovereignty issues involved there. I mean, if you think of security issues, cybersecurity is very different because there, you have nation states literally inside of each other’s networks. Most security issues don’t deal with that. It’s border issues, security on borders. Military being, obviously, the most typical example of that.

So let me start with global value chains. So just very briefly, previously, you can think of firms as used to be vertically integrated, meaning they made everything from the raw material all the way through to the final product. That’s a vertically integrated firm.

Over many decades, the firm started to break up. And they broke up more and more and more. They outsourced, and they also offshored. So they internationalized. And then they had other companies do other things. And that value chain can get fine, sliced very, very minutely. One company does one process, one task, but it has a global market to sell to.

And what that created is it created a situation of functional integration. That’s different from just globalization. We had trade, global trade, we had global investments, and things like that. Those are resources moving across the world. That’s not new.

What’s new is this functional integration. And what we’re left with is an intense degree of interdependency globally, but also global scale monopolies. In a lot of sectors, 1, 2, maybe 3 firms, sometimes dominate globally in that little minute task that they’re doing. And sometimes it’s not minute. Sometimes it’s a bigger task.

Well, China is kind of, partly, the poster child of a lot of this. They’re deeply integrated in lots of these tasks all over the place. Some are massive scale and whatnot. And so the idea of functional integration, how it differs is you’ve probably seen studies, there’s a study about trade, US-China trade or China trading with the rest of the world, studies about investments, Chinese investments inward or outward whatnot.

But a global value chains, there’s services. There’s IP licensing. There’s software. There’s also PhD students, like, where are they in the world. How much research papers are being– so this is basic research or University research. How many research papers are being published by who and who’s collaborating and everything– patents.

So those can each be a study. And they are people study that. Each of those is a topic. Let’s study it. Let’s look at the relationships, and whatnot. And they’re all great research. I’m not trying to say anything about that.

The global value chains integrates all that together. If you start with a product, let’s say the cell phone, it has all of those things all intermixed together. And that’s where the functional integration happens. So all of those. It’s not separate topics. It’s all these topics integrated into one thing. And that’s really where you start thinking about functional integration.

Now, in a world in which countries are friendly and it’s about development and win, win, no problem. That’s not an issue. And that’s the world we lived in for a very long time between US, China, China and other countries, of course, Europe, around the world. When that starts to– when the lens shifts to security, now you start looking at those value chains very differently. And that’s what has really changed.

I want to just give you a sense of how interdependence can be. What it is, and then how it can be perceived in very different ways. And so now we’re in a security world. And so now people are starting to scratch their head. And that’s where all these terms come from– nearshoring, friend-shoring, decoupling from China, de-risking from China.

There’s endless number of new words out there to deal with this. How do you deal with vulnerabilities from supply chain? Of course, COVID added to this too. We couldn’t get access to vaccines and masks and everything else. So people were like, wow, supply chains.

And, by the way, I’ve been studying that for a long time. Never was it the headline of newspapers. And then, suddenly, especially with COVID, it was headlines. I was, like, oh, wow, what I studied, actually people care about now. They actually know what the word supply chain is. So that was I guess a nice shift.

And now, the second issue about security and what are the boundaries here. I think this is a real quandary because you can already probably imagine about this interdependency and how that could lead to types of security. But the security dialogue is also shifting towards military. So advanced semiconductors.

When I said that, when I said advanced semiconductors five years ago, people were like, oh, that’s cool. We all benefit from advanced semiconductors. Today, the conversation is, well, this is going to go into supercomputers in China that are going to develop nuclear weapons or other types of things like that or AI.

AI should not be considered a military thing. There’s tons of scientific and other wonderful things, legal and everything. But the conversation is shifting. It’s also a military thing. It is a military thing. But the problem is with these emerging technologies, how do you parse that?

Some technologies like nuclear, we could parse the civilian and the military side of things relatively more easily. With a lot of these other technologies, I don’t know. It’s hard, where we’re trying to figure out what that parsing is. But right now, the security side seems to be winning.

And that’s a tremendous problem. Because we don’t know the boundaries of that what should and shouldn’t be regulated. What is a concern and what’s not a concern. So I don’t have an answer to that, where the boundaries are for security. But it’s one of the main issues we’re dealing with.

The final thing I’ll say is about digital technologies, in particular, as infrastructure. I think it’s, particularly, the case with digital. I think it can be applied elsewhere. But this is another type of what is, when we built the internet, no one was really thinking about security issues of famously, it was just, it was the open internet and everything’s good.

And once that infrastructure gets built, then, suddenly, like, oh, wait a minute, bad actors can do stuff. And I’m not just saying about state actors, like mostly non-state actors, can do bad things. Well, oh, geez, the infrastructure is already built. It’s very hard now to securitize infrastructure that’s already been built.

And so, that’s the classic case from the ’90s when infrastructure internet became sort of commercial, was passed off from government military to commercial purposes. But you build on top of this. You’ve got the internet, but then how does the internet work? There’s all this hardware, but then you build on top of the internet, obviously, social media and other things. So there’s a layered stack here of different integrated infrastructures that are largely global.

Now, there’s a lot out there on how countries are trying to regain sovereignty or trying AI sovereignty, data sovereignty, and whatnot. So we’re struggling to figure out how do we strike this balance. I think, in some cases, it’s going to be extremely difficult.

There are, just again, going back to that idea of intense monopolies. And I also just want to give you a sense of the– we hear so much in the United States about US security concerns. Let me just give you just two quick empirical examples from China’s perspective. And again, I’ll use mobile phones as an example.

There’s two operating systems in the whole world right now– it’s Apple and Android, Google and Apple right over here, right next door to each other. They control the operating systems of every single phone on Earth, including all the ones in China. A little bit Android, you can customize and stuff, but the underlying code is that.

Huawei, recently, is trying to develop their own operating system and break from that. So imagine every single phone in China is run by– the operating system is run by two companies here in San Francisco. That’s a security concern that we have to be sensitive to.

Another company– well, a company you’ve probably never heard of but is one of the most important countries in the world– ARM. They’re based in the UK, near Cambridge. Every single major, important chip in every single phone, the underlying architecture of it is designed by them in the UK– every phone in the world.

Not just phones, actually. ARM is not just in phones. It’s actually in every device that requires energy conservation or efficiency. So that means all of that– yeah, I’m just add one more comment.

ANNALEE SAXENIAN: Yeah, your fine.

MARK DALLAS: So I just want to give you a sense of the security concern of a country like China to think about that. I’ll make one quick comment and then I’m done. So the only thing I cringe, and this is just a generic thing because you hear it in the media a lot, is sort of tech catch up and technology is a horse race– who’s ahead, who’s behind, things like that.

I just want to, just general warning against, to people to just not tune too closely into that. It makes it sound like technology is one linear race, like a horse race, and you’re either behind or you’re in front and it’s just not. It’s so multilinear.

There’s so many different pathways to it. So just as a general, I don’t know, public announcement like just avoid that. Avoid that, if you read about it, which you will all the time. And I will make the same mistake. I’ll be like, who’s behind? Who’s ahead? You almost immediately fall into it, so.

ROSELYN HSUEH: I just want to really quickly make a comment about the economic security nexus. I think Mark does a good job in laying it out as that the technological or the structural attributes of sectors and the functionality of sectors and evolution of that, how that affects the economic security nexus.

But then, I want to bring politics back into that as well. And we can take this from the Chinese state’s perspective. And I think the SMIC, which is China’s, quote-unquote, “state-owned foundry” and the evolution of the corporate governance structure of that company is a really good example of that evolution of the economic security nexus.

So SMIC, in 2000, was foreign direct investment. And it was part of that kind of strategic use of FDI. But over the years, because of China’s response to internal and external pressures– I mean, in addition to technological attributes and advances, but in response to those internal and external pressures on the economic side, but also the security side, globally, but also perceived security issues internally, we saw, over time, that SMIC, through corporate governance interventions, actually is now from foreign direct investor that was foreign invested with the Shanghai state government and Peking University professor by 2010, before Xi Jinping even came into power, was, and became a state-owned enterprise, and dominated with state-owned, as well as state-controlled private entities as investors and on its board, the Chinese Communist Party. And so I just want to bring the politics back into the economic and security nexus.

ANNALEE SAXENIAN: Well, actually, just to pile on the politics, I mean, I think that a lot of the ways that US AI companies sell themselves to the state or this is security. I think we see lobbyists from OpenAI, from all of these companies in Silicon Valley, Google, going to Washington regularly and talking about the threats of falling behind China. And, therefore, we must, the US must invest in AI. So it’s politically a very–

MARK DALLAS: I think that’s the boundary conditions, is what is not security now. And security just cells–

ANNALEE SAXENIAN: Absolutely.

MARK DALLAS: –in the media and elsewhere.

ANNALEE SAXENIAN: So I want to just add a few comments about the research that I’ve done on Taiwan because US-China, we always frame it US-China. But Taiwan’s in the middle, and it’s going to stay in the middle. And it’s an interesting position.

In the 1990s and 2000s, I was studying communities of engineers who were educated in the US, but working in Silicon Valley. The story that I tell is about the way that they built very powerful institutional, economic, and technological ties between Silicon Valley, and then in Taiwan, and then after that, China.

And they built these ties because they were going back. After coming to the US, studying almost anywhere, Texas, Arkansas, they then took their knowledge, worked in Silicon Valley, marinated, learned the Silicon Valley model of doing business and learned the technology really well. And then they went to their homes, their home countries, whether it’s first Taiwan or I’ll tell the story of Taiwan. And they started companies there.

They started investing in startups. This was the early semiconductor industry era. Or even earlier, Taiwan was doing low-skill chip assembly, and then games assembly for Atari. And then they started manufacturing for IBM, the IBM PC and the Apple PCs.

So you see that the story I want to tell is that these people going back and forth between Silicon Valley and Taiwan were really the best of the global era, because they were transferring technology, they were building social and business ties that allowed both Silicon Valley to flourish and Taiwan to learn and move up the value chain. And Taiwan became, very, very quickly became very good at manufacturing and at manufacturing semiconductors and electronic systems. So good that they were really better than the US.

So starting as a low-skill assembly center, Acer, if you remember Acer technology, that was a Taiwanese company. You don’t hear much from them anymore. But quickly, through this back and forth and learning by doing and a lot of other state investments, a lot of processes, they became the leading in the world, really, in terms of the quality of and the speed at which they could design and manufacture motherboards, electronic systems, and also chips.

You hear now about TSMC. But I want to suggest that it goes deeper than that. So by the end of the ’90s, Taiwan, through this brain circulation, I call it, had have become a central node in the global value chain for manufacturing electronic systems.

In the 2000s, this value chain, this piece was moved lock, stock, and barrel to China, to Southern China, to Shanghai. And it was the same people. I mean, and so then you saw this linkage between Silicon Valley and Taiwan and China, and you saw the same people investing and starting companies, with the know-how of the, then, emerging semiconductor industry.

So the transfer of technology from Silicon Valley, Taiwan, and then to China means that now China takes over a piece of the value chain, and Taiwan needs to move up the value chain, and so does Silicon Valley.

So Silicon Valley becomes, for all of these advanced technology products, the design center, maybe the architecture, center of architecture. Taiwan moves up, becomes better at manufacturing mobile devices and things like that, more advanced semiconductors.

And then China enters first as a low-cost assembly and then builds up its own clusters of suppliers, which are, by the way, mostly managed by Taiwanese managers. So the transfer just happens across the Taiwan Straits. This process was– and actually, SMIC was created in that period. And a lot of investors from Silicon Valley and Taiwan involved in this forming of SMIC.

ROSELYN HSUEH: The founder, Weijia Jiang, is Taiwanese.

ANNALEE SAXENIAN: Yeah, exactly.

ROSELYN HSUEH: Former Texas Instrument executive, but Taiwanese. Yeah, Taiwanese-American.

ANNALEE SAXENIAN: Well, and TSMC has also started by a TI.

ROSELYN HSUEH: Yes.

ANNALEE SAXENIAN: So we have this small world that, at the same time, that you’re seeing what Mark has described as products functionally disperse across. You see these communities of people doing it. And they all know each other. They all knew each other.

So that period, however, of the global value chain sort of spreading out via people has ended. It started to end after 9/11. The US started to clamp down on migration and immigration. Xi Jinping emerges in China. Over time, there’s been anxiety. The security anxieties have led both the US and China, I think, to shut the doors more and more and more, and today they’re sort of slamming shut.

I just want to say that we all know because it’s in the news all the time. We hear about TSMC, Taiwan Semiconductor, because that’s the leading chip foundry in the world. And it really started in the ’80s and has become, again, the– well, interestingly, just to bring this to the present, people heard of NVIDIA.

Those are the most advanced chips that go into all of the data centers that power AI today. NVIDIA CEO Jensen Huang announced that he was going to onshore his advanced chip making to the US, again, to Texas and Arizona. If he does it, that’s a big deal. We’ll see if it happens.

But four of the five partners that it announced would move there were Taiwanese. So it’s TSMC, Foxconn, Wistron, and a company called SPIL, S-P-I-L. The other one is Korea of the five. So that’s not really that different than the process that happened with Apple computer.

When Apple decided to diversify its manufacturing, iPhone manufacturing out of China to India and Vietnam, it relied on Foxconn, Wistron, and a company called Pegatron, all Taiwanese companies, to do the heavy-lifting of rebuilding or building or rebuilding manufacturing capabilities. It’s tremendous know-how. There’s tacit knowledge. There’s also deep knowledge. There’s institutional knowledge. Doing this kind of very, these are very sensitive manufacturing processes.

So they’re being, it’s the same Taiwanese that set up in China and India, moved the iPhone. And now they’re being tasked to set up in the US, which helps explain the recent decision. When China announced their reciprocal tariffs on the US, they exempted chips.

And why did they exempt chips? Because they wanted to keep getting these chips even though they were designed in the US and they don’t want US products, but they were made in Taiwan and they will not be subject to the tariffs.

It’s an acknowledgment that we all, China depends on Taiwan. We depend on Taiwan. And that, in spite of politics, this interdependence continues. This functional interdependence that Mark described.

So with that note, I guess we are at now 1 o’clock. We have half an hour left. Do we want to discuss contemporary issues or open up what people have thoughts about contemporary issues like about the tariffs, or would people like to raise some questions? Looks like we have an audience that would like to get engaged. Why don’t we start here?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: So I appreciate the talk. It was an expatriate living in China during the good times when we had reform. And it was interdependence was good, not this functional integration. And I think about the higher theme of how do we avoid confrontation and war, and go back to deterrence, cooperation, competition. What is needed for that? That’s on a whoever can figure that out. I’m happy to hear– number one.

And then number two is on the domestic side, private sector. I was just in China and Taiwan two weeks ago, and privatization is still going on very well. Good thing will Xi Jinping be able to pull it off from an economy, high domestic internal consumption, keeping high export, and then also trying to become a technologically advanced country? So will he be able to pull it off?

ANNALEE SAXENIAN: We have two questions. How to avoid war? Minor question. And then the second question is about will Xi Jinping pull off this self-sufficiency in technology? Both really big really interesting questions. Who wants to start?

ROSELYN HSUEH: I guess I’ll dive in and try to see if I can answer these questions. So I mean, if we in terms of the first question, I think, we could think about the US-China trade war, when it first got launched in 2017.

Some of the very firms and sectors that were against the tariffs, the three rounds of tariffs, they did keep piling up. Not in the same way we’re seeing today. But those three rounds, some of the very businesses and sectors that were opposed are companies that needed the components from China because they were being produced in China.

And some of the components did have indigenous technology that China was producing. And so I think one very just good way politically for cooperation would be for some of these sectors and businesses to come together and step up and say, hey, we’re not going to stand for this. It’s this interdependent world and we do depend on China.

Now, I do think that it is true. There are security concerns and there some of the diversification of supply chains make it so that, maybe there’s less need or maybe perhaps there’s less opposition from sector and businesses in this round of trade war. But the domestic private interest groups can play a very big role in global cooperation in terms of, at least, this very next round.

And then on the domestic side of issues I think I mentioned. And so in my most recent book, Micro-Institutional Foundations of Capitalism, where I do compare China to India, Russia, across industrial sectors. But on the China side, part of what Xi Jinping in the party is kind of grappling with are internal pressures.

And some of those internal pressures are not just political, they are economic pressures. And so I will, I do believe, and maybe I’ll go out on a limb to predict it, is that there will be, certain tinkering and recalibration of how the Chinese government is dealing with industrial policy, even security concerns and economic policy as well.

MARK DALLAS: I’ll just add. So you were referring really to kinetic war, like real war, not just trade war or?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah, or a confrontation with Taiwan. Just saying the distance between confrontation and war is a lot shorter than you think it is.

MARK DALLAS: Sure. Yeah, I think one of the key things that can be done and should be done more of is just communication between the countries. I mean, you’re not going to solve, I mean, in an ideal world, we solve the security dilemma and we got peace. It’s been several thousand years. We haven’t solved the security dilemma. So I don’t think that’s going to happen overnight.

But what’s been declining is communication, and particularly between the militaries. That was at a real low point during the spy balloon incident and whatnot. But that’s a major concern. I think, just general communication, I mean, military-to-military communication and whatnot, to avoid anything like that sort of mistakes.

But then communication at different levels of government also would be better. And then also among civil society, I mean, I think business has a role. But national security in both countries is very much hived off intentionally from lobbying and things like that.

And so I think there is a role, but I think that won’t be like a silver bullet to solve that. Now, in terms of, I think your other question was about Xi Jinping achieving self-sufficiency. Is that a fair way to frame it?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: You, obviously, maintain the Communist Party is critical. At the same time, he’s got to continue economic growth.

MARK DALLAS: Sure.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I think if those two don’t happen, he’s got a big problem.

ANNALEE SAXENIAN: You’re right.

MARK DALLAS: Yeah.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: –put it off.

MARK DALLAS: Yeah, I mean, I don’t know if he can pull it off. I think the pressures on, the general pressures on China’s economy, I mean, their well-known demographic, their big structural stuff, creating a social safety net and all sorts of things to encourage consumption and whatnot, the property sector and whatnot.

In terms of, specifically, global integration issues and the drive for self-sufficiency, and whatnot, I think that’s a fool’s errand. I think the answer is going to be no. Or I think actually the better answer is going to be, China’s going to have to choose.

Do they want a second tier in terms of technological sophistication? Do they want second tier technology then they can probably do a degree of self-sufficiency? Or if they want to remain at first tier, they’re going to have to integrate.

And that goes back to my point before that, the supply chains are so fragmented and there’s expertise all over the world, and those expertise are extremely concentrated. The memory, for instance, I mean, in Korea, it’s just the global market share of two companies is just enormous.

You just can’t replicate all of that in a single even one. With as many smart people as China, with as much resources, which is much will, I just don’t think that’s possible. So I it is a bit of a fool’s errand. And I think some of these, what Rosie was saying earlier, are examples of, oh, geez. Or sorry, what you were saying about keeping semiconductors open is an example– like, oh, geez, we can’t close the door.

ANNALEE SAXENIAN: Yeah. Good point. And there’s that company in Netherlands, AML.

MARK DALLAS: ASML.

ANNALEE SAXENIAN: ASML, I mean, it is really, literally, very sophisticated knowledge all over the world.

MARK DALLAS: And China is trying to replicate that in a different way. They’re taking the EUV technology in a slightly different way. But what they’re doing with that EUV technology, which is the most advanced chip making, was done back about 20 years ago by Japanese and other companies, and they felt like that was a pathway that wasn’t going to lead anywhere. So that is a good example of second tier technology, potentially.

ANNALEE SAXENIAN: OK, Rachel has a comment on these questions.

RACHEL STERN: I want to open it up for more questions. I’ll just say one line, which is just to say that your first question about how to avoid war is a really live conversation in the China studies community. Just because the Washington Consensus has so hardened in both parties around a consensus that China is a threat. And I really think that has to do with our own domestic politics, in a way, and political polarization, and China being the thing that allows us to agree and get things done.

So anyway, just to say that people are thinking about this and thinking about other sources of ballast in the US-China relationship besides the business people that Rosie mentioned, whether it’s scholars, whether it’s students, diversifying opinion so that not all the voices on China come out of Washington, because that’s so much one voice at the moment, very hawkish. So I think just to flag that this is a conversation that’s happening in the field.

ANNALEE SAXENIAN: That’s very helpful. We have a question up here. And then the next one over.

RACHEL STERN: Yeah.

MARK DALLAS: The question is, is the technology of fintech in, legal tech, excuse me, is it different than it is in France? In other words, is it being used for authoritarian for monitoring purposes the way, say, social credit was? So how is legal tech different in China– the actual structure of it and what it tells you about users, et cetera?

RACHEL STERN: So I was talking about legal tech as it’s used in the courts. And the French courts have, in keeping with Europe being kind of tech skeptical in general, have just not rolled out the same type of technology as China has. I think that what they’ve done in China is that they can use it to monitor judges. And they want to make sure that judges are doing their work.

It makes sense in a highly centralized court system, you want to make sure that everybody, that has concerns about case overload, you want to make sure that everybody’s doing their work. So on the one hand, you could say that’s about surveillance. And it is. And I’m sure it’s resented by the judges.

But on the other hand, they’re also doing that in Israel and Taiwan. So it’s not exactly about regime type in a simplistic way. I think it’s more about having a highly centralized court system, where the high court wants to know what’s happening in the lower courts.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Your response had to do with the volume of cases. [INAUDIBLE] What about the nature of the decisions?

RACHEL STERN: I don’t think they have the capacity to monitor that right now. But one of the things that’s been the most interesting application of this, and if I had slides I would have shown you, is you can analyze, one of the ways that the software can be used is you can analyze all those past cases, and the judge can pull down some drop-down factors from a menu.

Like imagine you have a DUI case, Driving Under the Influence case, a drunk driving case. You pull down some factors. What was the blood alcohol level? How many damages were caused? What was the damages caused? And the software will analyze past similar cases based on the factors that you chose and give you a recommended sentence. Give you, the judge, a recommended sentence.

And it doesn’t tie your hands. It’s not telling you what the sentence should be, but anyone, anything. All the research at the intersection of law and psychology suggests that it has a really strong anchoring effect, such that you wouldn’t go outside that sentence.

And then once that technology exists, it becomes possible to identify maverick judges who are making outlier decisions. Now, I have no evidence that any legal system in the world is targeting maverick judges in this way. But what I know is that it’s possible.

ROSELYN HSUEH: One point I have about that is, it struck me as the information collection of the use of technology there. And that is Janus-faced. It could go either way.

ANNALEE SAXENIAN: Totally.

ROSELYN HSUEH: Yeah.

ANNALEE SAXENIAN: [? Asema ?] had a question.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: So I have a question for Rachel and one for Mark. My question for Rachel is that the initiative for this legal tech and courts, is it from the party state or is it court-generated? And then a second– I have a quick comment, which is that a professor Pei, who teaches at Claremont McKenna College, actually has a recent book on the sentinel state.

And he actually talks– the book is really about the low tech kind of aspects of the surveillance of common people, like neighborhood committees, but they also use tech like cameras and streets, and things. But how it is organized, he has a very interesting work. But I was wondering, the source of court, is it the party state or is it the court initiative on its own?

And one question for Mark. Great, very interesting presentation. My question really has to do with is there any product or any global chain where there is a disconnect or dissonance between these control policies to prevent the global value chains to existing and actual functional integration.

So has actual functional integration, is it proceeding the same way, or is there any product or any supply chain where all the protectionist and other control and self-reliant measures have actually affected the material basis of functional integration at the product level or at the supply chain level?

I was wondering because I find a dissonance. So all countries are doing all these great things. But as you said, there are a material limits to whether it can actually happen and whether there is any one supply chain where it is beginning to happen or has happened.

ANNALEE SAXENIAN: OK, why don’t we start with the courts, Rachel?

RACHEL STERN: Sure. That’s a complicated question to unravel. It comes, the initiative to a technology comes from the courts, but it also, is responsive to central priorities, if that makes sense. Like I mentioned, just in passing, that one of the key figures was the head of the Supreme People’s Court. And this is in the 2010s, a man named Zhiqiang.

But he very much framed technology as dovetailing with this national push for AI. So in a sense, it’s the courts fitting in to the broader priorities of the party state. And Xi Jinping is, around that time was, he had a huge anti-corruption campaign. And so the technology is also being framed as a way of combating corruption in the courts.

Maybe this is responsive to your question too. Letting judges know that they’re being monitored. And that it’s not clear what the mechanism is exactly, except it’s sort of a Foucauldian panopticon, is that, if people feel like they’re being watched, they’re less likely to stray, would be the logic.

So it’s kind of a back and forth. And I think in China as in France as in other places, these kinds of technology projects, they need champions. It’s hard work to do this within any state. So there’s champions within the court system, but very much framing their work as responsive to national priorities.

ANNALEE SAXENIAN: Great.

MARK DALLAS: Great. Yeah, good question. So I didn’t want to give the impression that functional integration of global value chains is equivalent to free markets. Those are very different things. And so I would, one answer to your question is, every single global value chain is shaped by various policies that you may have been referring to, whether it’s tariffs or everything else. They mold and sculpt themselves to all of those policies, of course.

And, of course, there’s a large literature about which countries are more favorable or less favorable. So a lead firm is going to decide where to go based on that. But no, there’s no value chain that is not affected by some of the things that you’re referring to. But you were also suggesting– so in a way, it’s all of them.

But you’re also, I think, suggesting is there any product that is completely enmeshed within these regulations. I mean, the classic case is military. So military goods and military companies are very much tied to the national economy. There’s lots of laws and other, depending on the country you’re in, reasons why military production is often purely national and they’re not as integrated in global value chains, not as integrated.

So Raytheon and Boeing, they’ve got military and commercial dimensions to what they do. Airplanes are very complex. They’ve got tens and hundreds, maybe even hundreds of thousands of parts. So you’re not completely walled off.

And so one of the concerns is, what is the defense industrial base at least in the United States? What is the quality of that defense industrial base in terms of producing some of these more less sensitive but critically important, but more conventional products that are more commercially oriented, let’s say?

And then all these companies like Raytheon, RTX is like their commercial arm. So even in the military space, there’s a degree to which. But if you wanted to choose one industry in which it’s much more hived off, let’s say, from functional integration, it would be that one.

ANNALEE SAXENIAN: Question here and then you’re next.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Venezuela, I’m a policy fellow at the law school. So I have a question related to your views about the role of industrial sectors, particularly more in maintaining the international regimes in amid the more intensified geopolitics.

So in the world of climate policy, so we see technology can be a factor for international collaboration, but they can also become a factor for intensified geopolitics, even though for the globalization of green technology productions, it used to be a factor to get more countries together. Now, it becomes more of a major factor US want to decouple with China.

So then, I’m thinking about OK, state actors seems cannot be helpful, in a way, to figure out a way to keep different parts together. How about the AI sector and also the industrial sectors, are they, in some way, can actually maintain the international like systems, which used to be very helpful, particularly after the World War II because of the UN systems and the international trade? So I was kind of, yeah, see you on that.

MARK DALLAS: Do you want to, who wants to take that?

ROSELYN HSUEH: I mean, just thinking about, you’re mentioning that you work in the climate sector. And to wet that with the question about industrial sector, I think Greentech would be a good example of where, perhaps, we could see international cooperation and collaboration. And if we could get countries to work together around the idea of the Paris Agreement, for example.

And I think Greentech achieves both climate change goals as well as economic goals and growth and development for countries and also sustainability. So, in many ways, it has these multi-dimensionality goals that can mean many different both country level goals, as well as economic business incentives. And so I think that’s how I approach your question.

MARK DALLAS: Yeah, I think, I don’t know if you were referring to particular products or whatever, but new electric vehicles as an example or something like that. I think there’s potential. I mean, clearly, China is at the leading edge of that sector. And so I’m not sure in the United States, but let’s say in Europe, I could see a lot tie-ups happening between Chinese firms, both in battery as well as in the vehicle assembly, given China’s advances in that.

And the China, truly, is exceptional, has done a wonderful job in developing that. It would be great if the whole world could benefit from that for exactly those reasons that you talked about. But whether or not, I think, the United States would be resistant to that, but I think Europe could be open to that, and they would benefit greatly from that. So then, you get a degree of that reintegration over common issues. I mean, obviously, there’s money making there, but the climate is a great offshoot of that development.

ANNALEE SAXENIAN: That’s a great point. We had a question right here. And then you’re next.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Sergey Donskoy, Professional Competence Institute. That’s my research organization. And I got two questions which tackle my own research I conducted 10 years ago. So the first question is mostly to Roselyn. And the other question is to Rachel and AnnaLee.

First question, it’s been said that China is liberalizing the sectoral part in country But, at the same time, infrastructure is still under control. So what do you think, will government of China liberalize the infrastructure? That’s the first question.

And the second question is about the knowledge transfer. So it’s been said about the chain, United States, Taiwan, and China. And there was a lot of discussions about it, about stealing technologies. So yeah, we’re open to speaking about it.

So what do you think– well, is there any legal basis for regulating this knowledge transfer? That’s my first question. And maybe it would be reasonable to create this treaty between the United States and China, for example, maybe the other country too, in order to regulate this knowledge transfer instead of implying balancing tariffs.

ANNALEE SAXENIAN: Yeah. Do you want to start?

ROSELYN HSUEH: Very interesting. Thank you for those questions. So the way I conceptualize thinking about infrastructure is that you can actually take it to the sector. And so think about infrastructure as a subsector of telecommunications, for example. And then you have services. Even the value-added services, as I mentioned before, that operate on top of that infrastructure.

And so, in that sense, then, that strategic use of foreign direct investment, that reregulation that we see is, there’s even some sectoral variation within one industry like telecommunications. But to your question, is there a possibility that China would ever liberalize that critical infrastructure? Telecoms is very critical. It has security implications and so forth.

I think that simply, and I think, perhaps, this is where authoritarianism might play a role more so than other sectoral questions, is that if party state legitimacy or political stability is important political goals, then letting go of infrastructure may counter to that, to those goals. And so particularly in critical infrastructure, where even countries like European countries and US have regulations around, then I think for China, I think the question would be probably less likely.

And in terms of knowledge transfers versus technology transfers, I think technology transfers could be seen and conceptualized as knowledge transfers. But I do think that software, for example, as knowledge is sometimes less tangible than maybe knowledge in chips. And in micro institutional foundations of capitalism, where I compare China to India and Russia, and for the Russia cases, I look at post-Soviet Russia Federation and patterns of market governance across sectors.

And when I look at software, that was where because it was more intangible. And as a result, even though much of telecoms and ICT was perceived as a military industrial complex sector and was actually never privatized in the way that we the conventional wisdom tells us software was, and it was because it was less tangible in terms of knowledge transfers.

And so there, I mean, I don’t know if this is the answer to your question about legal barriers, but when it’s less tangible, maybe there are opportunities for countries to come together and collaborate on how we could think about frameworks of regulating that.

ANNALEE SAXENIAN: Rachel, do you want to take a whack at that question or?

RACHEL STERN: Yeah, just briefly. So knowledge transfer and legal bases for dealing with knowledge transfer. That was a key point of, like that’s always a key point in Joint Venture contracts. So it is legally, like, there is a legal way to negotiate it between companies that are contemplating tie-ups.

I mean, doing it as a treaty on a national level, I can’t think of any examples. I mean, it’s possible to imagine but it’s also, you’d have to be at a really different world. You kind of connects us to the first question that was asked about, we’d have to be in a world with far more exchange and far more possibilities for cooperation than the one that we currently find ourselves in. So not impossible, but.

ANNALEE SAXENIAN: Yeah, I think this is a challenging conversation because there certainly has been IP theft. I think we know that has happened. On the other hand, the knowledge transfers that I’m talking about, there’s often tacit knowledge that happens. So you cannot start a chip plant without having people go who know how to do it. And we don’t know how to write it all down.

There’s a lot of transfer of knowledge that is just moves with the people. So much to know-how exists. You can’t write down how to run a venture capital fund or how do you– there’s a lot of things that are happening.

You can explicitly license technology, or you can steal it. But I do think that the people flows made this allowed for a lot different kinds of less explicit knowledge get transferred, which are very important as well.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: So we’re talking about stealing people.

ANNALEE SAXENIAN: Well, no, these are–

AUDIENCE MEMBER: [INAUDIBLE]

ANNALEE SAXENIAN: No. I think the problem is these are Taiwanese people who worked in the US and went home. So they’re running a company that, yeah, I mean, so if you want to call it stealing, you can. I don’t think anybody, at the time, would have seen it as stealing. I think that in the industry, it was mutually beneficial.

I think with China we have, there are cases. And I think we need to follow those and try to clamp down on them. But I would not do that at this. I think it’s terrible that we no longer have students going back and forth as much as we did. The student exchanges have been incredibly productive in terms of building common understanding and avoiding war. And having those cut off is very dangerous.

MARK DALLAS: Can I take a crack at that also?

ANNALEE SAXENIAN: Yeah, please do.

MARK DALLAS: Your question is very broad. I think breaking down knowledge is important. On the basic knowledge side, basic research, it’s completely open. And there’s no controls and whatnot. So you’re talking about knowledge that is in some way proprietary, and sensitive, and whatnot. So you’re at one end of that knowledge spectrum, let’s say.

And I think Anna is absolutely that there are, quote-unquote, “controls, regulations in place,” in companies, even for people– non-disclosure, if you leave this company, blah, blah, blah. So there’s plenty that companies are regulating it. Trade secrets are an important part, not just in semiconductors, but even aircraft engines. I mean, something like that. Lots of trade secrets. It’s all based on that. And so, yeah, companies do a lot of that regulating.

I mean governments I think probably would be doing less. But I’ll give you an example for people to people. In export controls, there’s actually a thing called deemed exports. And what a deemed export is, is basically two people. One is a foreign national, one is domestic in a particular country, and they talk to each other. That’s, quote-unquote, “a controlled item.” So government I mean, the US government does intervene at that level to regulate, quote-unquote, “knowledge between people.”

And just so you know that it’s possible. But I think most of it’s done by companies in terms of regulating knowledge. And I think also that the idea it’s not right, it’s not stealing people. It’s really about, you hire them away. There are certain things that they can divulge and they cannot divulge. And there’s a time limit over when that is.

But knowledge is abstract and then specific. It’s the specific stuff that’s associated with a particular company. And their particular processes that should, cannot and should not be transferred, at least in the United States. And you can be sued for doing that. So there are knowledge controls in place.

ANNALEE SAXENIAN: I mean, your argument would lead you to think that all these people have moved between companies in Silicon Valley. They work for one, they take with them. They can’t take the trade secrets. That’s illegal. They will be sued, and they should be. But there’s so much knowledge that they transfer just from their base of experience that you don’t want the government stepping in there. I think we have time for one more question back there.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, thank you so much for this panel. It’s very fascinating. I think my question is actually very related to the last question, and it’s on digital infrastructure and the materiality of software and how that changes the way we’re thinking about it. So this also relates to a cybersecurity question that you brought up, Mark.

So I guess my question is if we think about you, several people mentioned, like the operating systems and how American corporations are dominating this sphere. If we look at the production of these operating systems, open source software is a huge component of that. One example that I’m thinking of is in 2024, the Microsoft engineer caught this backdoor that was going to be released, and that would have huge implications.

But the larger point here is when we look at the materiality of software and the different network effects of software, that has sort of moved the industry toward this open source model that Silicon Valley is very reliant on, how do we think about that in terms of cybersecurity, and how we should think about digital infrastructure as something materially different from other sources of infrastructure, and like the telecommunications industry, and how are we thinking about this? Yeah.

MARK DALLAS: When you say materiality of it, are you referring to people or?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I guess I’m referring to the, especially the network effects of software and how the libraries are always dependent on each other and the way it’s produced, yeah.

ANNALEE SAXENIAN: When you say the open source model, you’re just referring to the development process. I mean, Silicon Valley is very split. I mean, there’s a lot of people developing software using the process, the open process that is open source, but they’re also commercially, they’re private companies that make profits. So you have that, I’m not sure what you’re referring to. Is it the process or?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I guess I’m asking you to hold both of, holding both of these together. Like, yes, there is the proprietary knowledge, but also a lot of the software industry is reliant on open source and have funny way there’s a software joke that goes around about it.

ANNALEE SAXENIAN: Yeah.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I wish I could pull up the meme.

ANNALEE SAXENIAN: Yes.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: But like Linux–

ANNALEE SAXENIAN: Yeah.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: –which is like–

ANNALEE SAXENIAN: I totally understand. Some people will tell you that 95% of software is run on open source. I don’t know how they figured that out, but, yeah. Go on. So you want the whole software sector. Do you want to?

ROSELYN HSUEH: I mean, I think one way I would approach this is how I answered the previous question, which is, if we think about traditional critical infrastructure as being physical. When it’s physical, in some ways, we have their existing processes and existing frameworks of thinking about how to regulate physical things.

But I think what you’re trying to get at is that when something that is open source or less physical, intangible, less tangible, as I mentioned, in software like that, then can we regulate it? And is it even desirable to regulate it?

And that kind of reminds me of one of the papers that was in one of our panels in the bringing the sector back in workshop that we just had, was that Jeff Ding at George Washington University, he presented a paper about how there’s still interdependence between US and China in the open source software space.

Because as, indeed, as you were saying, that network effect. The people to, and as Armando had mentioned, the people to people flows that’s part of that network effect, makes it. Maybe we don’t have the models yet anyway to try to regulate it. And is it desirable?

ANNALEE SAXENIAN: Well, you can’t patent it. I mean, it can be patented. So software can be.

MARK DALLAS: Do you want me to add something?

ANNALEE SAXENIAN: Yeah, please respond.

MARK DALLAS: So, I mean, it’s a fascinating topic that you hit on. It’s extremely complicated as well. Open source software in particular, I do think it’s a type of infrastructure, depending on how you define what that is. And I think, I mean, it’s a classic example of what I started off with, which is a transfer from a world in which we’re all friendly and there’s development issues to a security world.

And so, yeah, open source software was like this global, everyone contributes, it’s free, you download it, it’s free, you can customize it and then you give back to the community. It was like this global community, wonderful, almost for some anti-capitalist way of approaching things that was going to revolutionize everything.

And it still has that spirit. I think a lot of it. That’s some of that spirit is still there, although a lot of it has been commercialized, privatized, or services have been built on top of it or other ways of monetizing it.

You shift to a security world. And so I used Android. Android is open source. The source code underlying it, AOSP is open source. Everyone contributes to it. Google guides, it’s hard to say, use the word guide. They control it. What are they doing with it? I mean, technically, Google owns Android, but Android is open source.

So it’s this weird combination of private company, money making on the advertising. But with the operating system all over the world. So it feeds into their advertising model, but it’s open source as well. So it’s a strange world, which, I think, is what you were getting at.

But on the one hand, I already mentioned about China’s security dilemma, let’s say, just with something like that. On the other hand, open source is protected by First Amendment rights in the United States. So all the security folks out there are saying, hey, let’s leverage open source and really get the Chinese now, because so much digital infrastructure is built on open source. It’s a First Amendment right.

So it’s a higher bar. I’m not saying that when there’s a security issue, that First Amendment can start to get thrown out the window, too. I’m not saying that. First Amendment is a protection of, foolproof protection against security, but it’s a higher bar. It’s a stronger protection around it.

And so, I think, what you’re hitting on really it’s a topic that’s going to become more and more important. DeepSeek, for instance, was open source. That was the most recent case of a Chinese company that actually is using open source and has open sourced their product. So–

ROSELYN HSUEH: I do think this were regime type could come in, is that, if you are an authoritarian regime and you have the discretion and there’s no First Amendment protections, then maybe there’s not been any intervention, but could that potentially be an issue.

MARK DALLAS: That’s right. And I think one thing I’ll mention– I know we’re already over– is that a lot of this is based on trust. We don’t really talk about trust in the economy. I mean, there is, the sociologists do, sorry. But a lot of this is based on trust.

So when you talk about, will China develop its own open source models, they have to convince the rest of the world to build their products on top of an open source foundation that’s housed in China. And so that might be a hard sell for China. They may be able to create an internal to China open source system, but then you lose a lot of the magic of it.

ANNALEE SAXENIAN: Listen, I want to thank our panelists first, and the audience for a really fascinating conversation. Thank you so much for coming.

MARK DALLAS: Thank you.

RACHEL STERN: Thank you.

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[WOMAN’S VOICE] Thank you for listening. To learn more about Social Science Matrix, please visit matrix.berkeley.edu.

Matrix On Point

Governing Giants: Law, Politics, and Antitrust

Part of the Matrix on Point event series

Large corporations increasingly dominate markets, the flow of information, and political influence. In response, many governments have used antitrust policies in an attempt to rein in companies. Examples include investigations and cases brought by the United States and the European Union against Google, in addition to major investigations against Microsoft, Facebook, and others.

Recorded on April 25, 2025, this panel brought together scholars of political science, economics, and law to discuss the changing landscape of antitrust policy in an era of multinational corporations. The panel included Michael Allen, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Stanford University; Prasad Krishnamurthy, Professor of Law at UC Berkeley; and Amy Pond, Associate Professor at Washington University in St. Louis. Ryan Brutger, Associate Professor of Political Science at UC Berkeley, moderated; he also convened the panel as a Matrix Faculty Fellow.

The panelists spoke about new challenges in competition policy, the domestic and international dimensions of antitrust policy, and the economic, political, and social considerations that shape antitrust policy and enforcement.

The event was presented as part of Matrix On Point, a discussion series promoting focused, cross-disciplinary conversations on today’s most pressing issues. Offering opportunities for scholarly exchange and interaction, each Matrix On Point features the perspectives of leading scholars and specialists from different disciplines, followed by an open conversation. These thought-provoking events are free and open to the public.

Podcast and Transcript

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WOMAN’S VOICE: The Matrix Podcast is a production of Social Science Matrix, an interdisciplinary research center at the University of California, Berkeley.

SARAH HARRINGTON: Welcome. Thanks for coming today and joining us for this Matrix On Point panel discussion. My name is Sarah Harrington. I’m the program manager here at the Social Science Matrix. Today’s event is co-sponsored by the Department of Political Science. I want to thank the Matrix staff here for helping put on this event. And then also a big thank you to Ryan Brutger for bringing this group together today.

We’re pleased to have an outstanding group of scholars to help us examine the evolving landscape of antitrust policy in an era of multinational corporate power. Now, I would like to introduce our moderator, Ryan Brutger. Ryan is an associate professor of political science at the University of California, Berkeley. Professor Brutger specializes in experimental methodology, public opinion, and international relations. His research crosses political economy, international law, and international security, examining the domestic politics and political psychology of politics and economics. This is very challenging.

He’s also a 2024-2025 Matrix faculty fellow, so we’re really happy to have him here today. Without any further ado, let me hand it over to Ryan.

RYAN BRUTGER: Great. Sarah, thanks so much for that kind introduction and for helping organize this whole event. Thank you all for coming to be a part of it. And thanks to the panelists.

I’m excited to be talking about this because I think it’s a subject that is really important these days of thinking about how we regulate large firms and their influence on the economy, on politics, et cetera. And that’s why we’ve brought together a group of scholars who have studied corporate regulation and antitrust policy from a number of different angles. As you’ll learn, we have political scientists. We have economists. We have folks who work on international and domestic law, as well.

And by looking around in the audience, I think we have as much knowledge about antitrust in the audience, maybe more than we have in the front of the room, as well. So we’re going to progress by– I’ll do some quick introductions of our panelists, have them each share some thoughts on opening remarks.

I’ll facilitate some conversation and Q&A amongst our panelists initially. Then we’ll open it up to the room for more Q&A. And given who’s in the audience, I think, also just conversation about some of these topics and issues.

As a little background for those of you who maybe aren’t immersed in thinking about corporations and antitrust regulations and things, we’ve seen increasing consolidation of industries, especially over the last few decades. As someone who comes at this from an international relations perspective, this has been incredibly important when it comes to say, international trade.

For example, at the turn of the last century, we know that the world’s largest firms, just 10% of, say, the US exporting firms, were responsible for over 96% of the US’s total exports. So that’s a huge amount of business being done by a relatively small number of companies. And that concentration has continued to increase.

And so something that led me to be interested in this was actually a conversation that Professor Pond and I had years ago, when we were thinking about increasing power of these firms, not just in the economy, but their effects on democracy and governance. And I think that’s an issue that’s become increasingly important.

And so she and I have actually co-authored a couple of papers together on these topics and have really continued to just see a rising salience of these issues. And so that’s the motivation for today’s conversation. So I feel especially lucky to be joined by this group of panelists.

As I mentioned, Professor Amy Pond is joining us today. She’s an associate professor at Washington University in St. Louis. She received her PhD from the University of Michigan and was previously a professor at the Technical University of Munich at Texas A&M. She conducts research in a number of areas in international and comparative political economy, with a strand of current research that looks at how market concentration and international ownership affects domestic policies, including the provision of public goods like property rights and democratic representation. And so will bring a great deal of insights into today’s discussion.

Michael Allen is joining us from Stanford, where he is an assistant professor. He received his PhD in government from Cornell University and was also a postdoc at Yale and Harvard University before making the journey across the country. His research interests span international political economy, institutions, and law, with a focus on the politics of global capitalism. And he studies how the growth of private authority influences domestic legal developments and the power of countries to regulate foreign commerce. And he also has ongoing projects and related areas, including special economic zones, anti-corruption efforts, and global competition law.

Last but certainly not least, we have Prasad Krishnamurthy, who is with Berkeley’s Law faculty. He holds a JD from Yale Law School and a PhD in economics as well, so brings a wide variety of perspectives. His research includes financial regulation, antitrust and competition policy, consumer law and policy, and distributive justice.

I will say, in putting together this panel, I was more familiar with my fellow political scientists research, but really enjoyed reading some of your research on the regulation of banks and the consequences for, say, wages and small businesses. And I think that’s really relevant for the conversations we’ll be having today.

So without further ado, we can dive into some opening thoughts. And, Amy Pond, why don’t you kick us off, please?

AMY POND: Ryan, thank you so much. It’s just it’s a complete pleasure to be here. And thank you all also for joining us. It’s really nice to be here. It’s really nice to get to talk to people across different disciplines, because when you study antitrust, right, you really have to channel some divides. There’s people working on this in law and economics and political science and others.

And so sometimes I’m more familiar about the work in my area, but it’s so important to become informed about what others are doing as well. So I’m especially excited to be part of this.

I guess most of my work began with just this really simple motivation. So first, I’ll talk a little bit about what I think we know in terms of the parts of the field that I know the best, and then I’ll talk about what some of my research and most of this is co-authored with Ryan.

So in terms of the simple motivation, I mean, markets are becoming increasingly concentrated. If I were to put some– if I were to put a picture up right, I would have probably put this picture of the number of firms that are currently publicly traded in the United States, because the number has halved between 1997 and 2017.

And this isn’t necessarily a bad thing. And there are a lot of different explanations for this. When I think about the economics literature, I think the big one tends to be that it’s an increased number of mergers and acquisitions. And so we just have firms exiting the financial market. Another aspect of this is global trade and investment. It’s being dominated by the largest firms, that’s led to an increase in concentration in general.

So as I said, this isn’t necessarily a bad thing, but I think there are important reasons to be cautious about this. So in economics, we tend to think that more concentrated markets are going to be less competitive. This is going to lead to elevated prices and costs for consumers. There’s also some evidence that there are lower returns to labor, for example, as a share of value added. So firms are earning larger profits, but they’re not necessarily passing that along to laborers.

When we think about this in politics, we often think of these really large firms having an advantage in terms of overcoming collective action challenges. And so they’re better able to lobby and thus, have more political influence. And so this is kind of where I entered the literature. And I’ll talk about three separate projects.

I think the first one is just that– I argue that concentration doesn’t just affect the political influence of firms. It might also affect what they’re actually demanding from politicians. So if you think about potentially two ideal type markets, where you have one that’s focused on just one large firm, another that has many small firms, that large firm is going to be better able to secure their political preferences, so policies that are biased in their favor potentially creating entry barriers to their competitors, whereas if small firms tried to do that, there’d be a bunch of firms lobbying against them. And so those efforts would cancel out.

And so I argue that these markets that have many small firms are going to– the firms operating in those markets are going to prefer more public-goods policies that attempt to level the playing field, like strong property rights. And we in political science tend to think that property rights is a really important building block on the way to democratization.

And I have some survey evidence from business executives operating in Latin America. It’s consistent with this kind of argument. I’m happy to talk more about that research, if you all are interested. And then I have another set of papers looking at the context in which antitrust policy is made. And one of these papers just came out in Business and Politics. We have our editor here in the audience, so very excited to be here.

And so one of the arguments in this paper is that because these large firms are so effective at getting their policy preferences realized, they are going to earn larger profits. Like there’s more concentration, less competition. So they earn larger profits. They’re going to be able to use these profits to influence policy.

And so those firms that earn larger profits, we’re going to see them making larger tax payments and potentially also, unofficial payments like corrupt payments, are going to be better able to protect themselves from the enforcement of antitrust policy. And so in a cross-national sample, I show that firms that provide more revenue to governments are allowed to grow larger. This is controlling for their profit level, actually. It’s not sensitive to that.

And these effects are especially pronounced under authoritarian political institutions, which we think should be less attuned to consumer interests and also more able to violate the independence of regulators. So I think one crucial topic that we’re often talking about with antitrust law is how independent are regulators. And I’m happy to return to that any time if you all are interested.

And then the third project that Ryan and I have worked on is looking at citizen support for antitrust. So when do regular citizens, when are they willing to demand that the government do something about concentration? I think this is a really important question, because if you think about who benefits and who pays the costs of concentration, it’s going to be large firms are going to be demanding weak enforcement of antitrust, and the beneficiaries potentially have much harder time overcoming collective action problems. But politicians aren’t going to do anything unless citizens are motivating them to do so.

So we just to give you a preview of some of our results. We find that everyone is really worried about how competition might undermine the ability of firms to compete abroad. They’re also very attuned to fairness concerns. And we find that people who position their political ideology on the left are more concerned about the anti-democratic effects. And people on the right are more concerned about punishing companies who are successful.

And so, just to conclude, I think one of the big unanswered questions that we don’t know is how increases in concentration are going to be met. There’s a historical literature arguing that as you see more and more concentration, that’s going to foment support for antitrust and lead to stricter regulation. But there’s not a clear prediction about when that would happen or under what conditions it would happen.

And there’s a recent formal literature in economics looking at how concentration can create a vicious cycle. And if concentration begets political control, then they’re going to implement policies that just further that concentration. And so you can see this cycle. So I’m really looking forward to your comments and just having a conversation with all of you.

RYAN BRUTGER: Great. Thanks so much, Amy. Appreciate that. And Michael, we’ll turn it over to you.

MICHAEL ALLEN: All right. So I made some slides. So I’ll just go over here to share these. Yeah, so while I’m getting this, thanks, Ryan, so much for– and the Matrix– for hosting us. Yeah, super interesting panel. Very happy to take part in it.

What I thought I would spend my time and, I guess, your time to doing was just presenting some data on the kind of global diffusion of antitrust laws around the world. And then also just to give a high-level overview of how political scientists and historians and economists have thought about how to make sense of these kind of global patterns in enactment of antitrust legislation around the world.

So just to give a quick sense of how this stuff has changed over time. So this is just a snapshot, this is presenting data from this great project called the Comparative Competition Law Data Set, which was led by Andrew Bradford at Columbia and Adam Chilton at Chicago.

And so what they do is they coded all of these different antitrust laws around the world, going back to 1889 with the first law that was passed in Canada. And so as you can see here, the ones in blue signify the countries that have passed some kind of law. And so by the end of World War II, there’s basically limited to the US, Europe, and some commonwealth countries and Canada.

By the end of the Cold War, though, it had been a pretty dramatic expansion. Though it was limited, it seems to be kind of biased towards countries that heavily trade with the United States. So you see, a lot of the expansion is in East Asia, with Korea, Japan, Latin America, India, and some of the commonwealth countries.

But this changed a lot after the end of the Cold War and the decline of the Soviet Union. Countries are transitioning to market economies. And you see this really dramatic expansion in every region of the world and countries that have enacted these kind of general antitrust or competition policies. So this is not looking at sector-specific policies that we might get into during the discussion. But these are laws that set the rules of the road for competition across the economy as a whole.

And so I thought I’d categorize these different buckets of explanations into things that are kind of purely domestic factors that might explain why a country might adopt a competition law. And then I’m going to end with talking a bit about the international forces, in particular, like the role of global trade and how that affects the incentives to enact these laws.

And so the simplest, earliest explanation that you might see related to what I was just saying is that there’s been this kind of gradual transition amongst a number of economies around the world, away from planned economies towards market-oriented economies. And so competition authorities, obviously, play a bigger role in those kinds of jurisdictions.

Particularly, you can see on the right-hand side there, which plots the number of any type of antitrust law. So even reforming existing antitrust laws per year, there’s been this huge explosion after the end of the– dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War. These countries are transitioning to market economies.

And then another way that political scientists have thought about this, too, is not so much related to the structure of the economy as a whole, but to think about the kinds of interest groups that might benefit or lose from policies like competition policy or antitrust laws. And so one way to think about it is that antitrust law is they promote competition, which lowers prices, increases quality, incentivizes innovation, and which benefits consumers and consumers vote. And so in a democracy, they prioritize the interests of– these types of interests. And you might get more antitrust laws in those types of settings.

To add a kind of twist to it, you can then add different twists to this type of story. So, for example, Steve Weymouth has an argument that says, well, you might think that labor would benefit from antitrust rules, but there’s some types of labor organizations that have real leverage over their employers and might be able to extract some of the benefits of operating in a concentrated market. And so he finds in countries, where you have larger amounts of labor power, that you don’t see as strong of a connection between democratic transitions and enactment of democracy.

So the basic idea, though, is however you want to– what theory you want to apply, the idea is that– you might think about how different kinds of interest groups benefit or lose, and how the political institutions prioritize some types of groups over others as a way to predict how whether or not a country will enact its something like a competition law.

And then the second aspect of the domestic feature is– so I’m borrowing this term from a Robert Pitofsky, who is the chair of the FTC under Clinton, who, in an article in 1979, drew this distinction between what he called the political content of antitrust law and its economic content. And so this quote, there’s a lot to debate about it.

And so setting aside whether or not it is good or bad policy to incorporate political values in how you interpret the antitrust laws. I never find that it’s a kind of a useful distinction in thinking about how politicians or activists generate political coalitions that support the enactment of antitrust laws, or maybe oppose them.

And so what he meant by the economic content was kind of just what I was just describing. So there’s certain winners and losers, and you can see how those preferences get aggregated within the domestic political system. But then there’s something else that he argued, that there’s something kind of resonant between the goals of antitrust and just general democratic values writ large. So the basic idea is that there’s this fear that excessive corporate concentration can disrupt or corrupt democratic political processes.

So one thing I really like these old comics, I just felt like this kind of characterized some of the popular attitudes around antitrust in this was in, I think, the late 1880s from Puck magazine– that’s a P at the top of the page there– where it’s showing this snake with monopoly on its chest. Snakes have chests.

And then it’s wrapped around the US Capitol and it’s threatening Lady Liberty. And it says down here, Puck [INAUDIBLE] is asking Uncle Sam, what are you going to do about it? And so this has led to a kind of greater expectation that democracies have this– on top of the types of people, types of interest that democracies tend to prioritize, there’s this kind of deeper connection between democracy and the goals of antitrust that we should allow us to expect to find a more democratically oriented political systems to adopt similar kinds of policies.

So in one paper that I have jointly with Ken Scheve at Yale and David Stasavage, we use the– we find that– so when a lot of these early antitrust laws were passed in the United States, it was during a period in which not all senators were popularly elected. And so one of the things that we found is that senators that are popularly elected are more likely to support antitrust reform, like strict, more stricter antitrust laws than those that were nominated or selected by their state legislatures.

And then just from a global perspective, this is plotting similar data from that comparative competition law data set. And so on the y-axis is just this goes from 0 to 1. You can happy to talk about it more, but you can think about this as just higher values stricter antitrust laws. And then I’ve just plotted the average across democracies and non-democracies over time.

So you can see there’s this pretty consistent democratic advantage or preference for antitrust that shifts after 1990, when you have more countries that are transitioning to market economies, but not transitioning to democratic political systems. But the gap between democracy and non-democracies stays pretty consistent and actually kind of grows over time.

Now, the last point I want to make is about the kind of international aspects of antitrust law. So from the very beginning of these debates, there’s this connection made between trade and concentration. And so you see this, this is just a screenshot of a speech that was given at a pretty influential conference in Chicago in 1899 about the trust problem in the United States. And this is a common political refrain at the time that the tariff was the mother of the truss.

And so there are some scholars that argue– [INAUDIBLE] argues that the Canadian law, passed in 1889 prior to the Sherman Act of 1890, was primarily passed because as a kind of compensation for enacting after that a really high tariff. So you’d have the tariff that would protect the domestic industry. But to prevent some of the other ills of having concentration that might be caused by the tariff, there was an antitrust law to try to mitigate some of those negative consequences.

And on the flip side, you might think that trade was seen as– the reason trade was the mother of the tariff was because it would make it more difficult for domestic firms to collude, because a foreign firm could then could undercut the agreement made by the domestic cartel. And there are two problems with this view. The first is more just empirical, is that just what you would expect there is that, as trade expands, there’d be this kind of negative relationship with antitrust. But that’s just not how the kind of global economic cookie crumbled.

So you have, in the ’90s, a dramatic expansion of global trade. And at the same time, lots of countries were enacting antitrust legislation. On the other side, it just turns out that, and some people argue, that it might actually– global trade might not just make it harder to clue. It might make it increase the incentive, because it might be harder for domestic regulators to track agreements between firms to carve up markets across multiple jurisdictions.

So this led to a separate view that rather than being substitute for each other, antitrust and trade might be complementary and serve the same goals. So you have some– so Anu Bradford and Adam Chilton, who developed this data set that I was just presenting some data from, find that there’s this very tight connection between a country’s level of trade openness and their antitrust policies. The more open you are, the stricter your antitrust laws are.

And because of this possibility of increased collusion across borders, you would expect to see more cooperation between jurisdictions over antitrust laws. And what you’ve seen in the last probably 30 years or so is that there are agreements between countries to share information, maybe assist in investigations that are cross borders.

What I’ve plotted here is just the countries in blue are the countries that have– whose competition authorities have signed cooperation agreements with the US Federal Trade Commission, which is one of the bodies that deals with antitrust in the United States, for cooperation specifically related to antitrust. And you can see there’s a pretty heavy bias here, too, towards the countries that the US trades with a lot, like it’s China and lots of South and Central American countries, Japan, India, the EU.

And then to add one last wrinkle before I stop talking, to build off of one of the points that Professor Pond made, is that there might be a kind of– in this world with trade and antitrust, there might be a kind of a disadvantage for enforcing or having strict antitrust laws domestically.

So suppose you have these big export firms that are trying to compete in global markets, you might be able to give them a little bit of a competitive edge by weakening your own laws. So it creates a kind of free rider problem or cooperation problem.

And so one of the things that you see when you look at preferential trade agreements today is there’s been this increasing shift towards including provisions in those treaties that stipulate different provisions of how the country’s antitrust laws or competition policy ought to be structured. So, particularly the EU, which is generally seen as having a pretty strict competition regime, has been at the forefront of conditioning trade agreements on the other country, also having and enforcing its own competition laws.

So there’s benefits in terms of maybe harmonizing rules across jurisdictions for firms that are operating across jurisdictions. But I think there’s also an element in which this might help resolve some of the competitive elements that might lead to weakening antitrust in a world of global trade. And so I will just leave it there. And thank you and looking forward to the discussion.

RYAN BRUTGER: Thank you. All right. We’re getting lots of interesting thoughts and conversation starters. What’s that? I know I’m just giving him time to come back to my seat. All right. So we’ll now turn it over to Prasad.

PRASAD KRISHNAMURTHY: Thank you, Ryan. Good afternoon, everyone. It’s been really interesting to hear this discussion of antitrust from a number of different perspectives, and I will keep with the theme of the afternoon so far by offering a very different perspective from than what has come before.

I am a lawyer and also an economist, and I’ll have a few things to say about economics, but I will take more of a US legal perspective on how to think about current trends in antitrust. So I hope, especially for some of the students here, that by the end of this, you’ll feel more confident reading articles about Google and Meta and so on and the cases against them. And I have a sense of what are the stakes in these.

So in preparing these remarks– there are hundreds of antitrust cases a year. In preparing these remarks, I read all the cases since the Trump administration in 2016. And that’s a lie. I looked at some of the big cases, and I thought, let me try to pull out some of the big themes.

So in my time here and I’ll try to finish an expedited way, I want to advance three main arguments. First is that contrary to a lot of what you might read in the media and even what some of the defense side law firms are circulating in their publications, I want to suggest to you that all of the recent cases that are being brought that you read about in the news are very traditional antitrust cases.

And the kind of claims that are being bought– I’m not saying whether the plaintiff or defendant should win, but the kind of claims that are being brought are kind very consistent with the US tradition of antitrust. There’s nothing kind of really radical or a departure from the past here as far as the major claims.

Second, that if you– I think, unfortunately, it’s hard to read anything in the media these days on US antitrust without the reporter at some point getting into a debate over whether antitrust follows a consumer welfare standard. So I want to try to clean some things up in that area. And I want to suggest that when you read that should more or less ignore it.

And the reasons why it will be that, in general, as a matter of ordinary language and law, antitrust does not follow a consumer welfare standard. That is the language that economists use for what antitrust does. But in what economists are doing, it’s perfectly fine. Within their self-understanding of what consumer welfare means, that approach is quite valid and quite useful. So I’ll say more about it, but that’ll be the basic line.

And then third, many of the issues that were talked about in this panel that the public is concerned with antitrust rising concentration in the United States and in many other countries, domination of certain key infrastructure by a few companies, the entire communication infrastructure and internet infrastructure by a few companies, all of online retail by a few companies, that these concerns are perhaps better addressed by laws and regulation and political action that is actually quite distinct from antitrust. That antitrust maybe has to be a little bit more humble with respect to what it can do in light of these issues.

So let me start with the first claim on the tradition of US law in the recent cases. So first, I have to describe US law. The nice thing about antitrust is that the structure of the law is very simple. There are two kinds of antitrust claims. There is a claim of collusion, and there is a claim of exclusion. What’s collusion?

Collusion is a situation in which firms get together and agree to, say, fixed prices on a consumer or fixed prices on some customer. And we can understand from the economics that we shouldn’t allow that because that’s going to create, under most economic models, a deadweight loss and a harm.

Now is this a harm that is focused on computers– or excuse me, on consumers? In the law, not at all. If firms get together and fix prices on a consumer, it’s illegal. If they fix prices on some customer, who’s a business, also illegal. Fixed prices on a supplier, illegal. Worker, illegal.

Any agreement between firms to limit prices, quantity, quality, innovation, investment levels, credit terms, it’s illegal. And it’s illegal because it causes that kind of a deadweight loss. So it applies across the board. And so as a matter of ordinary language and as a matter of law, because in law we have to define, well, who can bring the case? What are the damages/ to whom are the damages are owed? So we don’t use a consumer standard for the law because the claims can be bought by anyone who’s suffering a harm, any direct party to the transaction.

Now, economists will say this is governed by a consumer welfare standard. And they are correct, because the idea is that there’s a deadweight loss. And in economics, when there’s a deadweight loss, that means there must have been some harm to someone’s consumption. And that’s what the economists are talking about. And they can analyze antitrust policies within that framework. And it’s really quite valid, but it’s separate from the law and it’s separate kind of from ordinary language. So that’s collusion.

The chief area of collusion cases and the easiest to prosecute in a way, but as a legal matter, are cartel cases. And I think it’s worth noting because some of the panelists have talked about this, there are many international price fixing cartels. And they often require a cross-jurisdictional coordination in order to figure out whether the cartel is taking place.

But from a lawyer’s perspective, these cases, there’s no interesting law in these cases. If you can prove that they fixed the prices, you have a criminal indictment, you’re going to win the case. The difficulty is the proof, because they’re going to try to hide it. So these cases, they don’t make the headlines very much. But they’re a very important part of domestic and international antitrust enforcement.

And I’ll note parenthetically, as a local matter, recently, the Trump administration has said they want to close the Chicago and San Francisco field offices of the DOJ for antitrust enforcement. And I don’t know much about the Chicago office, but the field office in San Francisco specializes in cartel cases. And they have prosecuted– if you go to their website, it’s pretty fun. Cartel cases are fun to read about because what’s going on is kind of interesting.

They have prosecuted dozens of cartel cases in the California economy in the past decade or so. And those cases require investigation. They require public enforcement because private parties can’t get the information in the same way that DOJ can. As anyone who saw the TV show The Wire knows, the feds can get wiretaps, and they can get information the way private parties can.

So collusion cases or cartel cases are very important. The collusion cases that get the most interest as far as the newspapers are concerned and online media is concerned are mergers. And I’ll have something to say about mergers following. OK, so that’s collusion.

Exclusion happens when one firm or a firm working in concert with other firms takes some action against its rivals. For example, cutting them off from a source of supply or cutting them off from a source of distribution, in a way that isn’t just about competition on the merits, but is done solely to harm that rival. So this is illegal.

Is it, for example, and is it described by consumer welfare standard? No, but the harm is to businesses rivals. The harm is to their competitors. Competitors are often the ones who are bringing these suits. Competitors are the ones who are getting damages. Competitors are the ones who are showing that there was a harm to them. So as a matter of ordinary language, you wouldn’t say that it’s consumers that are harmed.

And as a matter of legal language, we don’t. But the economists are still correct in their models that this is a harm for consumer welfare, because we’re not counting all harms. But if I, as a firm, make a better product or service than my competitor and they’re harmed, there’s no antitrust claim.

It’s only harms that will have some downstream effect, some downstream effect on other parties, which will mean some harm to consumption, some harm to welfare. And that’s what the economists are talking about when they say even exclusion follows a consumer welfare standard. They’re right, they’re right in their kind of conceptual worldview. But that’s not the worldview of the law and kind of public discussion.

And so let me talk about some exclusion cases. So we’ve got now, if you go to law school, just skip taking antitrust. You’ve got it all. You’ve got collusion. You’ve got exclusion. You can go to the cases. So let me talk about a few of the cases. I don’t think I’m going to get to talk about everything.

So one of the recent cases was against Google with respect to how it was prohibiting or other parties from getting their search engines onto Google’s commercial partner. So Google would say to Apple, we want you to place our search engine as the search engine in Safari, and of course, the search engine in Chrome as a default matter. And then consumers, they wouldn’t change that from that practice.

So Google, the claim by the DOJ against Google is that they were using these kind of paid tactics to cement their market control in search, like Google is clearly the leader in online search. So that would be considered an example of exclusion because Google is paying Apple and saying, here’s the money, and we want you to make it hard for our competitors to access your Apple interface. So you can make it out as a claim for exclusion.

But it also shows that exclusion cases are hard to win. It’s easy to win those cartel cases, but the exclusion cases are hard to win because Google has a defense. And Google’s defense is that we’re just paying for shelf space. When you go into the supermarket and you walk along the aisle, the aisle that is at your eye level costs a lot more to place the products than the aisle that’s near your feet. And companies are bidding for that.

When you click on something online, you see an advertisement, that advertisement is the result of a competing auction and simultaneous bids in a market clearing mechanism that allowed someone who wanted to give you an ad to pay money to show you that ad. So this is ubiquitous in the economy. And Google would say, why should it be illegal if we’re doing it?

So these exclusion cases always have that character, because the conduct that they’re being accused of is conduct that if the firm didn’t have market power, it would be just fine. It would be just fine. It’s only that we’re potentially calling the action illegal because of their power.

If there are any sports fans and you listen to– and you’re following the NBA playoffs, you might watch TNT, and Shaquille O’Neal is one of the commentators. And Shaq will always say, they’re calling all these fouls on me and I’m just touching people up. Now Shaq is enormous. He’s like 7 feet tall and 300 pounds.

So when Shaq touches someone, they go flying across the court. And the refs are calling a foul. And he says, but yet all these little guards, they’ll throw a punch at me and the ref won’t even call it. So that’s antitrust. Shaquille O’Neal understands antitrust very well. We have different rules for companies that have market power. We don’t just let Google touch up. DOJ won the case. So we don’t just let Google touch up its competitors.

A similar case for exclusion involved Google and the online ad space where Google controls firms that help– if you’re a publisher of a website, how do you place your ads? And then there’s an exchange that matches the ads. And so there’s a whole ecosystem of online ads.

Another case against Google that was recently decided, last week, was that Google monopolized in that ad by tying together its services. Again, ties happen all the time. And if you go to a burger place and they tell you we’re giving you a burger and fries, you’re not going to turn around and sue them for antitrust violation. But if a firm has substantial market power, then its ties can potentially be illegal.

I’m not going to be able to do all my exclusion cases, but that’s a take on some of the exclusion. Let me say a little bit about mergers. How much– how much time is it?

SARAH HARRINGTON: Five more minutes.

PRASAD KRISHNAMURTHY: OK, perfect, perfect. So collusion cases, we’ve got cartel cases. Not that interesting legally. Collusion cases are also merger cases because the idea is that two firms are merging, so we’re losing the competition between them. They’re in a way colluding by having the merger.

We also worry about whether after the merger, the market is now less competitive because more players have been kind of taken off the field. So that’s the major concern with mergers. But it’s important to get a sense of what is and is not possible as far as merger enforcement.

So I’m going to focus on 2022, where we have the full regulatory report of all the numbers. So mergers have to get reported to the federal government, the FTC and the DOJ, if they’re above a certain size. That size is about $120 million as far as the size of the transaction.

From 2013 to 2020, so in that seven-year span, the highest number of reported transactions was 2,111. And that was in 2018. So that means, more or less the last decade of 2010 to 2020, the highest number of mergers in a year was about 2,000

In 2021, there were 3,520 transactions reported. So that’s more than had ever been– you have to go back to 2000, you have to go back to the beginning of the century to find a higher number. And yet whenever I would open the Business Press, I would read articles about how the Biden administration and Lina Khan was suppressing US mergers.

Now, how is that possible when there are 3,520 transactions? Now, they might have been deterring specific transactions. That could very well be the case. But could merger policy have been substantially dampening mergers during that period of the Biden administration? I would say no. And so it’s important to keep that limitation in mind.

So when these 3,152 HSR like these filings came in, what did the Feds do? 47 times, they offered what’s called a second request. That’s where the FTC, DOJ say, we’ve looked at your initial filing. We think there could be some problem. We’d like some more information. So the 47 out of 3,152, that’s 1.5%. So 1.5% of transactions get a second look.

What did the DOJ do with the 47 transactions? They brought six lawsuits, 10 of the mergers were abandoned. They just didn’t want to deal with it after the second request. And then [INAUDIBLE] lawsuit. And in those lawsuits, there was some abandonment. They won a couple. They lost a couple.

So four suits litigated right by the DOJ essentially for mergers for that entire year. So this is not going to have a substantial deterrent effect on mergers. What it can do is it can affect the mergers that took take place. And some of those mergers involve firms that are very substantial from the standpoint of their injuries or standpoint of their industry.

So it still has a big impact on the industry [INAUDIBLE] down that really takes place and the limited way in which the mergers can happen. So I’ll talk about one merger and then conclude.

So it’s a case that wasn’t really litigated as a merger. And this is Meta’s acquisition of WhatsApp and Instagram. And so that acquisition took place 10 years ago. It wasn’t challenged by the DOJ at the time, but it is being challenged now and they’re going to trial. And Mark Zuckerberg testified last week. So it’s a hot topic in contemporary antitrust.

And the issue is that, at least according to the plaintiff, according to the government, that Meta bought these two companies and they bought them with the intention of actually shelving them. And so that’s problematic. And after having consolidated them into one company, they are now using the combined platform to deter other rivals from entering into the social media space.

So that’s an exclusion claim. What they’re doing is they’re using their control over a particular ecosystem to try to prevent other rivals. That’s the exclusion part of it. And the purchase of the two competitors is a kind of collusion claim. So they’ve got two of them mixed together.

Parenthetically, I think, so in a case like this, you have to prove that Meta is a monopolist, that they have substantial market power. And you have to prove that the harm was exclusionary. I think the government may succeed that Meta has the requisite market power. But trying to prove that the harm was exclusionary is going to be difficult because WhatsApp and Instagram have thrived.

But keep your eye out on it and understand the nature of the claims there. So in conclusion, I have sought to advance three arguments. Admittedly, I haven’t said much about the third, but I’ll say a little more about it.

The first is that all of the high profile cases we are reading about what Lina Khan did as head of the FTC, the cases brought by the Biden administration, the cases that are being continued by the Trump administration, these fit into the collusion exclusion paradigm. In that way, antitrust is a fairly mature body of law. I don’t see that much legal innovation that’s kind of taking place at that broader level.

But this is not to say that the cases are not innovative and new. They’re innovative in that they are being brought against these major companies. And the cases were not brought against these major companies in the past. Investigations took place and the investigations ferreted out activity that was potentially problematic. And all of that is a kind of a new situation where these companies are now on notice that they’re not going to get potentially a free pass for things that are potentially exclusive and are tilting the playing field in their favor. So those aspects of these cases are quite new.

Consumer welfare standard, I told you it doesn’t describe the law, but it does describe what economists do and the way in which economists analyze different antitrust laws and their implications is very useful for antitrust law and policy. So we just have to keep the languages distinct.

I had said this collusion and exclusion is all we’ve got in antitrust. We’re in an academic institution. And so I don’t want to discourage innovation. So where can there be new conceptual thinking in antitrust? I’ll offer one possibility. Hopefully, one of you will take me up on it.

In the early 20th century, there was a lot of discussion in antitrust cases of harm to small businesses. And it was thought of as being a discrete harm. And that has completely disappeared from the case law. And the question is why? And that’s the kind of historical question. And then I think a normative question is, well, how could it be reintroduced? And how could you create legal standards or a policy framework that takes into account small business harm as well?

Because the public clearly cares about it. And they clearly expect antitrust to do something about it. But in its current guise, it doesn’t do so directly. I mean, there’s still exclusion, which there can be exclusion of a small business, and then you’ve got a case.

But there’s nothing like, in some of these early merger cases, it was said, look, these are mergers. Bigger companies are taking place. Smaller companies are no longer able to compete. And so we’re going to consider that a harm. We don’t do that anymore. And the interesting question is why. And if not– and if we were going to do it, how we were going to– how would we do it?

And then lastly, I mentioned, and I’ll try to be brief, on the limits of antitrust. In my view, when you read what the public is concerned about with respect to Google and with respect to Apple or Meta and WhatsApp and Instagram and so on, they’re concerned about the general information ecosystem of our society, where we get our information, where we get our news, how we create our political ideologies and alignments and so on.

And I just don’t think antitrust is ultimately capable of solving policy and political problems in those areas, that it requires legislation and requires rulemaking by agencies, that’s just different from what we have seen in the past. In many ways, antitrust is going in the opposite direction to some of these concerns, because antitrust is a one-way competition ratchet. All you can do is make the economy more competitive Under antitrust law.

Do we want the Facebook, WhatsApp, Instagram sphere to be more competitive? If it’s more competitive, that means people spend more time watching it, because they are more addicted and more glued to it. But is that what people’s concern is? It’s like Instagram is not good enough. We need it to be even better, so that it can be the Instagram of our dreams, at least as the parent of a nine-year-old kid. That’s not what I’m thinking about with respect to– similarly, with respect to Amazon.

Like all these cases are presumably going to do is create more competition in online retail because that’s Amazon’s market. But with Amazon, we’re concerned about mom-and-pop businesses that are being pushed away by Amazon. If there are five Amazons that are even better than Amazon, that’s not good for a brick-and-mortar bookstore here in Berkeley.

So I think it’s important to keep in mind, competition only goes in one direction. And often society is concerned about something different than competition or things, even too much competition may not be a good thing. Lastly– and I’m done. I’ve talked over my time.

RYAN BRUTGER: All right. Well, thank you all for giving us a really good primer for our conversation today. And I want to pick up on one of the– or some of the points that Prasad were raising and connect them to some other ideas. So I’ll start by asking or thinking about how the technological change that has led to some of these companies that you were just mentioning might have changed the politics and incentives for stronger antitrust.

And so I’ll start with this being posed to the whole panel. But when we have now companies that use social networks as part of their product and social networks are more effective when they are larger, not fragmented. , how has that changed things? Or that many of these provide free products, you mentioned Google search. You mentioned you can engage with these and the consumer isn’t paying for it necessarily.

They pay for it through advertising and things that happens. But it’s a very different marketplace than perhaps when we think of the first Gilded Age and what led to some of the antitrust. So I’m curious if any of you would like to comment on how that might shape the push for antitrust or the lack of push for it politically for our political scientists.

Or potentially, how that also maybe has altered, if at all, the cases that are being brought on those dimensions, even if we’re not using a strict or using a consumer welfare standpoint, but whether that has even changed the motivation to bring those types of cases. So I’ll open that up to the panelists if you’d like to jump in, anyone.

PRASAD KRISHNAMURTHY: Maybe we’ll just move this way.

AMY POND: I don’t know. Go ahead.

MICHAEL ALLEN: Oh, sure, I can– yeah, I think there’s definitely a connection between technological change and these demand for changes in antitrust. So maybe because of my interest in the history of this stuff, it’s not an accident that you saw the initial push for antitrust in the United States happened in the late 19th century, when there were these big technological shocks that had, for the first time, created getting closer to a real national market within the United States, like prior to these communication technologies and transit through railroads and stuff, that type of national market wasn’t really didn’t really exist.

And that led to a lot of adjustments by local markets and exploitation, maybe through these kind of new monopolies that had controlled the railroads and so on. And so I think there’s definitely a sense that when you have these big shocks, and there’s clear winners and losers, antitrust is part of the political response that comes out of that kind of political mix.

And I think also getting at the point about whether or not antitrust is the right way to do it, one of the things that I think gets discounted in the history of the US history is that three years before the passage of the Sherman Act, they passed a law creating this thing called the Interstate Commerce Commission, which was that we say antitrust started in 1890, but that was really kind of a law to deal with railroads and how they set their prices and who’s allowed to use them and so on.

And so that’s kind of like a bill that was designed to resolve a very specific problem to that came out of this kind of big technological change and the economic concentration that resulted from it. And so I think if you look at also in the United States, but elsewhere, there’s this other side of the not the antitrust tradition, but how do we deal with economic concentration, very specific sectors, that is another key part of how to think about the politics of antitrust or concentration.

PRASAD KRISHNAMURTHY: Yeah. I agree with what you said. I think there are a lot of historical parallels in the sense that there was tremendous industrial concentration around economies of scale in the early part of the 20th century. So in that way, yes, the economies of scale are different now in many of these industries, it’s network effects and things of that nature. But I think antitrust was built around that idea. And we’re not– shouldn’t be shocked by the newness of that one.

One thing I think has changed on the consumer side is that I think many more of the consumer issues that we see, and you mentioned the free goods and so on, that we see that are of concern in these dominated markets are involved the behavioral economics of consumers, as opposed to in the early 20th century, was the milk rotten or not?

It’s fairly straightforward kind of question. And you don’t want the cartels to rot in the milk– rot the milk. So I think we, in that way, face more difficult questions of paternalism and freedom and the like, around regulating in these spaces where many of the big tech firms operate.

On this issue of when this choice between antitrust and kind of direct regulation, I think one interesting current area where the EU and the US have differed, for example, is around search. And I’m not a deep expert in this area. But as I understand it, the Europeans have more or less promulgated regulations around what any search engine has to do so as to be kind of fair and transparent and so on. We don’t have anything like that.

And the cases that have tried to be litigated against Google, claiming that Google favors its own content in its search have not gone anywhere. And so I think an important area. And it’s one where it’s directly at that kind of antitrust regulation interface.

And even if we were to win a suit against Google, it would only apply to Google, because it’s an antitrust case. Whereas if you have a regulation for search engines, it applies to any search engine, whether it has monopoly power or not. So I think we’re going to grapple with these issues.

RYAN BRUTGER: So one question I want to pick up on then is thinking about whether it’s grappling with these issues through specifically antitrust policy or potential legislation in other areas of what might lead to a political moment and political will to get to that point.

So you mentioned that there was a time when thinking about antitrust as being protecting small businesses or the harm to small businesses as being unique. That’s actually something that came up in Amy and I’s research, is looking at public attitudes towards protecting small businesses versus other things. And as Amy mentioned in her opening remarks, one of the findings we found was that Americans were very concerned about the competitiveness of US firms in international markets, and that seemed to move them much more than concern for protecting domestic small businesses.

Admittedly, that surprised us. We thought that protecting small businesses would be really important. So, Amy, since you and I have done some of the work, I might put you on the spot and say, do you have any thoughts on what’s most likely to lead toward a political will potentially coming from constituents, but maybe other actors as well, since I know your work crosses many spaces?

AMY POND: I mean, when I think about small businesses and antitrust, I think this is another one of the big differences between US antitrust law and European antitrust law, where I am not an expert in this area. If you’re not, I’m really not.

But my impression from reading some of this literature is that there’s been more of a tolerance for allowing small businesses to coordinate their behaviors in Europe, whereas in the United States, we apply this kind of same standard of no collusion across firms of all sizes. And this is what allowed small businesses in Europe to remain to be able to compete with these larger firms. And so maybe antitrust law is not the right– I don’t– maybe, yeah, I mean, it’s just not the right tool for this.

One area where I think there is a lot of political pressure to do something right now, and again, maybe antitrust law is not the right tool for considering this, but in terms of information provision. So if we think about a lot of people are getting their news and information from these social networking sites, it’s not clear that it should be one company that’s allowed to continue to do that.

And maybe that’s regulation. But I think historically, regulators haven’t been separate from antitrust law breaking up large firms. That’s just how we’ve been thinking about it, I think. So maybe we need a bigger departure.

RYAN BRUTGER: Great. So I have lots more thoughts to guide the conversation, but I realize with only 20 minutes left and a room full of interested people, I’d like to start a list as well. So we’ve got lots of people. We’ll start here in the front. And Sarah is going to help us make sure we have microphones.

And so please begin. And please introduce yourself if you don’t mind just.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah. My name is Clayton. And I’ve worked in Asia as an expatriate. So one question I have is on a global basis, what is the remedy for all this? And does the remedy involve ensuring our US companies are very competitive on a global basis?

Because if you look at China, they’re entrepreneurial, but they have state-run, they have large companies. We have to– in my opinion, we have to make sure our companies are competitive across that. The old rule of [INAUDIBLE], they’re not going to be effective. I think China is a different game than Japan was, that’s not necessarily a good model. How does that work onto it?

And then quickly, you indicated, when you look at some of the harms at the same time when large companies buy smaller companies, they bring resources to the smaller companies. You get national distribution or global distribution. And then the question also is on the number of acquisitions that was done. Was that a lot because of PE and venture capital? They may have not existed 50 years ago. There’s a lot of VCPE, et cetera there. So a series of questions there.

RYAN BRUTGER: Great. So you want to jump in on the global component first?

AMY POND: I can if nobody has burning– I mean, I was thinking about this from the perspective of antitrust regulation. And there’s just some really interesting challenges when we start comparing regulators across contexts. There’s lots of challenges in terms of how they write the laws, but then also the capacity to enforce the laws and the ability to collect all this information and other countries, and the potential for regulators to be more politicized.

I mean, this is something that’s talked about in the US context, but I don’t think politicized to the same degree that antitrust regulators might be in other places.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I think the political issues will be global, like ensuring our global capability goes beyond politics or policy. What is the right policy to ensure that our companies are competitive on a global basis, not just in the domestic side?

RYAN BRUTGER: And one thing that comes to mind here is, I mean, there’s the competition, but then what creates the landscape for competition is also the interaction of our own antitrust policy with others. So for example, when China decided to put in place a new antitrust policy that was viewed as being more stringent, at least my reading on it was that this was really led to divisive reactions amongst businesses, some of whom thought, oh, if this is applied apolitically, this might actually allow us to compete better. And others saw it as a potential tool for hidden protectionism that if it is applied in a biased manner, that could disadvantage foreign firms even more in the Chinese market, for example.

And so I think, I mean, a question that I had hidden here, but we haven’t gotten to yet, was sort of, is there space for coordination on this? Because I think what we do in any one country certainly doesn’t function in a vacuum anymore. And it affects our competitiveness, both firms domestically against each other, but internationally.

In the long run, I’m of the mindset that there is much more room for international coordination and cooperation on that, but it’s a really hard area to bring jurisdictions into a level of harmony that I’m not optimistic that we’re going to make much progress on. Do you want to touch on this?

PRASAD KRISHNAMURTHY: Yeah, I wouldn’t mind jumping in on this as well. Vinny is here. He knows a lot about these issues.

I think you have to separate out antitrust policies that try to create new businesses and the innovation side of things, where I think, in general, there is an alignment between antitrust policy and of national policy. But when you get how to think about the antitrust practices with respect to large firms, I do think some trade-offs come into place, where, in the ’80s, for example, after the ’70s stagflation, ’80s merger policy was very open and policymakers were quite clear. We would need to allow mergers so that we can get let the biggest ones survive, and they will be our national champions because we have to be competitive in a global marketplace. So merger enforcement was relaxed with the idea of creating national champions.

You might think are the same way about monopolization practices. Even if firms are exercising monopoly power to inhibit competition, it might have a domestic cost, but it might have– if it leads them to conquer foreign markets, then it has foreign benefits and things would have to be traded off now.

Actually, courts don’t do this right. There is no court that’s going to sit and balance those things. But policymakers who think about enforcement and things like that probably do.

RYAN BRUTGER: So next, we have Vinny and then Steve on the list. And I’m happy to take more as well.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: So I really enjoyed the presentations. The more current discussion seems more international than your presentations, but I understand you’re presenting. But different countries, as Ryan just said, have a very different perspective on competition policy, and as Prasad just pointed out.

I mean, I have a good friend who is in the Justice Department doing foreign antitrust, and he was helping the Japanese, quote, “develop antitrust law,” and the Chinese developed antitrust law. And he went to Japan for a year. I said, so what’s it like? He said, it’s really different than Washington. Here, they’re trying to make trusts. There, we were doing antitrust.

So it’s a very different environment for me. And by the way, no one wants to talk to me because the Japanese are terrified that I might spill the beans on something. So his experience was interesting.

But when we think of the politicization of antitrust– and you could argue the Chinese have politicized antitrust in the current Trump campaign against with tariffs and so on. And they’re using antitrust as a potential weapon against large American corporations.

But they’re not the only ones. I mean, we can think of the Europeans have done it for a long time. I was speaking to an antitrust regulator in Europe, DG Competition. And they said, well, I said, you’re pretty anti-American. Oh, no, no, we’re just going after Americans because they happen to be big. I said, really? And you’re not worried about the fact that you can’t compete in the AI, you can’t compete in all these industries, and you have really no search engine? Oh, no. No, of course not. That’s not the way we operate.

But following on that, there’s also now, as we all know, a great deal of politicization of antitrust in the United States. So I would like any of you, whoever, would like to take up this question, to think about the politicization of antitrust and getting away just from what we would hope would be a legal policy that’s kind of indifferent to the politics, but that’s clearly not happening in many countries or in the United States. Thank you.

RYAN BRUTGER: Who wants to jump in? That Pitofsky quote, so I think–

MICHAEL ALLEN: Yeah, no, I think– yeah. On the point that the different, yeah, different regimes have very different goals that they’re trying to accomplish with their antitrust rules. And I think that’s part of the thing that also would limit– is what are the limits on a deeper cooperation around antitrust.

So you have some countries that have these kind of national champions and the competition laws are really about managing these large conglomerates to promote some level of competition between them and also their smaller domestic suppliers versus maybe the more traditional– not traditional, but the way it had done historically in the United States, where it wasn’t about inculcating these big national champions in export markets. And these kind of domestic little agreements over how antitrust operates in the country can create big disagreements on how different countries pursue different goals that will limit that cooperation.

But the other side of it is I think as an idea like antitrust is– it’s s of like a black box, and you could put all sorts of demands into it, and it kind of makes sense. So you have Jim Jordan on the right, who sees antitrust trying to make antitrust claims against the social media companies for, in their view, censoring conservative speech or now against the Ivy League schools for DEI and so on.

And so there’s lots of different ways that they’re capacious enough to allow for political actors to exploit them rhetorically to make all sorts of demands. And then whether or not, though, they work as a different question, I guess, but you can imagine that those are actually part of the coalition that might lead to explain certain kinds of political outcomes. And it could sway how judges will rule, depending on who gets appointed and things like that. But it definitely, at least at the rhetorical level, antitrust allows for that kind of politicization in the United States.

RYAN BRUTGER: [INAUDIBLE]

PRASAD KRISHNAMURTHY: I would agree with that. I would say, I think the system works well when the political views around antitrust are kind of channeled in a coherent way. And so the Trump administration backing the case against Meta, because they think social media is suppressing conservative voices, like that’s not within the traditional set of values and things that we ask antitrust to do.

But that framework, the frame– the existing framework can be quite broad. And in 1946, ’44, there was a famous case against Alcoa. And in that Alcoa case, the judge whose name was Learned Hand, and that’s not by accident. That’s a badass name for a judge, Learned Hand.

He gets very close to saying that Alcoa has violated the antitrust laws because it is a monopoly in the sense that it’s simply its status and size mean that it’s violated the law. He gets very close to saying that, and then he backs away from it and says, no, you’ve got to be a monopolist, and you have to have done something unfair. And so we have both of those prongs.

But you could have an antitrust law that says status size enough is a violation. You can’t have a framework like that. And many– some academics have advocated for it in the ’70s and so on, distinguished academics, even some at the University of Chicago.

And even if you didn’t go with that, you could have that conduct standard be very light. So that you’d be very close to status. Pretty much anyone with monopoly power who even trips over their shoes in the wrong way is violating the Sherman law.

You could have a law that we don’t have that, but you could have that. So those are the permissible boundaries of where the law can exist are very broad. And people have to contest them by electing– petitioning the legislatures and making rules and the like, so as to figure out where we’re going to fit in that spectrum.

AMY POND: Ryan, can I–

RYAN BRUTGER: Oh, yes, please.

AMY POND: I don’t think this adds– I think you already know this, Vinny, but maybe I’ll say it anyway. I mean, we talked about two different sources of politicization. We’ve talked about international for sure, like targeting antitrust towards international firms. You talked about a number of really recent examples, but also domestic targeting of antitrust.

This is something that the Chinese government has– people have said that they’re targeting specific firms domestically with antitrust law. And this happens in Russia as well. And so typically, the institutional design that we point out in response to this sort of challenge of politicization is that we’re going to make antitrust regulators independent from political oversight.

And so that’s– so then that independence becomes very important and maintaining that. But the ability to do so I think really relies on people making sure that politicians don’t intervene with these independent agencies.

RYAN BRUTGER: And we’re seeing some challenges and concerns with that in various ways, that was the part that was left unsaid. You turned the microphone off. OK. Steve.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Fantastic panel. I’m Steven Vogel, political science and political economy. My question is for Professor Krishnamurthy. So you kind of suggested that the Biden administration represented not a change in paradigm, but a change in practice in the sense that they took more cases.

So I guess my question is, does the difference between paradigm or principle and practice get a lot muddier than maybe you suggested, in the sense that they’re taking those cases because– or they’re pursuing them more aggressively because they have a different evaluation of the economic analysis, and also they have a different view on what the breadth or narrowness of antitrust should be.

And I guess, related to that question would be maybe a second part to that question, which is you ended by saying, that antitrust really should be limited in its remit, shouldn’t try to do all kinds of things. So I agree with you that it can’t necessarily solve those other problems. But I think that still filters back into whether other concerns should be part of the antitrust.

So you mentioned small business, but so for example labor, that you could worry about the effects of a merger on labor or you could not. So I guess, my point is that you still have the question of whether you should consider a broader range of things as you’re making those decisions or not. Just curious to get your thoughts.

PRASAD KRISHNAMURTHY: Yeah, I agree the world is muddier than I made it out to be. I think one way I would characterize the Biden administration is of having a much broader view of what antitrust should do than collusion and exclusion, but having to operate within the parameters of winning cases.

So it’s like you be a Marxist in the Biden administration and on the antitrust staff, but you’re not going to convince a federal judge win your case unless you put out a theory of collusion and exclusion. And so then there is, I think, an interesting translation game between a political, economic worldview that’s wider than current antitrust and how to translate that into the language of current antitrust.

And my guess is that I know Lina Khan and my guess– and she’s certainly not someone who thinks that the world should begin and end with collusion and exclusion. But yet she had to operate within that framework. So I think– so I would take what you said as a friendly amendment, and I would accept it.

But I think still within that you could still push the boundary, not just of facts, but of law. And there– I mean, certainly, some of that was done in their jurisprudence. But for example, they didn’t try to push the monopoly standard, so that– the monopoly standard of conduct is still wider in the 1950s than what the Biden administration was trying to push. So they didn’t even try to even go for New Deal antitrust in terms of their particular theories of case, maybe just because they thought they couldn’t win. But you do see that.

And I think it’s good that we are now paying much more attention to labor markets in antitrust. But I see it as very consistent with the paradigm. These are just harms to actors from a merger to through the collusion, through the potential collusion, and whether they’re workers or whether they’re suppliers or whether they’re customers, antitrust law, the traditional approach doesn’t militate against that.

RYAN BRUTGER: Next, we have in the back of the room, Juno.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hey. Thank you so much for the inspiring discussion. And I was quite interested to hear that about Professor Krishnamurthy’s question on whether more competition in social media is a good thing or a bad thing. And it really resonates that having more social media companies might not necessarily be a social good or a public good.

In that regard, I was wondering whether this idea contrasts with the traditional conceptualization towards innovation, which is that monopolized firms have lower incentives to innovate, and that is– that greater regulation of monopolies would stifle innovation. Because if we look at the cases of social media, these firms’ innovations sort of happened already in a previous stage where they were not big firms. So this led me to question whether the idea that monopolization stifles competition is really a valid thesis, or I may be mischaracterizing things, but I just wanted to hear your perspective.

RYAN BRUTGER: I think, Prasad, that was primarily directed to you, but– if you want to start, I don’t know.

PRASAD KRISHNAMURTHY: Sure. I think there are these competing theories in economics about when innovation takes place. Some suggest that more competitive circumstances, you’re likely to get innovation from new firms and the like. There are others that suggest that incumbent firms invest the most and produce the most innovation, and some of both of that is true. And it kind of depends on the circumstances.

I think the social media landscape is an interesting one because it raises the specter that potentially that not all innovation is good. If consumers are not necessarily always the captains of their own well-being, then firms can innovate in directions that make consumers worse off in the long run or worse off with respect to their better selves or something along these lines.

And in that case, innovation isn’t necessarily the thing that policy should aim for. Now, then, it also raises the question of whether antitrust law is the right framework to deal with that, or whether we would have more direct social media regulation, more direct to consumer laws.

The FTC would pass rules on what social media companies can and can’t do to us, and what types of situations, and show us what type of information and have what kind of data. But I think the policy tension in that area is like– the antitrust cases sometimes feel like all we want is uninhibited competition in this area, and that’s going to redound to the benefit of us all. And I think there’s a growing public skepticism with that view in many areas.

RYAN BRUTGER: Well, with only one minute left, I think that is going to be the last question we can take. So please join me in thanking our panelists. Thank you all very much for joining us.

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[WOMAN’S VOICE] Thank you for listening. To learn more about Social Science Matrix, please visit matrix.berkeley.edu.

Matrix On Point

150 Years of Border Control: The Legacy of the 1875 Page Act

Recorded on April 23, 2025, this panel marked the 150th anniversary of the Page Act of 1875, one of the first federal laws to restrict immigration to the United States — especially Asian immigration, as the law prohibited the importation of Asian contract workers, prostitutes (a provision targeted against Chinese women), and criminals.

The interdisciplinary group of UC Berkeley professors discussed their current work related to race, gender, or labor in US immigration history or Asian American Studies, and their thoughts on the legacies of the Page Act and related issues for the United States today.

Panelists included Catherine Ceniza Choy, Professor of Ethnic Studies at UC Berkeley; Cybelle Fox, Professor of Sociology at UC Berkeley; Leti Volpp, Professor of Law at UC Berkeley; and Matrix Faculty Fellow Hidetaka Hirota, Associate Professor of History at UC Berkeley and Thomas Garden Barnes Chair in Canadian Studies.

The panel was co-sponsored by the Berkeley Interdisciplinary Migration Initiative (BIMI), the UC Berkeley Department of Sociology, the Department of HistoryDepartment of Ethnic Studies, the Asian American Research Center, and the Center for Race and Gender.

Watch the panel above or on YouTube. Or listen to the audio recording via the Matrix Podcast below (or on Apple Podcasts).

Podcast and Transcript

[MUSIC PLAYING]

[WOMAN’S VOICE] The Matrix Podcast is a production of Social Science Matrix, an interdisciplinary research center at the University of California, Berkeley.

SARAH HARRINGTON: Welcome. And thank you, all, so much for coming today and joining us for today’s Matrix On Point panel. My name is Sarah Harrington. I’m the program manager here at the Social Science Matrix. A quick thank you to the Matrix staff for helping us put this event on today. And then a big special thank you to Hidetaka Hirota, who’s one of this year’s Matrix faculty fellows, for putting this fantastic group together for this panel.

We’re really pleased to have this excellent group of scholars here today to help us reflect on the legacy of the 1875 Page Act, one of the earliest federal laws restricting immigration to the United States. This event offers an opportunity to examine its enduring implications for race, gender, and labor in US immigration history.

I would now like to introduce our moderator today. Hidetaka Hirota is a social and legal historian of US immigration, specializing in nativism, immigration control, and policy from the Antebellum era to the Progressive era. His research has appeared in leading history and migration studies journals. At UC, Berkeley, he teaches US Immigration History and codirects the Canadian studies program. He is also one of this year’s Matrix faculty fellows. So without any further ado, I would like to turn it over to Hidetaka.

HIDETAKA HIROTA: Thank you.

SARAH HARRINGTON: Thank you.

[APPLAUSE]

HIDETAKA HIROTA: Hi, everyone. Thank you for joining us this afternoon. Before we start this event, I’d like to thank the Social Science Matrix team, especially Sarah Harrington, for enormous assistance with the logistics of this event.

And I also want to thank all of the departments and centers who generously cosponsor this event, including Berkeley Interdisciplinary Migration Initiative, BIME, the Department of Sociology, the Department of History, the Department of Ethnic Studies, the Asian-American Research Center, and the Center for Race and Gender.

So this year, 2025, marks the 150th anniversary of the Page Act of 1875. This law was passed in the midst of growing anti-Chinese sentiment in the 19th century in the United States, especially here in California. And the law criminalized the importation to the US of women for the purposes of prostitution, and abandoned admission of such women as well as convicted criminals.

And the law also prohibited Americans from importing to the US forcibly recruited contract workers from Asia, from China, Japan, or an oriental country. The law prohibited the admission of so-called coolie workers, laborers. And the law made a violation of this provision a criminal offense.

So this act was one of the first national immigration laws that developed in the 19th century. But also, it had enormous implications for the discourse on race, labor, gender, sexuality, and morality in the US in the subsequent periods.

So I’m hoping to use this event as an opportunity to think about the significance of the Page Act related to issues of race, gender, and labor in US immigration history and Asian-American history. So the goal is big. The Page Act is important, but also, I’m hoping to provoke discussions of broader issues, as I said– race, labor, gender, and immigration, and Asian-American history.

And today, we are extremely fortunate to have three specialists in these fields at US Immigration and Asian-American history. All are UC, Berkeley professors, esteemed scholars. And I’m going to introduce all of them now. And then we’d like to develop around table conversation based on the questions that I have in the next 15 minutes. And then we will do Q&A toward the end. OK?

So right here on my left and to your right, I guess, Catherine Ceniza Choy is a professor of ethnic studies at UC, Berkeley and an award-winning historian of Asian-American history. She is the author of Asian-American Histories of the United States, published 2022. The book examines nearly 200 years of Asian migration, labor, and community formation in the US.

Her previous books include Empire of Care, on Filipino nurses in US history, and Global Families, on Asian international adoption. Professor Choy has been widely cited in media outlets such as New York Times, CNN, and The Atlantic. She previously served as chair of the Department of Ethnic Studies and associate dean in multiple university divisions.

On your right edge, Cybelle Fox. Professor Cybelle Fox received a BA in History and Economics from UC, San Diego, and a PhD in Sociology and Social Policy from Harvard University. Her main research interests include the welfare state, immigration, race and ethnic relations, American political development, as well as historical and political sociology.

Her most recent book, Three Worlds of Relief, compares the incorporation of African-Americans, Mexicans, and European immigrants in the American welfare system from the Progressive era to the New Deal. Professor Fox won six book awards for Three World Relief, including the C. Wright Mills award from the Society for the Study of Social Problems.

Her next book project focuses on the rise of legal status restriction in American welfare, social welfare policies since the New Deal. Her work has appeared in the American Behavioral Scientist, American Journal of Sociology, Journal of American History, Social Forces, Sociology of Education, Social Science History, Political Science Quarterly, Sociological Methods and Research, Law and Social Inquiry, and Studies in American Political Development. She is also co-author of Rampage– The Social Roots of School Shootings.

And in the middle, Leti Volpp, is a professor of law at UC, Berkeley, and a scholar of Immigration Law and Citizenship Theory, examining how law is shaped by culture and identity. She has published extensively on issues of immigration, gender, and race, with work appearing in Constitutional Commentary, Columbia Law Review, and UCLA Law Review, among others.

She is the editor of Looking For Law in All The Wrong Places and Legal Borderlands. Professor Volpp has received numerous honors, including fellowships from the Rockefeller and MacArthur Foundations, and is a member of the American Law Institute. Here at Berkeley, she directs direct the Center for Race and Gender and is affiliated with multiple interdisciplinary programs on campus.

As you can tell, we have a wonderful group of scholars for this event. And I would like to start our conversation at this point. So my first question is actually about your work. So this event is about Page Act. So I think it makes sense if I ask, how your earlier or current research intersects with the Page Act itself or related issues, as I said, race, gender, labor, class, sexuality, morality in US immigration or Asian-American history? So yeah, it’s a time for you to introduce your work to the audience. So why don’t we start with Professor Choy?

CATHERINE CENIZA CHOY: OK. Thanks so much, Hidetaka. Thanks so much for being here. The Page Act certainly intersects in terms of the historical theme of migration, how migration is gendered, racialized, and classed in all three of my monographs, from Empire of Care, which was about Filipino nurse migration to the United States, certainly, a gendered professional stream of migration to global families, which was about Asian international adoption, the history of that here in the United States.

The United States is an international adoption nation. It’s the leading country that receives internationally adopted children. We tend not to think of that as a form of migration, but it is.

But the Page Act and my work intersects most directly with my most recent book, Asian-American Histories of the United States, which you pointed out was published in 2022 by Beacon Press as part of their series on revisioning history. And it’s an overview kind of book, and it’s really meant for the broadest audience possible.

And you had mentioned, it spans 200 years. And one of the unique or distinctive aspects of the book is that it has a nonlinear or what some people have described as a backwards chronology. And what I point out in the introduction is that, when and where Asian-Americans enter in US history is a complex question. These are complex questions because this is such an incredibly large, I mean, the fastest growing racial ethnic group in the United States coming from over 20 sending countries– from East Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Indian subcontinent, over 24 million strong at this point. So it’s such a diverse group. And so how do you approach an overview of a history with so much diversity?

And so the way I approached it was through this idea of taking different origin years in history and saying that there is no one singular linear history that actually, you can take different origin years, and then through what I call this constellation approach, learn about and further explore particular themes in various Asian-American histories.

And so the first chapter begins in 2020, and the conclusion ends with 1869. But one of the years that I chose to feature was 1875, precisely because of the Page Act as an important origin year for history of the objectification of Asian-American women. And each of the chapters goes back to a particular origin year, but then also moves forward in time.

And I wrote the book primarily during our COVID-19 years, 2020, 2021. And so very much what had happened in Atlanta with the spa shootings in March of 2021, where six of the eight people who were killed in those shootings were Asian-American women. And this was such an important moment for our Asian-American communities, for communities in Atlanta, this idea, where is this coming from? Why did this happen? The perpetrator of these heinous crimes said that race had nothing to do with it, that he was having a bad day.

And so throughout that chapter, I posed certain kinds of questions to the reader. And one of the questions is, why is it that the perpetrators of violence get to establish this discourse about what happened? And I emphasized how important the Page Act is for not only the racialization, but also the sexual objectification of Asian-American women. How it’s not the only thing contributing to these kinds of discourses, and knowledge, and experiences that Asian-American women have had historically? Certainly, popular culture contributes to this as well.

And I think the last point I want to make, because I know this is a discussion, is, another point about the Page Act is the way that it was enforced. I mean, it was really about the immorality of women in connection to prostitution and the exclusion of that. But the way it was enforced was to have enforcement, specifically in ports in Asia, and even more specifically, Chinese women were targeted.

So part of it is the law. And then part of it is the enforcement. Part of it is the legacy that we’re living in today. And that association continues with us. And the Atlanta spa shootings was just one iteration of that.

So I’ll end with another question that I present to the reader regarding the Page Act and the association of Asian-American women with prostitution or immorality, historically, which was brought up by the historian, Mae Ngai, which is, how do you prove a negative? When you’re in enforcement, and the officers are deciding whether or not you’re a prostitute, I mean, how do you go about proving a negative?

HIDETAKA HIROTA: Thank you. I think we will go this way.

LETI VOLPP: OK. Well, this is fantastic, because what I’m about to say is completely in dialogue with these really wonderful remarks. So I wrote something that briefly talked about the Page Act. 20 years ago. And it’s basically a story about intersectionality. So this term, coined in 1989 by law faculty member Kimberlé Crenshaw, perhaps, best encapsulated by the title of a book, which was, All The Women Are White, All the Blacks Are Men, And Some of Us Are Brave. So it’s like, what happens if you try to look at particularly, the experiences of women of color and see how discourses that are focused on race and on gender tend to occlude what their particular experiences were?

So I was trying to write a history of dependent citizenship and marital expatriation centering Asian and Asian-American women. So I will say, we have Nancy Cott in our audience, who wrote the, I won’t say seminal, this is something I’m actually trying to get people to not use as the word “Seminal,” but to say “Germinal.” Exactly. Germinal or foundational work, Public Vows– A History of Marriage and Nation, if I remember correctly, which basically paved the way for people thinking about how to write a history of marriage and its intersection with nation in the United States.

So we had a history, where the logic of coverture, This Idea that when a woman married a man, her legal identity was subsumed into that of her husband. This idea was imported into immigration law. So a woman’s status would follow that of her husband. And that enabled both women, who were foreign born through the act of marriage, become citizens of the nation state, but also, as of 1907, meant that US citizen women who married non-citizen men actually, through the act of marriage, lost their citizenship.

So there was campaigning about this. There was a legislative remedy, what was called the Cable Act in 1922, which many people had pointed to and said, well, this solved the problem. But when you look at the legislation, that actual bill specifically says that if you are racially ineligible to naturalize, you will still lose your citizenship. And if you’re racially ineligible to naturalize, you cannot basically be a citizen. And so there was then piecemeal legislation fixing this in the early 1930s.

Anyway, so looking at that, it made me think about the Page Act and the conventional statement which is that Chinese Exclusion started in 1882, or that the first race based federal immigration law was enacted in 1882, or the first federal restrictive immigration law was in 1882, which was the Chinese Exclusion Act.

And it puzzled me like, why do people periodize history in this way? Why are they not thinking about 1875 as the advent of Chinese Exclusion? And is it possibly because there are questions of, as the act says, lewd or immoral conduct involved that this doesn’t seem purely about race in the same way as the Chinese Exclusion Act?

But if you think about the Chinese Exclusion Act, it was also about conduct, and that it wasn’t targeting all Chinese, it was specifically targeting Chinese laborers. That’s a form of conduct. You’re a laborer, and you’re not a merchant.

So anyway, so something that I think is interesting to think about, and in doing a little bit of research for this talk, I found a piece posted in 2022 by the National Park Service about the Page Act. And in it, they point to the fact that there was actually a Senate apology in 2011, issuing a statement of regret for its earlier passage of restrictive immigration laws, including the acts of 1875 and 1882.

I thought, wow, that’s really amazing. Let me look at that apology. When you actually look at the apology, it doesn’t say anything about 1875. It starts in 1882. Anyway, so there’s something very, I don’t know, telling about these repeated occlusions, which, perhaps, we can think about a way in which stories of race are told about male bodies, typically.

The other thing I’ve been thinking a lot or a little about more recently is actually, I love, by the way, this idea of, history is constellations and problematizing, that you take a year, and x starts in this year. But thinking also about how history is used to explain the present. And so there’s a way in which the Page Act has been used as this really interesting shorthand.

And I’m not at all saying, this is what you’re doing at your book. This is in the popular press. And the popular press, it feels like the Page Act serves as this kind of like too much explanatory force is given to it. It’s like the Page Act explains Atlanta.

I think it’s people are searching for something that proves right that the US nation state is founded on racism and sexism that is particularly aimed at Asian, Asian-American women, and here is proof. The Page Act explains this, there’s a piece in the nation I saw which is basically titled The Roots of the Atlanta Shooting Go Back to the First Law Restricting Immigration.

I think it’s also interesting for us to think about, what is occluded in that story? And what is occluded about thinking about anti-Asian violence against Asian women? How is this formed by, this is a particular workplace? What is the role of US militarism in creating massage parlors that have typically accompanied US military bases? How that was brought to the United States by people who had been involved in that and then in Asia and then moved to the United states? The question of, I mean, staggering age of a lot of the women that were killed in this.

Anyway, so there are, I think, other things going on in there. So questions of localism, globalism, militarism, labor, sexuality that tend not to be thought about when there’s this unilinear direct line that gets drawn.

HIDETAKA HIROTA: Thank you.

CYBELLE FOX: Thank you. So unlike these two brilliant scholars, my work is not directly related to the Page Act of 1875. I do study the race and immigration and the American Social Welfare System throughout the 20th century. So my first book, as Hide mentioned, Three Worlds of Relief, compare the incorporation of African-Americans, Mexicans, and European immigrants into the American social welfare system in the Progressive era and the New Deal.

And my new work, which is fully drafted and about to be sent out for review, explores the rise of legal status restrictions in American Social Welfare Policy from the new deal all the way up to 1994, with the passage of the Proposition 187 Ballot Initiative here in California, which you might remember, attempted to bar undocumented immigrants from all non-emergency social services as well as public education, from kindergarten through college, and then tried to require cooperation between social service providers and immigration officials.

So central to all of my work is the importance of race and racism for the treatment of immigrants in the United States, just as racism was central to the passage and impact of the Page Act. Racism is important in helping us understand why restrictive immigration laws are proposed or passed. And certainly, nonwhite immigrants in my work have typically been disproportionately targeted or affected by restrictive policies that have been adopted.

So in both the first book project and the current one, I show that European immigrants were incorporated into the early American Social Welfare System, while Latinos, especially Mexicans and Asians, were often excluded or at times, expelled from the nation for their attempt to gain access to these benefits.

So let me give you a little example. At various moments in time in the 20th century, social welfare agencies have cooperated with immigration enforcement in ways that made those who tried to apply for assistance either for themselves or sometimes, for their American born children, targets of deportation.

So in my first book, I discussed the role that social welfare workers in particular played in the expulsion of Mexicans and Mexican-Americans from the nation during the mass repatriations of the Great Depression. And those similar social workers in areas where there were lots of European immigrants protected European immigrants from immigration enforcement actions. So instead of encouraging and trying to expel Mexicans from the nation, social workers who worked with European immigrants tried to protect them from that sort of treatment.

Now, in the new book project, I detail a second less well-known episode but really important one, actually, of cooperation that occurred in the 1970s, when the federal government weakened confidentiality provisions embedded in welfare law that allowed cooperation between welfare, hospital, and immigration officials.

So during the 1970s, welfare and hospital officials sometimes reported undocumented immigrants to immigration officials. They threatened to call immigration officials to achieve other ends, including consent to sterilization. There was a huge episode of that in Los Angeles. And they forced welfare applicants to visit immigration offices to verify their eligibility for benefits.

When, due to understaffing or underfunding, immigration officials actually refused to deport individuals who were reported to them by these agencies, hospital officials sometimes hired private ambulances to repatriate migrants themselves. And welfare officials stationed welfare caseworkers in immigration offices in order to clear the backlog in immigration status verification forms, so more people could be expelled from the country and taken off the social welfare roles.

Alarmed by this rise in cooperation between welfare, and hospital, and immigration officials in the 1970s, Peter Schey, who, at the time, was this young immigrant rights attorney in California, one of the few who were working there, he later became a very prominent attorney, he charged that welfare agencies in the 1970s were being transformed into, quote, “the law enforcement arm of the migra or the IMS, the immigration service, a phenomenon that activists linked directly to the great repatriation that happened in the 1930s.

So these 1970s era restrictions affected men and women, young and old, of various nationalities, including immigrants from China, and the Caribbean, and Central and South America. But since Mexicans were both legally and socially constructed at that moment in time as the prototypical unauthorized immigrant, they were disproportionately impacted by this policy shift.

So, again, to reiterate, the tie for me is the centrality of race and the targeting of specific ethnoracial groups in the construction of restrictive immigration and immigrant policies, and then in the implementation of those policies.

HIDETAKA HIROTA: Thank you. This is great. My original plan was to let the panelists respond to each other, but I want to actually follow up with a really quick question based on what you said. So I see, what’s common here is labeling, legal status, determining somebody’s status. Page act was essentially about labeling, who’s prostitute? Who’s coolie? And Leti mentioned the Cable Act as well, and the legal treatment of immigrant women, and legal status restriction in Cybelle’s case.

So what’s the challenge of doing research on legal status? Policy about labeling. What’s so interesting, exciting about doing research on policies about labeling or legal status? Yeah, if anybody has any ideas. I thought that’s interesting, before we move on.

And Cathy introduced a really interesting point in Page Act. Yeah, it technically it prohibits prostitutes, but then how can you prove the negative? And that’s really an important struggle. I mean, it’s a very important, I think, dimension of this act. But again, yeah, I wonder if any of you can address the importance of the challenge of studying labeling or legal status in relation to immigration of Asian-Americans.

CATHERINE CENIZA CHOY: You see how challenging that question was?

[LAUGHTER]

 

I can try to take a stab at it. I mean, I think that one of the things that’s challenging is, I think, in terms of historical methodologies, that you have to understand the time period on its own terms. And I agree with you, what we do as historians is not this presentist kind of approach.

So in some ways, at the same time, we are here in the present and doing this kind of research. So I do think one of the challenges is understanding or trying to understand– why are there particular labels at that particular time? And what do they mean? And how do they translate today? Or how they’ve changed? Because they have.

I also think, another challenge is something that we work on, which is this not knowing, this occlusion or in Asian-American histories of the United States, I call it this theme of erasure. It’s like when the general public doesn’t necessarily know, even though this is such an important legal statute, the Page Act. But if you would ask someone about an important law, that’s not what they would remember. And so part of the challenge is also remembering and making those connections. I don’t know. What do you think?

CYBELLE FOX: Oh, sure. The question of labeling comes up a lot in my new work in a variety of different ways. The book is really about why we started to get legal status restrictions in American Social Welfare Policy. And they emerge in the 1970s, when the federal government, which I think I’ll talk about a little bit later, barred undocumented immigrants from virtually all social welfare programs. And then state and local communities had to do the work of implementing this new federal ban.

And there were lots of questions. It was really hard to implement in practice for a whole variety of reasons. It had all these horrible consequences. But it was actually challenging for social welfare workers on the ground, because they had to figure out, well, what does it mean to be an illegal alien, for example? Which was the language that they were using at the time. Who counts? And who doesn’t? And they didn’t actually have any great definitions on the ground. So there are lots of battles about who counts as undocumented and who doesn’t count as undocumented.

And part of that has to do with the language in the federal law that restricted benefits to either legal permanent residents or individuals who are called PRUCOL, Permanently Residing Under Color Of Law. But no one defined what PRUCOL was. And the entire intent of it was to make undocumented immigrants ineligible.

And so you get all these different definitions across various federal programs but also from state to state, about who actually counts as PRUCOL and who doesn’t count as PRUCOL. And therefore, who is undocumented for the purposes of the food stamp program, but not undocumented for the purposes of the Medicaid program? And then different states adopted different language about who was eligible for state benefits.

So even just the idea of, who counts as undocumented in this country? Who is meant to be barred by these laws? It took a long time for folks to try to start to sort that out.

And I’ll say, the other way in which labeling comes up a lot in my work is that undocumented immigrants are barred by virtually, every federal social welfare benefit. But they’re thought of and labeled as costly, and for state and local communities, unfair burdens.

And so a lot of the book is actually trying to understand if undocumented immigrants are actually barred by federal law from the vast majority of federal social welfare benefits. And if study after study after study shows that they contribute more in taxes than they consume in social welfare benefits, how does this idea of undocumented immigrants as costly and unfair burdens arise historically? Why is it so powerful?

And I’ll just say quickly that I actually think that the reason that stereotype comes about is because of federal restriction in the 1970s. I won’t go into the details of it, but I’m happy to talk about it further. But there’s this paradoxical consequence that when the federal government barred undocumented immigrants from all these federal social welfare benefits, this idea of undocumented immigrants as costly and unfair burdens actually followed in the wake of that, as a direct result of that federal change in policy.

LETI VOLPP: So I’m just thinking about just two examples, both connected to things the Trump administration has been doing. So one of them actually links to something Cybelle was saying about permanently residing under color of law, or we could think of temporarily residing under color of law. And the way in which JD Vance, I don’t know if you remember in his debate with Mike Waltz and then in subsequent lots of administration rhetoric, has tried to portray people who are here on temporary protected status or here on humanitarian parole as, quote unquote, “illegal.”

So it’s like this labeling, putting people from what a Biden administration perspective would be. These people have lawful presence. Even if they don’t have lawful status, they have lawful presence into another box.

The other thing I’m thinking of is the argument that’s being made by the Trump administration and litigation around the executive order, around birthright citizenship, which is that Wong Kim Ark’s parents were lawful permanent residents, which is a category that didn’t historically exist at that time.

So basically, if you remember, the executive order purports to deny birthright citizenship to anybody born to parents who are– if you have parents who are here on either temporary visas, so they’re what are called non-immigrants, they’re here on a H-1B visa, or student visa, or there’s tourists, and/or your parents are undocumented, you, according to this executive order, are no longer supposed to get birthright citizenship.

And there’s no relationship between those categories of legal status of person and the historical jurisprudence on this issue, which does exempt certain people from actually being able to access birthright citizenship, but it’s not on the basis of their legal status, it’s on the basis of whether they’re, quote unquote, “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States.

And there are three categories of people that, clearly, historically, were exempted– people who have diplomatic immunity, so you work for the embassy of such and such. This is why people don’t pay parking tickets when they work at the UN in New York City. They’re millions of dollars owed in parking tickets.

So you have diplomatic immunity. You are born to a hostile invading army. So one possible argument that certain people have floated is like, oh, undocumented immigrants are an invasion. But it’s clear that what is meant by a hostile invading army in the historical jurisprudence, including in the Wong Kim Ark case, is a situation where this invading army actually is in control of the government, which is not the situation at all that one would think of, there’s no context in the United States where people who are undocumented immigrants are actually in control of the US government.

And the third category is a historical category of people who were born to Native American tribal communities, where their sovereignty is recognized, which is why there was subsequent statutory citizenship granted for those persons.

And so the thread here is about obedience. Like, do you have to obey US law. That’s what is supposed to mean subject to the jurisdiction thereof. OK. So nonetheless, there’s this argument that Wong Kim Ark’s parents were lawful permanent residents, and so there’s a correlation with what the administration is trying to do.

And they’re described as residents in the case, but that doesn’t mean that they had the category of lawful permanent resident today, which includes the possibility of naturalizing as a US citizen. They couldn’t naturalize as US citizens because of racial restrictions on naturalization that began in 1882, with a specific provision within the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act against persons who were Chinese, and then was extended to lots of different groups of persons and were not lifted until the middle of the 20th century.

HIDETAKA HIROTA: Thank you. Thanks so much. This is really insightful. I was going to ask three questions in total, but I want to make sure we have time for questions for the end. So I’m going to skip the next one. I’m going to skip my third one, actually.

So yeah, it’s something about what we do as public intellectuals. So immigration, Asian-American history remain really important subjects today. But nevertheless, I think, those Asian-American immigration history are often told in a misleading ways, or simply misunderstood, or even distorted in the public discourse as we hear them.

So as a public intellectual, what are the things that you would like your nonspecialist audience to know about immigration or Asian-American history? What kinds of misunderstanding, or neglect, or distortion in public discourse on immigration Asian-American history would you like to correct? Put simply, as a scholar, what would you like to say in response to what’s going on in public discourse on subjects related to immigration or Asian-American history?

CATHERINE CENIZA CHOY: Well, there are so many things I’d like to say.

HIDETAKA HIROTA: Yes, I know.

CATHERINE CENIZA CHOY: But I will try to keep it succinct. I’ve been asked before, I’ve been in conversations before about, what is it about Asian-Americans? Is there no understanding about Asian-Americans in US history or contemporary American issues? And I’ve responded that it’s not that there isn’t a common understanding, but it’s often a misunderstanding. And there are multiple levels of this misunderstanding. I mean, the first is the perpetuation of the popular stereotype of the model minority that has multiple iterations, but some of the iteration is that Asian-Americans are honorary whites, they don’t complain, they’re quiet and submissive.

Partly related to this is another kind of discourse that I’ve been engaged with, where people will say, even in the most benign terms in conversation, that Asian-Americans just don’t really matter. When we’re talking about race and US history, they’re just not as important, and that’s not even meant to be hostile. But that is some of the discourse that is being shared with me.

And I think I’d like people to know that Asian-American history is such an integral part of American history, and that you can’t really know American history without knowing Asian-American history. I mean, one example that Leti has emphasized here has to do with the Wong Kim Ark case and its establishment of birthright citizenship, which is, in our discourse very much in the present day regarding immigration and the United States. So that’s just one example of that important precedent.

The Page Act is certainly another. And I’m glad that you’ve been doing so much work to change the public consciousness with all these events that you’ve organized about how important the Page Act has been for this precedent, for exclusion, based on not solely race, but that intersectionality, that race, gender, sexuality, class.

I mean, there are other things, things like, of course, 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, but the importance of the 1965 Immigration Act or the Hart-Celler act, how important that was to civil rights legislation? And what an impact that had on the Asian America we know today, which is such a large group? Part of it is highly educated. Part of it has to do also with the provisions and the infrastructure of the Immigration Act of 1965.

I think about the 1980 Refugee Act. How important Asian-American history, our US participation in the Vietnam war, the secret war in Laos? I mean, we are you’re also commemorating the 50th anniversary of the end of the Vietnam war, the fall of Saigon. And how it led to historically, one of the largest refugee resettlements of Southeast Asians in the United States? This is so important because it changed our country from an ad hoc policy regarding refugees to something more institutionalized.

So there’s so much more I could say, but I’m going to leave it at that.

HIDETAKA HIROTA: Perfect.

LETI VOLPP: So like Cathy, I also have a whole list of things, just quickly. I mean, I think something that’s interesting to think about are ways in which the government will frequently say, oh, we’re concerned about conduct, like behavior. That’s what we’re trying penalize. It’s not about your identity or your status, but I think it’s important for us to think about ways that these are fused.

So, for example, with the Page Act, it’s like lewd and immoral behavior makes you a prostitute, which is racialized as Chinese. Unlawful immigration renders you, quote unquote, “illegal,” which gets racialized as, quote unquote, “Mexican.” Criminal conduct turns into, you are a criminal, which is also racialized.

And we can see right now, what’s happened with people from Venezuela. And people are being subject to kidnapping and rendition, disappearing, either put into torture prison in El Salvador. Also, there’s reporting of one person who’s just completely disappeared, and nobody will say where he is.

Because they have a particular national origin, and that seems to be enough, possibly, there’s a tattoo they may have, absolutely no bearing with being put in this category of a gang member. There’s now all this documentation that there’s no relationship between having tattoos and being a member of the particular gang, the [INAUDIBLE], which they say they’re targeting. Anyway, so that’s something that I would like people to think about.

The fact that there was a statute of limitations, historically, on deportation, I think is amazing. You’d been here for a year, that’s long enough. You’ve set down roots. We’re not going to deport you. And then it was extended to five years. And then it was abolished.

But the fact that this existed once might suggest, maybe we can imagine it again. So I think it’s also fantastic to think historically about alternative realities that could possibly exist. The idea that, why don’t people just get in line in terms of getting legal status, thinking about trying to explain to people all the time, why there is no effective line?

For many, the idea that undocumented migration is this new phenomenon, this is something that particularly is surfacing around, again, birthright citizenship, where the presumption is that when the legislators who created the 14th Amendment said, all persons born in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are citizens, that they didn’t imagine that there were undocumented immigrants, and therefore, they could not have contemplated this. And therefore, this clause has no meaning for people who are born to undocumented immigrants.

But there’s wonderful research, Gerald Newman writing an early piece, and then more recently, Jack Chin and Paul Finkelman, that people who were trafficked here in violation of the federal laws regulating or prohibiting the slave trade and were, in fact, living in the United States in violation of federal law, were foreign born people who were illegally in the United States in 1868. And this is a historical analog to today’s parent who’s undocumented, who has a child in the United States. And that’s precisely who the framers were thinking of when they created the 14th Amendment. So that’s just a few of the things I think about.

So one myth that I think is especially pernicious is this myth of the bootstrapping white ethnic. I think a lot of white Americans, we like to tell ourselves that unlike today’s immigrants, our ancestors didn’t make much use of government services and came in lawfully. So in the run up to welfare reform, one congressperson said, quote, “My ancestors and most of our ancestors came to this country not with their hands out for welfare checks.” Or someone wrote in to a newspaper, “Our ancestors came here legally and didn’t place great demands on government services.” And national polls suggest, these attitudes are totally widespread.

And so my first book, Three Worlds of Relief, was really meant to interrogate that assumption, by comparing, again, the incorporation of Blacks, Mexicans, and European immigrants into the early American Social Welfare System.

And I was able to show that these groups were treated very differently by both the Progressive era and New Deal Social Welfare System. European immigrants were largely included within the boundaries of social citizenship, people who should be incorporated into the American welfare state. Black Americans were largely excluded. And Mexicans straddled the boundaries of social citizenship until relief officials forced them out, not only from the boundaries of social citizenship, but also from the nation.

And the book tries to show this by looking at a whole variety of different social welfare programs that were in existence during that period. But I’m going to focus in on one important piece of national legislation, which is the Social Security Act of 1935.

So the Social Security Act is really important because it essentially created the modern American Social Welfare System. It creates social insurance programs, like Social Security and unemployment insurance. And then it also created means tested public assistance programs for the elderly, for the blind, and for dependent children.

And the traditional way that scholars told the story about inclusion and exclusion in the Social Security Act along racial lines was that because of occupational restrictions that barred agricultural and domestic workers from Social Security and unemployment insurance, Black Americans were far less likely than white Americans to be covered by social insurance programs. And then they’re relegated to the more demeaning means tested public assistance programs, which had few federal standards or protections. And this is true. And it’s a very important part of the story.

But in my work, I show that those same occupational restrictions also barred the vast majority of Mexicans and Mexican-Americans, as well as Filipinos and Japanese residents from the more generous social insurance programs.

And the real winners here in terms of inclusion are not just whites, but foreign born whites in particular. So why is that? First, foreign born whites, especially Southern and Eastern European immigrants, were disproportionately represented in the occupations covered by social insurance, by Social Security.

Second, the Social Security Act contained no federal citizenship or even legal status exclusions. So both authorized and unauthorized immigrants had a federal right to Social Security and unemployment insurance. And this was true from 1935 all the way up into the 1970s, when I told you that the federal government first barred undocumented immigrants from virtually every social welfare program.

So to make sure that European immigrants understood this, that even if they had entered the country without authorization, that they were still going to be eligible for the Social Security Act. A prominent immigrant advocacy organization put out a newsletter during the Depression, assuring their readers that the applications forms for Social Security didn’t ask questions about citizenship, or when or in what manner a non-citizen entered the United States. And they also told noncitizens that they could file for benefits under their American names, decreasing the possibility that you could ever match Social Security files with immigration records.

And then to even prevent that possibility, Frances Perkins, who was the Secretary of Labor but in charge of the immigration service at the time, specifically instructed immigration field officers to quote, “refrain from requesting information from the Social Security board for immigration, naturalization, and other purposes.”

Not only that, European immigrants are not only more likely than native born whites to work in occupations covered by Social Security and then eligible, regardless of their citizenship or legal status, they’re also more likely than other groups to be nearing retirement when the program was first created. The age structure of the population of these European immigrants was such that almost half of foreign born whites were in their later working years by the time the first Social Security checks were issued. And this was not the case for any other group, including native born whites.

And the way they design the Social Security program is that workers who are nearing retirement needed to only work a few quarters to be eligible for Social Security for the rest of their lives. So consequently, these European immigrants contributed very little to the Social Security system, but then became eligible for this benefit their whole working lives. So instead of insurance for these retirees of European origin, Social Security was much more akin to welfare, but without the means test and without the stigma that often comes with it.

So I think this really reinforces that we have to be really wary of this romanticized notion of the bootstrapping white ethnic, who came to the United States the right way, who didn’t make use of the social welfare system that existed at the time. I think it’s very clear that the early American social welfare system was designed for all European immigrants, including those without authorization to be in the country. And that was never the case for Mexicans and for many Asian immigrants as well.

HIDETAKA HIROTA: Thank you. Does anybody want to respond to any comments? I have comment, but– [CHUCKLES]

CATHERINE CENIZA CHOY: Well, I would love to hear how you would answer that question, Hidetaka, because you’ve organized now multiple events regarding remembering the Page Act for organization of American historians, and the Immigration Ethnic Historical Society, and now, this. What’s on your mind about what you would like the public to know about Page Act?

HIDETAKA HIROTA: First of all, thank you.

[LAUGHTER]

 

Well, this is not necessarily about the Page Act itself, but I want to respond to some of the comments you three just said. So for example, Leti mentioned this statute of limitation to deportation. So if you’re in the United States for five years, for example, deportation would not apply to you, so your status here is guaranteed. That’s the policy that this country used to have, but that was abolished.

I think a few things that we need to know that existed in this country, because today, I think one of the things that I noticed is that some of those things are considered as if they were even unthinkable. So the statute of limitation is one thing. And then for example, 1950s and later, there was government’s policy for legalizing undocumented immigrants. And that was part of the US policy. But again, it seems like that’s not even thinkable at this point. So it’s not even considered a political option.

So when I speak to the public, I try to refer to this, just to let us know that these were the actual policies that existed here. It could be conceivable if there is a political will. And I have so many things to say about this myth that all the European immigrants came here legally. It’s a gross myth. And I’ve written some op-eds on this topic.

But let me tell you, everyone here, a lot of Europeans came to the United States through the Canadian borders, unlawfully. As of 1895, seven inspectors guarded the entire Canadian border, seven individuals. I mean, how could you guard the border with the team of seven people? So, I mean, there was no way to establish strong surveillance against unauthorized immigration.

And so we’re talking totally different periods between then and now when it comes to an authorized immigration. And even Ellis Island, if you have $30 in cash, you could be admitted, you could be considered a self-sufficient [INAUDIBLE] immigrant. But then if you’re an international student here, you know how much money you have to have in your bank accounts to get an F-1 visa, tens of $1,000, just to prove that you’re not going to be a public charges.

So again, I think, yeah, our ancestors came legally. Our ancestors were virtuous, law-abiders. I think that is one of the myths that I’ve always challenged in my own work.

Anyway, we have 20 minutes or so. And at this point, I would like to take questions from the audience. And yes, please raise your hand. And maybe you can identify yourself.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. I’m Yumi Kim. I’m in the History Department. I arrived just a few months ago. I’m a historian of Japan and Korea. I have actually so many questions, but I’ll just pick one. We usually do this thing where we’re like, I have two or three, but I’ll just do one.

Especially in thinking about what, is it Cybelle, you were saying about the Social Security Act and the various contingencies involved, it made me want to ask the question of– for you three or four, how much white supremacy is an explanatory factor for you when you’re thinking about the histories, and events, and peoples you’re looking at?

And I asked this question because this is feedback I get from students. It’s something I think about myself. There are always contingencies. And yet, the way white supremacy is often dehistoricized and seen as a transhistorical universal phenomenon, I’m often asked this question, or I ask myself the question too, is– does white supremacy have enough force as an explanatory factor? Or is it better to really insist on the various contingencies?

But when you insist on the contingencies, it often makes it seem like then white supremacy is not at play as much. And so I’m just wondering, how the concept or the ideas around white supremacy, if that is something you think, with and if it’s useful for you.

CATHERINE CENIZA CHOY: Yeah, that’s such a great question. So thank you for asking. I’ve been wanting to meet you, actually.

[LAUGHTER]

It’s great, you’re here. For me, the answer is both. I think it is important to take into account the historical racial formation of white supremacy. But I also think the contingencies are important. I’m just going to give one historical example.

When I write about the rise of the United States as a historical power through imperialism, including places like Hawaii and the annexation of Hawaii, the take over, as well as American colonialism in the Philippines, among other places, I also point out that it didn’t have to be that way, and that there was actually also an anti-imperialist movement here in the United States. And so it’s always, I think, more complicated than the factor of white racial supremacy.

On the other hand, it is also white racial supremacy. And we also have to take into account today, I mean, I think about, I’m so influenced by David Roediger’s book, Wages of Whiteness. And I think it really helps me understand not only the 19th, early 20th century, but also why there might be continuing anti-immigrant sentiment today, even among other immigrants.

It has to do with that psychological wage of whiteness, even when it’s going against your interests. Actually, solidarity, common class consciousness could be very empowering, but there is an attraction of white racial supremacy and those wages of whiteness. So that’s a concrete way, I hope, to address your question.

LETI VOLPP: Welcome to Berkeley. It’s such an interesting question. And I think I haven’t really thought about this consciously. I will say, I think everything I write is shaped by the presumption that racism is foundational to this historical and present day structure of US state and society. I don’t tend to say, it’s white supremacy, in my writing. And I think that’s something that I should think about.

I wonder if a corollary of this might be the ascendancy of anti-blackness as a theoretical lens through which many scholars are now writing. I’m thinking, for example, Claire Jean Kim, who famously wrote about what she called racial triangulation of whites, Blacks, and Asians, where there’s a field of racial positions.

And you can see that as incredibly exemplified in justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy versus Ferguson, where he says there is a race so different from our own, we will never allow them to become citizens, but they are allowed to ride in the White train car the way that brave soldiers, who fought for the Union, are not, who are African-American.

So you see simultaneously, white social supremacy, white civic belonging. In this earlier piece, she said, Black civic belonging but Black social subordination. Asian somewhat elevated social subordination but completely debased civic belonging. And then more recently, she said, I’m stepping away and think anti-blackness actually is foundational. And the civic belonging that I was thinking about earlier is actually less belonging in that people were also expelled from that.

And so anyway, so I feel like these are, I think, active questions that I need to struggle with. I would say that, I think, whenever we’re thinking about, just as people tend to periodize history around certain bodies, there’s a way in which certain historical experiences are correlated with certain racialized bodies, which needs to be opened up.

This is from the wonderful foundational, germinal, Omi and Winant, racial formations. So it’s like, Asians experienced exclusions. Native Americans experienced genocide and removal. Mexicans experienced conquest. African-Americans experienced racial slavery in Jim Crow. But it’s like then, you don’t think about ways in which those racial communities also experienced those other phenomenon as well. So, for example, how do we think about exclusion, like immigration exclusion, that they experienced as well?

CYBELLE FOX: Yeah. And I would say, white supremacy is central to the construction of the Social Security Act. I may have made it seem like it was all contingent. I think the only piece of that that was contingent was the grandfathering people in and the age structure of the population. But the people who crafted the Social Security Act had European immigrants in mind when they were designing the early modern American social welfare system.

The two key people in there were Harry Hopkins and Frances Perkins. And they both had long histories working as social workers in the Northeast and Midwest with immigrant populations. And Frances Perkins had even worked in a settlement house.

And so when they were imagining, who are we building this welfare state for? Who are we building Social Security for? They were imagining the immigrants that they had been working with for a long period of time, the White immigrants from Europe that they’d been working with for a long time. And they knew exactly who would be included and excluded from the more generous social insurance provisions of the act.

The act was drafted by the Committee on Economic Security. And so going through their records, you can actually see that they estimated, what proportion of each population, including foreign born whites versus native born whites versus African-Americans, who’s going to be included and who’s going to be excluded from this policy that we’re designing right now? So in crafting it, they had full knowledge of what they were doing. And the goal was about protecting the White worker, including the foreign born white worker in particular. That was why Social Security was even necessary.

And it wasn’t an accident that there were no citizenship or legal status restrictions in the act, either. The principal alternative to the Social Security Act being debated at the time barred all noncitizens. Anti-immigrant sentiment was incredibly high.

The first public opinion polls that were fielded nationally were fielded during the Great Depression. And they asked multiple times whether noncitizens should have access to relief, or if those who used relief should be expelled from the country. And the vast majority of Americans did not think they should have access to these programs.

So against that, the people who are, again, crafting the Social Security Act are very consciously trying to make sure that this population not only will be covered by this legislation but then won’t be excluded by citizenship or legal status restrictions. So white supremacy is foundational to– who’s included? And who’s excluded? Who’s imagined as deserving of this new welfare system that’s being born and who’s not?

HIDETAKA HIROTA: Thank you.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. My name is Helen. I’m a junior undergraduate here. So I had a question going back to the change in the social welfare system that you talked about in 1971. So considering who was on the Supreme Court and the rise of neoliberalism in that era, to what extent do you think neoliberalism may have played a role in restricting access to the social welfare system?

CYBELLE FOX: I think most people date the rise of neoliberalism to the late 1970s and not the early 1970s, when these restrictions in federal policy are formed, so more important than something we might call neoliberalism. I would say, actually, anti-blackness in particular is really foundational for why we start to see the rise of legal status restrictions. It comes at a moment when there’s a racial backlash against the Civil Rights Movement and against the rising welfare roles.

And the main targets of that racial backlash are Black Americans. Many of them assumed to be recent migrants to California or the Northeast and Midwest from the South, so not international migrants, but domestic migrants. As well as in New York City, they were also thinking about Puerto Ricans from the island. And there was this huge backlash against this group and this perception that they were migrating to these parts of the country that had higher welfare benefit levels and that they were placing an undue burden on the social welfare system.

And so there’s this huge effort in the early 1970s that state and local officials are engaged in, in trying to reduce the size of the welfare rolls. And in part, again, the main target are Black Americans and maybe Puerto Ricans from the island, but the Supreme Court passes a decision, Shapiro v Thompson, that prevents them from barring people from access to benefits if they hadn’t been in the state for a certain amount of time, so these residence restrictions.

So state and local officials are desperately looking for, well, who can we bar from assistance? And so in the process of trying to figure out– what can we do? What is legal? What is in our control? They start to think about international migrants instead of domestic migrants.

And at that same moment, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, their union, they want to get more resources for immigration enforcement. And so they start to construct undocumented immigrants in particular as welfare-dependent.

And so there’s this convergence of state officials desperately looking to reduce the welfare roles, primarily motivated by anti-blackness. Immigration officials often rank and file who are desperately looking for more resources for immigration enforcement, who both construct this stereotype of undocumented immigrants as welfare dependent. And then state officials end up barring state. And then federal officials end up barring undocumented immigrants from these programs. So it’s much more, I would say, is race matters at this early moment much more.

HIDETAKA HIROTA: I think we have five minutes. So we take multiple questions and then let the appellants respond.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. Hi. My name is Nancy Cott. I’m a historian too. I want to get back to the Page Act. And I would certainly applaud making the common knowledge as to when Chinese Exclusion anyway, if not all Asian, began. But I wanted to ask you all to perhaps, comment on, how come something even earlier didn’t come up in any of your comments, which I see as even more or equally foundational to treatment of Asians in America, which is the exclusion of anyone who was not either white or a descendent of Africa from the change in the Naturalization Law that was passed in 1870?

And actually, Harlan’s opinion, which you just referred to, makes reference to it, that Sumner’s idea was to just say, anyone can be naturalized. And the Californians, I think it was, or the Californians and the Coloradans said, no, we don’t want Asians ever to be able to be naturalized. And when was that overboard in the Hart-Celler Act?

LETI VOLPP: 43, right?

CATHERINE CENIZA CHOY: 52.

HIDETAKA HIROTA: 52 for all Asians.

CATHERINE CENIZA CHOY: For all groups.

HIDETAKA HIROTA: For Chinese, 43.

LETI VOLPP: 43 Chinese. 46, I think, Filipinos and Indians.

CATHERINE CENIZA CHOY: Asian and Indians.

LETI VOLPP: People from Guam, 50. And then everybody, 52.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: So I was struck that you mentioned that. So maybe just–

HIDETAKA HIROTA: We can take a few more. Yeah.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Lila. I’m an undergrad. I probably don’t need a microphone, I’m loud. But anyway–

CREW: It is recording.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: OK. What impact did the Page act have on the creation of the border patrol, the US-Mexico border? That’s what I’m curious about.

HIDETAKA HIROTA: One more? Yes.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: All right. My name is Judy. I’m a former US history teacher. So I also like going back to the Page Act, because I’m wondering, we haven’t really specifically referenced reconstruction. And we’ve referenced the 14th Amendment. And I really love the fact that you brought up the anti-racialization of the movement against Black people in America really came from the 1860s and ’70s, when there was pushback against reconstruction. And so I just would like to know, in the context of reconstruction and the election of 1876, how the Page Act of 1875 may have been pushed?

HIDETAKA HIROTA: Anybody wants to respond? I can try, as a historian, 19th century US historian here. Broad answers. I’m going to give a really broad answer here.

So the Page Act should be really understood as part of the US government’s attempt to establish control over, essentially, membership, the who’s in? Who’s out? And the 14th Amendment, 15th Amendment, those were really created as the efforts to integrate the African-Americans or formerly enslaved people into the American polity.

But then Page Act is a forerunner of the later Chinese Exclusion. And I think it’s not an Exclusion Act, it’s only exclusion. But again, they think that purpose is essentially the same, that is, the federal government creates control over, who’s in? Who’s out? In other words, it’s a control over membership. So I think that’s the context. That’s how Page Act fits into the broader reconstruction politics.

And the Page Act itself doesn’t really affect the Mexican border. But again, I think Page Act still is important because it paved the way toward Chinese Restriction Act and then later, Chinese exclusion laws essentially encouraged Chinese to go to Mexico and Canada first. And then as a result, the United States responded by militarizing US-Canada borders first and then US-Mexico borders later. So the Page Act itself might not heavily influence US-Mexico border control, but again, I think we need to understand this as part of a longer process.

And again, the naturalization was incredibly important because the 1870 act is really the boundary. Who’s in? Who’s out? And exactly, Charles Sumner, former abolitionist from Massachusetts, said that, why don’t we make naturalization colorblind? But then the California politicians, realizing that that’s going to make Asiatic Americans, and we don’t want that. And thankfully, from my perspective, towards the end of the 19th century, birthright citizenship was guaranteed for people of Chinese descent, as a result of Wong Kim Ark. But again, as we responded, the naturalization was not permitted for Asians as late as 1940s and 1950s.

But again, I think the Citizenship Act, Naturalization Act of 1870 was again part of this broader reconstruction package that was designed to reestablish the federal control over territorial sovereignty and membership. Any response?

CATHERINE CENIZA CHOY: Yeah. Well, I’ll respond to Nancy’s question. I mean, I think citizenship is such an important theme in Asian-American history. I do see, just from my standpoint, the Page Act being more about entry and migration, the exclusion of it, who’s included?

It is in the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act about the ineligibility of Chinese to become citizens. And I have no doubt there’s an intersection here. But I think that was just my emphasis when I was presenting about the Page Act and when I’ve talked about it in scholarship. They absolutely go hand in hand.

Again, I think with the issue regarding Border Patrol, this is about federal statutes now as opposed to local regional ones. And so the idea of immigration being connected historically at this point to US national sovereignty, and with it, enforcement, even though I don’t think it’s necessarily always directly connected to US-Mexico border patrol, I do see there’s a connection there regarding systematic enforcement.

LETI VOLPP: I’ll just add that we could think of the citizen is correlated with the idea of freedom at this moment. And that you can see in the Page Act, the Chinese male worker a.k.a. “The Coolie” and the Chinese female a.k.a. the prostitute are correlated with both ideas of unfreedom. So there’s definitely a lot of scholarship on thinking about ways in which the recently emancipated Black Americans from slavery or enslavement, ways in which Chinese immigrants were positioned in relationship negatively to this recently emancipated population in terms of, we don’t want another phenomenon like that.

CYBELLE FOX: And I’ll just add that racial bars to naturalization certainly mattered in the early American social welfare system, not in the federal welfare state that was created and survived the Great Depression, but the WPA program initially had no citizenship or legal status restrictions but adopted them in the course of the program. The entire program was done by 1942, but obviously, individuals ineligible to naturalize were therefore, completely barred from access to the WPA. I think that’s part of the history that we need to explore more in terms of its effect on Asian populations.

But also old age assistance, even though the federal government had no citizenship or legal status restrictions, it allowed states to adopt citizenship restrictions if it wanted to. Basically, they thought the Social Security nativism was so high, the Social Security Act would not pass without some sort of option to restrict. And so many states barred noncitizens from old age assistance early on.

And the states that kept those restrictions in place the longest were states that had large Mexican or Asian populations. And of course, whereas in theory, Mexicans could naturalize to be able to get access to old age assistance when those laws were in place that barred naturalization for different Asian groups, then there was no option to naturalize, and so then complete exclusion from those programs.

HIDETAKA HIROTA: One last thing before we close, I forgot, I want to say this. The Page Act really established that the traveling single women will be seen as potential prostitutes. So in other words, the Page Act really established the family as a normative group. And eventually, anti-prostitution provisions were incorporated into immigration law. And Mexican women coming through the Mexican border, for example, were subjected to this skepticism. If, I mean, Mexican women without husbands were traveling, they would be seen with suspicions. And then they could be excluded as prostitutes. So I think there is very important implications of the Page Act for later laws and beyond Asian-Americans.

Anyway, with my own remark–

[LAUGHTER]

–I would like to close this event. Thank you for joining us today.

CATHERINE CENIZA CHOY: Thank you.

[APPLAUSE]

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